4
DoD Long-Term Manufacturing Institutes’ Strategy: Business Model Options and Implications
The business model options and implications that follow were developed by the study committee to span the range of alternative strategies for the Department of Defense (DoD) to consider in developing its long-term engagement with existing and potential future institutes. These options and implications were developed in closed session during the 2.5 days immediately following the study workshop while the inputs from all relevant sources were fresh in the committee’s thoughts.
The committee observed two distinct DoD modes of engagement with the institutes: (1) as coinvestor with industry in creating an ecosystem that will lead to dual-use U.S. supply chains in an emerging technology sector and (2) as a customer for DoD projects that tap capabilities in these sectors to meet defense needs. The first engagement mode, also referred to as DoD core funding, has been dominant to date. However, from the outset DoD core funding was planned to ramp down after 5-7 years.
With these two modes of engagement in mind, the committee developed the following five business model options for evaluation:
- Option A: Current model with planned reduction in DoD support for core activities.
- Option B: Current model with improvements to processes, offerings, and value-based core funding.
- Option C: Transition to DoD customer model.
- Option D: Transfer core responsibilities to the National Program Office (NPO) at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
- Option E: No core funding of institutes beyond initial investment.
OPTION A: CURRENT MODEL WITH PLANNED REDUCTION IN DOD SUPPORT FOR CORE ACTIVITIES
The current model was used to establish and operate the DoD institutes as public–private partnerships, with an emphasis on core activities (including funds for unencumbered industry-driven institute research and development [R&D] projects) for the first 5-7 years. Core funding is provided by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Manufacturing Technology (ManTech) program office, each institute’s membership dues, state funding, and in-kind cost share from members. As shown in Appendix B, 14 of the 20 generic institute offerings currently use non-project core funding (although some could transition to funding as discrete projects).
The OSD ManTech budget1 for the eight institutes is projected to decline from $92 million in fiscal year (FY) 2019 to $37 million by FY2023. Although DoD adjusts budgets annually, this expected funding constraint would necessitate a reduction in core activities supported by OSD, with available funding going to the highest-priority core offerings as determined by DoD. The current model also assumes that unencumbered joint public–private partnership funding for industry-driven R&D projects as part of core will likely come to an end due to budget constraints.
Executing Option A is based on renewed or extended cooperative agreements or technology investment agreements with each institute as their current agreements expire. It anticipates that OSD oversight of the DoD institutes will continue to reside in the ManTech office under the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (OUSD(R&E)). It also assumes that contracting and government program management via Contracting Officers’ Technical Representatives would continue to be provided by the current Army, Air Force, and Navy contracting offices.
Under Option A, institutes will need to find other sources of funding to maintain core activities and cover overhead and administrative expenses. Long-term funding for customer-defined project offerings could come from DoD, other federal stakeholders, industry, and foreign sources, but few or none are expected to provide core funding beyond their current membership dues. Financial anorexia will slowly make it more difficult for institutes to decline alluring international offers of funding. Foreign interest in the DoD institutes exists now and will steadily increase as they mature their respective technologies.
A summary of the implications for DoD goals is provided in Table 4.1.
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1 Julie Locker, JDMTP Chair, 2018 Defense Manufacturing Conference, presentation on December 3, 2018.
TABLE 4.1 Impact of Option A: Current Model with Planned Reduction in DoD Support for Core Activities
DoD Goal | Implications |
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NOTE: DoD, Department of Defense; EWD, education and workforce development; MRL, manufacturing readiness level; R&D, research and development; TRL, technology readiness level.
OPTION B: CURRENT MODEL WITH IMPROVEMENTS TO PROCESSES, OFFERINGS, AND VALUE-BASED CORE FUNDING
This option is structured to build on Option A, applying the potential improvements obtained as inputs from the stakeholder groups to the maximum extent possible within budget constraints. Option B assumes that DoD will formally review the performance of each institute as part of the decision to extend or renew agreements and that it will fund continued support of core activities at a level commensurate with the value to DoD (which may or may not be higher than Option A depending on results of the reviews).
Appendixes C and D contain summaries of the potential improvements, listing key activities that DoD and the institutes would consider “keep doing,” “start doing,” and “stop doing.” Many of these improvements will require no or low additional cost to implement, yet will improve outcomes and also save time and money. Option B further assumes that DoD will work with the institutes to prioritize improvements that yield the best value, starting with those that improve the high-value offerings discussed in Chapter 2.
Given the dual-use nature of the technologies involved, and the importance to commercial industry of the core activities, Option B also assumes that core cost share from non-DoD sources will continue.
The improved core processes and communication mechanisms of Option B will give DoD a better basis for assessing the long-term value of a continued public–private partnership for co-investment and for defending the DoD core budget accordingly. Appendix D identifies several potential communication mechanism improvements to be considered for DoD Strategic Goal 4, “Maximize Stakeholder Understanding of the Institutes.” The budget level will be set by DoD, but even if it remains at the level expected by Option A, the implementation of improvements and continuation of core funding for high-priority offerings will be more beneficial to DoD goals than will Option A. A summary of the implications for DoD goals is provided in Table 4.2.
OPTION C: TRANSITION TO DOD CUSTOMER MODEL
Option C transitions from the current focus on core activities to a new focus on projects driven by DoD needs and sponsored by DoD customers outside of the OSD ManTech office. The committee believes there is a clear opportunity to better
TABLE 4.2 Impact of Option B: Current Model with Improvements to Processes, Offerings, and ValueBased Core Funding
DoD Goal | Implications |
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NOTE: DoD, Department of Defense; R&D, research and development.
connect the DoD Manufacturing USA institutes to the service ManTech programs, the broader science and technology (S&T) community, and the DoD acquisition and sustainment (A&S) communities in order to expand the impact of the DoD Manufacturing USA institutes for DoD.
The vision for Option C is that the DoD Manufacturing USA institutes move beyond the initial start-up phase to assume a prominent role in advanced manufacturing technology maturation for DoD. Table 4.3 shows how Option C differs from Options A and B in the actions needed by DoD and the institutes to connect with technology development activities at the front end of the TRL/MRL 4-7 window, and with technology implementation activities at the back end of the window. Under this option, the institutes would grow their program portfolios to provide customer-relevant offerings of expertise and (where applicable) equipment and facilities as a technology resource to the broad DoD community. Institutes would also offer relevant education and workforce development (EWD) project support to meet DoD needs, such as those identified in a recent U.S. Government Accountability Office report2 to maintain depot workforce skills. Institutes that succeed in offering solutions and capturing project-based direct support from DoD customer communities would both serve the business interests of their members and increase the number of projects that can absorb a share of the infrastructure costs of the institutes. In Option C, DoD customer-focused projects would tailor cost-share requirements (mandatory or optional) based on project objectives. For example, projects with high commercial potential might mandate industry cost share, while those unique to military applications might not. As noted in Chapter 2, during the workshop breakout II exercise, “Keep Doing, Stop Doing, Start Doing,” some members of the DoD stakeholder group proposed to “eliminate [the] cost-share requirement.”
Option C entails a shift from the DoD sponsor model in the start-up phase of the DoD Manufacturing USA institutes to a DoD customer model in the long-term engagement phase. The committee recognizes that this shift requires effort to build the connections necessary to generate customer project funding. A 3-year transition period is recommended by the study committee for this option. In this period, OSD ManTech can ascertain the most effective approach to retain important core functions, such as EWD and technology roadmapping. Option C gives the OSD ManTech office a greatly expanded role to facilitate institute connections to DoD customers, understanding of needs, and program development. This option assumes OSD will arrange assistance with S&T and ManTech organizations and build interfaces with OSD and service A&S organizations to facilitate the necessary customer connections.
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2 U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2018, DOD Depot Workforce: Services Need to Assess the Effectiveness of Their Initiatives to Maintain Critical Skills, GAO-19-51, December, Washington, DC.
To meet DoD customer needs for speed of prototyping and smooth transition to production, this option also assumes that DoD will establish an Other Transaction Authority (OTA) interface with the institutes, either individually or through some networked mechanism.
Finally, Option C expects that an institute’s portfolio of core activities and projects will continue to include non-DoD sponsored activities supported by other federal or state organizations as well as commercial industry to contribute to the original dual-use mission of the DoD Manufacturing USA institutes.
Option C represents a substantial shift in engagement model and focus compared to Options A and B. Its primary focus is on increasing DoD customer-driven projects that deliver impactful R&D, implementation, and associated workforce development to meet DoD needs. Given the dual-use nature of the institutes’ technology areas, many of these projects will spin in commercial technologies or spin out commercial benefits so Option C engagement with the institute membership and capabilities will continue to help meet DoD goals. Under Option C, continued DoD support for core activities is possible where they add value, but secondary. A summary of the Option C impact on DoD goals is provided in Table 4.4.
TABLE 4.3 Option C as a Pathway to DoD Customer Communities
Option | Addressable DoD Markets | DoD Actions | Institute Actions |
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OSD ManTech | Support fewer core activities | Become more selfsustaining |
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OSD ManTech | Same as A, with improvements in core processes and network | Same as A, with improvements in core processes and network |
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Service ManTech S&T
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Facilitate through JDMTP Facilitate connections
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Understand ManTech needs Compete for S&T projects
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NOTE: DoD, Department of Defense; JDMTP, Joint Defense Manufacturing Technology Panel; MRL, manufacturing readiness level; OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense; OTA, Other Transaction Authority; R&D, research and development; S&T, science and technology; TRL, technology readiness level.
TABLE 4.4 Impact of Option C: Transition to DoD Customer Model
DoD Goal | Implications |
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NOTE: DoD, Department of Defense; MRL, manufacturing readiness level; OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense; OTA, Other Transaction Authority; R&D, research and development; TRL, technology readiness level.
OPTION D: TRANSFER CORE RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE NATIONAL PROGRAM OFFICE AT NIST
This option would phase out DoD core funding for the institutes after 5-7 years (as originally planned) and transfer responsibility to the NIST Advanced Manufacturing NPO (AMNPO) for all functions except DoD sponsorship of mission-related R&D projects. The rationale is that continued support of development of an ecosystem to benefit economic growth and global competitiveness is not a primary defense mission once the start-up phase is completed. Under the Revitalize American Manufacturing and Innovation (RAMI) (industrial) Act of 2014,3 Congress specified eight purposes for the National Network for Manufacturing Innovation program, all related to economic growth and competitiveness. RAMI established the AMNPO at NIST to act as a convener of the network of Manufacturing USA institutes and to oversee planning, management, and coordination of the program. Option D would depend on congressional action to authorize and appropriate funds for the NPO to support the federal share of core activities at the
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3 Title VII of Division B of Public Law 113-235.
DoD Manufacturing USA institutes (including former DoD Manufacturing USA institutes) and to replace current DoD cooperative agreements with new contractual agreements for this purpose. DoD sponsorship of R&D projects would be contracted directly with the DoD Manufacturing USA institutes, using OTAs or other appropriate contracting mechanisms. Since the federal interface would shift from DoD to NIST, connection to DoD project sponsors would receive less help than Options A or B, and much less than Option C.
Option D may seem attractive to some in DoD as a way to free up defense resources, but it is far riskier for DoD goals than Options A, B, or C. If Congress does not support NIST taking on the role of core funding, the viability of the institutes is doubtful. If core funding is provided through NIST, DoD influence on the core agenda will no longer exist and the connection to DoD needs will be unworkably distant. A summary of the Option D impact on DoD goals is provided in Table 4.5.
OPTION E: NO CORE FUNDING OF INSTITUTES BEYOND INITIAL INVESTMENT
This option would eliminate DoD core funding for the institutes after 5-7 years (as originally planned), but, unlike Options A and B, Option E would ramp it down to zero. This is consistent with the original plan. It is anticipated that not all institutes, if any, will survive this model. The rationale is that those institutes that provide dual-use value to DoD would also have commercial value on a scale large enough to keep the institute afloat. The option assumes that to meet the core funding needs of the institutes, commercial investments would replace the DoD investment. DoD could continue to sponsor projects and take advantage of the commercial investment in
TABLE 4.5 Impact of Option D: Transfer Core Responsibilities to the National Program Office at NIST
DoD Goal | Implications |
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Loss of DoD influence on institute agendas. Shift in emphasis from dual use to commercial impact. DoD projects less likely. |
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Unsustainable if Congress does not fund. Consequence would be loss of sources for DoD projects and reduced likelihood of dualuse U.S. supply chains in areas of DoD interest. |
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Optimized for commercial impact, not DoD (except projects). |
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Serious loss of connection with DoD customers. |
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Focused on commercial workforce, not defense industry or depots. |
NOTE: DoD, Department of Defense; NIST, National Institute of Standards and Technology; R&D, research and development.
institute facilities and expertise, but customers would have to contract with individual institutes or directly with their members. Since Option E would no longer have OSD ManTech as a network manager and DoD interface facilitator, a likely result would be incoherence in DoD understanding of institute capabilities and institute understanding of DoD needs. Where institutes manage on their own to connect with DoD customers, engagement would entail multiple contractual vehicles and engagement interfaces. The risks associated with this model include a breakdown of the institute network; potential foreign engagement and influence of the institute; lack of participation and outreach to small and medium-size enterprises; and loss of some critical—if not all of the—institutes.
Like Option D, Option E might seem attractive to those in DoD who want to free up resources, but it is the highest-risk option in terms of impact on DoD goals. Option E is essentially abandoning the federal role in the public–private partnership at a time when development of the ecosystem for dual-use supply chains is far from complete, despite initial optimism that 5-7 years of DoD investing would be sufficient. A summary of the Option E impact on DoD goals is provided in Table 4.6.
Let the experiment reach its conclusion per the preliminary design. It’s time for the government to be a customer of the institutes, not an investor.
—DoD stakeholder interview
TABLE 4.6 Impact of Option E: No Core Funding of Institutes Beyond Initial Investment on DoD Goals
DoD Goal | Implications |
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NOTE: DoD, Department of Defense; R&D, research and development.