National Academies Press: OpenBook

Report 4 on Tracking and Assessing Governance and Management Reform in the Nuclear Security Enterprise (2020)

Chapter: 3 Sustainment of the Enterprise's Core Science and Engineering Capabilities

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Suggested Citation:"3 Sustainment of the Enterprise's Core Science and Engineering Capabilities." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, and National Academy of Public Administration. 2020. Report 4 on Tracking and Assessing Governance and Management Reform in the Nuclear Security Enterprise. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/25730.
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3

Sustainment of the Enterprise’s Core Science and Engineering Capabilities

A strong foundation of wide-ranging science and engineering research is essential to fulfilling the nuclear security mission, because the technical challenges of stockpile stewardship, and of nuclear security more generally, require deep and authoritative understanding of many areas of science and engineering. This foundational research maintains core competencies and builds new capabilities, enabling the nuclear security enterprise to overcome technical challenges that are otherwise intractable, along with providing scientific understanding of potential technological surprises that could threaten our national security. Carrying out this foundational research is also consistent with the laboratories’ responsibilities as federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs), as defined in federal law (48CFR 35.017): FFRDCs must have access to government data, facilities, and people beyond a typical contractual relationship; operate under a long-term relationship with the sponsoring agency to attract high-quality staff; maintain currency in their fields of expertise; preserve familiarity with the needs of their sponsoring agency; and meet the agency’s special long-term research and development needs.

The past 2 years have seen a rapid increase in workload across the nuclear security enterprise, especially in connection with life-extension programs and the development of plutonium pit production capabilities. The panel felt it was important to check whether these highly visible activities, with their ambitious timelines, are having undesirable effects on the ability of the nuclear security enterprise to carry out the long-term research that sustains and builds the more generic science and engineering (S&E) capabilities needed by the enterprise. That long-term research is not normally tied to a specific near-term deliverable, but strong S&E capabilities create new options for addressing near-term deliverables while also providing tools that will be important to the enterprise further in the future.

Through site visits in 2019 to the three National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) laboratories, panel members participated in free-ranging and frank discussions with over 90 researchers at varying levels of seniority, with the goal of assessing how well the core S&E capabilities are being sustained. Those interactions overall showed that research to support those core capabilities continues to receive attention and priority, and that the laboratories’ scientists and engineers continue to produce valuable work. However, a primary observation arising from these visits is that near-term demands and some administrative issues are stressing this work by severely limiting the time that researchers can devote to deep and sustained creative thinking. Moreover, top research leadership at the three laboratories did not seem to fully recognize the amount of stress felt by those researchers. Accordingly, the panel arrived at the following key findings:

Suggested Citation:"3 Sustainment of the Enterprise's Core Science and Engineering Capabilities." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, and National Academy of Public Administration. 2020. Report 4 on Tracking and Assessing Governance and Management Reform in the Nuclear Security Enterprise. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/25730.
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  • People are the essential resource, and they are under stress.
  • The infrastructure needs attention and is essential to enable continued excellence in S&E.
  • Bureaucracy is overly burdensome to the staff.
  • M&O leaders do not seem fully aware of staff concerns.

The panel’s observations are discussed in the rest of this section.

THE NNSA LABORATORIES MUST SUPPORT BOTH MISSION WORK AND S&E CAPABILITIES

Laboratory scientists and engineers with whom the panel interacted value the fact that they are able to work as members of a team to solve mission-related problems. They take satisfaction in working to support an important mission while also partnering with very smart and accomplished colleagues. Those attributes of the laboratories are critical for recruiting and retention of top talent, especially in highly competitive fields. (While all of the laboratories are aware of significant competition from industry in some areas of research, they feel they can still attract and retain top talent, although with notable challenges in hot skill areas such as computer science, computer engineering, and data analytics.) Staff appear to take seriously the need to balance science advancement and mission deliverables. Sustaining an S&E capability for future circumstances and decisions is an essential part of the mission. If the S&E foundations are neglected or deemphasized, the overall mission will suffer.

A persistent challenge is the level of resources available for such research, which is generally not supported by the life-extension programs or other product-oriented funds. Support for the people who sustain the laboratories’ core S&E capabilities is strongly dependent on a separate line of Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) funds, supplemented by smaller sources such as competitive awards from the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Science. One area that is currently well-funded is advanced computing, which receives great support from the NNSA Office of Defense Programs (NA-10), the Office of Science, and the DOE Secretary’s exascale computing initiative. In addition, support for core capabilities—for example, additive manufacturing, the dynamic mesoscale material science capability, and enhanced capability for subcritical experiments, along with funding associated the National Ignition Facility, Sandia’s Z machine, and other experimental facilities—includes funds not only for facility operations but also for the core science programs associated with the facilities. Nevertheless, research staff at all sites visited voiced concern that as overall laboratory budgets are growing, funding to support core S&E capabilities is not growing proportionately. At one lab, some staff members expressed a concern of increasingly becoming a services organization rather than a research and development (R&D) lab. Some researchers are troubled by the fact that they are expected to find support for their own research, even when they are still very junior. All research staff with whom the panel interacted did, however, value the combination of mission work and science found at the labs.

Staff generally viewed the allocation of LDRD as strategically planned and executed. Some expressed concern regarding operational aspects of the program such as timely notification of proposal decisions. Some also expressed concern that getting the time and attention of mission leaders in order to incorporate LDRD results into life-extension programs (LEPs) or other weapon-specific work was very difficult owing to the pressure of timelines. This time pressure inhibits efforts to develop new technologies that could bring potential improvements. The panel encourages NNSA to remain mindful of these operational concerns as well as the necessity of keeping LDRD support in balance with the growing mission.

Based on the site visits, the panel urges NNSA and the laboratories to do more to convey strongly and clearly their commitment to support both the core S&E capabilities as well as work directly targeting specific weapons and other nearer-term goals.

Suggested Citation:"3 Sustainment of the Enterprise's Core Science and Engineering Capabilities." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, and National Academy of Public Administration. 2020. Report 4 on Tracking and Assessing Governance and Management Reform in the Nuclear Security Enterprise. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/25730.
×

PEOPLE WORKING ON CORE S&E CAPABILITIES ARE STRESSED

In general, the morale at the labs has made significant steps in recovering from what was generally perceived as a poor state 5 to 10 years ago. However, staff with whom the panel interacted at all the labs expressed feelings of stress and of having very little time to think or take on new work. They attributed this to the pressures of program work, with ambitious timelines—the effect of which cascades throughout the labs, even to those working on core capabilities—along with the considerable inefficiencies of overly burdensome administrative processes. Adding to this stress, all three laboratories are actively hiring additional scientists, and current staff are responsible for mentoring and rapidly integrating the new hires, which takes conscientious thought and considerable time.

While workers in many walks of life feel overworked, this feeling was expressed by almost everyone with whom the panel met, who described it as something new. In most cases, this was described as their worst problem. Science and engineering research is a very creative process, one that requires adequate time to develop fresh and deep understanding, and to uncover innovative ideas. An environment in which time is overly constrained can limit the quality of all work, particularly the creative work that sustains core S&E capabilities.

Many parts of the labs exhibit a great S&E environment, including strong teamwork among leaders, which provides critical support for the S&E staff. Still, a variety of other specific concerns were raised by S&E staff. At two of the labs, researchers expressed frustration that it takes some 5 years to be recognized and accepted as a fully capable staff member. At all three labs, staff were concerned that new hires are rarely brought on board early enough to overlap with the experienced staff member with special expertise that they are to replace. This inhibits the retiring person’s experience and unwritten knowledge from being effectively passed on.

Senior and mid-career staff described spending considerable time writing proposals and selling their programs. The shortage of administrative assistance to help with the burdensome bureaucracy was also cited as a problem. Some researchers described spending up to 20 percent of their time doing tasks that could be more effectively accomplished with much less expensive administrative staff help.

Staff at all three labs said there was virtually no new-hire orientation beyond compliance training and paperwork. For example, most had not received background about their laboratory’s heritage and accomplishments in essential service to the nation. Mentoring is important, but it is not uniform—some staffers with whom the panel interacted had received great mentoring and some none at all. Continuing education program offerings are not consistent across the labs, with some programs benefiting from the university partners involved in the laboratory’s management, while others are focused on tactical training. It is important for all three laboratories to have effective programs to support their rapidly changing research workforce, such as mentoring programs available to all; on-boarding programs that convey the mission, ethos, and history of the laboratory; and career-enhancing continuing education programs.

Although two of the three laboratories have gone through contract transitions in recent years, the stresses and concerns brought to the panel’s attention may not all be attributed to those disruptions.

INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDS ATTENTION

Infrastructure (facilities, equipment, etc.) at all three labs is inadequate and in various states of disrepair. At one laboratory, the staff felt optimistic about infrastructure improvement because the lab had plans in place and had shared them. At the other two labs, there was not the same optimism. One lab is undergoing “densification” owing to its rapid hiring and insufficient office space—requiring many researchers to share offices. Some staff described frustration about the multiple years needed to get a new science lab operational. Staff stated that it is challenging to maintain facilities and major equipment that are not supported by an LEP; there is no funded program to support the technical base facilities that broadly serve multiple weapons systems.

Suggested Citation:"3 Sustainment of the Enterprise's Core Science and Engineering Capabilities." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, and National Academy of Public Administration. 2020. Report 4 on Tracking and Assessing Governance and Management Reform in the Nuclear Security Enterprise. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/25730.
×

Staff at all three laboratories would benefit from better communication about plans for infrastructure revitalization and strategies for facility sizing for the current and projected workforces. The labs also need to assess the balance of their workforces to ensure adequate and effective administrative support while not unduly increasing the overhead burden.

SOME PROCESSES ARE OVERLY BURDENSOME

The S&E staff feels that too many of their laboratories’ administrative processes are burdensome, rather than working (as intended) to facilitate the conduct of the mission. Staff lamented that too many of the current systems and processes do not increase effectiveness or provide helpful structure. For example, the current implementation of Earned Value Management for nuclear weapons projects (the use of which is mandated by NNSA) was described as “consuming” the Product Realization Teams with little to no value observed. There was, however, staff enthusiasm for safety staff when they are observed transitioning from the mindset of “you can’t do what you need to do” to “let’s find a safe way for you to do what you need to do.” That attitude shift is a welcome one from what had been seen as a risk-averse culture.

While some burdensome practices have been identified by NNSA and the laboratories, more needs to be done to methodically surveil for inefficiencies and mitigate them. Laboratory staff often cannot discern whether any particular administrative burden is “home-grown” or driven by outside requirements, so NNSA and laboratory leadership must proactively address this so as to reduce stress on the staff. This issue was raised in the panel’s first report; see Finding 3.1 and Recommendation 3.1, which are reproduced in Appendix C of this report.

ONGOING MONITORING OF THE HEALTH OF CORE S&E CAPABILITIES

It is noteworthy that research leadership at all three laboratories painted a more upbeat picture of their S&E work environment than did their staff at multiple levels. While the research leaders recognized that the workload has grown, it is not clear that they are aware of the high level of stress affecting their staff. The stresses recounted above were not clearly understood, perhaps not even recognized, by the laboratory executives with whom the panel interacted during the site visits. While some of those stresses may be traced to recent growth in the overall workload of the nuclear security enterprise, others (e.g., infrastructure, burdensome processes, size of the administrative staff, onboarding practices) should be at least somewhat under local control.

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION

For those doing scientific and engineering research, the work environment and adequate time for thoughtful exploration are crucial for maintaining S&E excellence and capabilities. Because the health of the core S&E capabilities is vital to the nuclear security enterprise, especially in maintaining the ability to recruit and retain top talent, laboratory leadership and NNSA need to proactively monitor and support that health. The issues raised to the panel were recounted readily, so all that is needed is a commitment to asking questions and listening. Research leadership could follow a similar practice. (A previous panel recommendation1 stressed the value of regularly monitoring employees across the enterprise.) The panel therefore offers a specific recommendation for the three laboratories, as follows:

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1 Recommendation 3.3 of National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine and the National Academy of Public Administration, 2018, Report 2 on Tracking and Assessing Governance and Management

Suggested Citation:"3 Sustainment of the Enterprise's Core Science and Engineering Capabilities." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, and National Academy of Public Administration. 2020. Report 4 on Tracking and Assessing Governance and Management Reform in the Nuclear Security Enterprise. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/25730.
×

Recommendation. The Directors of the three laboratories, with National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) assistance as needed, should periodically assess the environment for work that sustains the enterprise’s core science and engineering (S&E) capabilities. This assessment should include input from the researchers engaged in that work, and identify steps needed to strengthen the environment.

___________________

Reform in the Nuclear Security Enterprise, Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, p. 3: “As a first step toward meeting the need for objective evidence and data, NNSA should begin surveying the entire workforce of the nuclear security enterprise (possibly by leveraging existing surveys) so as to gain understanding of attitudes and engagement throughout the enterprise and insight about specific worker concerns.”

Suggested Citation:"3 Sustainment of the Enterprise's Core Science and Engineering Capabilities." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, and National Academy of Public Administration. 2020. Report 4 on Tracking and Assessing Governance and Management Reform in the Nuclear Security Enterprise. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/25730.
×
Page 17
Suggested Citation:"3 Sustainment of the Enterprise's Core Science and Engineering Capabilities." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, and National Academy of Public Administration. 2020. Report 4 on Tracking and Assessing Governance and Management Reform in the Nuclear Security Enterprise. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/25730.
×
Page 18
Suggested Citation:"3 Sustainment of the Enterprise's Core Science and Engineering Capabilities." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, and National Academy of Public Administration. 2020. Report 4 on Tracking and Assessing Governance and Management Reform in the Nuclear Security Enterprise. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/25730.
×
Page 19
Suggested Citation:"3 Sustainment of the Enterprise's Core Science and Engineering Capabilities." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, and National Academy of Public Administration. 2020. Report 4 on Tracking and Assessing Governance and Management Reform in the Nuclear Security Enterprise. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/25730.
×
Page 20
Suggested Citation:"3 Sustainment of the Enterprise's Core Science and Engineering Capabilities." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, and National Academy of Public Administration. 2020. Report 4 on Tracking and Assessing Governance and Management Reform in the Nuclear Security Enterprise. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/25730.
×
Page 21
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The Nuclear Security Enterprise consists of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) plus a large, distributed system of laboratories, production plants, and other sites that are staffed by personnel working under management and operating contracts. In collaboration with the National Academy of Public Administration, Report 4 on Tracking and Assessing Governance and Management Reform in the Nuclear Security Enterprise evaluates the implementation plan developed by the National Nuclear Security Administration and Department of Energy in response to the FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act, and the subsequent implementation of such plan. The recommendations of this report will guide the NNSA as they reform management culture to a culture of performance, accountability, and credibility that is mission-driven.

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