Models for Law Enforcement at Airports (2020)

Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

15 Survey Respondents The study goal was to include airports from each security category. The information and analysis in this synthesis represent each airport’s TSA security category and describe ownership models, law enforcement models, and the descriptives for each quantitative and qualitative survey question. Subsequent chapters break down those descriptives by each law enforcement model. While geographic representation was not sought, the respondents are spread around the country, with representation from nearly all regions (Figure 1). Security Category Respondents are largely Category I airports (20), followed by Category II (9) and Category X (8). There is also representation of airports in Category III (2) and Category IV (5). Table 1 notes these results. Ownership Model The respondents are primarily city owned (18) and governed by airport authority (16). The remaining ownership models among the respondents are county owned (11), port authority (3), state owned (2), and other ownership (3). There is a wide variety of integration and involvement among the ownership agency, airport operations, and law enforcement partners. For example, in 2012, Massport, owner of Boston Logan International Airport, reports daily meetings with partners and stakeholders, including airlines, law enforcement, and federal agencies such as TSA and FBI (Freadman, 2012). Type of Law Enforcement Models Most respondents operate under either an airport police department (20) or a city police department (16). Additional law enforcement models include county sheriff (10) and state police (5) organizations. DPS data and information are aggregated during the literature review. Airport Owner or Operator Determination of Equipment Access Most respondents indicate that the airport owner or operator does not determine law enforce- ment access to specific equipment (25) while some respondents note that the airport owner or operator does have some control over law enforcement access to equipment (14). C H A P T E R 4

Figure 1. Map of respondents.

Survey Respondents 17 Integration of Law Enforcement and Operations There is a wide range of integration between law enforcement and airport operations that ranges from very little to daily operational integration. For example, at Minneapolis–Saint Paul International Airport, then Chief and now Director of the Department of Public Safety Mike Everson reports that he has been a part of the proactive education of airport food and beverage servers in responsible service to help reduce the number of disruptive passenger events related to alcohol consumption, which indicates a very high level of operational and training integration (Air Line Pilots Association 2018 Air Safety Forum, 2018). Airport-Specific Training According to 49 CFR 1542.213, any individuals who will be performing security functions for the airport must receive information and training if they will have unescorted access to the secured area. The training must include accessible and nonaccessible areas for unescorted access authority, identification media, law enforcement support for escort and challenge procedures, identification of sensitive security information, and any other topics important to the security program. Airport-specific training for LEOs assigned to an airport is strongly recommended by many experts involved in airport law enforcement, and it has some broad availability from third-party organizations such as the American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE) (AAAE, 2010), Airport Law Enforcement Agencies Network (ALEAN), and Airports Council International (ACI) (Airport Law Enforcement Agencies Network, 2019). Without this unique training, the LEOs may have an incomplete understanding of the regulatory requirements and their impacts, potentially increasing costs and reducing operational efficiency (McCormick, 2011). In a unique working environment, a full and complete understanding of relevant regulations, obligations, and operations is essential (McCormick, 2011). LEOs at Security Checkpoints Most respondents indicate that their LEOs are not stationed at security checkpoints (19). However, a similar number of respondents do station LEOs at security checkpoints (13). LEO Access to Airfield According to 49 CFR 1542.203, all airports must identify a secure area or AOA, and access to that area must be controlled. Most respondents indicate that their LEOs are trained to drive on the airfield (26), but at some airports (6), they are not. Answer Frequency Category X 8 Category I 20 Category II 9 Category III 2 Category IV 5 Table 1. Security categories.

18 Models for Law Enforcement at Airports Just over half of the respondents (19) indicate that the LEOs may drive unescorted on the FAA-controlled AOA (19) while at some airports, they may not (13). However, most respondents report that the LEOs may drive unescorted in the non–FAA-controlled AOA (27). Only four respondents note that LEOs may not drive unescorted, and one respondent is unsure. Difference between Airport Police and Security Most respondents indicate a difference between the airport police and airport security staff (27), with only a few reporting no difference (6). All respondents note a clear separation of powers between airport police and airport security personnel. LEO Access to Ancillary Operations and Resources Per 49 CFR 1542.219, airport operators may request the use of TSA personnel under a reimbursable agreement, allowing the airport to supplement its available law enforcement resources. In addition to supplemental TSA resources, airport operators have access to other ancillary services. The airports report considerable access to many ancillary resources, including: • Bomb squads (29) • K-9 units (32) • Explosive detection (29) • Hostage negotiations (27) • Special weapons and tactics (SWAT) (29). Note: For this question, respondents could select multiple responses.