National Academies Press: OpenBook
Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2021. Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control Monitoring, Detection, and Verification: A National Security Priority: Interim Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26088.
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Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2021. Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control Monitoring, Detection, and Verification: A National Security Priority: Interim Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26088.
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Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2021. Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control Monitoring, Detection, and Verification: A National Security Priority: Interim Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26088.
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Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2021. Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control Monitoring, Detection, and Verification: A National Security Priority: Interim Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26088.
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Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2021. Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control Monitoring, Detection, and Verification: A National Security Priority: Interim Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26088.
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Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2021. Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control Monitoring, Detection, and Verification: A National Security Priority: Interim Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26088.
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Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2021. Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control Monitoring, Detection, and Verification: A National Security Priority: Interim Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26088.
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Page viii Cite
Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2021. Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control Monitoring, Detection, and Verification: A National Security Priority: Interim Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26088.
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Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2021. Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control Monitoring, Detection, and Verification: A National Security Priority: Interim Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26088.
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Page R9
Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2021. Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control Monitoring, Detection, and Verification: A National Security Priority: Interim Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26088.
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Page R10
Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2021. Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control Monitoring, Detection, and Verification: A National Security Priority: Interim Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26088.
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Page R11
Suggested Citation:"Front Matter." National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2021. Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control Monitoring, Detection, and Verification: A National Security Priority: Interim Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/26088.
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Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

PREPUBLICATION COPY NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL MONITORING, DETECTION, AND VERIFICATION: A NATIONAL SECURITY PRIORITY Interim Report Committee on the Review of Capabilities for Detection, Verification, and Monitoring of Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material Committee on International Security and Arms Control Policy and Global Affairs A Consensus Study Report of This prepublication version of Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control Monitoring, Detection, and Verification: A National Security Priority—Interim Report has been provided to the public to facilitate timely access to the report. Although the substance of the report is final, editorial changes may be made throughout the text and citations will be checked prior to publication.

PREPUBLICATION COPY | UNCORRECTED PROOFS THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS 500 Fifth Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20001 This study was supported by Contract No. DE-EP0000026/89233120FNA400280 between the National Academy of Sciences and the Department of Energy. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the view of any organizations or agency that provided support for this project. International Standard Book Number-13: 978-0-309-XXXXX-X International Standard Book Number-10: 0-309-XXXXX-X Digital Object Identifier: https://doi.org/10.17226/26088 Additional copies of this report are available from the National Academies Press, 500 Fifth Street, NW, Keck 360, Washington, DC 20001; (800) 624-6242 or (202) 334-3313; http://www.nap.edu. Copyright 2021 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America Suggested citation: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2021. Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control Monitoring, Detection, and Verification: A National Security Priority: Interim Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: https://doi.org/10.17226/26088.

PREPUBLICATION COPY | UNCORRECTED PROOFS The National Academy of Sciences was established in 1863 by an Act of Congress, signed by President Lincoln, as a private, nongovernmental institution to advise the nation on issues related to science and technology. Members are elected by their peers for outstanding contributions to research. Dr. Marcia McNutt is president. The National Academy of Engineering was established in 1964 under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences to bring the practices of engineering to advising the nation. Members are elected by their peers for extraordinary contributions to engineering. Dr. John L. Anderson is president. The National Academy of Medicine (formerly the Institute of Medicine) was established in 1970 under the charter of the National Academy of Sciences to advise the nation on medical and health issues. Members are elected by their peers for distinguished contributions to medicine and health. Dr. Victor J. Dzau is president. The three Academies work together as the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine to provide independent, objective analysis and advice to the nation and conduct other activities to solve complex problems and inform public policy decisions. The Academies also encourage education and research, recognize outstanding contributions to knowledge, and increase public understanding in matters of science, engineering, and medicine. Learn more about the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine at www.nationalacademies.org.

PREPUBLICATION COPY | UNCORRECTED PROOFS Consensus Study Reports published by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine document the evidence-based consensus on the study’s statement of task by an authoring committee of experts. Reports typically include findings, conclusions, and recommendations based on information gathered by the committee and the committee’s deliberations. Each report has been subjected to a rigorous and independent peer-review process and it represents the position of the National Academies on the statement of task. Proceedings published by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine chronicle the presentations and discussions at a workshop, symposium, or other event convened by the National Academies. The statements and opinions contained in proceedings are those of the participants and are not endorsed by other participants, the planning committee, or the National Academies. For information about other products and activities of the National Academies, please visit www.nationalacademies.org/about/whatwedo.

PREPUBLICATION COPY | UNCORRECTED PROOFS COMMITTEE ON THE REVIEW OF CAPABILITIES FOR DETECTION, VERIFICATION, AND MONITORING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FISSILE MATERIAL Jill Hruby (Chair), Sandia National Laboratories (retired) Corey Hinderstein (Vice Chair), Nuclear Threat Initiative Andrew Alleyne, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign Charles Craft, Sandia National Laboratories (retired) Joseph DeTrani, Independent consultant Mona Dreicer, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (retired) Sallie Ann Keller, University of Virginia, Arlington Annie B. Kersting, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Thorne Lay, University of California, Santa Cruz Keith Masback, Plum Run, LLC Chris Pickett, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (retired) William Tobey, Harvard University Ned Wogman, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (retired) Study Staff Marie C. Kirkegaard, Study Co-Director Benjamin Rusek, Study Co-Director Charles Ferguson, Director, Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board Micah Lowenthal, Director, Committee on International Security and Arms Control Hope Hare, Administrative Assistant Nicole Cervenka, Research Associate v

PREPUBLICATION COPY | UNCORRECTED PROOFS ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF REVIEWERS This Consensus Study Report was reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine in making each published report as sound as possible and to ensure that it meets the institutional standards for quality, objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review comments and draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process. We thank the following individuals for their review of this report: Anthony Gouge, Savannah River National Laboratory Miriam John, Independent Consultant R. Scott Kemp, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Susan Koch, Department of Defense (retired) William Ostendorff, United States Naval Academy Frank Pabian, Los Alamos National Laboratory (retired) Abel Rodriguez, University of California, Santa Cruz Gary Samore, Brandeis University Jay Zucca, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Although the reviewers listed above have provided many constructive comments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the conclusions or recommendations nor did they see the final draft of the report before its release. The review of this report was overseen by Julia Phillips. She responsible for making certain that an independent examination of this report was carried out in accordance with the standards of the National Academies and that all review comments were carefully considered. Responsibility for the final content rests entirely with the authoring committee and the National Academies. vii

PREPUBLICATION COPY | UNCORRECTED PROOFS PREFACE The initial plan for this study called for an ad hoc National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (the National Academies) committee to hold a series of in-person meetings where the members would interact directly with relevant government officials and external experts. The committee members would also tour relevant research and operational facilities. After data gathering, the committee would meet to agree on the findings and recommendations and write the report. Because non-publicly available information is important to this study, most of this work would have taken place in secure locations. However, this customary plan could not be followed due to the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic. To satisfy the congressional request to provide an assessment in time to inform the FY2022 budgetary process, even if the results were only partial, the National Acadmies significantly revised the project plan and divided the project into two phases. This report is a result of the first phase of the study. The data gathering and committee meetings were conducted entirely virtually using video conferencing, and a protected remotely accessible digital workspace was used to write the report. Only the topics that the committee could address using this format are covered in this report. To meet the schedule request, the committee completed the data gathering process in just two months and finished a draft of the report for review one month later. This extraordinary amount of work was possible because of the expertise, time, and attention of the volunteer committee members and the creativity and commitment of the National Academies project staff. Key government officials and external experts also helped with timely briefings and fulsome responses to follow-on questions. David LaGraffe at the National Nuclear Security Administration was particularly valuable to the committee’s frequent and time-critical requests during the data gathering period. In this interim report, the committee assesses both the governance and technical elements of the nuclear nonproliferation and arms control monitoring, detection, and verification (MDV) enterprise. In particular, in the governance element of the report, the committee assesses the roles, responsibilities, and coordination of the key government agencies and technology providers. However, important contributors to the MDV mission, such as the intelligence community, could not be assessed under the COVID-19 limitations. In the technical element of the report, the committee focuses on three topical areas: monitoring, detection, and verification of (1) the nuclear fuel cycle, (2) nuclear test explosions, and (3) arms control treaties and agreements. Two emerging cross-cutting technical areas of interest are also highlighted due to their potential impact: open-source assets and data, and advanced data analytics. The committee is aware of technical activities that it could not assess or include in this interim report. Nonetheless, the committee was able to assess a significant portion of the governance and technical elements of the MDV enterprise and make important findings and recommendations. These findings and recommendations represent the consensus of the committee and are drawn viii

ADVANCE COPY | UNCORRECTED PROOFS from briefings and responses from relevant government officials and external experts, as well as from the collective knowledge of the experts on the committee. A second phase of this study, set to begin when the committee is able to receive briefings in person and visit relevant facilities, will assess the governance and technical capabilities of the MDV enterprise in more breadth and depth, covering components of the MDV mission space that the committee could not access or be briefed on for this interim report. Although the committee looks forward to the second phase of the study, this interim report contains important recommendations to strengthen the MDV enterprise and build a comprehensive MDV program that stewards capabilities, meets future capability needs, and minimizes technical surprise. It is our hope that these recommendations will be reviewed and acted on without delay. Jill Hruby Committee Chair ix

PREPUBLICATION COPY | UNCORRECTED PROOFS CONTENTS SUMMARY ...............................................................................................................................1 1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................5 1.1 Study Task .................................................................................................................5 1.2 Report Scope and Organization .................................................................................6 1.3 Current Security Challenges for Nonproliferation and Arms Control .....................10 1.4 Approaching MDV as a Key Priority ......................................................................15 1.5 Overview of Roles and Responsibilities ..................................................................17 References ...........................................................................................................................34 2 GOVERNANCE OF THE MDV ENTERPRISE ...............................................................38 2.1 Policy, Operations, and RDT&E Integration ...........................................................39 2.2 Stewardship of MDV Capabilities ...........................................................................46 2.3 Increasing RDT&E Efficacy and Innovation ...........................................................57 References ...........................................................................................................................75 3 TECHNICAL MDV CAPABILITIES AND RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ........78 3.1 Research and Development Priorities ......................................................................81 3.2 MDV for the Nuclear Fuel Cycle.............................................................................83 3.3 MDV for Nuclear Weapons Test Explosions ..........................................................98 3.4 MDV for Arms Control .........................................................................................106 3.5 Cross-Cutting Technology: Leveraging Data ........................................................118 References .........................................................................................................................135 4 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................142 APPENDIX A STATEMENT OF TASK.............................................................................144 APPENDIX B LIST OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.................................145 APPENDIX C SUMMARY OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE REPORT: ASSESSMENT OF NUCLEAR MONITORING AND VERIFICATION TECHNOLOGIES ............................................................................................................159 APPENDIX D SUMMARY OF THE 2018 PLAN FOR VERIFICATION, DETECTION, AND MONITORING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FISSILE MATERIAL ......................................................................................................................160 APPENDIX E TECHNOLOGY READINESS LEVELS ....................................................161 APPENDIX F NNSA DNN (NA-20) ORGANIZATIONAL CHART ................................162 APPENDIX G MDV AT THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL LABORATORIES ............................................................................................................163 APPENDIX H NNSA’S OVER THE HORIZON INITIATIVE .........................................167 xi

PREPUBLICATION COPY | UNCORRECTED PROOFS APPENDIX I EXAMPLE CHARTER FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL’S EXTERNAL ADVISORY BOARD FOR MONITORING, DETECTION, AND VERIFICATION ASSESSMENT ....................................................................................169 APPENDIX J LIST OF RELEVANT TECHNICAL AND PROGRAM REVIEWS ..........171 APPENDIX K SUMMARY OF CURRENTLY FUNDED NNSA/DNN R&D UNIVERSITY CONSORTIA ...........................................................................................173 APPENDIX L TABLE OF MDV R&D TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES NEEDED FOR THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE, NUCLEAR TEST EXPLOSIONS, AND ARMS CONTROL ..................................................................................................175 APPENDIX M MDV R&D PRIORITIES LISTED IN THE NDRD STRATEGIC PLAN FOR FY2020–2024 ...............................................................................................179 APPENDIX N COMMITTEE BIOGRAPHIES ...................................................................181 APPENDIX O LIST OF COMMITTEE MEETINGS AND BRIEFINGS ..........................191 xii

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At the request of Congress, this report presents findings and recommendations related to governance of the U.S. government's monitoring, detection, and verification (MDV) enterprise and offers findings and recommendations related to technical MDV capabilities and research, development, test, and evaluation efforts, focused in particular on the nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear test explosions, and arms control.

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