National Academies Press: OpenBook
« Previous: Front Matter
Suggested Citation:"Summary." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, and National Academy of Public Administration. 2020. Governance and Management of the Nuclear Security Enterprise. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/25933.
×
Page 1
Suggested Citation:"Summary." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, and National Academy of Public Administration. 2020. Governance and Management of the Nuclear Security Enterprise. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/25933.
×
Page 2
Suggested Citation:"Summary." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, and National Academy of Public Administration. 2020. Governance and Management of the Nuclear Security Enterprise. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/25933.
×
Page 3
Suggested Citation:"Summary." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, and National Academy of Public Administration. 2020. Governance and Management of the Nuclear Security Enterprise. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/25933.
×
Page 4
Suggested Citation:"Summary." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, and National Academy of Public Administration. 2020. Governance and Management of the Nuclear Security Enterprise. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/25933.
×
Page 5
Suggested Citation:"Summary." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, and National Academy of Public Administration. 2020. Governance and Management of the Nuclear Security Enterprise. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/25933.
×
Page 6
Suggested Citation:"Summary." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, and National Academy of Public Administration. 2020. Governance and Management of the Nuclear Security Enterprise. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/25933.
×
Page 7
Suggested Citation:"Summary." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, and National Academy of Public Administration. 2020. Governance and Management of the Nuclear Security Enterprise. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/25933.
×
Page 8

Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

Summary The governance and management of the national nuclear security enterprise has improved in the years since the publication in 2014 of the congressionally mandated report A New Foundation for the Nuclear Enterprise (the Augustine-Mies report).1 However, that progress is fragile, and there is still more work to be done. Maintaining the progress to date and continuing the positive trajectory will not be easy and will require diligence by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the Department of Energy (DOE) and support from Congress and the Administration. Many studies over several decades—more than 50 by one count—have identified long-standing management problems in the nuclear security enterprise. While the enterprise has met critical mission needs, including especially stewardship of the nation’s nuclear stockpile, management deficiencies contributed to performance problems, including cost overruns and schedule delays. More generally, better management will enable the enterprise to overcome the stresses and surprises that are inevitable for any challenging and complex activity. The Augustine-Mies report concluded, “The existing governance structures and many of the practices of the [nuclear security] enterprise are inefficient and ineffective, thereby putting the entire enterprise at risk over the long term.”2 Since that time, NNSA has taken a number of steps to address governance and management concerns raised by the Augustine-Mies report and others like it. The Panel to Track and Assess Governance and Management Reform in the Nuclear Security Enterprise was established by congressional direction in 2016 to monitor progress by carrying out the charge presented in Appendix A. This report presents the panel’s review of progress since release of the Augustine-Mies report. Over the past 5 years, NNSA has improved the governance and management of the nuclear security enterprise. Over the course of 2016–2020, the panel has seen progress in reforming governance and management of the nuclear security enterprise. Through many interviews, site visits, and discussion groups, the panel has observed improved levels of trust, mission focus, and unity of purpose across the enterprise. Important examples of improvements include the following:  While the 2014 Augustine-Mies report described the relationship between NNSA and its management and operating (M&O) contractors as “dysfunctional,” the current panel’s interviews with individuals at all levels of both NNSA and the M&O partners depict relationships that are less adversarial and tending toward more trust. 1 Congressional Advisory Panel on the Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise, 2014, A New Foundation for the Nuclear Enterprise: Report of the Congressional Advisory Panel on the Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise, http://cdn.knoxblogs.com/atomiccity/wp- content/uploads/sites/11/2014/12/Governance.pdf. 2 Congressional Advisory Panel on the Governance of the Nuclear Security Enterprise, 2014, p. ix. PREPUBLICATION COPY—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION 1

 The Augustine-Mies report found that NNSA and the Department of Defense (DoD) were not collaborating well, but more recently most DoD and NNSA personnel interviewed by the panel characterized the overall DoD-NNSA relationship as “good” and sometimes used even more positive terms.  The Augustine-Mies study cited a lack of clarity about roles and responsibilities among DOE, NNSA headquarters, NNSA field offices, and the M&Os. However, NNSA and DOE have implemented new formal directives that redefine those roles and responsibilities, and processes to implement them, and interviewees report progress.  On the issues of cost and schedule management, NNSA has created new offices and formal policies that may have contributed to some improvement in performance, although it is too early to assess their full impact. In 2019, NNSA issued three important guidance documents related to governance and management:  Strategic Vision: Strengthening Our Nation Through Nuclear Security;  Governance & Management Framework; and  Strategic Integrated Roadmap 2020–2044.3 In addition to clearly articulating the mission priorities and their major milestones, these documents lay out a vision for the shared values and expected behaviors, strategic management challenges, and governance and management expectations for the enterprise. They therefore provide an important step toward addressing many of the concerns identified in the Augustine-Mies report. The three guidance documents listed above do not constitute the Implementation Plan called for by Congress when it requested the panel’s study (see Appendix A). NNSA did create such a plan late in 2016, but the panel did not find it to be a useful tool for tracking and assessing NNSA’s progress to reform governance and management, and NNSA has not relied on it. As this report was being finalized, the panel was told that NNSA is developing an Action Plan to operationalize the three guidance documents listed above. In its third interim report, the panel listed seven elements desired in such a plan,4 which are reprinted in Chapter 1 of this report. Absent a clear plan for reforming governance and management, the panel has relied to a large extent on its own data collection and analysis during this study, relying on its members’ collective experience to assess the promise of actions taken. NNSA needs to build on progress made and ensure that improvements to date in governance and management percolate throughout the enterprise and become ingrained. NNSA needs to work on remaining problems and must ensure that improvements to date in governance and management, now largely felt in the upper levels of management, percolate throughout the enterprise and become ingrained. The panel is cautiously optimistic that if NNSA continues to drive 3 National Nuclear Security Administration, Strategic Vision: Strengthening Our Nation Through Nuclear Security, Washington, D.C., May 2019; National Nuclear Security Administration, Governance & Management Framework, Washington, D.C., May 2019; and National Nuclear Security Administration, NNSA Strategic Integrated Roadmap 2020–2044, Washington, D.C., May 2019. 4 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine and the National Academy of Public Administration, 2019, Report 3 on Tracking and Assessing Governance and Management Reform in the Nuclear Security Enterprise, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C. Quoted material from p. 32. PREPUBLICATION COPY—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION 2

the messages of those 2019 guidance documents throughout the agency and builds on its initial steps of improvements as noted in this report—while also measuring and institutionalizing progress made—it will be in a strong position to navigate current and future challenges. This report offers suggestions to help NNSA maintain its current momentum for reforming the governance and management of the nuclear security enterprise and steering the associated culture change. Continued success for NNSA and the nuclear security enterprise requires all parts of the enterprise to work together with mutual trust and respect, putting aside their local allegiances to focus on the overall mission. The erosion of mission focus began decades ago, and building on the NNSA Administrator’s message of “One NNSA,” NNSA must continue a conscious, persistent, and urgent push to reestablish the needed emphasis on unity of purpose. NNSA must continue a conscious, persistent, and urgent push. A continuous improvement strategy is an essential element for future success. The current NNSA Administrator has been promoting such a vision, which requires openness and cooperation across the federal headquarters team, the NNSA field offices, and the laboratories, plants, and sites. Openness and cooperation are also essential in the enterprise’s dealings with DoD and other partners. In this final report, the panel makes 16 recommendations, falling into four major themes:  Solidify leadership and support for the mission across DOE and DoD—within the current statutory structure (the focus of Chapter 2);  Reinforce the healthy management practices emerging within NNSA (the focus of Chapter 3);  Take additional steps to maximize the contributions of the M&O partners (the focus of Chapter 4); and  Establish mechanisms and culture for continuous improvement in governance and management (the focus of Chapter 5). Each of the 16 recommendations is intended to address specific issues identified in the panel’s 5-year review and contribute momentum to NNSA’s ongoing improvement efforts. The specific recommendations are provided in Table S.1, below. MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NNSA Four issues of focus are key to NNSA being successful in its reform of governance and management, as follows. First, in order to ensure that improved governance and management produce the bottom-line results needed by the nation, it is especially important that NNSA continues to strengthen its management policies and practices for cost and schedule control of major programs and capital projects (see Table S.1, Recommendation 3.3). Successful performance in the long run will always require disciplined compliance with best management practices and continued support from the Administrator and others in top management to offset any resistance that can naturally arise. NNSA and DOE must sustain and continually improve the organizations and processes they have established for rigorous technical and cost analyses of projects and programs. Examples include NNSA’s Offices of Cost Estimating and Program Evaluation (CEPE) and Acquisition and Project Management (NA-APM), DOE’s process 413 governing Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets, and NNSA’s 6.x process for PREPUBLICATION COPY—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION 3

governing the Nuclear Weapons Life Cycle. It is especially critical that the enterprise continue to carry out open, thorough “analyses of alternatives” and peer reviews of key projects and programs. The value of these processes over the past 5 years can be seen in the redesign of significant projects, such as the Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 site in Tennessee and the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in New Mexico, which has saved billions of dollars and improved rates of progress. Second, in order to learn more about NNSA’s management of large-scale programs, the panel examined the program for plutonium pit production to learn more about NNSA’s management of large- scale programs, which led to Recommendation 3.4 in Table S.1. This program is one of the largest and most critical of NNSA’s current challenges. Some aspects of the management structure are quite encouraging, particularly the degree to which a team at Los Alamos has been empowered by the program manager to take responsibility for defining how the process can be built up at that site. The amount of management control that is vested in the Office of Defense Programs also strengthens the management structure. However, the panel also learned of several instances in which decision making was slowed because the pit program office was not given the final authority for making management decisions related to technical aspects of the pit production program; the program manager lacks the authority and stature to resolve all the issues that come up. As a result, it is not uncommon for disagreements to arise that require elevation to higher levels in NNSA for resolution. It appears to the panel that NNSA needs to strengthen the authority of this program manager, and lessons learned from this program’s management structure might have relevance to other major programs within NNSA. Third, to meet the demanding workload, be prepared for the dynamic geopolitical landscape, and continue to improve its overall effectiveness, NNSA must leverage all the scientific and technical capability of the enterprise and ensure that objective and independent expertise is and remains readily available. The panel delved into the state of health of the science and engineering (S&E) environment at the three NNSA laboratories, and the state of the relationships between NNSA and its laboratories. Recommendation 4.4 in Table S.1 is in response to the panel finding that the S&E workforce, which is the crucial foundation for the scientific and technical capability now and in the future, is feeling stressed. That stress is driven by administrative burden, funding uncertainties, and other factors, and it did not appear to be fully appreciated by the laboratory leadership. Improvements could also be made in the onboarding of new hires into the S&E workforce. The panel recommends attention to keys aspects of S&E health. Fourth, the Augustine-Mies study observed a breakdown in the relationship between NNSA and its laboratories, which were set up as Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs), a special category that is meant to be different from typical government contractors. The panel therefore reexamined this topic and found that while some in NNSA have an understanding of how those differences can be incorporated into governance to produce effective FFRDC relationships, that understanding is not shared by all. This has led to conflicting perspectives on how laboratory governance should be approached. Recommendations 4.2 and 4.3 in Table S.1 address this. Because the breakdown of these FFRDC relationships dates back to the 1990s, reinvigorating the relationships will take a focused effort that would benefit from drawing on experience elsewhere in government where the FFRDC model is effectively applied. In addition to the absence of an enterprise-wide understanding, NNSA’s implementation of the FFRDC model lacks a clear contract strategy that is consistent with maximizing the FFRDC relationships. The panel recommends steps to reinvigorate these relationships so as to increase the value of these laboratories to the nation. PREPUBLICATION COPY—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION 4

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONGRESS At the time of the Augustine-Mies study, there was widespread concern that NNSA’s position as a semiautonomous agency within DOE was contributing to NNSA’s performance problems. That report evaluated several possible organizational arrangements and decided that the nuclear security mission should remain in DOE, concluding that “an autonomous organization to replace some or all of the functions of NNSA [is] a clearly inferior choice.” The panel examined the overlaps between NNSA and DOE, especially with respect to functional (support) offices handling decisions connected with finances, contracting, legal, environment, health, safety, and security. It found that roles, responsibilities, accountability, and authorities have in many cases been clarified since 2014. While the panel heard a few lingering concerns, in general NNSA’s functional staffs find that their interactions with DOE generally work well and have improved over the past several years; the dysfunctional overlaps that concerned the Augustine-Mies panel have been mitigated notably. Because NNSA’s placement within DOE has the clear benefit of placing the nuclear security mission in the hands of a Cabinet official, and DOE-NNSA interactions have improved, the panel sees no compelling reason for changing this structure, as reflected in Recommendation 2.1 of Table S.1. Despite the structural overlaps and ambiguities identified in the Augustine-Mies report, the maturation of working relationships has progressed to the point where the risks from any statutory restructuring—disruptions to staff and operations, plus the chance of unintended consequences—substantially outweigh the potential benefit. Still, the Secretary of Energy and NNSA Administrator should continue to pursue improvements that can be made to strengthen the way the organizations work together to accomplish the mission. As noted above, NNSA’s reform of governance and management has been ongoing for 5 years, and more remains to be done. Ensuring that the desired behaviors are embedded throughout the organization—so that today’s progress is not lost as leaders move on—requires a long-term effort to change habits and presumptions throughout the agency’s staff. Continuing the reform of governance and management while maintaining a steady hand on NNSA’s critical, long-term missions requires continuity among the senior leadership. Those leaders also must hold office long enough to carry out reforms, which often take multiple years, and Recommendations 2.3 and 2.4 in Table S.1 address this. Since the creation of NNSA in 2000, there have been four periods without a confirmed Administrator. Those gaps averaged 247 days between the vacancy and Senate confirmation of the next Administrator, and they would have been even longer if the previous Administrators had not stayed on into a new administration (for an average of 1.6 years). In order to foster greater continuity in this highly specialized position, the panel echoes the Augustine-Mies report in calling for the NNSA Administrator position to become fixed-term. The panel also calls for some changes to improve the continuity of the leadership at the Principle Deputy and Deputy Administrator levels. Last, because this report was requested by Congress, it is logical to ask what else that body might do to support the steps recommended herein, and to follow up in the future; Recommendation 5.3 in Table S.1 is the result. The national security mission of NNSA and the overall nuclear security enterprise is critically important to the nation and needs to be carried out in the most effective way possible. The recommendations in this report will be embraced by some—perhaps many—of the leaders within DOE and NNSA and its partners, but there will also be inertia, and possibly resistance, within the system, thus requiring periodic assessments. In order to enable the “brief reviews” envisioned in Recommendation 5.3, it is critical that NNSA develop and track clearly interpretable and readily measurable indicators of improved management practices (per Recommendation 5.2). Those measures will provide a snapshot of the quality of governance and management of the nuclear security enterprise. PREPUBLICATION COPY—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION 5

TABLE S.1 Complete Set of Recommendations Theme: SOLIDIFY LEADERSHIP AND SUPPORT FOR THE MISSION ACROSS DOE AND DOD—WITHIN THE CURRENT STATUTORY STRUCTURE Recommendation 2.1: The statutory relationship between the Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) should not be restructured. The Secretary of Energy’s ownership of DOE’s nuclear deterrence mission should be reemphasized through the Senate confirmation process and annual administration and congressional reporting and oversight activities. Both DOE and NNSA should diligently enforce assigned roles and responsibilities throughout both organizations in order to maintain a healthy and effective enterprise. Recommendation 2.2: The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Administrator, in collaboration with the Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition and Sustainment), should continue to implement and institutionalize practices that promote the transparent exchange of information and a strong, collaborative working relationship between the Department of Defense (DoD) and NNSA. The Administrator and Undersecretary should particularly emphasize coordination of the agencies’ budgets for the stockpile and weapons delivery systems. Recommendation 2.3: Congress should amend the National Nuclear Security Act to modify the position of National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Administrator so that it has a fixed term but is still filled by presidential appointment subject to Senate confirmation. To eliminate leadership gaps, the Administrator should be authorized to stay in office until a replacement is confirmed by the Senate, even beyond the formal completion of his or her term. Recommendation 2.4: To reduce gaps in other key leadership positions, the requirement for Senate confirmation of the Principal Deputy Administrator, Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, and Deputy Administrator for Defense Nonproliferation should be removed. These positions should continue to be filled with political appointees to provide appropriate stature. Theme: REINFORCE THE HEALTHY MANAGEMENT PRACTICES EMERGING WITHIN NNSA Recommendation 3.1: National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) leadership should build on progress made on clarifying roles, responsibilities, authorities, and accountability by improving its communications about and enforcement of the relevant policies.  To clarify the roles of functional support offices vis-à-vis mission execution, NNSA leadership should promulgate policies that engage support-office personnel early in mission-related planning in order to smooth the process of “getting to yes,” thereby enabling mission accomplishment.  To increase the shared understanding of roles and responsibilities throughout the enterprise, NNSA leadership should expand programs for rotation of personnel between federal and nonfederal positions, as well as between headquarters and field offices. This expansion should take the form of making such opportunities more widely available and of longer duration. Consideration should be given to requiring rotational assignments prior to promotion to senior NNSA positions. Recommendation 3.2: The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) should gain a better understanding of attitudes and engagement of the entire enterprise workforce. It should require all of its management and operating (M&O) partners to conduct regular employee surveys, PREPUBLICATION COPY—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION 6

preferably including some questions that are found on the Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey (FEVS). NNSA should require the M&O partners to provide it with the responses, properly anonymized, to at least those latter questions. Recommendation 3.3: The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) should enforce its policies for estimating and controlling budget, cost, and schedule for major programs and capital projects. To enhance the credibility of program plans and budget estimates, NNSA should improve its process for addressing differences in cost estimates from Cost Estimating and Program Evaluation (CEPE) and program offices to include providing accessible documentation that reconciles the differences and makes clear the provenance of the estimate used in the budget. Recommendation 3.4: The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) should ensure that the management structures for its major programs provide a high level of authorities and capabilities to one strong program manager so that program managers can serve as the focal point for anticipating and resolving issues in the execution of the program. As an example, the manager of the pit production program should be transitioned to have even stronger authorities and capabilities in order to maximize the program’s chances of success. Recommendation 3.5: The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Administrator should promptly designate a career senior executive service member as the accountable change management leader to provide intensive and sustained attention to the challenges of institutionalizing governance and management reform. This leader should support the Administrator in developing continuous improvement strategies and implementation plans, leading continuous improvement processes, and ensuring that management metrics are developed and employed. Theme: TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS TO MAXIMIZE THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE M&O PARTNERS Recommendation 4.1: The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and management and operating (M&O) management should expand their existing processes to identify and mitigate burdensome processes and requirements, instituting a process of continuous improvement. Those in a position to develop and promulgate improvements, and those affected by the improvements, should work collaboratively on these efforts. At least five elements are needed:  The burdens identified in the 2019 survey and analysis carried out by NNSA’s Operations and Efficiencies Board should be addressed to the extent that they are within the control of NNSA or the Department of Energy (DOE).  Surveillance and mitigation analogous to the 2019 survey should be conducted annually, with results made available throughout the enterprise.  NNSA should consider expanding the site governance peer reviews to contribute to revealing and removing burdensome practices and sharing improvements.  NNSA and laboratory management should improve their monitoring of administrative inefficiencies that hinder the technical staff at the NNSA laboratories, and develop a simple process whereby significant inefficiencies can be identified, analyzed, and prioritized for possible mitigation.  NNSA should proactively work with the labs, plants, and sites to identify where the M&O processes might be more risk averse than appropriate. Recommendation 4.2: The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) should establish management practices that derive the maximum value from the established principles for Federally PREPUBLICATION COPY—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION 7

Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs). To achieve this, the Administrator should convene a working group whose members are knowledgeable about successful FFRDC relationships and some of whom are outside the current nuclear security enterprise to assist NNSA in developing a conceptual model for the relationship it seeks to have with its FFRDCs. NNSA should then take the necessary steps to put the model in place for all three FFRDCs so that their ability to act as trusted, independent, expert contributors is maximized. Recommendation 4.3: The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) should identify a more effective contract model for its Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs). The Administrator should convene a working group to develop an FFRDC contract model to better enable the desired FFRDC relationships, which are to be closer than normal contractual relationships. The working group should include staff within NNSA and its laboratories as well as experts from other agencies with a large number of FFRDCs, such as DoD. Recommendation 4.4: In addition to the elements included in Recommendation 4.1, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and management at its laboratories should take steps to improve the environment for science and engineering (S&E) research and development (R&D) to include the following:  A clear articulation of how the S&E core capabilities will be supported at the laboratories, perhaps including funding lines that would complement laboratory directed research and development (LDRD);  Enhanced onboarding processes to help new scientists and engineers become highly productive by emphasizing the laboratories’ strengths, expertise, organization, past accomplishments of service in the national interest, and roles and responsibilities as Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs). Theme: ESTABLISH MECHANISMS AND CULTURE FOR CONTINUOUS IMPROVEMENT IN GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT Recommendation 5.1: National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) leadership themes such as “one NNSA” and “getting to yes” have established the tone for needed management improvements. These themes need to be reinforced through systematic efforts to instill these desired behaviors and values throughout the enterprise. Recommendation 5.2: National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) next steps to steer governance and management reform should specify the actions to be taken—by whom and when, with associated budget and metrics—to a degree that allows progress to be tracked and changes made as necessary. Metrics should be specific enough to support data-driven, continuous management improvement and be suitable for informing periodic external reviews into the effectiveness of governance and management of the nuclear security enterprise. Recommendation 5.3: The panel encourages the relevant committees of Congress, especially the Armed Services Committees and the Appropriations Subcommittees, to follow up on the recommendations in this report. The panel recommends that Congress convene a small group of knowledgeable experts, perhaps three to five, approximately every 3 years, to conduct a brief review of the status of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) governance and management. PREPUBLICATION COPY—SUBJECT TO FURTHER EDITORIAL CORRECTION 8

Next: 1 Introduction »
Governance and Management of the Nuclear Security Enterprise Get This Book
×
Buy Paperback | $45.00
MyNAP members save 10% online.
Login or Register to save!
Download Free PDF

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)leads a nuclear security enterprise that includes three national laboratories, several production facilities, and an experimental test site. NNSA's mission is protect the American people by maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile; by reducing global nuclear threats; and by providing the U.S. Navy with safe, militarily effective naval nuclear propulsion plants.

The FY2016 National Defense Authorization Act called for the National Academies, in partnership with the National Academy of Public Administration, to track and assess progress over 2016-2020 to reform governance and management of the enterprise. Governance and Management of the Nuclear Security Enterprise assesses the effectiveness of reform efforts and makes recommendations for further action.

  1. ×

    Welcome to OpenBook!

    You're looking at OpenBook, NAP.edu's online reading room since 1999. Based on feedback from you, our users, we've made some improvements that make it easier than ever to read thousands of publications on our website.

    Do you want to take a quick tour of the OpenBook's features?

    No Thanks Take a Tour »
  2. ×

    Show this book's table of contents, where you can jump to any chapter by name.

    « Back Next »
  3. ×

    ...or use these buttons to go back to the previous chapter or skip to the next one.

    « Back Next »
  4. ×

    Jump up to the previous page or down to the next one. Also, you can type in a page number and press Enter to go directly to that page in the book.

    « Back Next »
  5. ×

    To search the entire text of this book, type in your search term here and press Enter.

    « Back Next »
  6. ×

    Share a link to this book page on your preferred social network or via email.

    « Back Next »
  7. ×

    View our suggested citation for this chapter.

    « Back Next »
  8. ×

    Ready to take your reading offline? Click here to buy this book in print or download it as a free PDF, if available.

    « Back Next »
Stay Connected!