Mainstreaming System Resilience Concepts into Transportation Agencies: A Guide (2021)

Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

103   This step brings together the exposure data (from Step 5) and the impacts data (from Step 6) to complete a systems-level vulnerability assessment. The vulnerability assessment assigns a vulnerability score to each exposed asset. These scores can be ranked to prioritize which assets should receive detailed facility-level assessments first (Step 8C). The results can also inform several other agency actions to enhance resilience (Steps 8A, 8B, and 8D). There are three general approaches for conducting vulnerability analyses being used at the time of publication (note that there are many variations on these approaches and also hybrid approaches, but for ease of understanding we boil it down to three primary techniques): Matrix approach: This approach develops a matrix (table) that is used to qualitatively assign a vulnerability score to each asset. Most often, this table is based on a qualitative defini- tion of risk—risk being the likelihood of the hazard/threat occurring multiplied by the consequences if the hazard/threat does occur. The rows in the table typically represent the likelihood of exposure, and the columns represent the magnitude of the consequences or vice versa (Figure 4). Depending on available data, the scoring of the likelihood of the hazard/threat and the associated consequences if the hazard/threat occurs can be based on qualitative (e.g., expert opinion) or quantitative (e.g., empirically based analysis) information; either way, each cell in the matrix represents a qualitative integration of this information (typically into some form of low, medium, or high vulnerability score). If the scoring is largely based on qualitative information, the results tend to be subjective and, therefore, may change depending on the resources and/or stakeholders engaged. In practice, a risk matrix approach will likely review GIS overlays of asset types with hazards to identify system-wide exposure, costs, and consequences over time for each hazard and threat. This information can inform general awareness of potential system impacts. Indicators approach: This type of approach identifies indicators, proxies, or criteria that, taken together, represent asset vulnerability. The approach essentially calculates a vulner- ability index for transportation assets. For climate-related physical hazards, many state transportation agencies have used an indicators approach framing that considers whether the asset may be exposed (exposure), whether the asset is sensitive if it is exposed (sensi- tivity), and whether there are already available means to cope that reduce the potential consequences from the exposure (adaptive capacity). These indicators are then given scores based on the indicator value and combined to provide an overall vulnerability score. This approach can be scaled and applied asset-by-asset. A more general exposure-consequence framing can also be used with the indicators approach. Whichever framing is used, the indicators approach can be applied to assess multiple scenarios (e.g., what-if scenarios, C H A P T E R   9 Determine Vulnerability and Prioritize Responses (Step 7)

104 Mainstreaming System Resilience Concepts into Transportation Agencies: A Guide future changes in climate, and so on). There are understood challenges with indicator approaches such as the selection in input criteria, standardization of data, determining the importance of criteria (weighting), integrating the relationships between them, and validating the results. Another option, a variant of the indicators approach, is to consider multi-criteria analyses such as the analytical hierarchy process (AHP) and the analytic network process (ANP). For example, one study applied a multi-criteria approach to assess transportation vulnerabilities by (1) calculating how a disruption to a system of transportation assets and related economic assets in one sector of the economy impacts other sectors and the region as a whole due to the interdependencies and (2) applying hierarchical holographic modeling to capture the influence of multiple levels of disruption that reflect the impacts across sectors such as power, transportation, communication, and supply chains on the transportation network and operations. Through risk filtering, the stakeholders could then focus on those sources of risk that are most critical. FHWA has developed a publicly available indicator-based tool, the Vulnerability Assessment Scoring Tool (VAST), for transportation practitioners interested in an indicators approach (FHWA 2018). VAST uses the more traditional index form of an indicators analysis as opposed to multi-criteria analysis. Challenges with vulnerability indices include them being (1) hard to interpret in terms of actual impacts, (2) the fact that they provide only a relative ranking across the assets compared, and (3) results can be hard to communicate and justify (e.g., Why is one asset’s index-based vulnerability score 71 while another is 54?). In addition, which indicators are chosen can have a signifi- cant impact on the vulnerability results and, as such, should be used selectively and with purpose. For example, in some instances, asset condition does not always serve as a reason- able criterion for whether an asset will fail or be damaged if exposed to a hazard. Another drawback is that generally there is more confidence in estimating some indicator values over others; however, it is challenging to weigh the confidence accurately to integrate this uncertainty into the results in a meaningful way. Monetization approach: This approach, significantly more complex than the others, uses a quantitative, risk-based framing to provide the most quantifiable and perhaps understandable vulnerability assessment results as they relate to transportation investment Note: Rows correspond to the likelihood of the hazard/threat occurring, and the columns correspond to the degree of consequence if the hazard/threat occurs (L = Low, M = Medium, H = High, E = Extreme). Each row and column generally has a range of values (e.g., moderate financial consequences may be assigned to $200,000–$500,000). Figure 4. Example of a risk matrix.

Determine Vulnerability and Prioritize Responses (Step 7) 105   and system management strategies. For a given individual asset, the hazard/threat-to- damage curve is combined with the probability of a hazard/threat occurring at the critical thresholds to produce damage curves as a function of the frequency of the hazard/threat occurring. The monetized consequences of the loss of service of the asset are folded into the hazard/threat-to-damage curves for a more comprehensive estimate of economic loss. If the hazard/threat is anticipated to change over time, particularly over the lifetime of the asset, an additional step is needed that projects the predicted damage costs over time. All assets are then ranked to identify which assets suggest significant damage without intervention. Also, those consequences that cannot be monetized could be qualitatively applied to shift the rankings before finalizing the results. This approach provides dollar estimates in response to the loss of each of the assets over time, information that is more easily understood in support of prioritizing assets for more detailed study (and getting a high-level estimate of an agency’s financial exposure to hazards/threats along the way). It should be noted that approaches for assessing vulnerability, screening, and prioritizing as found in the nation’s seismic refitting program offer good examples of an approach similar to what is being suggested in Step 7 (FHWA 2006). A fully mature agency will have conducted sophisticated and well-vetted all-hazards and threat analyses that consider the interdependencies across other sectors, with the findings disseminated across the agency and the methodologies and approaches to vulnerability mainstreamed in agency practice. Capability Factors and Levels of Maturity Factor 7.1: Have you characterized the vulnerability of each asset to each hazard? Vulnerability analyses can range from a basic understanding of which hazards and threats will likely cause system disruption (based on qualitative discussions in workshops) to compre- hensive quantitative assessments. The level of analysis conducted informs an appropriate scale of decision-making. A basic understanding of asset vulnerability might prove useful in inform- ing a transportation research plan and/or for growing agency awareness across stakeholders. A more comprehensive and quantitative analysis, however, is desirable in that it provides more useful and understandable information in support of informed decision-making. This factor utilizes all the analyses conducted in Steps 5 and 6 to develop as comprehensive an understanding as possible of the vulnerability of each asset to each hazard. The levels are tied to the various vulnerability assessment approaches described above. • Level 1: We have used the matrix approach to characterize the vulnerability of individual assets to each hazard/threat. • Level 2: We have used the indicators approach to characterize the vulnerability of individual assets to each hazard/threat. • Level 3: We have used the monetization approach to characterize the vulnerability of individual assets to each hazard/threat. Factor 7.2: Have you characterized the vulnerability of each asset for all potential hazards/threat and hazard/threat combinations? This factor combines the findings of the prior factor to identify how the assets are vulner- able across all hazards and threats. An agency can develop its own transparent methodology to determine how best to compare identified vulnerabilities across hazards/threats for each asset.

106 Mainstreaming System Resilience Concepts into Transportation Agencies: A Guide Vulnerability/Risk Assessments The terminology of resilience, particularly when considering extreme weather/climate change, has in the past included usage of the terms “vulnerability” and “risk,” often interchangeably. The cross-pollination of these terms in the past has sometimes sewn confusion in the transportation field and created a disconnect when the perspective was expanded to include an all-hazards perspective, where a different structure was utilized—one where risk was the only guiding consideration (this is especially the case in the human threats assessment community). One of the primary factors that contributed to the past disconnect was the approach employed by the IPCC toward defining the implications of climate change on various systems (natural, human, etc.). In earlier documentation, the IPCC referred to vulnerability (not risk) as the final determining outcome and the basis on which decisions were to be made. This structure has been carried into processes that are widely documented in past practices, including in the transportation profession. The term “vulnerability assessment,” in the context of climate change, has wide- reaching recognition in the transportation profession, and, therefore, it is recognized as an important structural element of this document. In its latest release of information (AR5), the IPCC adopted a framework that focuses assessments more toward a risk-based perspective, restructuring the elements and identifying vulnerability as one of the primary factors (with probability) (IPCC 2014). Note, however, that this use of the term “vulnerability” is narrower than used before, more akin strictly to asset sensitivity to a hazard/ threat (a use of the term common in the risk analysis community) than it is to the broader definition that has been used traditionally by IPCC and transportation climate vulnerability assessments. Moving forward, given the IPCC change in guidance and other considerations, risk-based climate assessments are anticipated to become more common and vulnerability-based framings less so. This will lead to a change in terminology and approach, particularly as more probabilistic and cost-based data are developed to facilitate risk-based analysis. This guide outlines both vulnerability-based and risk-based approaches to systems-level vulnerability analyses and identifies the methods by which assessments are generated for each. A full (quantitative) risk-based approach, whereby the probability of an event is multiplied by its likely impact costs, is presented as a Level 3 approach (referred to in this guide as the “monetization approach”). A qualitative risk-based approach is presented as a Level 1 approach (referred to in this guide as the “matrix approach”). The more traditional vulnerability-based framing is presented as a Level 2 approach (referred to in this guide as the “indicators approach”). In some regions, hazard combinations—that is, hazards that could occur sequentially or in tandem—are a concern. In those instances, one can review the vulnerability scores across all hazard/assets combinations to identify which assets are most vulnerable to more than one hazard/ threat as well as the degree to which the assets are vulnerable. This effort becomes subjective when using the matrix approach. An indicators approach provides an empirical means of combining indicator scores into an overall vulnerability score for the asset. A monetization approach is ideal as it naturally allows for the probability of the event and the corresponding impacts that have been monetized. That said, the joint probabilities of various hazard/threat combinations happening can be challenging to quantify.

Determine Vulnerability and Prioritize Responses (Step 7) 107   The major distinction among the maturity levels for this factor is defined as the degree to which your agency characterizes the vulnerability of each asset for all potential hazards. • Level 1: We have used the matrix approach to qualitatively consider all possible hazards and developed a final cross-hazard vulnerability score for each asset (e.g., low, medium, or high). • Level 2: We have combined the indicator scores for each hazard to develop an all-hazards vulnerability score for each asset. • Level 3: For each asset, we have summed the estimated “do-nothing” costs for each hazard to create an estimated life cycle cost if no actions are taken. Factor 7.3: Have you developed a prioritized list of vulnerable assets? This factor considers the following to develop a prioritized list of vulnerable assets: (1) the results of the previous factor (i.e., identifying the vulnerability of each asset for all potential hazards and hazard combinations), (2) input from key stakeholders and the general public, and (3) your agency’s needs and mission. If all considerations are applied in the prioritization of vulnerable assets for a detailed assessment in Step 8C, then your agency has reached a Level 3 maturity. The major distinction among the different levels of maturity in this factor is the degree to which resources have been applied to develop a list of vulnerable assets for detailed assessment. • Level 1: We used vulnerability scores and agency policy considerations to develop a prioritized list of assets for more detailed assessments. • Level 2: We have achieved Maturity Level 1. In addition, we have reviewed the vulnerability scores with staff responsible for the different assets and adjusted the priorities accordingly. • Level 3: We have achieved Maturity Level 2. In addition, we have cross-referenced the vulnerability scores to planned projects in our capital program. Factor 7.4: Have you communicated the prioritization of assets to agency staff and key external constituencies? Once an agency has a prioritized list of vulnerable assets, it is important that key agency staff and external constituencies understand how the list was developed, and they are given an opportunity to provide feedback on the prioritization. This is important to ensure the prioritized list is actionable and aligned with department considerations. In addition, this helps determine which agency departments are responsible for critical assets. The distinction in maturity levels in this factor reflects the degree to which agency staff and key external constituencies have been engaged in reviewing the prioritized list. • Level 1: We have held an internal meeting on prioritization with relevant staff. We have identified agency points of contact who have reviewed the prioritization. • Level 2: We have a formal working group that has reviewed the prioritization method and findings. The working group is charged with updating the methodology as appropriate. Key external groups have been briefed on the results of the prioritization assessment. • Level 3: We have achieved Maturity Level 2. In addition, we have cross-walked the high- priority assets with agency unit responsibilities. We have conducted workshop(s) and/or webinar(s) to discuss the prioritization methodology and preliminary findings with key external stakeholders. We have incorporated consensus feedback from these external stake- holders and transparently revised the prioritization. The results of the prioritization are part of our agency’s resilience communications strategy to inform key constituencies and the public on how our agency is proactively implementing our resilience strategy. Table 18 shows the factors that are included in the self-assessment tool. The maturity levels for each factor are presented in the descriptions of each factor.

Maturity Factor Level 1 (1 point) Level 2 (2 points) Level 3 (3 points) 7.1 Have you characterized the vulnerability of each asset to each hazard? We have used the matrix approach to characterize the vulnerability of individual assets to each hazard/threat. We have used the indicators approach to characterize the vulnerability of individual assets to each hazard/threat. We have used the monetization approach to characterize the vulnerability of individual assets to each hazard/threat. 7.2 Have you characterized the vulnerability of each asset for all potential hazards/threats and hazard/threat combinations? We have used the matrix approach to qualitatively consider all possible hazards and developed a final cross- hazard vulnerability score for each asset (e.g., low, medium, or high) We have combined the indicator scores for each hazard to develop an all-hazards vulnerability score for each asset. For each asset, we have summed the estimated “do-nothing” costs for each hazard to create an estimated life cycle cost if no actions are taken. 7.3 Have you developed a prioritized list of vulnerable assets? We used the vulnerability scores and agency policy considerations to develop a prioritized list of assets for more detailed assessments. We have achieved Maturity Level 1. In addition, we have reviewed the vulnerability scores with staff responsible for the assets and adjusted the priorities accordingly. We have achieved Maturity Level 2. In addition, we have cross-referenced the vulnerability scores to planned projects in our capital program. 7.4 Have you communicated the prioritization of assets to agency staff and key external constituencies? We have held an internal meeting on prioritization with relevant staff. We have identified agency points of contact who have reviewed the prioritization. We have a formal working group that has reviewed the prioritization method and findings. The working group is charged with updating the methodology as appropriate. Key external groups have been briefed on the results of the prioritization assessments. We have achieved Maturity Level 2. In addition, we have cross-walked high- priority assets with agency unit responsibilities. We have conducted workshop(s) and/or webinar(s) to discuss the prioritization methodology and preliminary findings with key external stakeholders. We have incorporated consensus feedback from these external stakeholders and transparently revised the prioritization. The results of the prioritization are part of our agency’s resilience communications strategy to inform key constituencies and the public on how our agency is proactively implementing our resilience strategy. Score Range Description of Agency Maturity in Determining Vulnerability and Prioritizing Responses 0 to 5 Your agency is emerging into this area and has taken initial steps to begin to identify which assets are vulnerable. 6 to 10 Your agency has implemented several vulnerability and prioritization activities and has a sense of which assets are responsible for the greatest risk to the transportation system. 11 to 12 Your agency has reached significant maturity in comprehensively prioritizing vulnerable assets drawing on expertise, agency mission and needs, and vulnerabilities. The major focus should be on maintaining and enhancing existing efforts when appropriate and taking advantage of enhancing and validating current practices and findings whenever possible. Table 18. Assessment table for Step 7: Determine Vulnerability and Prioritize Responses.

Determine Vulnerability and Prioritize Responses (Step 7) 109   Recommended Actions to Maintain the Highest Level of Agency Resilience Capability The highest level of capability for Step 7: Determine Vulnerability and Prioritize Responses focuses on continual improvement in agency engagement, vulnerability analyses, and priori- tization criteria to rank assets by their vulnerability. If your agency has reached Maturity Level 3 of agency capability, the steps that can be taken to maintain this level include: • Update the prioritized list as new analyses from Step 5 and Step 6 occur. • Periodically reassess the prioritized list of assets to ensure the ranking continues to correspond to agency needs and mission. • As your agency units and personnel evolve, consider including new agency stakeholders to review the methodology and the prioritized list. Also, continue to include external partners. • Consider developing and periodically updating a plan of action to provide milestones and a timeline of when specific vulnerable assets will be further analyzed. • Update your agency’s communications strategy and documentation with the results of the latest vulnerability assessment. If you did not score a 12 in the assessment (a perfect score in Level 3 efforts), identify those factors that were rated lower and identify a strategy or action steps to improve these particular components of Step 7. Recommended Actions to Achieve Higher Levels of Resilience Capability If you scored at Maturity Levels 1 or 2, you are still in your evolution toward a more resilience- oriented agency. In such a case, the top managers of the agency should identify which of the factors in Table 18 were most lacking and determine priorities for implementing approaches for vulnerability assessments and prioritization. Table 19 is offered as a template to determine which steps your agency can take to improve your agency’s resilience capabilities, who should be responsible, the timeframe for implementa- tion, and expected outcomes. Table 19. Actions to achieve a higher level of maturity for Step 7: Determine Vulnerability and Prioritize Responses. Let’s do this. (check) Action Re sp on si bi lit y? Ti m ef ra m e? Ex pe ct ed ou tc om es ? For different asset types, develop methodologies for combining physical and socioeconomic costs that may occur over the asset life span by scenario, time period, and hazard. Monitor the process of using the information from Step 5 as input to Step 6. In addition, monitor how the results of Step 6 are used in subsequent steps. (continued on next page)

110 Mainstreaming System Resilience Concepts into Transportation Agencies: A Guide Chapter 9 References FHWA. 2006. Seismic Retrofitting Manual for Highway Structures: Part  1 – Bridges. FHWA-HRT-06-032. Jan. McLean, VA. Accessed September 23, 2020, from https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/research/ infrastructure/bridge/06032/06032.pdf FHWA. 2018. Vulnerability Assessment Scoring Tool. Website. Washington, DC. Retrieved June 30, 2020, from https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/sustainability/resilience/tools/ IPCC. 2014. Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report: Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri and L.A. Meyer (eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland Useful Resources AASHTO. 2011. Transportation Asset Management Guide: A Focus on Implementation. Washington, DC. Retrieved June 30, 2020, from https://books.google.com/books/about/AASHTO_Transportation_Asset_ Management_G.htm l?id=sQyOx_u2cgIC Bye, P., L. Yu, S. Shrivastava, and S. van Leeuwen. NCHRP Report 753: A Pre-Event Recovery Planning Guide for Transportation. Transportation Research Board of the National Academies, Washington, DC. Retrieved June 30, 2020, from https://doi.org/10.17226/22527 DHS. 2018. Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA) and Stakeholder Preparedness Review (SPR) Guide: Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 201, 3rd ed. Retrieved March 28, 2021, from https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-04/CPG201Final20180525.pdf FHWA. 2017. Incorporating Risk Management into Transportation Asset Management Plans. Washington, DC. Retrieved June 30, 2020, from https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/asset/pubs/incorporating_rm.pdf FHWA. 2017. Vulnerability Assessment and Adaptation Framework, 3rd ed. FHWA Report. FHWA-HEP-18-020 Washington, DC. Retrieved June 30, 2020, from https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/environment/sustainability/ resilience/adaptation_framework/ Let’s do this. (check) Action Re sp on si bi lit y? Ti m ef ra m e? Ex pe ct ed ou tc om es ? Identify critical agency stakeholders and external partners who are crucial for supporting prioritization. Establish a means of collaborating with these groups in the assessment and prioritization processes. applied and the resulting rankings. Map the prioritized assets to agency unit responsibilities. Possible steps for Step 4: Implement Early Wins Develop communication materials that describe the methodologies Table 19. (Continued).