Deploying Transportation Resilience Practices in State DOTs (2021)

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10 Chapter 1: PROJECT CONTEXT, RESEARCH OBJECTIVES, AND APPROACH Introduction Large-scale disruptions to transportation systems are one of the realities of today’s world. In the case of extreme weather, events over the years have demonstrated—often with tragic consequences—that many transportation agency assets, as well as other public and private assets, are at risk of failure. Over the long term as climate change exacerbates these threats, these risks are likely to increase for many different types of transportation assets and in different regions of the nation. Transportation systems are also one of the most vulnerable targets of terrorist attacks worldwide. And in an increasingly connected digital world, cyberattacks have become an ever-increasing threat to transportation system operations. In 2020, another type of disruption—the global COVID-19 pandemic—led to major disruptions in international, national, state, and local transportation systems across all modes of transportation. COVID-19 highlighted the dependence on, and importance of, the transportation and logistics supply chains for medical supplies and equipment. Transportation system resilience has always been a critically important, if under-recognized, characteristic of effective system performance. It is becoming more so with the growing awareness of the consequences of disruptions to the transportation system. No matter the cause, the loss of transportation assets leads to significant consequences for system users, the economy, and to society in general. The level of preparedness and capacity to withstand, as well as to respond to, disruptions is one of the key challenges facing transportation officials today. The array of transportation agency preparation, response, and recovery efforts to system disruptions has often reflected the fragmentation of professional expertise and responsibility, ranging from transportation incident management and response, to issues of security and safety, and to extreme weather events and the slow onset of climate change. What has been lacking among many—probably most—public sector transportation organizations is a well-integrated, high-level approach to tackling resilience issues where synergies, as well as competing concerns across a breadth of resilience issues, can be addressed. Such an approach should be developed with the same level of policy thinking, strategic context, resource deliberations, and performance oversight that has traditionally been afforded to capital investment, long-range planning, project development, and delivery processes for transportation system and service improvements. Research Purpose The purpose of this research is to develop a set of tools and products for agencies interested in achieving a “resilience-focused” culture in their organizations. Two major research products in support of this purpose was the development of a Resilience Guide and Self-Assessment Tool for use by transportation officials and organizing a RISE (hereafter referred to as the Summit). RISE was structured to share insights and best practices among state DOTs and others that support mainstreaming resilience concepts throughout an entire organization. NCHRP Project 20-117 was part of a larger American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (AASHTO)/NCHRP vision of how system resilience and producing a resilience-focused culture in

11 state DOTs could be encouraged. Many of the Transportation Research Board’s (TRB’s) Cooperative Research Program (CRP) projects have examined some facet of system resilience. The results of such research were used as input into this project. Two projects in particular, NCHRP 20-59(54), “Transportation System Resilience: Research Roadmap and White Papers” and NCHRP Project 20-59(55), “Transportation System Resilience: CEO Primer & Engagement” were intended to lead directly into the research products of this project. Research Approach Figure 1 shows the overall research approach for this project. Task 1 conducted a literature search on several key bodies of literature that were considered critical inputs into developing the research products. Importantly, examining the concept of resilience from a systems perspective was an important perspective because by doing so leads to the identification of important factors that must be considered in any organizational strategy to enhance the concept of resilience in agency actions. A systems perspective also points to the interaction of different actors/players in the institutional structure for implementing resilience strategies. Task 2 collected information on current state DOT efforts to enhance transportation system resilience. Originally, the intent was to survey state DOTs, but it was discovered that such a survey had already been conducted as part of NCHRP Project 20-05/Topic 48-13 leading to NCHRP Synthesis 527, Resilience in Transportation Planning, Engineering, Management, Policy, and Administration (Flannery, et. al. 2018). The NCHRP 20-05/Topic 48-13 researchers shared the results of the survey with the research team for this project. In addition, to gather additional information on state DOT resilience activities, state DOT officials attending the Summit were asked to prepare a conference poster that identified key actions that were part of their resilience strategy. A compendium of these posters was produced as a product of this research. See Transportation RISE 2018 Attendee Posters Compilation. The next two tasks laid the basic structure of two major research products. Task 3 developed a proposed structure and plan for the Summit, speaker topics, the poster session, and workshops. Task 4 provided an outline for the Resilience Guide and Self-Assessment Tool. Task 5 prepared materials that provided input into the Summit and the Resilience Guide and Self- Assessment Tool. The intent was to prepare enough of the Resilience Guide and Self-Assessment Tool prior to the Summit so that attendees could provide input and feedback on the materials. Other materials, such as case studies, tool and method descriptions, and Summit handouts were also prepared. Task 6 organized and managed the Summit. As will be described in a subsequent section, the Summit was organized to provide exposure to all aspects of a transportation agency’s strategy for transportation system resilience. See Transportation RISE 2018 Summit/Peer Exchange Final Program. Task 7 summarized the results of the Summit, which were used to develop the final Resilience Guide and Self-Assessment Tool in Task 8. Task 9 examined the strategies for disseminating research products and fostering the implementation of resilience-oriented actions and strategies.

12 Task 10 produced the final research products -- this final report and other dissemination products such as a PowerPoint presentation. Task 1: Identify Resilience Characteristics Task 3: Develop Summit and Peer Exchange Plan Task 4: Develop Resilience Guide and Self-assessment Tool Outlines Task 5: Develop Pre-Summit Materials including Draft Guide and Toolkit Materials Task 6: Conduct Summit/ Peer Exchange Task 9: Beyond the Summit: Dissemination to Deployment Task 7: Develop Summit/ Peer Exchange Report Task 8: Finalize Resilience Guide and Self- assessment Tool Task 10: Prepare Draft and Final Report for Project Task 2: Review State DOT Resilience Efforts Figure 1: Research Approach Organizational Perspectives on Transportation System Resilience The results of CRP resilience research suggest that the study of resilience and its relationship to the characteristics of system disruptions is multi-faceted and complex. It requires a solid understanding of transportation system and service vulnerabilities; a grasp of the nature and range of potential disruptions; and a thorough awareness of likely impacts on the economy, society, and on myriad aspects of transportation agency operations. Research has shown that among the key challenges in sustaining attention to resilience as a high-profile, mainstreamed agency topic are the infrequency and unpredictability of sudden shock events and the lack of immediate urgency for slow-onset, long- timeframe disruptions. This research began with the following perspectives on the nature of system

13 disruptions and how they relate to an organization’s capacity to prepare, respond to, and recover from such disruptions. Interconnected and Cascading Network Disruptions - Much of the attention in the resilience research has focused on natural “system shock” events such as floods, hurricanes, tornados, and the like; and human-caused shock events such as the imminent threat or reality of terrorist attacks, catastrophic structural failures, and cyberattacks. However, it is often not just the one extreme event in isolation that is the only concern. Multiple, interrelated disturbances—such as floods that cause structural failures or snow and ice storms that cause extremely disruptive traffic events, which occur within the same area over a short time period—can compound impacts while undercutting efforts to respond and recover. Clusters or rapid sequences of relatively moderate events may cause more damage and disruption than more powerful single events (National Intelligence Council and U.S. Intelligence Community 2016). Infrastructure State of Good Repair - Failure to address aging infrastructure has a potential multiplier effect on the impacts and consequences of infrastructure failure. In some ways, this is as important as the other threats mentioned above— Hurricane Katrina would not have had such a disastrous impact had there not been deferred maintenance and delayed levee improvements. Superstorm Sandy would not have had such severe consequences to New York City’s transit system had the subway flood doors been maintained. The potential consequences to the transportation system and to surrounding communities from the combination of poorly maintained infrastructure condition and system shocks is an important aspect of understanding the role of state DOTs and system resilience. This is also true for non-transportation infrastructure whose failure could significantly impact transportation facilities (e.g., the 2020 dam collapses in Michigan that resulted in downstream bridge and road failures). Organizational Commitment and Capability – There is a wide variance in transportation agency commitment and attention to transportation system resilience issues. With respect to extreme weather events, some states have adopted systematic approaches to understanding the likely future risks of changing weather conditions, while others have done relatively little. Many states that have experienced major natural disasters have undertaken, or are in the process of supporting, studies to examine network vulnerabilities and risks. States like Alaska, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Oregon, and Washington have led the way in applying risk concepts to system operations. The Federal requirement for risk-based asset management systems has begun the process of more formally incorporating such concepts into the state DOT’s investment decision-making processes. State DOTs also suffer from staff turnover (as do sister response/recovery agencies) that can impact agency capacity to plan for, respond to, and recover from system disruptions. A state with strong capabilities today may lose that status with the retirement of a few key staff members. Unlike the more traditional practices of engineering, such as bridge and highway design, where the numbers and experience levels of staff provide a better position to sustain an “engineering design culture,” the much more limited depth and breadth of technical and institutional knowledge and experience associated with operations and emergency management, so important to a culture of resilience, can be undermined with a few key staff departures. In some respects, there is a need for DOTs to be resilient against the planned and predictable event of key staff turnovers in the emerging areas connected with resilience.

14 The state-of-the-practice for system resilience among state DOTs presents a mix of strong capability and commitment in some areas and relatively little progress in others. Providing insights into the challenges and potential barriers to implementing a transportation system resilience perspective was considered a critically important aspect of this research in structuring an impactful Summit agenda and providing an insightful Resilience Guide and Self-Assessment Tool. Agency Readiness - State DOTs that have begun to address their vulnerabilities and risks in light of potentially catastrophic disruptions invariably become deeply concerned about their readiness to respond quickly and effectively to the range of threats that might plausibly (and perhaps, to some degree, implausibly) disrupt the transportation system and services for which they are responsible. They would naturally be concerned about their ability to gain a timely and reliable assessment of the damage and disruption, and what it would take to get the affected or alternative transportation facilities and services back into operation as quickly as humanly possible. They would be concerned about their readiness to respond to the need for information and communication with the governor and with other elected officials; with partner federal, state and local agencies such as law enforcement, fire and rescue, emergency coordinators and other transportation agencies; with the media (traditional as well as through social media); and with individuals and groups of citizens whose homes, livelihoods, and communities may be affected. The DOTs would be concerned about their ability to prioritize their efforts in restoring at least some stopgap service, while pulling out all stops to expedite the recovery process. State DOTs would also be concerned about the safety and well-being of their staff as they undertake immediate and longer-term actions to provide temporary relief and ultimately resolve the emergency. State DOT leaders generally understand that a lack of preparedness in responding to threats of disruption, even those that are infrequent and difficult to predict, is not tenable. A combination of notable failures in recent years in responding to extreme weather-related events and heightened anxieties with respect to human-caused events such as terror attacks, amplified through 24/7 media coverage (both traditional and social media), have raised public awareness and expectations to new heights. Failure to anticipate and be positioned to deliver a substantive response to disruptive threats is not a viable option for decision makers. This should motivate agency leaders to consider an “all-in” agency approach to resilience awareness, strategies and actions. One of the ways of enhancing the readiness and response to system disruptions is to understand a priori what options and best practice examples are available, the roles and responsibilities of the different stakeholders involved, the barriers that might diminish the effectiveness of an organization’s response, and proactive strategies for surmounting those barriers. Total Agency Involvement – Well-performing companies have recognized that consistent excellence in customer service cannot be the responsibility of a compartmentalized customer service department, but must be infused in the values, culture, and practices of the entire enterprise. So too, improving the resilience of transportation systems and services in the face of an array of potential threats cannot be the sole responsibility of individual organizational units. Planning for, and then acting upon, responses to disruptive threats must involve the entire organization, from planning and environmental staffs to engineering and operations. Engineers working on future improvements should be thinking about how their projects could be affected by future disruptions, and how such risks might be reduced. Right of way

15 staff may well become involved in securing staging areas for pre-positioning resources and staging areas. Maintenance forces will almost invariably serve on the front lines of emergency responses in providing people, materials, equipment and the “know how” to deploy these resources in a safe and effective manner and in concert with other responders. Despite the fact that few if any state DOTs have established “total agency involvement” in resilience issues, most are increasingly recognizing the need to demonstrate that predictable, long-term threats, as well as less predictable sudden threats are being planned for in a strategic sense across their organizations. While most if not all state DOTs have a long way to go in this regard, there is a growing recognition that this includes not only vulnerability assessments and generalized contingency planning, but also the design and deployment of resilience-oriented improvements in the physical system of infrastructure as well as in the operational strategies and processes involved in the management of transportation facilities and services. This also means identifying and committing financial resources and establishing effective institutional arrangements with a range of other agencies and organizations that will be critical partners in responding to different disruption contexts. Concern for resilience must also be accounted for in the internal management systems that are vital to the day-to-day functions of an organization. Anticipation of threats and the significance of resilience measures to protect the integrity of internal systems must be addressed early on, and they should include systems for asset management, financial management, equipment and materials management, program and project management, human resource management, and contract management. This latter system is often essential to procure and deploy contractors on an emergency basis. Internal and external data sharing, data management, and knowledge-sharing inside and outside the agency each become important components of a resilience-focused organizational culture. Interconnected and Intermodal Consequences - The interconnected and intermodal nature of the transportation system can be an important characteristic of a resilient system (e.g., providing modal substitutions when one modal network is disrupted). At the same time, significant disruptions to one part of a network or one sector of services can have a domino effect on other transportation system elements and services. In the freight sector, this is particularly evident given the range of economic activities that rely on a resilient and reliable transportation system to provide essential raw materials and resources, and to deliver finished products on just-in-time schedules along a supply chain extending across continents and oceans and affecting a vast multitude of stakeholders. In the case of human- caused, malicious disruptions, the targeting of transportation systems has the potential to result in profound long-term losses to the economy, but more critically can result in compromised lives and safety of people whose welfare and sustenance depends on the movement of vital goods or the provision of essential passenger transportation services. The 2020 COVID-19 pandemic has illustrated the two-way nature of the interconnections between transportation and other sectors. On one hand, the delivery of medical supplies and equipment and other products was highly dependent on a functioning supply chain system that itself was heavily affected by the pandemic (the supply side of transportation). On the other hand, the highly volatile and changing market and demand for goods resulted in major shifts in the need for transportation. For public passenger modes, the shutdown of major cities resulted in 90 to 95 percent reductions in transit

16 ridership resulting in major cutbacks in service. And yet many essential workers were dependent on transit to access their jobs. On a smaller scale, but no less important to those affected, the loss of service for a critical bridge on a busy highway bypass, which might arise from an unexpected finding in a routine structural inspection, could cause massive disruption along the surface streets of the community served by the bypass as well as to the people and goods that are attempting to move through the area. System interdependencies can also affect network performance among different infrastructures. For example, an electric grid that experiences brownouts during extreme temperature events could cause electric rail networks to curtail service; or a failure in a water main or in the capacity of a storm sewer may result in a flooded and severed transportation facility; or a bridge that carries utilities over a river could disrupt utility service if the bridge itself was damaged. Where the resilience of the transportation facility or service is directly related to the resilience of other infrastructure over which transportation officials have little or no control, the risks associated with this interconnectedness must be considered in any effort to assess system vulnerabilities comprehensively. Multi-agency Responses - Key parts of a broad resilience systems perspective, e.g., critical infrastructure, infrastructure protection, all hazards response, and system risk management, have their own set of operational characteristics. This suggests that agencies outside the purview of the DOT, e.g., emergency management, public safety agencies, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), FHWA and the like, will have critical roles in responding to system disruptions. These roles will vary by type of disruption and how long the effects are likely to last. In many ways, this is the approach taken by DHS in its operational concept for incorporating system resilience into its activities. The DHS broadens the perspective of system resilience from simply the actions of individual agencies, and notes that, “In the public and private sectors, the ability of critical systems and key functions to fully recover from a catastrophe depends on the pre-planned as well as ad hoc actions and reactions of staff, contractors, volunteers, and ordinary individuals” (DHS 2007). Depending on the type of disruption, DHS noted that the characteristics of resilience could include personal, organizational, community, infrastructure, state, national, and global factors. Thus, system resilience must be viewed from beyond the agency boundaries and address such questions as how transportation system resilience can effectively support community resilience in the broadest sense. DOT leadership in agencies that are advanced in their resilience culture are likely to become personally engaged in the process of building partnerships and establishing working relationships at all levels with other agencies in assessing commonly-faced risks, and in formulating and directing the implementation of response and recovery strategies. They are likely to have thought about the need for some degree of redundancy to compensate for partner agencies that may, for whatever reason, be unable to fulfill their roles in responding to system and service threats. They are also likely to be engaged in communicating their strategies and actions in terms of how they will minimize the adverse economic and social impacts of system and service disruptions. They will be advocates for inter-agency, table top, and field exercises to test how well their contingency plans translate into demonstrable and harmonized action.

17 Report Organization Chapter 2 summarizes the key transportation system resilience literature. This review examined alternative definitions of “resilience,” a systems perspective on resilience, characteristics of disruptions, and measures of resilience. Chapter 3 summarizes the RISE meeting and presents the key findings. The Resilience Guide and Self-Assessment Tool is presented in Chapter 4. As noted earlier, the guide and tool are published in a separate research document. Chapter 5 discusses possible implementation strategies for the results of this research, with an emphasis on how a policy and organizational focus on system resilience could be encouraged. Chapter 6 presents the research conclusions. Appendix A contains the RISE program.