Deploying Transportation Resilience Practices in State DOTs (2021)

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18 Chapter 2: LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESILIENCE DEFINITION Introduction This literature review examined four major topical areas. The next section examines alternative definitions of resilience as offered by a range of disciplines. The following section investigates a systems perspective on resilience, with includes looking at transportation’s role in a broader community resilience as well as an organizational systems context on organization change and adaptation for resilience-related strategies. The next section discussed the literature on disruption impacts and system adaptation. The final section examines efforts at measuring resilience with the literature organized in five major parts—metrics concerning disruption responses, asset condition measures, transportation systems or network-level resilience, community resilience, and organizational effectiveness and/or performance. This literature on resilience topics is vast, and thus difficult to summarize in a comprehensive way. Accordingly, the review focused on key reports/studies that illustrated the type of literature found for each topic. Secondly, other CRP-sponsored research projects have conducted their own literature reviews. The literature review for this project did not repeat what had already been done; these other literature reviews were referenced as important resources. Those interested in additional literature on resilience (other than what is discussed here) are referred to the Transport Research International Documentation database supported by TRB (https://trid.trb.org/). Alternative Definitions of Resilience In an organizational sense, the meaning of “resilience” depends on what responsibilities an individual manager has, the types of disruptions the agency is facing, and the level of resources available for addressing the impacts and consequences of these disruptions. Figure 2 illustrates this point by noting that those responsible for resilience-type actions in a transportation agency are likely to view them very differently depending on their individual responsibility. A wide range of resilience definitions are found in many different fields of study. Examples of this range from non-transportation-specific sources include: • “The ability to prepare and plan for, absorb, recover from, and more successfully adapt to adverse events” (The National Academies 2012) • “Resilience” refers to a system’s ability to absorb shocks. When national-security experts and risk managers talk about resilience, they’re often thinking about “recovery”—protecting “normal” life, and how quickly we can rebound to “normal” after a disaster. Others think of “resilience” and “sustainability” as synonyms” (Carson 2013) • “The ability to resist, absorb, recover from, or successfully adapt to adversity or a change in conditions,” and also, “The ability of systems, infrastructures, government, business, and citizenry to resist, absorb, recover from, or adapt to an adverse occurrence that may cause harm, destruction, or loss of national significance” (Kahan 2009)

19 Figure 2: Perspectives on Resilience Will Vary by Where You Sit at the Table • “The ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions. Resilience includes the ability to withstand and recover from deliberate attacks, accidents, or naturally occurring threats or incidents” (Office of the President 2009) The literature review led to three categories of resilience that were important perspectives for this research: • Transportation systems resilience • Transportation operational resilience • DOT organizational resilience Transportation Systems Resilience Some of the earliest work on transportation system resilience occurred in the 1970s in response to Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries oil embargoes when declining supplies of petroleum imports caused many transportation officials and agencies to examine the resilience of the transportation system to this external “shock.” Since the mid-2000s, the volume of research and reporting on system resilience in its many aspects within the transportation community has become

20 voluminous and dispersed throughout the TRB modal and subject area domains. As of January, 2019, for example, 219 security-, emergency management-, and infrastructure protection-related planning and implementation projects had been initiated through TRB programs. Of these 194 of the projects had been completed; 19 projects were in progress; and six projects had contracts pending or were in development (CRP 2019). Prior to 1995, the terms ‘resilience’ and ‘resiliency’ did not receive widespread attention in the transportation community (except for the oil shortage shocks of the 1970s as noted above). One of the first systematic applications of the term ‘resilient infrastructure systems’ is found in the governmental and research literature concerning earthquakes, especially associated with communities and their vital infrastructures (water, communication, electric power, transportation, etc.). The discussion of transportation system resilience also gained saliency following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (AASHTO 2017). AASHTO and others have summarized the many different transportation-sourced definitions of resilience offered by both the academic community and government agencies (AASHTO 2017). The recommended perspective from AASHTO, and the one adopted in this research project, is that system resilience becomes an overarching framework that ties together key aspects of governmental and private-sector response, as well as the internal operations of individual agencies. However, for purposes of establishing the boundaries of what transportation system resilience definitions include, the following definitions span a variety of transportation modes and agencies. • “The ability of a system to provide and maintain an acceptable level of service or functionality in the face of major shocks or disruptions to normal operations. A system of systems characterization across ‘lifeline systems’ including power, water, connectivity, and mobility with a focus on providing these essential services first. Self-diagnosing, self-healing, and self-repairing systems that have fewer long-term service disruptions and lower life-cycle costs. Systems that are sustainable, energy efficient and performance-based” (AASHTO and TRB 2013) • “The ability to anticipate, prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand, respond to, and recover rapidly from disruptions” (FHWA 2014) • “The ability for the system to maintain its demonstrated level of service or to restore itself to that level of service in a specified timeframe.”(Heaslip et. al. 2010) • “A characteristic that enables the system to compensate for losses and allows the system to function even when infrastructure is damaged or destroyed” ( Pitilakis et. al. 2016) • “A system’s ability to accommodate variable and unexpected conditions without catastrophic failure” (Victoria Transportation Institute 2019) • “The ability for the system to absorb the consequences of disruptions to reduce the impacts of disruptions and maintain freight mobility” (Ta, et. al. 2009) • “The ability to anticipate, prepare for, and adapt to changing conditions and withstand, respond to, and recover rapidly from disruptions such as significant multi-hazard threats with minimum damage to social well-being, the economy, and the environment” (Federal Transit Administration (FTA) 2015)

21 For purposes of this project, the working definition of resilience offered by The National Academies was adopted: The ability to prepare and plan for, absorb, recover from, or more successfully adapt to adverse events (The National Academies 2012) This definition contains some key phrases that are inherent to a good approach leading to a more resilient transportation system. “Prepare and plan” by its very definition implies a structured approach or framework that allows officials to anticipate possible disruptions and then identify potentially successful strategies for minimizing the consequences. “Absorb, recover from, or more successfully adapt” suggests different types of strategies that can be considered by those responsible for the transportation system. Absorbing the impact(s) suggests that a facility or system has been designed with the capacity to handle disruptions, that there is perhaps redundancy in the network to allow traffic flows to bypass the disruptions, albeit with reduced performance (such as the 2017 I-85 bridge deck collapse in Atlanta that severed one of the busiest interstates in the nation). Recovering from a disruption implies that resources are in place to not only remove the disruption as quickly as possible, but also an ability to bring an asset or facility back to the pre-disruption functional performance. From the bridge deck collapse example in Georgia, the response of the Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT) in expediting the building of the replacement bridge deck is a good illustration of a recovery strategy. Adapting to adverse events suggests that lessons learned from a disruption are incorporated into the standard operating procedures of the responsible agencies. For example, Superstorm Irene in Vermont in 2011 resulted in more than 2,400 roads, 800 homes and businesses, 300 bridges, and a half dozen railroad lines destroyed or damaged. In response, the Vermont Agency of Transportation (VTrans) redefined its design approaches for bridges and culverts such that heavy water flows that are anticipated with expected future climate conditions can be handled more efficiently. In other words, the standard operating procedures for providing transportation capacity in the state have been redesigned to provide a better adaptability of the physical infrastructure to future weather-related stresses. A resilience perspective in transportation planning and decision-making does more than simply focus on keeping traffic flowing during disruptive events. It points to the interrelationships among the many different agencies and organizations that must collaborate to promote system resilience; it shows a linkage to other policy goals that rely on a functional transportation system; and increasingly in many communities it is a prerequisite for obtaining good bond ratings. Transportation Operational Resilience Maintaining or restoring transportation system operational capacity during disruptions can be a considered a subset of overall transportation system resilience. However, the literature indicates that the resilience of transportation system operations has been a focus of transportation agency actions and thus deserves separate attention. The term "transportation operational resilience" has two prominent meanings in the literature:

22 Locks and Dams 52 and 53 The approximate $3 billion Olmsted Locks and Dam project to replace the Locks and Dams 52 and 53, completed in 2018, was the US Army Corps of Engineers’ (USACE) largest civil works project since the construction of the Panama Canal. Construction delays and cost overruns coupled with negative publicity helped spur political support and changes in original project funding. The Water Resources Reform and Development Act of 2014 (WRRDA) reduced the federal share of the project to 15% and limited Congressional appropriations for the project to a minimum of $150 million annually until project completion (USACE 2017). Incorporating lessons learned from the Olmsted project’s challenges, WRRDA made several reforms to the project delivery process, including requiring US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to: • Employ risk-based cost estimates with confidence levels of at least 80% • Appoint certified project managers for capital improvement projects • Identify best practices for waterways project delivery • Create a portfolio of standard designs for locks • Submit annual financial plans for projects costing over $500 million The project offers several lessons for resilience practitioners, including the importance of risk-based cost estimates, use of portfolios of standard designs and best practices that address project risks, and the risk of megaprojects with large cost overruns can cause systemwide funding shortages. Photo: USACE Olmstead Locks and Dams website

23 • The ability to maintain or restore normal traffic operations under a range of conditions; and • The ability to maintain or restore mission-critical business processes. The state-of-the-practice in transportation system resilience varies considerably across the nation. Most attention has been given to incident response. This has occurred in a broader state DOT strategy of investing in strong transportation system management and operations (TSM&O) capabilities. Most of the nation’s major metropolitan areas have some form of traffic management strategy for responding to incidents and for minimizing the associated disruptions to system operations. What began as real-time management of traffic and response to incidents has matured and expanded within many DOTs to more robust emergency response capabilities involving a broader array of threats and disruptions, building upon both internal resources and evolving relationships with other emergency response agencies. Many state DOTs have forged agreements, and conduct formal exercises, with emergency response agencies to foster improved coordination in responding to natural and human-made disasters. Outside of traffic operations, operational resilience receives significant attention in protecting, maintaining, and recovering from disruptions to mission-crtical business processes. Generally, this follows the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) Core Framework for community resilience which consists of five concurrent and continuous functions—Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover. (Software Engineering Institute 2016; NIST undated). In short, the focus is on an ability to maintain or restore normal community activities under a range of conditions. Cybersecurity is another area were operational reslience is a critical concern. The DHS Cyber Resilience Review (CRR) process is a qualitative self-assessment tool for organizations to help evaluate their operational resilience and cybersecurity practices and their ability to manage operational risks to critical services and their associated assets (DHS 2019). One of the foundational principles of the CRR is, “the idea that an organization deploys its assets (people, information, technology, and facilities) in support of specific operational missions (i.e., critical services).” The CRR assesses ten domains: • Asset management • Controls management • Configuration and change management • Vulnerability management • Incident management • Service continuity management • Risk management • External dependency management • Training and awareness • Situational awareness

24 Each domain represents important capabilities contributing to the operational resilience of an organization. More specifically, each domain is composed of a purpose statement, a set of specific goals and associated practice questions unique to the domain and a standard set of Maturity Indicator Level (MIL) questions, similar in concept to the maturity levels in a capability maturity model (CMM). Organizational Resilience Physical transportation infrastructure attributes can be identified and countermeasures introduced to improve system resilience. However, what is often left unsaid in the literature other than by implication is that achieving resilient infrastructure requires DOTs to be organizationally and operationally resilient themselves. This leads to the definition of organizational resilience. The literature on how organizations face a changing environment often uses the term “resilient” in describing successful organizations. Although not directly linked to developing a resilient transportation system (that is, a resilient transportation system could be a product of an organization that is itself not “resilient”), the idea that a state DOT’s efforts at providing a resilient transportation system are related to a resilience-oriented agency culture is an important foundation for the transportation resilience literature. A resilience-oriented state DOT culture leads to such questions as: What does a resilience- oriented state DOT culture look like? How does a state DOT evolve to such a status? Further, how is such a culture sustained over time, along with sustaining the resilient transportation systems, particularly with evolving institutional responsibilities and increasingly constrained resources? The concept of examining an organization's capability or effectiveness from the perspective of its structure, processes, procedures, information flows and level of collaboration is not new. Much of the early work on organization behavior and effectiveness (1960s and 1970s) focused on structural issues, which soon evolved into a "human" perspective whose major thesis was that an organization can only be as effective as those who are part of the organization (see, for example, [Beckhard 1969; Amitai 1975; Rainey 2009; and Barney 1986]). Research and organizational studies soon showed, however, that no matter how successful one was in identifying the causes or factors of low productivity or ineffective action, bringing about change in the organization was often a much bigger challenge than the process of identifying what was wrong. This led to an entirely new field of study on organizational change behavior, and in political science more targeted studies on the process of implementing policies and programs (and why they were not resulting in the outcomes they were designed to achieve). Although many organizations have implemented innovative practices (e.g., innovative finance, innovative contracting procedures, innovative public involvement techniques), organizations that developed and rewarded a culture of innovation were those always in leadership positions when fostering new ideas and approaches in a particular field. In other words, these organizations viewed innovation was as a part of the organizational culture rather than a one- or two-time experimentation with a policy or practice. That said, there is consensus across the management and organizational behavior literatures that organizational culture is difficult to change. It is interesting to note that very few transportation agencies have been the focus of such studies (see, for example [CTC and Associates 2015; Siekmeier et.al. 2015; and State Smart Transportation Initiative and Smart Growth America 2015]). Some researchers have looked at what makes a state transportation agency innovative, but most of these efforts simply list innovative practices and then note that

25 “leadership is necessary.” One area where transportation agencies have shown leadership among public agencies is in the application of CMMs to enhance aspects of their agency performance. Before discussing examples of CMMs and their application to transportation contexts, it is useful to transition to this discussion with a summary of the key concepts in organization theory and from the literature on organizational change that serve as the foundation for a CMM approach to state DOT self-assessment for resilience. The key concepts include: 1. Organizational effectiveness relates to the processes, organizational structure, human capital, and relationship capabilities that together support an organization's actions to achieve its goals. 2. For a public agency in particular success in many efforts well depend on successful collaboration with other agencies, groups and key stakeholders (in theory called interaction with the organizational environment). 3. For particular initiatives such as enhancing a state DOT's capability in resilience, the major leverage points or organizational enabling actions can be identified and become part of an organizational change strategy. 4. There are many potential institutional, personnel, technical, legal, and administrative factors that could constrain the ultimate achievement of successful change. However, by understanding the way in which organizations operate and behave, efforts to change the focus, culture and/or priorities can be directed and managed. 5. Although dramatic or substantive organizational change can occur in response to crises or change in leadership, in most cases, change can be managed in an evolutionary manner, usually staging increments in change that allow the organization to learn from prior experience. 6. A "healthy" organization is one that has processes in place to continually monitor the performance of the organization, identify strategies for change when necessary, and make the necessary changes to enhance overall performance (modified from [FHWA 2016a]). The CMM concept was developed for the information technology (IT) industry primarily because of the need for matching the requirements for software use to the ability of the organization and its staff to utilize it appropriately. Given the rapid change in IT, some approach was necessary to gauge whether organizations were ready to handle the requirements of new and changing IT capabilities. Although originally developed for organizations that were outcome-oriented and service-focused, CMM has now spread to other industries and sectors. The key concepts of a CMM approach include: Influence Factors -- the variables/factors that can enhance or degrade successful implementation, collaboration, or organizational change. These are called by different names in different CMM tools, such as domains and causal variables. Maturity Level -- the combined set of actions/strategies/policies/planning history that represents a user-specified level of maturity in this case relating to resilience. Different models usually identify from three to six levels of maturity. Usually knowing your current maturity level serves as a “point of departure” for the analysis, and is the focus of the self-assessment tool.

26 Maturation – changing the level of maturity of collaborative planning by using strategies targeted at specific influence factors. For example, establishing formal institutional mechanisms for fostering collaboration is likely an important step in institutionalizing what may have been done on an ad hoc basis previously. FHWA also identifies several “rules” for the application of the CMM tool that can be found in most applications. These include (taken from the FHWA guidance on CMM applications): • A set of action plan steps for each level are required for an agency to move up to the next level of capability, beginning from the point of departure indicated by the user's self-evaluation. The factors found at the lowest level of capability are usually the principal constraints to improvement in program effectiveness and therefore the highest priority to be addressed. • It is more difficult to improve capability in certain dimensions than others, as actions required may be at odds with the agency's legacy processes and organization, and/or outside the complete span of control of a given manager. However, each of the dimensions included is essential and must be addressed. Omitting improvement in any one dimension will inhibit the continuous improvement of program effectiveness. • For any dimension, maturity levels cannot be skipped. Each level builds on the technical and/or organizational readiness of the previous level. Steps taken for a given dimension usually need to be in place for a period of time (e.g., one year) to become embedded as the basis of the next level of improvement. • In each case, after the CMM user has proceeded through the self-assessment process, the tool will present guidance on how to improve performance. The self-evaluation questions probe the strengths and weaknesses of an agency's current capability in the key dimensions shown to be critical to improving effectiveness on a continuous basis. The evaluation provides a user with a starting place to develop agency actions to improve the effectiveness of the agency's activities. • Action plans can be developed to improve capability from the maturity level your organization is at indicated in the self-evaluation up to the next level and establish the basis for continuous improvement (which would include the use of tools and strategies that have been found in this research) (FHWA 2016b). There are several examples of a CMM-based self-assessment process that can serve as a model for the self-assessment tool proposed in this research. AASHTO National Operations Center of Excellence: This web-based, self-evaluation process examines an agency’s TSM&O efforts (AASHTO 2014). Templates are provided that indicate the current level of TSM&O maturity, the next level up, and for each dimension, the types of strategies in the form of an Action that serves as the basis for an agency TSM&O improvement program. Six key dimensions were determined to be the most important in terms of assessing capability: • Business processes including formal scoping, planning, programming and budgeting • Systems and technology including use of systems engineering, systems architecture standards, interoperability, and standardization

27 Georgia DOT (GDOT) Institutional Response to Serious System Disruptions On January 29, 2014, thousands of cars and trucks were stuck on ice-coated highways in the greater Atlanta area. The public safety implications of the storm’s consequences, and the perspective on the disaster as portrayed in the national press, caused state government and GDOT to reexamine its policies, strategies and institutional structures to respond to such events in the future (AASHTO 2018). Three years later, a fire-caused bridge deck collapse on one of the busiest interstates in Atlanta resulted in massive disruption to travel patterns in the Atlanta region. However, this second disaster was widely perceived as an example of a successful DOT response to unexpected system disruptions. To a large extent, the reason for this success related to the changes GDOT has implemented post-ice storm to enhance its capabilities in incident response. Such changes included : PLANNING AND DESIGN • GDOT has expanded its connection to the National Weather Service for improved advanced warning. • Road sensors were put in place to get a better handle on what is happening with respect to traffic conditions on the road network. • GDOT formed “strike teams” covering every section of Interstate that will respond to disasters having responsibilities for assessing initial damage and organizing DOT response to open the roadway as soon as possible. • GDOT engaged in many advanced planning efforts for possible disruptions, including with major tow truck operators who had a critical role to play in the ice storm. • Better coordination was developed for the release of employees among government agencies in anticipation of serious weather. • GDOT added a dedicated radio service to its and other agency communications that allowed all the agencies involved in the response to communicate and listen to what others were doing POLICIES AND REGULATIONS • The governor gave GDOT $15 million to make changes so that “it would never happen again.” Funds were focused on improved planning for emergency response and coordinated agency action. • Prior to the storm, the State Maintenance Engineer was responsible for response; a new position in Operations called Director of Emergency Operations was created to better coordinate future responses to system disruptions. • A new GDOT coordinated effort was established to not send GDOT teams into a disaster area without the state patrol accompanying them.

28 • Performance measurement including measures definition, data acquisition, and utilization • Culture including technical understanding, leadership, outreach, and program legal authority • Organization and workforce including programmatic status, organizational structure, staff development, and recruitment and retention • Collaboration including relationships with public safety agencies, local governments, MPOs and the private sector Four levels of maturity were defined: Level 1 - Activities and relationships largely ad hoc, informal and champion-driven, substantially outside the mainstream of other DOT activities Level 2 - Basic strategy applications understood; key processes support requirements identified and key technology and core capacities under development, but limited internal accountability and uneven alignment with external partners Level 3 - Standardized strategy applications implemented in priority contexts and managed for performance; TSM&O technical and business processes developed, documented, and integrated into DOT; partnerships aligned Level 4 - TSM&O as full, sustainable core DOT program priority, established on the basis of continuous improvement with top level management status and formal partnerships FHWA Business Process Frameworks for Transportation Operations: In support of an agency’s TSM&O efforts, FHWA has developed CMM-based self-assessment frameworks in seven topical areas (FHWA 2020; Scriba et. al. 2020). • Road Weather Management • Planned Special Events • TIM • Traffic Management • Traffic Signal Management • Work Zone Management • Active Demand Management The frameworks are intended to assess the current strengths and weaknesses and to help develop a targeted action plan for the program area. Traffic Incident Management Self-Assessment (TIM SA): The FHWA-sponsored TIM SA is benchmarking tool for evaluating TIM program components and overall TIM program success. The assessment is intended to provide local TIM program managers with a way to assess progress toward improved TIM practices. The self-evaluation tools consists of 31 questions that are grouped into three TIM areas -- strategic, tactical and support. Those assessing their TIM programs are able to assign from 0 to 4 points

29 to each criterion in the 31 questions. They can then see how the overall program effectiveness matches to others or how it changes over time. From Handshake to Compact: Guidance to Foster Collaborative, Multimodal Decision Making, A Practitioner’s Guide. TCRP Report 106/NCHRP Report 536: Campbell et.al. (2005) produced one of the first CMM tools used in transportation application. The Guide provided overall guidance on the characteristics of successful collaboration in transportation and on the steps that can be taken to enhance the probability of success. The CMM-based tool focused on several key dimensions of successful collaborations – foundational efforts to establish partnerships, leadership, effective processes, and organizational support. Another area of research that informed the concept of a resilient transportation agency relates to Enterprise Risk Management. NCHRP Project 08-93, which examined Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) as part of a state DOT’s responsibilities, explicitly incorporated the concept of risk into the organizational resilience definition (Proctor et.al. 2016). An organization’s willingness and ability to undertake risks to achieve its strategic objectives should influence its decision-making (in other words, as part of an organization’s culture). This is critical to the holistic integration of risk management in an organization. These concepts directly relate to organizational resilience when ERM is thought of as part of an agency’s resilience culture. By combining the key principles of CMM and ERM, an organizationally-resilient state DOT can be defined as: An organization that examines all organizational functions from the perspective of current status and that identifies actions to enhance organizational capacity. The concept of risk management has been integrated throughout all levels of the DOT such that priorities can be established to minimize the impacts and consequences of transportation system disruption. The self-assessment tool for this project was based on the principles for CMM and a resilience organization described above. A set of criteria relating to a resilience-focused organizational culture was identified. The self-assessment tool allows users to identify specific areas where agency leaders can make changes to promote a more resilience-focused agency. Depending on the score calculated in the self-assessment, different strategies can then be identified to improve organizational performance. A SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE ON RESILIENCE The majority of resilience definitions listed previously include the term “systems” (Martin-Breen and Anderies 2011). A transportation system consists of many different components including physical elements as well as operational service regimes, all of which must function together for the system to work successfully. Communications and internet systems, for example, include a multitude of components that present potential vulnerabilities to DOT operations. In a sector like transportation, where much of the management activity undertaken by DOTs is asset-oriented, a systems-based approach is essential to address how assets and operational functions interact. Viewing transportation resilience from a systems perspective makes sense for a variety of reasons. As noted by the Atlanta Regional Commission (ARC), a system resilience focus allows the transportation planning process to:

30 • Place greater emphasis on a reliable and efficient transportation system as a planning goal • Begin the process of putting in place safeguards to protect the transportation system and its users given projected future weather conditions • Emphasize the importance of physical network connections (cascading effects, dependencies, etc.) in determining transportation needs • Emphasize institutional partnerships and collaboration • Promote the consideration of the broader implications of transportation system resilience to other policy areas • Provide evidence for local government bonding requirements that infrastructure risk has been considered as part of the “due process” requirement • Help satisfy Federal requirements (ARC 2018) According to Argonne National Laboratories’ (ANL) Resilience: Theory and Applications, the uncertainty about network relationships, data gaps, and time and budget constraints can be partially addressed through a systems approach to resilience assessment. “In a systems approach, the extent to which the analysis addresses the resilience of the individual subsystems can vary. Specifically, high-level systems analysis can be used to identify the most important lower-level systems. In turn, within the most important lower-level systems, site assessment data should be collected only on the most critical asset-level components about which the least is known …. This means that “the most critical assets…inform the scope and focus of a resilience assessment….” (ANL 2012) A systems perspective accounts for network vulnerabilities and potential ripple effects—conditions created because of the interconnectedness and interdependence of transportation assets, systems, and functions. Systems interdependencies extend beyond transportation networks, facilities, and assets. In often interacting with other critical infrastructure networks, transportation systems are exposed to compounding effects wherein common-caused failures lead to interlinked consequences across diverse public and private stakeholders, potentially mitigated with coordination and collaboration among stakeholders (FEMA 2017). The National Infrastructure Protection Plan states that government and private-sector owners and operators of 16 critical infrastructure sectors should collaborate to manage risk and advance security and resilience outcomes and interdependencies of physical, economic, and social systems (DHS 2013). Volume II of the Plan identifies specific critical infrastructure systems (e.g., energy, communications, water and wastewater, transportation), and identifies applicable metrics, standards, codes, and lists for implementing community resilience plans. These critical infrastructure systems are referred to as value-driven, complex adaptive systems that have the following characteristics: • Sustained diversity and individuality of components • Localized interactions among these components • Autonomous processes that based on the results of local interactions select a subset for replication or enhancement from among those components (Martinson 2017).

31 With respect to transportation agencies, NCHRP 20-05 Topic 48-13 noted that a broader systems perspective on resilience is required due to three primary barriers to incorporating resilience into state DOTs’ management practices: • Lack of understanding of how resilience is related to risk assessment • Lack of metrics to measure system resilience and the benefits expected from resilience investments • Lack of clear direction as to how system resilience can affect mandated transportation performance measures such as safety, infrastructure health, system operations, and vice versa (Flannery et. al. 2018) For those agency functions dependent on internet capability, a systems perspective also recognizes that the transportation sector has rapidly evolved into a cyber-physical system that is embedded within the larger cyber-physical world. And has been seen in all sectors, these systems are highly susceptible to cyberattacks. Transportation and Community Resilience NIST frames the issue of community resilience in terms of a community’s capital, i.e., financial (economic), built (physical), political, social, human, cultural, and natural resources (NIST 2016a). Its guidance focuses on built capital (i.e., buildings and infrastructure systems), with a strong emphasis on how built capital supports other capital resources within a community, especially social capital. Social needs relate to the desired performance of a community’s buildings and infrastructure systems, particularly to “prepare for and adapt to changing conditions.” These changing conditions can include both natural conditions such as extreme weather events, rising sea levels, etc. and changing human- induced conditions such as increased use of wireless technologies and alternative energy sources impacting travel demands and forms of travel. It is instructive to consider how the relationship between the concept of community and transportation has been considered in the context of the National Preparedness Goal (FEMA 2017). A community system is an important building block for DOT roles in state, regional, and national transportation systems that are critical to achieving the National Preparedness Goal. First, there are numerous transportation related “dependencies” within social institutions that ultimately link with and to state, regional, and national transportation systems. These dependencies are linked both directly and indirectly and may have cascading impacts wherein a failure, disruption, or change in one part of the social system induces failure, disruption, or change in another. An illustration of this is the transportation service for community service organizations (CSOs). CSOs need transportation to provide services to clients, staff, volunteers, and for the transport of products. The possible direct impacts of disruptions to this service relates to the inability of current at-risk populations to obtain food, water, and shelter; the indirect impacts could include the public health consequences to these populations and to the community at large if these basics are not available. Adopting a community systems perspective when considering options for transportation system resilience in certain situations allows one to broaden the identification of impacts and consequences of implementing resilience actions (Martinson 2017).

32 DISRUPTION IMPACTS AND SYSTEM ADAPTATION The literature on disruptions and on strategies to adapt to such disruptions is vast and diverse, with the range in literature reflecting the type of disruption being considered and the context of the disruption itself. The following discussion summarizes some of the key contributions of this literature as they relate to understanding better the actions that can be taken to enhance transportation system resilience. Disruption Characteristics Range of Disruptions - Many different types of natural and human-caused disruptions and/or aspects of such disruptions need to be considered as part of a resilience-focused agency culture. Looking at the Transit Cooperative Research Program (TCRP)/National Cooperative Freight Research Program (NCFRP)/ Airport Cooperative Research Program (ACRP)/NCHRP projects that have examined different types of transportation system threats and corresponding responses, one sees a range of potential disruptions. For example, NCFRP Report 39, Freight Transportation Resilience in Response to Supply Chain Disruptions, categorized disruptions as: • Abrupt events – disruptions that occur with zero to extremely little advance notification. These could be natural events such as earthquakes, tsunamis, or manmade events such as terrorist attacks, bridge failures, fires, and technology failures. These events show very little to no prior warning signs. Advance notification of such events could be measured in minutes or hours. • Rapid events – disruptions that occur with little to moderate advance notification. These could be natural events such as a hurricane, snow or ice storm, flood, or manmade events such as a labor strike or governmental failure to approve an operating budget. These events show some warning signs before occurring and notification could occur days in advance of the actual event. • Planned/Predictable events – disruptions that can be anticipated and occur with an ample amount of advance notification or predictability. These could be natural events such as climate change, or manmade events such as a lock or bridge closure for preservation or replacement purposes. Advance notification of such events could be measured in weeks to years (Meyer et. al. 2019). The literature review for this NCFRP project also noted that the impact of a disruptive event, depending on its geographic scope, level of predictability, duration, and loss of lives and economic activity, could be classified as: • Severe – disruptive events that can affect national or international transportation and rank very high in terms of economic loss incurred, and/or due to many lives that are lost. Examples include the 2011 Japan Earthquake, the 2002 West Coast port shutdown, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, and the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic. • High – disruptive events that can affect national or regional transportation and rank high on economic loss incurred, and/or due to lives that are lost. Events such as the 2001 Baltimore rail tunnel fire that disrupted rail traffic along the eastern U.S. or the Midwest floods of 2015 can be considered as high impact events.

33 • Low – disruptive events that can affect regional or local transportation and rank low to moderate on economic loss incurred, and/or due to injuries incurred. Events such as the bridge closure on a major highway fall in this category. Duration – The duration of a system disruption will affect not only the overall impacts and consequences of the disruption, but for planning purposes expected duration will lead to needed strategies for coordinating action among the response/recovery agencies (Contestabile and Radow 2017). Figure 3 shows this concept. Disruption Types – Disruptions can come from many different sources. Where they come from and the nature of disruption (e.g., loss of the electrical grid) are examples of the important information transportation officials need to develop plans and strategies to avoid or at least mitigate impacts. Several studies have identified the types of disruptions likely to occur for different hazards and the likely impacts on the transportation system. Source: (Contestabile and Radow 2017) Figure 3: Incident Scale in Relation to Public Preparedness, Intergovernmental Multijurisdictional Involvement NCHRP Report 750, Vol. 2: This report was one of the first in the U.S. to examine the potential impacts of climate change to the nation’s highway/transportation network. The report presented a framework for conducting climate change adaptation analysis and outlined how climate change might affect the role and functions of transportation agencies (Meyer et.al. 2014). Table 1 was presented in the report as an illustration of possible impacts of extreme weather and climate change on transportation agency functions.

34 Improving the Resilience of Transit Systems Threatened by Natural Disasters: This report compiled into one table the potential impacts to public transit infrastructure and services of different natural disasters, threats, and hazards. Table does not group these impacts into larger categories. As shown in Table 2, the research categorized the impacts as a preliminary step to creating categories for a hazards and threats table. Hazards and threats were viewed as creating both impacts to transportation systems and challenges to the DOT organizations themselves All Hazards Approach This research has adopted an “all hazards” approach to mitigation and adaptation planning. The all hazards approach comes from emergency management and public health backgrounds. Some important concepts and definitions from this literature include: Medicare (Medicare 2017): An all hazards approach is an integrated approach to emergency preparedness planning that focuses on capacities and capabilities that are critical to preparedness for a full spectrum of emergencies or disasters, including internal emergencies and a manmade emergency (or both) or natural disaster. This approach is specific to the location of the provider or supplier and considers the particular type of hazards most likely to occur in their areas. FEMA (DHS 2009): “The following process for hazard mitigation planning is the same for natural, technological, and manmade hazards: • Identify and organize resources (create a planning team with representatives from the public and private sectors, citizen groups, higher education institutions, and nonprofits); • Assess risk (identify hazards and assess losses); • Develop a mitigation plan (identify mitigation actions that will reduce the effects of the hazard and create a strategy to prioritize them); • Implement mitigation actions, evaluate results, and update the mitigation plan accordingly.” DHS (undated): “The National Response Plan (NRP) is an all-discipline, all hazards plan that establishes a single, comprehensive framework for the management of domestic incidents …. The NRP assists in the important homeland security mission of preventing terrorist attacks within the United States; reducing the vulnerability to all natural and manmade hazards; and minimizing the damage and assisting in the recovery from any type of incident that occurs.” Ready.gov (Official website of DHS; undated): “Strategies for prevention/deterrence and risk mitigation should be developed as part of the planning process. Threats or hazards that are classified as probable and those hazards that could cause injury, property damage, business disruption or environmental impact should be addressed….In developing an all hazards preparedness plan, potential hazards should be identified, vulnerabilities assessed and potential impacts analyzed. The risk assessment identifies threats or hazards and opportunities for hazard prevention, deterrence, and risk mitigation. It should also identify scenarios to consider for emergency planning. The business impact analysis (BIA) identifies time sensitive or critical processes and the financial and operational impacts resulting from disruption of those business processes. The BIA also gathers information about resources requirements to support the time sensitive or critical business processes.”

35 Table 1: Summary Table of Climate Impacts on Highway System Climatic/ Weather Change Impact to Infrastructure Impact to Operations/ Maintenance Temperature Change in extreme maximum temperature • Premature deterioration of infrastructure; • Damage to roads from buckling and rutting; • Bridges subject to extra stresses through thermal expansion and increased movement. • Safety concerns for highway workers limiting construction activities; • Thermal expansion of bridge joints, adversely affecting bridge operations and increasing maintenance costs; • Vehicle overheating and increased risk of tire bow-outs; • Rising transportation costs (increase need for refrigeration); • Materials and load restrictions can limit transportation operations; • Closure of roads because of increased wildfires. Change in range of maximum and minimum temperatures • Fewer days with snow and ice on roadways; • Reduced frost heave and road damage; • Structures will freeze later and thaw earlier with shorter freeze season lengths; • Increased freeze-thaw conditions creating frost heaves and potholes on road and bridge surfaces; • Permafrost thawing leads to increased slope instability, landslides and shoreline erosion damaging roads and bridges due to foundation settlement (bridges and large culverts are particularly sensitive to movement caused by thawing permafrost); • Hotter summers in Alaska lead to increased glacial melting and longer periods of high stream flows, causing both increased sediment in rivers and scouring of bridge supporting piers and abutments. • Decrease in frozen precipitation would improve mobility and safety of travel through reduced winter hazards, reduce snow and ice removal costs, decrease need for winter road maintenance, result in less pollution from road salt, and decrease corrosion of infrastructure and vehicles; • Longer road construction season in colder locations; • Vehicle load restrictions in place on roads to minimize structural damage due to subsidence and the loss of bearing capacity during spring thaw period (restrictions likely to expand in areas with shorter winters but longer thaw seasons); • Roadways built on permafrost likely to be damaged due to lateral spreading and settlement of road embankments; • Shorter season for ice roads.

36 Climatic/ Weather Change Impact to Infrastructure Impact to Operations/ Maintenance Precipitation Greater changes in precipitation levels • If more precipitation falls as rain rather than snow in winter and spring, there will be an increased risk of landslides, slope failures, and floods from the runoff, causing road washouts and closures as well as the need for road repair and reconstruction; • Increasing precipitation could lead to soil moisture levels becoming too high (structural integrity of roads, bridges, and tunnels could be compromised leading to accelerated deterioration); • Less rain available to dilute surface salt may cause steel reinforcing in concrete structures to corrode; • Road embankments at risk of subsidence/heave. • Regions with more precipitation could see increased weather- related accidents, delays, and traffic disruptions (loss of life and property, increased safety risks, increased risks of hazardous cargo accidents); • Closure of roadways and underground tunnels due to flooding and mudslides in areas deforested by wildfires; • Increased wildfires during droughts could threaten roads directly, or cause road closures due to fire threat or reduced visibility. Precipitation Increased intense precipitation, other change in storm intensity (except hurricanes) • Heavy winter rain with accompanying mudslides can damage roads (washouts and undercutting) which could lead to permanent road closures; • Heavy precipitation and increased runoff are likely to cause significant flood damage to tunnels, culverts, roads in or near flood zones, and coastal highways; • Bridges are more prone to extreme wind events and scouring from higher stream runoff; • Bridges, signs, overhead cables, tall structures at risk from increased wind speeds. • The number of road closures due to flooding and washouts will rise; • Severe erosion at road construction project sites as heavy rain events take place more frequently; • Road construction activities will be disrupted; • Increase in weather-related highway accidents, delays, and traffic disruptions; • Increase in landslides, closures or major disruptions of roads, emergency evacuations and travel delays; • Increased wind speeds could result in loss of visibility from drifting snow, loss of vehicle stability/maneuverability, lane obstruction (debris), and treatment chemical dispersion; • Lightning/electrical disturbance could disrupt transportation electronic infrastructure and signaling, pose risk to personnel, and delay maintenance activity.

37 Climatic/ Weather Change Impact to Infrastructure Impact to Operations/ Maintenance Sea-level rise Sea-level rise • Higher sea levels and storm surges will erode coastal road base and undermine bridge supports; • Temporary and permanent flooding of roads and tunnels due to rising sea levels; • Encroachment of saltwater leading to accelerated degradation of tunnels (reduced life expectancy, increased maintenance costs and potential for structural failure during extreme events); • Loss of coastal wetlands and barrier islands will lead to further coastal erosion due to the loss of natural protection from wave action. • Coastal road flooding and damage resulting from sea-level rise and storm surge; • Underground tunnels and other low-lying infrastructure will experience more frequent and severe flooding; • Increase in number of road accidents, evacuation route delays, and stranded motorists. Hurricanes Increased hurricane intensity • Stronger hurricanes with longer periods of intense precipitation, higher wind speeds, and higher storm surge and waves are projected to increase; • Increased infrastructure damage and failure (highway and bridge decks being displaced). • More frequent flooding of coastal roads; • More transportation interruptions (storm debris on roads can damage infrastructure and interrupt travel and shipments of goods); • More coastal evacuations.

38 Table 2: Categories of Public Transit Infrastructure and Services Impacts Category of Impacts Public Transit Infrastructure and Services Impacts Electrical & Power Damage  Power failures  Power failures due to tree and debris damage  Power failures due to flooding of substations  Power failure/damaged electrical infrastructure from accumulating snow/ice, brown outs  Overheated electrical equipment  Sagging and/or failure of catenary systems  Auxiliary system failures at stations and on buses/trains due to increased use of air conditioning  Lightning strike damage to catenary lines, circuitry and switching systems • Damaged electrical transmission, signal systems and other circuitry associated with surface and subterranean facilities Asphalt Damage • Asphalt buckling • Asphalt heaving/potholes from freeze-thaw • Urban/street and riverine flooding from snow melt • Ground and embankment failure resulting in rail/pavement damage Rail Damage • Rail buckling • Rail fracturing • Gradual degradation of tracks/rail beds from increased freeze-thaw • Frozen rail switches • Track and tunnel misalignments • Ground and embankment failure resulting in rail/pavement damage Bridge Damage • Binding/locking of moveable bridges • Ice jams impacting bridges • Wind induced bridge vibrations/damage • Bridge pier and abutment scouring • Seismic damage to bridges Other Damage • Damage to signage and other overhead structures • Damage or replacement to bus shelters • Damage to stations and buildings (fixed facilities) • Damage to docks, levees, channels and dams necessary to maintain water-borne transit • Damage to fixed facilities located in the path of fire • Damage to fixed facilities such as stations (surface and subterranean), terminals, maintenance yards, garages and administrative offices located in low-lying areas • Ground and embankment failure resulting in rail/pavement damage

39 • Landslides, washouts, land subsidence and erosion along/adjacent to infrastructure • Erosion along/adjacent to infrastructure and bank destabilization • Failure of overwhelmed drainage systems • Damage from salt water intrusion to low-lying coastal infrastructure • Higher water tables and permanently flooded infrastructure is rendered inoperable • Flooding of waterside ferry terminals, docks and piers on a recurring basis • Infrastructure previously unaffected becomes vulnerable due to changing flood zones and exposure to salt water, tidal flooding and storm surge • Vegetation loss impacting erosion control and maintenance Information Systems Disruption • Disruption of passenger information systems Vehicle Damage • Vehicle overheating and excess wear and tear on vehicle components, such as air conditioning and tires • Frozen air lines on locomotives and gelling of diesel engine fuel • More rapid degradation of batteries utilized by rail and buses • Vehicle damage from blowing debris • Train derailment and overturned rail cars during event Impeded Travel • Slow travel orders due to equipment stress (vehicles, tracks, catenary) • Slow travel orders for vehicles operating under high wind conditions • Slow travel orders or annulments of service • Increase in rock falls from freeze-thaw • Freezing of waterways navigated by ferries • Restrictions on ferry operations • Reduction in bridge clearance on waterways • Delays due to snow/ice removal operations • Potential debris on tracks and across navigable waterways • Decrease in water levels restricting use of navigable waterways Direct Impacts to DOT Organization and Operations • Worker/customer health and safety concerns • Cessation of operations until flooding subsides and damage is repaired • Diminished visibility that impedes operations • Risks to employee/customer safety due to slippery walkways/platforms • Rerouting to undamaged areas • Widespread impacts resulting in extensive assessment and repair time • Stranded customers following event • Reduced capacity to implement emergency plans • Potential rerouting or cessation of services until danger has passed

40 • Employee health and safety concerns • Reduced visibility and safety Increased Vulnerability to Other Hazards • Increase in rock falls from freeze-thaw • Landslides, washouts, land subsidence and erosion along/adjacent to infrastructure • Infrastructure previously unaffected becomes vulnerable due to changing flood zones and exposure to salt water, tidal flooding and storm surge • Urban/street and riverine flooding from snow melt • Increase susceptibility to wildfires and the vulnerabilities such an event creates Source: (Matherly et.al. 2017) NCHRP Report 525, Volume 15: Costing Asset Protection: An All Hazards Guide for Transportation Agencies (CAPTA). (Science Applications International Corporation and PB Consult 2009): This report focuses on mainstreaming an “integrated, high-level, all-hazard, National Incident Management System– responsive, multimodal risk management process into major transportation agency programs and activities.” Resource allocation guidelines are recommended for transportation officials on safety and security investments. The guidelines are based on the following questions: • What hazards or threats do I face? • What event(s) concern me most? • What assets of high consequence do I have? • How can I avoid these hazards and threats? • How can I prepare myself for this disturbance if it does occur? • Where and when should I commit resources to address my concerns? Countermeasures are proposed for state DOT agencies that are within their purview. NCHRP Report 525, Volume 14, Security 101: A Physical Security Primer for Transportation Agencies (Frazier, et. al. 2009): This report examines a range of factors associated with physical security of transportation assets and facilities. It offers a risk management approach to identify where priority security investments should occur. Risk management is defined as a set of activities that a transportation agency can take to resolve identified risks. • Risk avoidance accomplished by eliminating the source of the risk • Risk reduction characterized by the implementation of actions that lower the risk to the agency • Risk spreading through the distribution of risk across various program areas or activities • Risk transfer by the use of insurance to cover costs that would be incurred as the result of a loss

41 • Risk acceptance, which reflects a knowledgeable determination that a risk is best managed by taking no action at all. The proposed steps for risk assessment included: 1. Identification and valuation of assets, 2. Enumeration of credible threats to those assets, 3. Documentation of applicable vulnerabilities, 4. Description of the potential consequences of a loss event, and 5. Production of a qualitative or quantitative analysis of resulting risks. The report notes that the identified risks should be reported in order of priority or severity and linked to some description of a level of risk. As noted in the report, “risk assessment answers the questions: What can go wrong? What is the likelihood that it would go wrong? What are the consequences?” MEASURING RESILIENCE Measuring system performance can support various agency decision-making processes. These include system performance tracking and analysis, identification of societal and system trends and issues, input into resource allocation and decision-making, communicating the status of the transportation system to external and internal stakeholders, and motivating agency staff to meet targets. Metrics are also useful in performing peer comparisons and identifying high-performing agencies to facilitate the sharing of institutional knowledge and practices. Measuring resilience helps agencies contribute to community resilience and support their organization’s resilience goals and objectives by determining whether expected progress is being made. Resilience metrics can also inform an agency’s risk management and risk-based asset management process and help determine whether a resilience investment or project should be implemented. Metrics thus support agency needs at various levels of the organization. Because the resources needed to implement performance measures are not insignificant, DOTs seek out best practices of performance management and measures development and implementation to ensure that the selected metrics will support agency goals and objectives. DOTs have a great deal of experience with performance metrics for a range of resilience-related purposes including the assessment of operations and TIM (e.g., reliability, travel time, clearance time) and safety (e.g., fatalities and injuries). A key challenge in developing and using credible resilience metrics is that they can be influenced by multiple factors and characteristics of a disruption such as time of onset, spatial and temporal extent, and its overall intensity. The target-setting and metric selection processes will likely be impacted by several questions: Do we look at all hazards or should performance measures be hazard-specific? If hazard-specific, what type of hazard? Scope/scale? No-notice event? Disaster phase? This section examines performance measurement as it occurs for different purposes—metrics relating to 1) individual disruptions, 2) asset conditions, 3) transportation systems or network-level resilience, 4) community systems, and 5) organization effectiveness and/or performance.

42 Disruption Response Metrics – Time to Recovery from Incidents Recovery time and functionality/performance are key elements of measuring infrastructure system resilience and operational resilience. As NIST states, community resilience performance goals are “defined by how quickly the functionality of infrastructure systems recover after a hazard event” (NIST 2016b). The NIST Community Resilience Guide (NIST 2016a) demonstrates the use of performance goals in increasing community resilience. A transportation infrastructure performance goals table in this Guide helps users, stakeholders and owners determine anticipated/current and desired/future performance goals. Hazard type is first identified and then the hazard level – routine, design, or extreme; the affected area size – local, community, or regional; and the transportation infrastructure system disruption severity - minor, moderate, or severe are assigned to the assessment of hazard risks, which includes the recovery time and response and recovery needs. The concept of a resilience triangle, often used to depict and measure resilience, features the time to recovery as a key metric of resilience (see Figure 4) (Adams 2012). Tierney and Bruneau (2003) first used the concept of a resilience triangle in earthquake disaster research. The resilience triangle relates the performance or functionality of infrastructure or system (the y-axis) with the time since disruption (the x-axis). Time to recovery is the period between when a disruption occurs and the asset performance regaining its original performance or condition. The smaller the area of the triangle, the more resilient the infrastructure or system. NIST’s Community Resilience Planning Guide for Buildings and Infrastructure Systems, Volume 1 (NIST 2016a) provides an example of recovery times for building cluster and infrastructure systems, and the transportation systems section of Volume 2 highlights the interdependencies of the transportation sector with other sectors (NIST 2016b). These other sectors included energy, communication, buildings/facilities, water/wastewater, and intermodal transportation. Incorporating these interdependencies into resilience measurement might require the collection of new data and analysis. Also, increasing interdependencies between the cyber and physical worlds add an additional layer of complexity if cyber capability is part of the threat being examined. For each hazard type, the NIST approach identifies and categorizes transportation infrastructure assets by function – ingress of goods, services, and disaster relief; egress/evacuation of people; and community recovery of building clusters and other community needs. Design hazard performance is defined in three recovery categories: Phase 1 – short term (0-3 days), Phase 2 – intermediate (1-12 weeks), and Phase 3 – months (4-36+ months). Restoration levels for infrastructure systems and building clusters are color- coded based on percent of function restored – 30%, 60%, or 90%, and anticipated performance of 90% for clusters. A support needed column indicates the required support anticipated in the plan: R = Regional; S= State; MS=Multi-State; C = Civil (Corporate/Local).

43 Source: (Adams 2012) Figure 4: Resilience Triangle For transportation systems operations, resilience measurement reported in the literature has also focused on this “bouncing back” aspect of resilience with the use of the resilience triangles, recovery times of function or performance, or surrogate metrics to represent recovery performance. This concept is found in NCHRP Report 708, A Guidebook for Sustainability Performance Measurement for Transportation Agencies (Zietsman et. al. 2011), and Fatarechi and Miller-Hooks (2015), Measuring the Performance of Transportation Infrastructure Systems in Disasters: A Comprehensive Review. Two transportation examples to measure resilience illustrate efforts to do so. Mississippi DOT’s (2010) “Framework for Calculating the Measure of Resilience for Intermodal Transportation Systems-The Measure of Resilience (MOR)” is a quantitative method used to measure post-event system resiliency. A MOR formula was developed based on a ratio of the reduction of the intermodal system performance after a disaster with respect to the system performance before a disaster. A Performance Index (PI), comprised of travel speed and truck miles traveled, is defined as “the ratio of the travel speed with respect to the free flow speed (FFS) weighted by truck miles traveled.” Pre- and post-event intermodal terminal level of service (LOS) of highway network and intermodal terminals was determined using mobility, reliability, flexibility, security, and accessibility metrics. Pre- and post-event intermodal origin- destination traffic was estimated using population and employment data. The Oregon Seismic Safety Policy Advisory Commission (OSSPAC) led the development of a plan to address performance gaps between current and resilient infrastructure performance through capital investment, incentives, and policy changes to prevent a Cascadia earthquake and tsunami disaster from

44 impacting Oregon’s economy and communities (OSSPAC 2013). Target states of recovery for transportation and information and communication systems were defined as: Target timeframe for transportation systems: • Minimal. A minimum LOS is restored, primarily for the use of emergency responders, repair crews, and vehicles transporting food and other critical supplies. • Functional. Although service is not yet restored to full capacity, it is sufficient to get the economy moving again—for example, some truck/freight traffic can be accommodated. There may be fewer lanes in use, some weight restrictions, and lower speed limits. • Operational. Restoration is up to 90 percent of capacity: A full LOS has been restored and is sufficient to allow people to commute to school and to work. Target timeframe for information and communication systems: • Operational: Restoration is up to 90% of capacity: A full LOS has been restored and is sufficient to allow people to use the system for non-essential activities (such as entertainment). 80%–90% • Functional: Although service is not yet restored to full pre-event capacity, it is sufficient to get the economy moving again (e.g. business uses for credit cards and banking). Limits may be placed on uses that take up a lot of capacity (such as streaming video). 50%–60% • Minimal: A minimum LOS is restored, primarily for the use of emergency responders, repair crews, and in support of critical health and human services (mass care). 20%–30% A color-coded table was developed showing for different roadways, bridges, and landslide disruptions the expected recovery times compared to targeted performance metrics in terms of percent operational functioning. Asset Condition Resilience to Disruption Asset condition is one of the most oft-used surrogates for a resilience metric. The focus of such metrics is on the physical ability of an asset to minimize or forego material disruption or failure. Bridge and asset security resilience metrics are good examples of this (similar indices are found for pavement condition and other asset categories found in a typical transportation agency). Asset Condition Measures FHWA Synthesis of National and International Methodologies Used for Bridge Health Indices – This Synthesis provides a description of U.S. and international practices in measuring bridge health (FHWA 2016c). The Synthesis states that bridge resilience metrics may be developed from the following information: regional conditions such as natural hazard zones, geotechnical features of the site, toughness, and resilience in the event of damage or failure. Performance Measures to Assess Resiliency and Efficiency of Transit Systems - Nassif, H. et al. (2017) proposed a conceptual framework to assess the performance and resilience of bridge structures in a transit network before and after disasters. The approach utilized structural health monitoring (SHM), finite element (FE) modeling, and remote sensing using Interferometric Synthetic Aperture Radar

45 (InSAR). On-site sensors on bridges was proposed to acquire damage information and then FE models would be used to assess post-disaster damage and resilience. National Performance Management Measures - “Assessing Pavement Condition for the National Highway Performance Program” and “Bridge Condition for the National Highway Performance Program,” Final Rule effective May 20, 2017 requires state DOTs to use the following condition-based performance measures for bridges (FHWA 2017d): • % of NHS bridges by deck area classified as in Good condition • % of NHS bridges by deck area classified as in Poor condition In addition, • State DOTs must “establish targets for all bridges carrying the NHS, and bridges carrying the NHS that cross a State border, regardless of ownership.” • State DOTs must “establish statewide 2- and 4- year targets by May 20, 2018, and report targets by October 1, 2018, in the Baseline Performance Period Report.” • State DOT bridge performance” targets should be determined from asset management analyses and procedures and reflect investment strategies that work toward achieving a state of good repair over the life cycle of assets at minimum practicable cost.” State DOTs have been using bridge management systems for many years, which are based on bridge condition indicators. For example, Caltrans includes a Bridge Health Index in its Strategic Management Plan with the following target: “By 2020, maintain 95 or better rating on Bridge Health Index.” An accompanying note states that targets will be achieved through the development and implementation of the Asset Management Plan (Caltrans 2015). Security Measures Security-focused bridge metrics can be identified and/or developed from: 1) FHWA Bridge Security Design Manual (FHWA 2017b), 2) FHWA Framework for Improving Resilience of Bridge Design (FHWA 2011), and 3) NCHRP Report 645 Blast-Resistant Highway Bridges: Design and Detailing Guidelines (Williamson et.al. 2010). Transportation infrastructure resilience can also be influenced by physical and cyber security and infrastructure protection, risk management and assessment, risk-based asset management, and interdependencies with other critical infrastructures (Countermeasures Assessment & Security Experts and Western Management and Consulting. 2019; FHWA 2013; National Infrastructure Advisory Council. 2015). For example, the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center’s Infrastructure Resiliency: A Risk-Based Framework describes resilient infrastructure systems as meeting three high-level performance criteria: efficiency – infrastructure systems perform specified functions at the lowest possible cost, sustainability – extent to which resources are used sustainability, and survivability – infrastructure is capable of withstanding damages with minimal adverse impacts (Volpe National Transportation Systems Center 2013).

46 Transportation Systems or Network-level Resilience Metrics The degree to which a transportation system provides a reliable trip experience is one of the more important transportation system resilience measures to decision makers. This has been consistently rated highly among transportation system users as an important system performance characteristic. Similar to federal requirements for condition measures, a Federal Rule has been promulgated requiring the reporting of national performance measures. The measures include: • Percent of the Person-Miles Traveled on the Interstate that are Reliable • Percent of the Person-Miles Traveled on the Non-Interstate National Highway System (NHS) that are Reliable • Percent Change in Tailpipe CO2 Emissions on the NHS Compared to the Calendar Year 2017 Level • Truck Travel Time Reliability (TTTR) Index • Annual Hours of Peak Hour Excessive Delay Per Capita Percent of Non-Single Occupant Vehicle (SOV) Travel • Total Emissions Reduction (FHWA 2017e) Note in this list of performance measures that the concept of “reliability” is the transportation system performance measure that comes closest to a metric for system resilience. In this case, reliability measures relate to the day-to-day performance of a transportation system, and not so much to unexpected disruptions. All things being equal, changing system performance could be related to the level and types of investment that have been made in the transportation system. Of course, all things are not equal, and with increasing population, the advent of newer and safer vehicle technologies, etc., travel behavior in reality responds to many different influences not under the control of transportation agencies. However, even with such a qualification, system performance measures can still provide useful information to the planning and decision-making processes. Summaries of how resilience has been defined in the context of transportation planning indicate that very few applications for performance measurement are found in the field (Caltrans 2015b). The most extensive application occurred in New Zealand where resilience was defined as having two elements -- a technical, systems performance element and an organizational element (New Zealand Transport Agency 2014). The technical element consisted of three components: robustness, redundancy, and what was referred to as “safe to fail.” ANL’s publications discuss resilience, risk, and related concepts. Much of its work, performed in conjunction with DHS, pertain to resilience measurement for all critical infrastructure sectors including transportation (ANL 2012, 2013a, 2013b, ANL 2010). This research produced the Resilience Measurement Index (RMI), Protective Measurement Index (PMI), Vulnerability Index (VI), and the Consequence Measurement Index (CMI).

47 Community Resilience Metrics Community metrics answer the questions: “How resilient is my community? Will my community‘s decisions and investments improve resilience? If so, how big of an impact will it make?” According to NIST, community resilience metrics will be accurate, reliable, comprehensive, scalable and adaptable, affordable, actionable; simple, open and transparent; well-documented; aligned with the community‘s goals and vision; address multiple hazards; able to be replicated by others; and characterize geographic extent, physical dimensions, and community members (NIST 2016a). Community resilience impacts and metrics are viewed much more broadly than single-use metrics. The data collection process often involves a combination of simplified modeling, past experience, and expert judgment. Types of community metrics are wide ranging and go beyond just physical damage and repair costs. As presented in NIST Community Resilience Guide, Volume 2 (NIST 2016b), they include: • Economic vitality, attracting/retaining businesses and jobs, tax base, poverty and income distribution • Survival, personal safety and security • Economic sustainability • Social well-being Also, a wide range of factors affect or are correlated with recovery times: • Design criteria • Hazard loads due to the event • Critical dependencies among the infrastructure and social structures • Spatial distribution and extent of damage • Resources and leadership available to improve or repair the infrastructure Nine community metrics were identified based on the following criteria (2016a): • Scope – “the breath[sic] of community sizes, hazard types and intensities, recovery time scales (e.g., short, medium, and long term), systems (i.e., different components of the built environment), and system dependencies.” • Utility – “the clarity and ease-of-use of the methodology, the extent of subject matter expert (SME) support required to implement the methodology, the value of the methodology outputs for planning, and how well the methodology and its outputs align with the definition of resilience.” • Impacts – “the extent to which the methodology addresses each of the first three types of metrics discussed in this chapter (i.e., recovery times, economic vitality, and social well-being).” NIST determined that “none of the nine methods reviewed (for assessing community risk) is uniformly strong in each of the three dimensions.” NIST suggested that combinations of the best features of these and emerging methods can be used to develop a new methodology.

48 According to NIST (2016b), a community’s social needs are expected to drive performance goals selected by the community. Socioeconomic, cultural, and political factors can result in increased vulnerabilities for special needs populations (NAACP 2016) and create equity issues that should by legislation be addressed (FHWA 2015). Also, despite the economic and environmental benefits of a program, the benefits could still be distributed inequitably (Zietsman, et. al. 2011). Community and context will be important factors in defining resilience for an agency and will have implications for setting transportation performance goals, metric selection, development, and target-setting. In some circumstances, such as urban environments, community and environmental context will be important factors in defining resilience strategies for an agency and will have implications for setting transportation performance goals, metric selection, development, and target-setting. Organization Effectiveness and/or Performance Relating to Resilience There are very few organizational metrics relating to resilience-related agency performance. Such metrics are different from the measures focusing on transportation system resilience. As noted earlier, the CMM literature does focus on organizational capacity and effectiveness relating to targeted subjects, but little attention has been paid to the effectiveness of implementing a system resilience program. Some studies that have included such a perspective include the following. Transit Resilience Guide, Volume 1 presented three types of transit resilience metrics - process and input metrics, output metrics, and outcome metrics (Matherly et. al. 2017): PROCESS AND INPUT METRICS • Routine maintenance protocols in place and are regularly completed • Standard • Operating procedures are in place to permit the safe shutdown of services when needed • Infrastructure design criteria address resilience issues and risk • Resilience considerations are included in asset management systems • Long-range capital plans include strategies to improve system resilience to extreme weather and potential climate change threats OUTPUT METRICS • Dollars invested in resilience projects • Percent of sensitive electrical/signal systems located in 100-year flood plain • Percent of personnel trained in emergency management plan procedures OUTCOME METRICS • Repair costs resulting from extreme weather events • Passenger hours of delay associated with weather events • Hours/days to return to full service after an event • Customer satisfaction with service performance under adverse conditions

49 Examples of effective practices from several U.S. agencies and from one international agency (Transport for London) are also provided in this report. Los Angeles Metro (LA Metro) Resiliency Indicator Framework: LA Metro created a resiliency indicator framework and used in this framework the definitions from the New Zealand Transport framework. Following the development of this framework, LA Metro developed a weighting system for a range of technical metrics that could be used in infrastructure decision-making (LA Metro 2015). The framework helps the agency "prioritize and evaluate climate adaptation implementation priorities to ensure infrastructure resilience and maintain a good state of repair." Metric scores in the framework are weighted and aggregated into a summary resiliency score using a 10-point scale (1 least resilient, and 10 most resilient). The measurement scale for each metric describes level of resilience in the following manner: 4 (Very High), 3 (High), 2 (Moderate), and 1 (Low) Sustainability: The sustainability literature such as NCHRP Report 708 A Guidebook for Sustainability Performance Measurement for Transportation Agencies (Zietsman, et. al. 2011) and resources such as FHWA’s Sustainable Highways Initiative site and the INVEST self-evaluation tool can also be helpful in thinking about system resilience metrics. In this case, resilience would consider the environment, ecological systems, equity, and community (FHWA undated).