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Science, Policy, and the Coast: Improving Decisionmaking (1995)

Chapter: 3 Challenges to Effective Use of Science in Making and Implenting Coastal ...

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Suggested Citation:"3 Challenges to Effective Use of Science in Making and Implenting Coastal ...." National Research Council. 1995. Science, Policy, and the Coast: Improving Decisionmaking. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/4968.
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Suggested Citation:"3 Challenges to Effective Use of Science in Making and Implenting Coastal ...." National Research Council. 1995. Science, Policy, and the Coast: Improving Decisionmaking. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/4968.
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Suggested Citation:"3 Challenges to Effective Use of Science in Making and Implenting Coastal ...." National Research Council. 1995. Science, Policy, and the Coast: Improving Decisionmaking. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/4968.
×
Page 29
Suggested Citation:"3 Challenges to Effective Use of Science in Making and Implenting Coastal ...." National Research Council. 1995. Science, Policy, and the Coast: Improving Decisionmaking. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/4968.
×
Page 30
Suggested Citation:"3 Challenges to Effective Use of Science in Making and Implenting Coastal ...." National Research Council. 1995. Science, Policy, and the Coast: Improving Decisionmaking. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/4968.
×
Page 31
Suggested Citation:"3 Challenges to Effective Use of Science in Making and Implenting Coastal ...." National Research Council. 1995. Science, Policy, and the Coast: Improving Decisionmaking. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/4968.
×
Page 32
Suggested Citation:"3 Challenges to Effective Use of Science in Making and Implenting Coastal ...." National Research Council. 1995. Science, Policy, and the Coast: Improving Decisionmaking. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/4968.
×
Page 33
Suggested Citation:"3 Challenges to Effective Use of Science in Making and Implenting Coastal ...." National Research Council. 1995. Science, Policy, and the Coast: Improving Decisionmaking. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/4968.
×
Page 34
Suggested Citation:"3 Challenges to Effective Use of Science in Making and Implenting Coastal ...." National Research Council. 1995. Science, Policy, and the Coast: Improving Decisionmaking. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/4968.
×
Page 35
Suggested Citation:"3 Challenges to Effective Use of Science in Making and Implenting Coastal ...." National Research Council. 1995. Science, Policy, and the Coast: Improving Decisionmaking. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/4968.
×
Page 36
Suggested Citation:"3 Challenges to Effective Use of Science in Making and Implenting Coastal ...." National Research Council. 1995. Science, Policy, and the Coast: Improving Decisionmaking. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/4968.
×
Page 37
Suggested Citation:"3 Challenges to Effective Use of Science in Making and Implenting Coastal ...." National Research Council. 1995. Science, Policy, and the Coast: Improving Decisionmaking. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/4968.
×
Page 38
Suggested Citation:"3 Challenges to Effective Use of Science in Making and Implenting Coastal ...." National Research Council. 1995. Science, Policy, and the Coast: Improving Decisionmaking. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/4968.
×
Page 39
Suggested Citation:"3 Challenges to Effective Use of Science in Making and Implenting Coastal ...." National Research Council. 1995. Science, Policy, and the Coast: Improving Decisionmaking. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/4968.
×
Page 40
Suggested Citation:"3 Challenges to Effective Use of Science in Making and Implenting Coastal ...." National Research Council. 1995. Science, Policy, and the Coast: Improving Decisionmaking. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/4968.
×
Page 41
Suggested Citation:"3 Challenges to Effective Use of Science in Making and Implenting Coastal ...." National Research Council. 1995. Science, Policy, and the Coast: Improving Decisionmaking. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/4968.
×
Page 42
Suggested Citation:"3 Challenges to Effective Use of Science in Making and Implenting Coastal ...." National Research Council. 1995. Science, Policy, and the Coast: Improving Decisionmaking. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/4968.
×
Page 43
Suggested Citation:"3 Challenges to Effective Use of Science in Making and Implenting Coastal ...." National Research Council. 1995. Science, Policy, and the Coast: Improving Decisionmaking. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/4968.
×
Page 44
Suggested Citation:"3 Challenges to Effective Use of Science in Making and Implenting Coastal ...." National Research Council. 1995. Science, Policy, and the Coast: Improving Decisionmaking. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/4968.
×
Page 45
Suggested Citation:"3 Challenges to Effective Use of Science in Making and Implenting Coastal ...." National Research Council. 1995. Science, Policy, and the Coast: Improving Decisionmaking. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/4968.
×
Page 46
Suggested Citation:"3 Challenges to Effective Use of Science in Making and Implenting Coastal ...." National Research Council. 1995. Science, Policy, and the Coast: Improving Decisionmaking. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/4968.
×
Page 47
Suggested Citation:"3 Challenges to Effective Use of Science in Making and Implenting Coastal ...." National Research Council. 1995. Science, Policy, and the Coast: Improving Decisionmaking. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/4968.
×
Page 48
Suggested Citation:"3 Challenges to Effective Use of Science in Making and Implenting Coastal ...." National Research Council. 1995. Science, Policy, and the Coast: Improving Decisionmaking. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/4968.
×
Page 49
Suggested Citation:"3 Challenges to Effective Use of Science in Making and Implenting Coastal ...." National Research Council. 1995. Science, Policy, and the Coast: Improving Decisionmaking. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/4968.
×
Page 50
Suggested Citation:"3 Challenges to Effective Use of Science in Making and Implenting Coastal ...." National Research Council. 1995. Science, Policy, and the Coast: Improving Decisionmaking. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/4968.
×
Page 51
Suggested Citation:"3 Challenges to Effective Use of Science in Making and Implenting Coastal ...." National Research Council. 1995. Science, Policy, and the Coast: Improving Decisionmaking. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/4968.
×
Page 52
Suggested Citation:"3 Challenges to Effective Use of Science in Making and Implenting Coastal ...." National Research Council. 1995. Science, Policy, and the Coast: Improving Decisionmaking. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/4968.
×
Page 53
Suggested Citation:"3 Challenges to Effective Use of Science in Making and Implenting Coastal ...." National Research Council. 1995. Science, Policy, and the Coast: Improving Decisionmaking. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/4968.
×
Page 54
Suggested Citation:"3 Challenges to Effective Use of Science in Making and Implenting Coastal ...." National Research Council. 1995. Science, Policy, and the Coast: Improving Decisionmaking. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/4968.
×
Page 55
Suggested Citation:"3 Challenges to Effective Use of Science in Making and Implenting Coastal ...." National Research Council. 1995. Science, Policy, and the Coast: Improving Decisionmaking. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/4968.
×
Page 56
Suggested Citation:"3 Challenges to Effective Use of Science in Making and Implenting Coastal ...." National Research Council. 1995. Science, Policy, and the Coast: Improving Decisionmaking. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/4968.
×
Page 57
Suggested Citation:"3 Challenges to Effective Use of Science in Making and Implenting Coastal ...." National Research Council. 1995. Science, Policy, and the Coast: Improving Decisionmaking. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/4968.
×
Page 58
Suggested Citation:"3 Challenges to Effective Use of Science in Making and Implenting Coastal ...." National Research Council. 1995. Science, Policy, and the Coast: Improving Decisionmaking. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/4968.
×
Page 59
Suggested Citation:"3 Challenges to Effective Use of Science in Making and Implenting Coastal ...." National Research Council. 1995. Science, Policy, and the Coast: Improving Decisionmaking. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/4968.
×
Page 60
Suggested Citation:"3 Challenges to Effective Use of Science in Making and Implenting Coastal ...." National Research Council. 1995. Science, Policy, and the Coast: Improving Decisionmaking. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/4968.
×
Page 61
Suggested Citation:"3 Challenges to Effective Use of Science in Making and Implenting Coastal ...." National Research Council. 1995. Science, Policy, and the Coast: Improving Decisionmaking. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/4968.
×
Page 62

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~2 Challenges to Effective Use of Science in Malting and Implementing Coastal Policy THE ROLE AND LIMITATIONS OF SCIENCE AND POLICYMAKING At the very heart of the issue of the use of science for policymaking is the fact that science is concerned with inquiry, description, and explanation, whereas policymaking is concerned with governance of human behavior. Science is supposed to be value-free, whereas policymaking is normative, reflecting societal values, by definition. Although it is clear that there is no value-free science, every attempt is made by responsible scientists to identify their assumptions and biases and try to minimize the latter. The policymaking process must identify value orientations and then work toward addressing community values (Hammond and Adelman, 1976~. Science should hold to the standards of objectivity, reliability, and validity. Policymaking should reflect human values, advocacy, and leadership. In this sense, scientific results can only answer policy questions of the form: What will happen to (X) if human behavior is changed in the manner (Y)? Science can never answer policy questions of the form: What should happen to (X)? Science can sometimes answer questions of the form: If we wish to have (X), what different values of (Y) will yield (X)?, but only after applications of the theories, methodologies, resources, time frames, and analytical capabilities available to the scientist for the particular question at hand. Social science can help us understand the distribution of beliefs, perceptions, and norms among a constitu- ency against which various objectives, alternatives, and their impacts can be 27

28 SCIENCE, POLICY, AND THE COAST measured, but even social science cannot be normative in and of itself (Weiss, 1987). So, for example, in the case of coastal environmental mitigation strategies in California, a scientist may predict what mitigation techniques will lead to a certain outcome but not whether or how much of that mitigation or particular outcome is appropriate. A scientist in the Gulf of Maine region may identify a reliable, cost-effective indicator of a certain condition in the environment but not whether the condition identified is acceptable. A scientist in the Gulf of Mexico region can describe the relationship between coastal development and closed shellfish waters but not how much development or shellfish closure is appropri- ate. Questions that science cannot answer fall into the category of policymaking, or governance. Policymaking is the process of identifying objectives, alterna- tives for achieving those objectives, and their relative costs and benefits and measuring these relative costs and benefits within the context of human values. Policymaking answers questions of the form: Given that we have an objective and we know that the costs and benefits of alternative (A) will be (X) and the costs and benefits of alternative (B) will be (Y), should we do (A) or (B)? It is the governance process, with all of its requirements for planning, analysis, and public input, through which public policy decisions are made. Political processes are important considerations and are often one of the most uncontrolled and unpre- dictable variables in science-policy interactions. In the case of mitigation strategies in California, if scientists communicate what strategies are available and their relative costs and benefits, the policymaking process can proceed to identify the human values against which the alternatives and their various costs and benefits may be judged. In the case of an environmen- tal indicator in the Gulf of Maine region, if a scientist identifies a condition in the environment from a given indicator, then the policymaking process may proceed to a decision as to whether the condition indicated is desirable or undesirable, if it should be changed, and in what manner. If a scientist in the Gulf of Mexico region can describe which land and water uses result in shellfish closures, the policymaking process can then proceed to a decision concerning how much de- velopment, and how much shellfish closure, is acceptable. The difference between science and governance is extremely important but is often ignored or confused. Scientists often feel so strongly about a particular normative position that they claim the science indicates the best way to behave. Because coastal environmental policymaking is often contentious and occurs in the midst of a complex mixture of human values and preferences, such claims are likely to confuse the discussion further, and to lead to a diminution of the cred- ibility of the scientist (Caldwell, 1990; Jasanoff, 19904. Science and policymaking are different from one another but complemen- tary. The conduct of each requires different sets of expertise. The scientist must know theory, methodology, and techniques. The policymaker must know con

CHALLENGES IN MAKING AND IMPLEMENTING COASTAL POLICY Modification/ Initiation Formulation Implementation Evaluation Termination ~1 1 29 -1 -1 Figure 2 Stages in He policy process (Knecht, 1995). stituencies, governance processes, and value orientations expressed as legal man- dates. It is, of course, useful for each to know something of the other's trade as well, although it is unreasonable (as a general rule) to expect one to do the work of the other. The policymaking process is composed of a number of stages (see Figure 2~. In the policy initiation phase, a problem is recognized by federal, state, or local governments. In the policy formulation stage, a policy response to the problem is developed by agencies or the legislature. Policy implementation is the stage in which mechanisms planned in the policy formulation stage are made operational. In the policy evaluation stage, the results of the new mechanisms are compared with the desired outcomets) of the policy. Finally, policy modification/termination is the phase in which the results of the evaluation are acted on and the policy is either adapted or eliminated. Scien- tific input is more applicable to some stages than to others but can play an important role in each. The policymaking process can also be viewed as a system of cultural ecology (see Figure 3), as described by Orbach (1995~: "The cultural ecology of coastal environments has two broad subcomponents: (1) human constituencies of the coastal environment itself, for example, people who live on, use, or otherwise are concerned in their beliefs or behaviors with the coastal environment; and (2) humans who constitute the policy and management structures whose decisions and actions affect the behavior of the coastal constituencies defined in (1~." The cultural ecology of coastal systems is determined by the set of cultures involved in the policy process, as described in the next section. CULTURAL DIFFERENCES Human Culture as a Variable in the Science-Policy Interaction All human behavior is a result of a complex interaction between culture and environment, where culture is defined as the beliefs, perceptions, and normative rules of behavior of a group of people, and environment is the total set of objects and processes with which those people interact (Harris, 1968~. Culture in this sense is shared differentially among human groups not everyone has the same

30 SCIENCE, POLICY, AND THE COAST Coastal Environment - - Human constituents Direct Coastal industries Coastal residents Interest groups Indirect Non-coastal residents Interest groups (Social science) Policy and management organizations International Federal Regional State Local Private sector (Natural science) Scientific community Figure 3 The cultural ecology of coastal public policymaking (Orbach, 1995). beliefs, perceives or interprets things in the same way, or has the same normative rules of behavior. Although culture ultimately resides in the individual, certain groups share more of their culture than others, forming subcultures around lin- guistic, ethnic, national, professional, community, religious, and other variables. These cultural differences contribute significantly to the development of environ- mental policy (Caldwell, 1990~. We learn our culture, although some personality characteristics, tastes, or preferences are evidently a product of our individual genetic makeup. Most of our normative rules are taught to or internalized by us in various acculturation or socialization processes. Beliefs and perceptions are formed through a combina- tion of the above processes in addition to our individual life experiences. Through the acculturation process some of us become scientists, some of us become administrators, some of us become politicians, some of us become busi- ness persons, and some of us become advocates of various causes. We tend to live and work around those who have beliefs, perceptions, and norms similar to

CHALLENGES IN MAKING AND IMPLEMENTING COASTAL POLICY 31 our own-hence the existence of subcultures. With respect to coastal environ- mental issues, all of our subcultures arid behaviors interact in a complex cultural, or human, ecology that determines our societal rules of behavior, or policies (Fortman, 1990; Orbach, 1995~. When we speak of the interaction between science and policy, we mean interactions among a number of subcultures, includ- ing scientists of different disciplines and employment, elected officials, legisla- tors, administrators, business people, coastal arid noncoastal residents, interest and advocacy groups, and many others (Jasanoff, 1990~. The Genesis of Cultural Differences in Coastal Policy People acquire their professional cultures through education and training, institutional affiliation, and rewards and incentives. These lead to differences in behavior and points of view associated with the cultures of science and policy described by Boesch and Macke (1995) and shown in Table 3. Cultural differ- ences can impede the interactions of scientists with policymalcers and, conse- quently, the use of science in coastal policymaking. Although many individuals and groups are involved in the cultural ecology of coastal policy, we focus on two subcultures of that cultural ecology scientists and public policymakers (defined here as legislators or administrative agency personnel). TABLE 3 Behaviors and Points of View Typically Associated With the Cultures of Science and Policy Factor Science Policy Valued action Research, scholarship Legislation, regulations, decisions Time frame That needed to gather evidence Immediate, short-term Goals Increase understanding Manage immediate problems Basis for decisions Scientific evidence Science, values, public . opinion, economics Expectations Understanding never complete Expect clear answers from science Grain Focus on details, contradictions Focus on broad outline World view Primacy of biological, physical, chemical mechanisms Primacy of political, social, interpersonal, economic mechanisms SOURCE: Boesch and Macke, 1995; from Coastal Management, vol. 21(3), p. 189, Bernstein et al., 1993, Taylor & Francis, Inc., Washington, D.C. Reproduced with permission. All rights reserved.

32 SCIENCE, POLICY, AND THE COAST Education and Training-Scientists are professionals who obtain advanced de- grees, most often the Ph.D., in a specific single- or interdisciplinary training program at a college or university, thereby acquiring scientific credentials, usu- ally in some very specific scientific domain. Scientists generally stay in school longer than the average citizen in an atmosphere that emphasizes the value of knowledge, objectivity, reliability, validity, and the scientific method. Their training institutions are somewhat insulated from society through the mecha- nisms designed to promote the quest for knowledge and academic freedom. Uni- versity faculty instill in their students a belief in the high status of scientists and the scientific enterprise and scientists come to assume that policy must be based on science. Most problem solving in science takes the form of hypothesis testing as opposed to behavioral change. Policymakers, although they come from a variety of backgrounds and educa- tions, may lack scientific disciplinary focus or much education in the sciences. For example, law school, in contrast to scientific postgraduate programs, empha- sizes behavioral change over hypothesis testing (Millsap, 19844. Policymakers may be people who choose to work in a world of human interaction where every new law or policy has the potential to create consensus or conflict. Rational planning, public involvement, and balanced responsiveness to constituencies and to the public trust are the hallmarks of the policymaker (Anderson, 1984~. Institutional Affiliation There are, of course, people trained as scientists who work as policymakers. Over time, however, individuals who receive the same scientific training and more especially others whose background and training differ often diverge into separate subcultures based on their institutional affili- ations (Fortman, 1990~. A person with scientific training who works as an administrator in a federal regulatory agency will acquire a different set of beliefs, perceptions, and norms of behavior than would a research scientist at a university because of the different requirements, contexts, and processes of their work. Individuals working in different regulatory agencies will diverge from each other for the same reasons. In the coastal area, for example, professionals at the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) or the Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management (OCRM) of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), or the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will diverge from those in the Mineral Management Service (MMS) or the U.S. Anny Corps of Engineers (Corps) because of the widely varying mandates, struc- tures, and processes of those agencies. The mandate of the university is to investigate and educate; of NMFS, OCRM, FWS, and EPA to plan for the conser- vation of fishery and coastal resources; of MMS and the CorDs to clan for the. development of mineral and infrastructure resources Time Frame For a university scientist, time frames tend to be drawn out owing

CHALLENGES IN MAKING AND IMPLEMENTING COASTAL POLICY 33 to institutional factors and the infrequency of some natural events that are stud- ied. Addressing most significant coastal issues requires long-term data and moni- toring to provide information sufficient for the scientific process. Time is mea- sured in contract and grant submission deadlines, hour-long lectures and semester-long courses, two-year article publication schedules, and decade-long research programs. In policymaking, on the other hand, time frames and deadlines tend to be short and frequent. Regulatory development is a constant process under any given set of legislative mandates, and those mandates themselves are constantly changing. Information, power, and decisionmaking are much more hierarchical than at the university, and the policymaker will most often need to obtain data and analysis in a matter of days, weeks, or months rather than years. Thirty-day comment and response periods, controlled congressional correspondence, regula- tory decisions with the best of planning all of these are short time frame issues compared to those of the scientist. Product Forrn The products of the scientist are the results of research and the training of students. The premier product of the scientist is new knowledge, peer reviewed and disseminated to colleagues. There are, of course, many scientists who care very much about applied work-that is, science with some identifiable application to a problem or issue outside the scientific or university community- and how science is applied. Traditional academic scientific products do not, in the main, cause changes in behavior; they are not intended to. The purpose of policymaking is behavioral change. It is our common cul- tural norms, as expressed through the representative democratic process and written down as laws, policies, and regulations, that constitute public policy (Nader, 19691. It is the creation of such behavioral change that is the product of the policymaker, in the form of laws, policies, regulations, and the materials, events, and processes that accompany the policy development and implementa- tion process. An important part of the product for the policymaker is that which is communicated to the private sector constituencies and the public about the policy and policymaking process. Public involvement, for example, is an impor- tant product of the policymaking process. Public involvement is not a phrase one traditionally hears in the discussions of most scientists in their scientific work, certain social scientists excepted (Peterson, 1984~. However, scientists and the public are interacting with increasing frequency, regarding the conduct of field experiments and the interpretation and application of research results to contro- versial environmental issues. Cultural Conflict in Coastal Policymaking What are the results of the existence of the different cultures and subcultures of people involved in coastal policymaking? The existence of different points of

34 SCIENCE, POLICY, AND THE COAST view and different interests is a major strength of the U.S. governance system, which has the structure and organization to achieve consensus among those points of view and interests. However, different cultures and subcultures also have negative effects on the use of science for policymaking. The negative effects fall into four general categories: (1) lack of understanding, (2) lack of communica- tion, (3) lack of or misuse of each other's products, and (4) conflictual or com- petitive rather than cooperative interaction. Lack of Understanding-Human ego is a powerful thing, and few things offend us and make us react in negative ways as much as the knowledge that another person does not value, respect, or understand what we are as individuals or what we do professionally. Whether it is an interaction between a fishermen and a marine biologist, an oil worker and an environmentalist, a land-use planner and a private property advocate, a social scientist and a natural scientist, or a scientist and a politician, if we interact with others with an attitude of superiority or contempt, conflict is likely. Understanding does not have to mean admiration or agreement, but simply an acceptance of the fact that the other party has a legiti- mate status and role in the human ecology of the policymaking process and views that must be understood in the context of that status and role. Lack of Communication-Cultural differences, whether they stem from language, occupation, or advocacy position tend to make communication more difficult. Not only are we less likely to communicate at all with different cultures or subcultures, but communication that does occur tends to be fraught with misinter- pretation or lack of understanding. The use of scientific jargon in a public presentation is one such example of this problem. A scientist and a fisherman interpreting differently the results of a trend or cycle in fish landings is another. A shellf~sher and a marina owner discussing water quality is a third. Sometimes the message is not received at all; sometimes it is perceived or interpreted differ- ently than intended (see Lampl, 1995~. It is difficult, but possible and desirable, to expend the effort to open a line of communication and to be aware of the different possibilities for perception and interpretation. Lack of ~ or Misuse of, Each Other's Products-It is often the case that an admin- istrator will not know how to use the contents of a scientific report. It is often the case that a scientist will not understand the genesis or rationale for a particular public policymaking process. Private citizens will often be confused by both a scientific report and a policy process. The unfortunate response is for individuals to disengage- that is, to withdraw from the interaction or process-or simply to ignore the activity or viewpoint of others. Citizens stop attending public meet- ings or hearings. Scientists stop seeking funding from applied research pro- grams. Policymakers carry out their responsibilities as best they can, assuming that the best scientific information available is that which they can interpret and

CHALLENGES IN MAKING AND IMPLEMENTING COASTAL POLICY 35 use, which may be a small portion of that which scientists have produced and which may be meaningless outside the larger context. The alternative is to take the product and use it inappropriately-a scientist advocates a value position rather than simply presenting the science, a policymaker lists a report in the bibliography and uses it by reference to justify a predetermined course of action, or a citizen uses a public meeting to advance a particular constituency's advocacy agenda in the name of the public. Conflict and Competition Instead of Cooperation-All of the above effects lead to conflict and competition in place of cooperation. They are all dimensions of the potentially negative public policy outcomes that can result from cultural differences, when those differences are not recognized, understood, and ad dressed. The next section focuses on the manner in which these phenomena apply particularly to scientists in agencies, academia, industry, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY AND REVIEW MECHANISMS Mechanisms for Providing Advice Scientific information is provided to policymakers through a variety of chan- nels, including formal reports, interactions with individual scientists, and via the public and news media. Important mechanisms also include the formal rendering of advice by scientists internal or external to the responsible agency or critical review of reports and proposals, so-called peer review. Peer review is a mecha- nism within the scientific community by which scientists review the work of their colleagues, usually as a step supporting a research project or publication of jour- nal articles. This procedure serves as a check on the validity of the methods, interpretation of the data, and applicability of the conclusions drawn. While this process is not specifically directed to science-policy interactions, it provides an important quality control step in the dissemination of science and thus has an impact on public policy. For example, research on cold fusion was not subjected to peer review before the discovery was announced in a press conference and was adopted by some policymakers as a solution to the nation' s energy problem. This recent example illustrates how policymaking can be affected deleteriously by the omission of peer review. Scientific advice can be obtained through at least four different mechanisms: 1. Internal Advice The first line of scientific advice often available for designing agency programs and forming policy is from scientists who are agency employees or whose services are obtained through contracts. Internal advice may be available more quickly and tailored to answer agency questions more directly

36 SCIENCE, POLICY, AND THE COAST than can many forms of external advice, because internal scientists are acquainted with the agency culture and procedures. Internal advice can take the form of research findings as well as deliberative internal advisory groups. The committee did not evaluate specific means of improving the use of internal scientific advice, but most mechanisms recommended in the final chapter are applicable to both internal and external sources of advice. 2. Advisory groups external to policymaking agencies. External advisors can be useful to agencies and policymakers for situations in which an indepen- dent evaluation of information is needed, agencies desire to review their internal scientific mechanisms, and when it would be more cost-effective to obtain the information from outside the governmental organization. These groups may be convened by an agency from among scientists not employed by them or con- vened by another organization such as the National Research Council (NRC) or a professional society at the request of the agency. In the latter case, the group is typically asked to review how an agency is handling some aspect of its policymaking. There are examples at all levels of government of such external advisory functions. MMS offers a good example of the use of external commit- tees. MMS was required by the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Lands Act Amendments of 1978 to establish an external Scientific Committee of its OCS Advisory Board. Members are selected from academia, technical service firms, the oil and gas industry, and government. They meet on a regular basis to help the agency set its scientific agenda and, to a limited extent, interpret the results of the MMS Environmental Studies Program. Twice, MMS has requested the NRC to review the Environmental Studies Program, which resulted in two reports (NRC, 1978, 1990c). EPA, NOAA, the National Science Foundation, and other federal agencies have one or more scientific advisory committees at different levels of the agency. 3. Workshops. A workshop may be convened to offer advice to an agency on a specific issue. The attendees may all be scientists, but typically the group also includes policymakers and stakeholders. 4. Informal policy advisory groups. The published results of scientific research performed outside an agency can provide information that is directly applicable to an agency policy decision. The information may come to the agency's attention via its own scientific professionals, outside scientists, or mem- bers of the public. With electronic mail and on-line workshops, it has become much easier to be aware of the range of information on a subject. Why Do Scientists Participate? If we wish to encourage cooperation between scientists and policymakers through advisory mechanisms, it helps to understand why scientists participate in such endeavors. The personality of the scientist plays a considerable role. Scien- tists are trained problem solvers, so they tend to be challenged by the idea that

CHALLENGES IN MAKING AND IMPLEMENTING COASTAL POLICY 37 they can contribute to solving problems connected with public policy. Although not all scientists are motivated to this service, those who respond most often to such a challenge are likely to see contributions to policymaking as a stimulating extension of their professions. If they have confidence in their knowledge and its applicability to the policy questions to be addressed, they will be more willing to participate. Finally, if they believe the problems that need scientific input are significant to society, they will feel their commitment of time and effort is worth- while. Another reason for participation can be funding. Many research scientists fund much of their time and effort, and that of their assistants, through grants and contracts. There is a considerable lead time involved in obtaining funding, and sometimes there are gaps between funded projects. Advisory committees pro- vide scientists with the opportunity to expand their networks and update their information on existing funding sources and fundable research. Furthermore, the possibility of funding some of a scientist' s time to work on an advisory commit- tee, recognizing that the time commitment may be great and money in relatively small units, could be a motive for serving as an adviser. The final criterion must be that the scientist has time available and feels that she or he can afford to devote it to the purpose at hand, realizing that advisory committee work is not usually judged to be of equal value to publishing research papers in the reward structure of most scientific institutions. This situation con- tinues to persist even though universities and agencies assert that public service is a valuable part of a scientist' s career. Impediments to Participation and Success A number of impediments must be overcome to elicit help from scientists and to ensure that their advice can be used effectively. Time constraints As pointed out earlier, by the time managers realize that a policy decision must be made, there is frequently little time remaining in which to investigate the scientific bases for a decision. Under these circumstances, it is very difficult to find scientists whose schedule permits them to respond immedi- ately. Even those within an agency may find it difficult to locate the necessary information quickly, evaluate it adequately, and respond to a request for scientific input to the decision. The case is more difficult for scientists external to an agency, if only because they must be located and recruited to the purpose before their input can be obtained. Many of the scientific advisory bodies in government rely on volunteers, the scientists giving their time and expertise without compensation. The bigger the issues that must be addressed, the more consideration and, therefore, time that must be devoted to the matter. The more background material there is to be considered, the more time it takes to locate, obtain, and assimilate it. In most

38 SCIENCE, POLICY, AND THE COAST cases of volunteer members, the time required will be a major impediment to the advisory process. Adequate staff support by the agency can make a critical difference. Com- mittee staff can locate, copy, and distribute documents. Staff can often take the first step in preparing reports. They can set agendas and arrange meetings and meeting support. All of this can save time for the scientists involved as well as make them feel that their efforts and time are valued that the advice received will have an effect on policy decisions. Strong vested interests The agency ostensibly seeking scientific advice may have so strong a vested interest in a certain policy position that it is not receptive to objective scientific advice that questions the bases of that policy position. In reality, the agency's policy position may be shaped by other legal, political, or economic considerations, but the failure to communicate these constraints hon- estly may lead to frustration and cynicism by the scientific advisers. A related situation occurs when agency leaders have already formed an opinion on a subject and convene a committee to legitimize their previously held beliefs. At its extreme, this approach can skew the scope of the advisory panel' s charge and its membership, result in the advisory panel being brought too late into the decision process, and can diminish the credibility of scientific informa- tion and scientists. lock of unanimity among scientists Scientists frequently disagree in their inter- pretation of data. In fact, questioning interpretations is a necessary aspect of truth seeking in science. But if scientists on an advisory committee disagree on the interpretation of important data, it may be very difficult for agency managers to know how to use this conflicting information. There is no good solution to this problem, but its existence should be recognized by the policymakers and should not be allowed to upset the entire process. Differing biases may be the source of the disagreement (see below). Science is not the basis for a decision-There are and will be many times when scientific information will not be the basis for a decision. Other considerations are simply more important. The desire of the public for an action may be so powerful that the policymaker is pressured to ignore scientific advice about the nature of the problem and the consequences of an action. In most cases, the process of formulating a policy requires accommodations between a variety of interests and is subject to political pressure. Thus, a decision may be made on the basis of public desire even though the action, according to scientific opinion, will not have the desired effect. In other cases, the decision will be based partly on science and partly on other considerations. It may, therefore, seem undesirable to the advisory scientists. Again, there is no way to avoid this difficulty in a

CHALLENGES IN MAKING AND IMPLEMENTING COASTAL POLICY 39 democratic society, but scientists must recognize that their input is not necessar- ily going to be used or used appropriately. Lack of independence of scientists Competent scientists work in agencies, academia, business, and NGOs. They may, however, as pointed out above, represent an agency with a regulatory role. It is possible that they will find themselves in positions where their scientific judgment is affected by agency policy or where they do not have complete independence to state their opinions or accept alternative interpretations. For example, Sabatier (1995) cites a case in which scientists employed by a state fisheries agency disagreed with the interpre- tation of results from a scientist employed by the same state's water resources agency who had suggested a source of mortality for striped bass larvae other than that on which the management by the fisheries agency was then based. The same issue may be evident with scientists employed by businesses or NGOs with an interest in the decisions that will be affected by the scientific advice provided. Finally, it must be realized that academic scientists also have their biases. Uni- versities are subject to the political pressures of interest groups, and if the aca- demic scientist is funded by an agency involved in the process, his or her uncon- scious bias may be very similar to that of the agency scientist. Lack of attention to the advisory committee by the agency-It can happen that an agency has a scientific advisory committee whose advice does not seem to be given sufficient attention by the agency. An example comes from the history of the previously mentioned MMS Scientific Committee. This committee criticized the scientific information that was used to support OCS leasing decisions but seemed to have little effect on the program. But when an NRC committee reported the same criticisms under different political and economic circumstances, these criticisms were used to support moratoria on leasing in Georges Bank, Florida, and California (NRC, 1989, 1991~. It appears now, though, that MMS is more responsive to its Science Committee than it was in the past. When an advisory committee proposes changes in an agency's structure or its scope of activities, the agency's reaction can be strong and negative. Such a reaction encourages many advisory committee members to withdraw and go back to their normal activities, carrying with them a general distaste for the advisory process. There are also cases, however, in which individuals are stimulated to great efforts by opposition (Scheiber, 1995~. Lack of big picture Scientific advice will necessarily be incomplete if the pur- view of the advisory committee is restricted such that committee members cannot consider all aspects of the problems at hand. This may occur because of limita- tions in the agency's legal responsibilities or as a result of turf wars among agencies. It may occur as a result of limitations in the committee's terms of reference as given to the committee or as a result of its own failure to examine the

40 SCIENCE, POLICY, AND THE COAST problem completely. A complete perspective may include the entire ecosystem for the natural scientist or the whole coastal social and economic system for the social scientist. For example, there are a variety of terrestrial and marine activities that affect spawning and nursery areas, as well as adult habitats of commercial fish species. These activities include wetland destruction, coastal pollution, and introduction of nonindigenous species. Fishery management councils have little or no author- ity over such activities and over habitat alterations or protection in general, re- ducing any attention to these matters by their statistical and scientific advisory committees. The government, not the committee, fails to define the scope of the committee's activities properly (Shelley and Dorsey, 1995~. Scientists' reluctance to extrapolate-Scientists, by training, attempt to limit their scientific conclusions to those that can be supported firmly by their data. If they extrapolate beyond this, they usually do so hesitantly and at the risk of considerable criticism from their peers. As a result, scientists frequently resist extrapolation, citing the need for further study. This typically happens at the point in the process where the policymakers need a firm recommendation based on the data available. Scientists become advocates-Just as scientists' objectivity may be questioned if they are biased by associations or personal interests, they may also lose credibil- ity if they go beyond explaining, from their discipline's viewpoint, the conse- quences of a certain policy to advocating a specific policy. Probably no scientist is without some advocacy. But when scientists become subjective advocates, their claim to strict logic, drawing from carefully bounded conclusions from properly collected data, is seriously jeopardized. There are cases in which scien- tists feel the evidence is so compelling that they must become advocates for reform, as in the cases of regulating DDT and antifouling paints containing tributyl tin. These cases must remain rare if scientists are to continue to be viewed as objective observers and analysts (Boesch and Macke, 1995~. Emphasis is on legal aspects and the threat of litigation When there is large- scale environmental damage, legal actions seem to dominate and scientific advice is devalued. Actions under the Superfund law provide a long series of examples of how attention is paid to legal issues rather than to the good science needed to find the most suitable ways in which to repair damage. A good example is the Exxon Valdez oil spill (Wheelwright, 1994~. The event offered many opportuni- ties for scientists to learn more about damages from large oil spills and about how to clean them up most effectively. We learned what should and what should not be done. But in case after case scientists were cautioned concerning the distribu- tion of their results, and their data were sequestered because of the legal require- ments of the damage assessment process. Many scientists came through this

CHALLENGES IN MAKING AND IMPLEMENTING COASTAL POLICY 41 event greatly discouraged from participating in future policy actions; others per- severed. Examples of Failures and Successes The following examples of failures are taken from symposia discussions to show several ways in which scientific advice was not sought and/or used for coastal policymaking. Drilling Discharge Studies MMS and the oil industry both funded studies of the effects of drilling muds on the marine environment. These studies uniformly showed that the detrimental effects of the discharge of muds were limited to small areas immediately around the drilling rig and that there were no serious, long- term effects (NRC, 1983a). These studies were reviewed by the Scientific Com- mittee of the OCS Advisory Board, which repeatedly recommended that no fur- ther studies were necessary or desirable from a scientific viewpoint. This opinion never had much impact. Additional studies of the effects of drilling muds were recommended by various local groups whenever new OCS leasing was proposed. The problem was probably one that should have been addressed by social scien- tists rather than by natural scientists, recognizing the issue as largely political and removing it from the natural scientific agenda altogether. One must conclude that the scientific analysis was misunderstood or ignored. Northeast Groundfish-The groundfish industry in the Georges Bank/Gulf of Maine region has collapsed despite the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act, a law that established regional fishery management councils, each with an advisory scientific and statistical committee to manage the stocks. The reasons for failure are many and complex. They are related to failures to (1) take a large enough view, (2) protect fish populations and habitat, (3) use the scientific advisory committee effectively, and (4) understand the social problems involved in management of fisheries and fishermen (Acheson, 1995; Orbach, 1995~. Trinity Ledge Herring Fishery Trinity Ledge, an area off the southwest coast of Nova Scotia, was a popular herring fishery ground. Although the need for regu- lation to protect the fishery was recognized, insufficient action was taken, and the area now supports only a small fishery compared to what it supported previously. The management failure was due to industry pressure against regulation and lack of consideration of the importance of the habitat for the substock of herring whose habitat was on the ledge (Chang et al., 1995~. It seems clear that there was insufficient effective communication among industry, scientists, and regulators. The following examples of successes and partial successes are taken from those mentioned during the symposia to illustrate that despite the difficulties

42 SCIENCE, POLICY, AND THE COAST advisory committees and scientific inputs have been successful in influencing policy decisions in a positive fashion. New Hampshire Coastal Wetlands Manual Because of the limited extent of coastal wetlands and associated habitats in New Hampshire and the intense de- velopment pressure to which they are subjected, the New Hampshire Coastal Program, the U.S. Soil Conservation Service, and the New Hampshire Audubon Society collaborated to develop a coastal wetlands evaluation manual. They involved scientists, environmentalists, citizens, and policymakers. The develop- ment of the manual is an example of a successful collaboration, although the success of its application remains to be evaluated (NRC, l995b). Arcata Marsh Mitigation This mitigation program in Arcata, California, cre- ated wetlands habitat in connection with wastewater treatment. It was built on good scientific input, including pilot projects and ongoing involvement by aca- demic scientists. This resulted in acceptance by both the public and state regula- tors and an economic benefit to the local community in terms of reduced waste- water treatment costs (NRC, 1995a). MMS Scientific Committee This committee has provided input to MMS's Envi- ronmental Studies Program that has helped move scientific efforts in needed directions, has encouraged greater involvement of social scientists, and has in- volved participation by academic scientists. It is only a partial success because its recommendations have not always been heeded, as mentioned earlier. In a paper from the California Symposium, Boesch and Macke (1995) ob- served that, despite the many limitations discussed above, scientific advisory committees can provide valuable services of detached criticism, public valida- tion, and forward-looking advice. Boesch and Macke offer several suggestions to agencies and the scientists who serve on advisory committees about how to make scientific advisory committees effective (see Box 1~. INTEGRATION OF NATURAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES Interaction is important not only between scientists and nonscientists but also among scientists from different disciplines. In this section the committee considers issues that arise in the interaction of subcultures of scientists, particu- larly those from the natural and social sciences. The Need for Scientific Integration Environmental problems of the coastal zone have multiple attributes on physical, economic, social, and political dimensions. Because environmental problems have multiple dimensions, they cross boundaries that have traditionally

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44 SCIENCE, POLICY, AND THE COAST social sciences. The natural sciences contribute to coastal ocean policy through research that assesses the status and function of natural systems (biological, chemical, geological, and physical), the interactions of these components, and the functional relationships within and between populations and environment. The social sciences offer analogous knowledge regarding the basic attributes of eco- nomic, social, and political systems; their interactions with their environment and with each other; and the functional relationships within and between groups. An example of the need for an integrated approach is provided by the issue of freshwater inputs in the Gulf of Mexico region (NRC, l995c). Management is faced with the challenge of balancing the need for human use of fresh water with the need for fresh water to maintain healthy estuarine systems. The ideal role of research on coastal environmental problems is to contribute to the understanding of natural and human systems so that their interaction can be structured in socially desirable ways. Policy to adjust human behavior cannot be effective without a basic knowledge of both the natural and the human systems. If scientific understanding is incomplete, policy will fail to address coastal prob- lems in their full dimensions. Obstacles to Scientific Integration Unfortunately, research in the natural and social sciences usually is not inte- grated in ways that will address the full dimensions of environmental problems. The obstacles to integration are many, based on differences that include history and tradition, language, world view, and incentive structures. History and Tradition U.S. resource management has historically proceeded on a single-resource basis. Scientific analysis of resource questions has been corre- spondingly specialized. The single-resource approach is the residual of an era of general resource surplus. Resources were developed singly, and the negative effects of any one resource harvesting activity on another were considered unim- portant. Policies for marine resources developed on an as-needed basis in re- sponse to specific problems. Initial stages of management were centered on conservation needs. The scientific staffing of resource agencies, heavily weighted toward the biological sciences, reflects their roots in conservation concerns. So- cial scientists are either unrepresented or poorly represented on agency staffs. Interactions between the social and natural sciences are limited by the small number of social scientists and the infrequency of interdisciplinary research. As a result, human aspects of environmental problems are often not brought into research projects at the design stage and are more likely to be added, if at all, at the end of the research process. Academic environments are also characterized by infrequent professional interactions between natural and social scientists. Language-All scientific disciplines develop technical language that reflects spe

CHALLENGES IN MAKING AND IMPLEMENTING COASTAL POLICY 45 cialized and in-depth knowledge of their subject. Specialized training and the predominantly within-discipline interactions reinforce the use of discipline-spe- cific technical language and build barriers to wider communication. The limited interactions between social and natural scientists maintain those language barri- ers. The result is often mutual ignorance about concepts, methodologies, and paradigms that inhibits communication and integration. An associated barrier is incompatibility of natural and social scientific data over geographic scales, time scales, and units of measurement. World view The professional training of natural and social scientists is based on different paradigms of ecosystems, particularly with regard to the role of humans. Natural scientists often view humans as intruders in ecosystems, whereas social scientists generally consider an ecosystem as a provider of services to humans. Natural science may focus more on the conservation or preservation of resources. Social science may focus more on the use of resources. The different world views also extend to responses to environmental variability. For natural systems the uncertainty created by variability dictates a conservative approach to use; it is better to act conservatively and underuse than to act aggressively and overuse. For human systems, however, there is an opportunity cost of foregone consump- tion. The human response to uncertainty is to shorten the time horizon of re- source use and accelerate use in the current time period. Incentive structures Scientists are rewarded for specialization within their dis- ciplines. Own-discipline publication outlets are generally more highly regarded than interdisciplinary outlets. There are numerous positive incentives that keep people within their own area of specialization, rather than interacting with scien- tists in a broader disciplinary area. Despite the acknowledged need for interdis- ciplinary research and collaboration on environmental problems, there are many factors that discourage collaboration and promote specialization. Finally, the token representation of social scientists in most resource agencies and on many advisory committees provides a further disincentive to active collaboration. A single social scientist is often expected to represent all social science disciplines with regard to a range of issues. PREDICTION AND UNCERTAINTY Descriptive and Predictive Science Most natural and social science has been directed to uncovering the causes of change in the natural or human parts of an ecosystem, including those changes caused by human activities. Much less effort has addressed the consequences of these changes on the broader ecosystem, including their human components. Even less attention has been devoted to attempting to predict the effects of future

46 SCIENCE, POLICY, AND THE COAST activities, resource uses, or management actions on these ecosystems. Yet the issues that policymakers and implementers must address inherently require a predictive capability from science. For example, it is not good enough to know that oxygen has been depleted in a particular coastal ecosystem as a result of nutrient overenrichment; the policymaker needs to know the sources of the nutri- ents and how much the nutrient inputs should be reduced to achieve a certain improved condition. It is not sufficient to know that certain factors have de- graded coastal habitats; the manager needs to know how these habitats can be restored. It is not good enough to know that overfishing has reduced a fish population; the manager needs to know how many fish can be harvested without additional deleterious effects on the population and whether and how a popula- tion can be maintained at optimum levels. Most often, scientists provide information needed for the predictions under- pinning policy decisions or management actions based on inference developed from retrospective analysis of the relevant changes observed. Most scientists are uncomfortable making predictions that strain the traditions of the scientific method, including the avoidance of overextrapolation of research results. The reluctance of scientists to answer policymakers' needs for unequivocal predic- tions and policymakers' lack of understanding of the scientific limitations for prediction are at the heart of the mutual frustration often seen at the science- policy interface. Risk Assessment and Simulation Models Several approaches have been pursued for predicting the outcome of policy or management decisions. Various forms of risk assessment attempt to quantify the severity or likelihood of effects or responses. In its least quantitative form, relative risk assessment has been applied to rank threats or actions in terms of severity, extent, and reversibility of effects. Relative risk assessment has been applied to rank environmental problems for the nation (EPA Science Advisory Board, 1990), a particular state (e.g., Louisiana Department of Natural Resources, 1991; Vermont Agency for Natural Resources, 1991), or community; for the long-teIm impacts of offshore oil and gas development (Boesch and Rabalais, 1987~; and for marine pollution problems on a global scale (GESAMP, 1990~. Relative risk assessment is subjective but can provide a framework for develop- ing a consensus of expert opinion. It is not designed to make quantitative predic- tions of the outcome of a particular management option, but it may be useful in weighing the relative effectiveness of alternatives. More quantitatively rigorous risk assessment is generally used to estimate the risk to human health of exposure to carcinogens or other toxicants based on a paradigm that has four phases: hazard identification, dose-response assessment, exposure assessment, and risk characterization (NRC, 1983b). A similar ap- proach is used by EPA and other agencies to predict the effects of chemical

CHALLENGES IN MAKING AND IMPLEMENTING COASTAL POLICY Ecological risk assessment ...... ............ ..... .......... .............. ........... . . . .. Discussion between the risk assessor and risk manager (Planning) ~.: 1 ~i .1.-. . 1~2 ''' ' ~'2' -''' ' '':""2""' , , ~-, .... :... -I:. -................. .. , aim - ~ - - ~ ., ~ i -,. : ,: . i. ~ ...... -a ..'..~-'...'....-,..'. .. '... i < .2 ' ...... at ...... ..... . . ........ < ., : ....... , - ~, ~ :~: ~ ~ Characterization j tuna ac~enza~lo of I of exposure ~ecological e fects 1 1 ! . ~ . ~' : i, . ......................... . . ........ . . ~ ~ , -, ~ ~ . . . ........ ......... - ............... , i-, . .. ............ ' . .. .. . . . . . ... ... .. ...... ... ... ..... . ~ i .. ... .... ...... .... . . i. . . . . .... ... .. . .. .. . . :::::::::: :::::::: ::: :::::::::::::::::::~::::::::: ::::::::::::: ::::::::: ::::::::: :::::::::::::::::::: ::::::::::::::::::: ::: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ::::::::::::::::::: :::: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: . i, . ~ . .: Discussion between the risk assessor and risk manager (Results) - | ~ Risk~mangen~nt ~ ~:|~-------------- Figure 4 A framework for ecological risk assessment (EPA, 1992~. 47 ~ L ~ :1 contaminants and other stressors on marine organisms or ecosystems, as depicted in the framework for ecological risk assessment shown in Figure 4. In this context, characterization of ecological effects is used in lieu of dose-response or hazard assessment, which are more relevant to chemical stressors than to the variety of nonchemical stressors that can affect components of the ecosystem. As applied to an environmental stress such as a toxic chemical, reduced dissolved oxygen, or temperature abnormalities, this involves estimating exposure concen- trations by direct measurement or by modeling the dilution or fate of the stressor in the environment and experimental measurement of the effects induced at vari

48 SCIENCE, POLICY, AND THE COAST ous levels of the stressor to predict the risk of prescribed effects. Such ap- proaches frequently are employed to regulate the use of chemicals and treatment of wastes discharged into the coastal environment. Although advances are being made in ecological risk analysis of nonchemical and multiple stressors (EPA, 1992), in practice, risk assessments have several limitations, including (1) gener- alizations about broader effects from tests based on one or a few species; (2) scale extrapolation (e.g., from a test container to an ecosystem); and (3) relevance of the assessment to indirect and cascading effects (e.g., as manifested via food chains) (NRC, 1994a). Another approach to prediction involves the use of a simulation model to attempt to predict outcomes based on mathematical expressions of the important functional relationships within an ecological or social system. These simulations may be rather general or highly detailed and complex. For example, population models are used extensively in fisheries management. Water quality models have evolved from the earlier hydrodynamic-sanitary engineering models to rather sophisticated ecosystem models, particularly when applied to the assessment of nutrient loading and the resulting biogeochemical responses. For example, the Chesapeake Bay water quality model considers three-di- mensional hydrodynamics, primary and secondary production, respiration, sedi- mentation, bioturbation, and nutrient regeneration to predict dissolved oxygen concentrations (Louis Linker, EPA Chesapeake Bay Program, personal commu- nication). This model includes inputs from the watershed and the atmosphere and is being used to predict the effectiveness of nutrient control strategies on future oxygen conditions and living resources. Our understanding of coastal ecosys- tems, as well as modeling capabilities, has advanced to the point where such predictive modeling can be a very useful tool in environmental management (ARC, 1994a). The models can identify the most critical scientific uncertainties and can be useful in evaluating alternatives, if not predicting outcome precisely. In the proceedings of the Gulf of Mexico symposium, Sklar (1995) notes that "the tool for management tof freshwater inflow] will eventually be multiobjective, nonlinear mathematical models that will identify the processes that can lead to estuarine degradation and/or establish minimum maintenance levels below which biological productivity no longer supports estuanne functions such as fishery productivity, assimilation of organic and inorganic wastes, and biodiversity." It should be emphasized that any model can be no more accurate than the under- standing of the relationships that went into its construction, as well as the input data used to run the model. Also, most such models are deterministic, do not express the uncertainty in predictions, and thus may provide a false sense of confidence. Within the human sector of coastal ecosystems, predictive modeling of eco- nomic conditions is most advanced. However, economic models can be mislead- ing because they often fail to quantify the environmental costs or benefits com- pletely and do not adequately depict the delicate interactions between economic

CHALLENGES IN MAKING AND IMPLEMENTING COASTAL POWCY 49 and social phenomena (NRC, 1991). New synthetic approaches developing from the emerging field of ecological economics offer some hope of dealing with the first limitation. Methods are being developed to couple economic behavior, policy options, and environmental outcomes in geographically specific models. Decisionmaking with Uncertainty In most cases, coastal policy is developed and management is executed without specific scientific prediction. Even in the case of the most sophisticated models (e.g., the Chesapeake Bay water quality model), considerable uncertainty in the predictions remains simply because coastal ecosystems are complex and incompletely understood and often have nonlinear responses that are difficult to model. Without an understanding of the embodied uncertainty, such models may take on lives of their own, self-defining truth (Boesch and Macke, 1995), which is at odds with the empirical "real-world" observed effects. Based on the discus- sions at the three regional symposia, it is clear that too little attention is paid to this uncertainty across the science-management interface to quantifying it, un- derstanding it, or even talking frankly about its existence. Scientific uncertainty may be used to support the positions of those advocating strict environmental protection, those advocating resource exploitation, and those seeking relaxation of environmental controls. The "precautionary principle" was promoted by German environmentalists in the 1970s and was embraced by the North Sea Interministerial Conferences, which agreed that "in order to protect the North Sea from possibly damaging effects of the most dangerous substances, a precautionary approach is necessary which may require action to control inputs of such substances even before a causal link has been established by clear scientific evidence" (North Sea Inter- ministerial Conference, 1990~. This concept recognizes that it is sometimes a good idea to take precautionary action before scientific knowledge is complete (Cairncross, 1991~. Originally applied to controls of highly toxic substances, the precautionary principle has been evoked for the control of nutrients, overfishing, and virtually every human activity affecting the marine environment (e.g., Earll, 1992~. Precautionary approaches or measures are embodied in a number of recent international agreements, including the Rio Declaration on the Environ- ment and Development and the Framework Convention on Climate Change. Although there is no agreement on the precise substantive formulation of such precautionary approaches, the concept has become central to the international community's approach to addressing environmental issues. Without some quantification of risk, however, precautionary principles, ap- proaches, or measures become rhetorical or, at best, difficult to apply (Gray, 1990; Gray et al., 1991~. Similarly, the more familiar concept in the United States of "risk-averse decisionmaking" at least implicitly requires some evalua- tion of the uncertainty and severity of potential effects embodied in the concept

so SCIENCE, POLICY, ANrD THE COAST of risk. At the same time, opposing such environmentally conservative ap- proaches are those advocates of minimal regulation who argue that present poli- cies are too cautious and that the resulting overregulation is unnecessarily costly. They propose the application of risk analysis and cost-benefit analysis, while asserting that an activity that could harm the environment can be continued until it is proven scientifically to be harmful. It seems that policymakers expect greater certainty for environmental sci- ence predictions than for economic predictions. Both decisionmakers and the public are accustomed to the high uncertainty associated with economic forecasts and do not dismiss the economist for one wrong prediction. Ecological and social systems are no less complex and unpredictable than economic systems. How- ever, the present climate does not allow environmental scientists to offer predic- tions without the risk of being discredited if the predictions are incorrect. SETTING TO SCIENCE AGENDA Who Sets the Agenda The determination of what science is supported, commissioned, and con- ducted to contribute to coastal policy and management is challenging. What criteria should be used and who should make the decisions? In a time of limited public resources to support science, it is essential to plan carefully and to consider the important variables that influence the potential for success in crafting science plans that can reasonably be expected to be carried out. One of the first challenges confronted is determining which of all the prob- lems confronting coastal environments and communities are of the highest prior- ity for study. As scientific methods and understanding have advanced, more questions emerge. For example, advances in analytical chemistry have allowed the measurement of contaminants at lower and lower concentrations. Coupled with this is the discovery of very subtle, nonlethal impacts of some toxic sub- stances on marine organisms. For example, tributyl tin used as an antifouling agent in marine paints can now be assayed in seawater at the parts per trillion level, and even at these low concentrations it has been shown to affect the sexual development and reproduction of marine animals (Goldberg, 1986~. As new detection methods are developed, scientists will undoubtedly continue to dis- cover new pollution problems involving plant nutrients, environmental estrogens, algal toxins, plastics, and pathogens. But which of these threats are greater to ecosystem integrity, biodiversity, living resources, and human society? The debate is often too heavily influenced by advocacy from scientists, managers, interest groups, or by the public's concerns, which may or may not be commen- surate with scientifically documentable risks. In-depth pursuit of these problem areas is bound to be limited by finances and available personnel. Should the criteria for allocating resources for scientific

CHALLENGES IN MAKING AND IMPLEMENTING COASTAL POLICY 51 activities be primarily economic? Many marine scientists argue that there may be a growing trend toward eutrophication in coastal waters through the discharge of plant nutrients in agricultural, residential, and industrial wastes. Studies in the North Sea, the northern Adriatic, and some coastal waters of the United States have documented major and large-scale changes in coastal ecosystems and re- lated resources over periods of decades. There is the haunting possibility that changes in the nature of the base of the food chain will alter the abundances of commercially valuable fish and shellfish. Scientists point out that the number of variables that should be measured to follow the course of eutrophication is great and includes dissolved oxygen, nutrients, chlorophyll, and the nature of phy- toplankton communities and their rates of production. Furthermore, they argue that understanding such complex phenomena requires long-term and rather basic studies. If economic impact is a factor, how does one balance the potentially large, but difficult to quantify, economic impacts with the substantial and rather open-ended commitments of resources likely to be required for research, moni- toring, and modeling? On the other hand, should those pollution problems that affect human health, primarily through the consumption of seafoods, be accorded a high ranking for support? On such a basis, algal toxins, pathogens, and the possible effects of environmental estrogens would merit greatest attention. Some novel monitoring procedures might be initiated for example, the use of maricultured or geneti- cally engineered organisms as sentinels or biomarkers for pollution or satellite mapping of the are al extent and frequencies of exotic algal blooms. Coastal zone policy must be continually assessed to ensure that it is both beneficial and cost effective. It must be better able to put problems in perspec- tive, on the basis of science, as knowledge advances. Governmental agencies have a tendency to avoid introspection. An illustrative example involves heavy metals in the marine environment. Heavy metal concentrations have increased over the past century in the waters, sediments, and organisms of some areas (although decreases have also been noted recently (Owens and Cornwell, 1995~. However, only three metallic compounds have been involved in serious pollution episodes (i.e., causing serious environmental or human health effects): methyl mercury in the Minimata Bay epidemic in Japan, tributyl tin in mollusc reproduc- tion throughout the world, and copper linked to organic material in the "green- ing" of oysters in Taiwan. These episodes had certain unique qualities: the metals were chemically linked with organic material, and in two of the cases the events were discovered at maricultural facilities (Goldberg, 1992~. Still, pro- grams that monitor metals (e.g., NOAA's Status and Trends Program) analyze up to a dozen elements. Measurements are regularly published in agency reports and journals, but almost none of the metals have had environmental or human health effects that have been ascertained. How do we reallocate resources to more important uses? In addition to the assessment of relative risks, the potential that new scien

52 SCIENCE, POLICY, AND THE COAST tific knowledge could help resolve poorly understood problems, management operations, restoration, or policy development should be considered. Some poli- cies may reflect firm social or political attitudes and may not be very susceptible to influence by new scientific information. Other policies may only be influ- enced by the long-term accumulation of knowledge rather than by research fo- cused on a particular question. In one attempt to include such considerations in an assessment of science priorities, Boesch and Rabalais (1987) compared issues regarding the long-term environmental effects of offshore oil and gas develop- ment based not only on severity, duration, and reversibility of effects but also the likelihood that scientific knowledge could be improved significantly such that it would affect policy and management. Several of the highest-priority issues identified in that process were not, at that time, receiving much research support. Other recent assessments of priorities for coastal science (NRC, 1994a; National Ocean Service, 1995) have also, at least implicitly, included such considerations of how new knowledge could help resolve environmental problems. Once priorities are established among the various problem areas, there still remains the challenge of defining the research or monitoring activities that will provide the appropriate scientific knowledge. Because of the complex interac- tions within coastal ecosystems and between these ecosystems and human soci- ety, this is not an easy task. Here, the roles of the research manager interfacing between the policymakers and implementers and the scientific practitioners and scientific advisory committees become very important. They need to bridge the gap between scientists, who provide innovation but may be primarily interested in advancing knowledge, and managers, who need answers quickly but may be wary of taking risks on innovative science. This gap was described as "What's the answer? What's the question?" by the issue group that addressed issues related to changes in freshwater inflows at the Gulf of Mexico symposium (NRC, 1995c). Factors That Should Be Considered in Setting the Science Agenda The pressures of population growth, the needs of economic development, demographic change, competing and conflicting uses, judicial decisions, politics, competition for scarce public fiscal resources, the demands of a diverse and fragmented society, and the increasing complexity of the issues raised (e.g., addressing cumulative impacts) will inevitably drive agenda formulation and implementation. Many of these factors are discussed in greater detail elsewhere in this report and involve the following dynamics, principles, and assumptions: · the importance of timely and effective interaction between science and policy in all phases of policy formulation and implementation; · the differing needs and dynamics of the science and policy cultures (see pp. 29-33~;

CHALLENGES IN MAKING AND IMPLEMENTING COASTAL POLICY 53 · the importance of ingenuity, innovation, and peer review; · the relative value of fundamental and applied research and of reactive (e.g., damage assessment) versus proactive (e.g., predictive modeling) scientific activities; · the meaningful and appropriate involvement of stakeholders in the devel- opment and support of the science agenda; · the compelling need to achieve programmatic and logistical efficiencies and effectiveness; and · emerging approaches such as "integrated" and "adaptive" management (see pp. 59-62) and strategic thinking relative to "place-based" policymaking (e.g., ecosystem and watershed planning). With these factors in mind, a science agenda can be developed and imple- mented. Obviously, the principles involved in "setting" the agenda will differ from those that determine the degree to which the science that emerges influences policymaking. The scientific and policy communities and, in appropriate cases, the public must be involved in setting the agenda. In turn, each community will be influenced by its respective constituencies or motivational forces, such as the expectations of academic institutions; pressure from those who will benefit eco- nomically from the outcome; personal interests, goals, and objectives; the ex- pressed desires of influential interest groups; and the perceived need to address contemporary environmental and societal problems. Role of Fundamental Research Although the focus here is on setting the agenda for policy-relevant science, it should be recognized that advances in policy-relevant knowledge also depend on advances in understanding derived from fundamental or basic research (NRC, 1992b). By definition, such research is not focused on solving an immediate practical problem and thus it is difficult to predict if and how the research results might eventually be useful. Nonetheless, our understanding of the effects of human activities on coastal ecosystems and societies has advanced considerably as a result of fundamental research, from advances in measurement capabilities, studies of basic biology and geochemistry, and theoretical studies. Fundamental research efforts organized to pursue a specific theme, such as the Land Margin Ecosystem Research and Coastal Ocean Processes programs funded primarily by the National Science Foundation, are now making major contributions to our understanding of estuaries and continental shelves. More effort is needed in the interpretation of fundamental science results for use in policymaking. Perhaps the most effective means of such integration is by coastal scientists who are engaged in both fundamental research and policy- relevant scientific activities, although such individuals are a rarity. They are able to extend the results of more applied, and often more descriptive, research by

54 SCIENCE, POLICY, AND THE COAST bringing in the understanding of processes resulting from fundamental research. Furthermore, the availability of large amounts of descriptive information from monitoring studies provides a context for the formulation of hypotheses and the interpretation of fundamental research results. For example, neither monitoring measurements nor research experiments alone was sufficient to answer the ques- tion posed by managers in the Chesapeake Bay: "If water column nutrient inputs were reduced by 40 percent, how long would it take for the nutrient levels in the bay to respond, considering that there are large amounts of nutrients stored in bottom sediments that would continue to leach out?" But with the plentiful background information provided by 10 years of monitoring, appropriately de- signed research experiments were able to demonstrate that this "sediment memory" effect would last only about two years (Boynton et al., 1995~. National and Regional Needs and Roles Although national policies may set the general management framework or establish certain standards, the policies that most affect coastal ecosystems, re- sources, and societies are implemented at the regional, state, and local levels. For example, coastal construction, land development in the watershed, agricultural practices, harvesting of most resources in territorial waters, and discharge per- mits are managed primarily from state capitals, county seats, and city halls rather than from Washington, D.C. Furthermore, the increased emphasis on integrated, place-based management raises additional responsibilities for state and local gov- ernments and multijurisdictional regional programs. Yet it is the federal govern- ment that bears the primary burden for supporting coastal science. How can it be assured that this science is relevant to scales ranging from regional to local while at the same time avoiding unnecessary duplication of these efforts, which the nation cannot afford? Some national scientific efforts are undertaken to guide national strategies for environmental protection or coastal management. For example, NOAA's National Status and Trends monitoring program includes chemical and biological measurements made with standard techniques at a relatively sparse array of sites around the country. This program has identified regions of the country that have high concentrations of certain chemical contaminants or a high incidence of maladies of marine organisms and has demonstrated certain trends. However, these results are not used much in environmental management at the regional scale, in large part because the sampling density is too sparse to assist in manage- ment on these smaller scales. EPA has also undertaken an estuarine component of its Environmental Monitoring and Assessment Program (EMAP) in the Mid- Atlantic and Gulf of Mexico regions. Again, because this program was not designed with more local-scale management in mind and frequently is not coor- dinated with existing local or regional monitoring programs, EMAP results have not been used much by management programs that focus on a particular estuary

CHALLENGES IN MAKING AND IMPLEMENTING COASTAL POLICY 55 or state. An earlier NRC report (NRC, 1990b) recommended integration of these national monitoring programs and the inclusion of existing or new regional moni- toring programs of greater intensity within the national network as a way to meet the needs for environmental management on both national and local scales, but this has not been accomplished. Similarly, NOAA's strategic assessments of coastal data around the nation have produced reports that are very useful in revealing national patterns and trends but that are not seen as particularly useful by state and local coastal managers, who require more detailed information. An exception is in relatively unstudied areas, such as the Barataria-Terrebonne estu- ary (Rabalais et al., 1995), where such data may constitute the only information related to chemical contaminants. This problem of monitoring at appropriate scales presents a difficult chal- lenge. To meet this challenge will require federal involvement in selected re- gional scientific programs and improved synthetic understanding by both scien- tists and managers so that knowledge can be better extended from one region to another. Another improvement needed is better availability of state and federal data. DEALING WITH COMPLEXITIES IN THE COASTAL DECISIONMAKING PROCESS The traditional paradigm for managing coastal and ocean resources is sector- by-sector management of specific resources like fisheries, oil, and gas through relatively well-delineated authority by state or federal governments and involv- ing a limited number of participants, primarily those most directly affected. An important exception to this approach is the Coastal Zone Management Act, which integrates management of resources to some extent. There has been a growing realization nationally and internationally, particu- larly in the past decade, that such an approach is no longer applicable in many cases. Many of the issues facing coastal areas are transboundary in nature and involve multiple jurisdictions and multiple participants with diverse interests and perspectives. Examples include management of estuaries bordered by several states and management of nonpoint sources of pollution. In such examples we have seen the involvement of a wide array of participants, some of them relative newcomers to decisions about natural resources state, federal, and local agen- cies; nongovernmental organizations whose numbers have grown in size and complexity in recent years; user and industry representatives not only from the ranks of the most affected use/industry but also from other related uses and industries; scientists (primarily from the natural sciences, but increasingly from the social sciences as well); and members of the public. These interactions are often adversarial, and typically there are not well-established fore or mechanisms for conflict resolution. Such examples have drawn attention to the need to consider the effects of

56 SCIENCE, POLICY, AND THE COAST activities of one sector (such as agriculture) on other sectors (such as fisheries) and on the environment (fisheries habitat), to find new ways of resolving con- flicts in multiple-actor and multiplejurisdiction situations, and to adopt manage- ment approaches that are adaptive-that anticipate problems and issues and in- corporate "learning" about the natural and socioeconomic environments and the performance of government programs into the management process (see pp. 61- 62~. As eloquently stated at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environ- ment and Development, achieving sustainable development of oceans and coasts will require new management approaches, that are "integrated in content and anticipatory in ambit" (UNCED, 1992~. To devise more integrated and adaptive approaches to management that incorporate a strong interface between science and policy, we must first under- stand the complexity of perspectives that are typically present in multiplejuris- diction, multiple-actor situations. Policymakers and Policy Implementers at Different Levels of Government Policymakers, including Congress, state legislatures, regional bodies, county boards, and city councils, are responsible for responding to environmental prob- lems by designing policies and programs, generally in the form of legislation. Policy implementers include federal agency officials, state agency officials, and regional, county, and city officials. Implementers are responsible for putting legislation into practice by developing regulations and monitoring and enforce- ment programs, also with public input. Scientists Scientists are employed in academia, government, industry, and nongovern- mental organizations. Scientists may play different roles-as purveyors of objec- tive information, authority figures, advocates and antagonists, and/or cooperators (Boesch and Macke, 1995; Sabatier, 1995~. Policymakers and the public can become confused when scientists oppose each other because of differing interpre- tations of their own and others' research results. This situation leaves Policymakers in a quandary, may paralyze decisionmaking, and may consider- ably diminish the role that science plays in the policy process. Solid data and analysis may be dismissed because of criticism of individuals unqualified in the scientific field in question (NRC, 1995c). The academic peer review system has as its major goal the maintenance of "good" science, but it is not always apparent to individuals not familiar with the issue (including other scientists) how to compare the quality of science and statements associated with opposing scien- tists.

CHALLENGES IN MAKING AND IMPLEMENTING COASTAL POUCY Users/Industry 57 Expansion in the scope of coastal issues has meant an expansion in the number of users affected by and involved in the policy process. Users have become increasingly organized and active. Many coastal industries and user groups support regional and/or national coordinating entities such as associations or institutes. Examples include the American Petroleum Institute for oil and gas issues, the National Fisheries Institute for commercial fishing issues, and the American Sportsfishing Association for recreational fishing issues. Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) The number of NGOs active in coastal decisionmaking has grown signiDl- cantly in recent years. NGOs play an important role in bringing new issues to light, educating the public, contributing to the policy development process, and acting to monitor the process. NGOs may pursue different interests (e.g., envi- ronmental, business) and vary in the extent of their interactions with the public, scientists, and policymakers. NGOs increasingly enlist scientists in their work, and their impact has increased. Examples of national and international NGOs that focus on coastal issues include the American Oceans Campaign, the Center for Marine Conservation, the Environmental Defense Fund, Greenpeace, and the National Coalition for Marine Conservation. The Public Members of the public participate in the decisionmaking process either as members of organized interests (users, NGOs) or as individuals taking advantage of the many opportunities for public participation provided by U.S. environmen- tal laws. It is public values and perceptions, in an aggregate sense, that provide policymakers with direction and goals. The public has opportunities to influence policymaking through contact with legislators and by providing input during comment periods associated with new legislation. There is a tendency for scientists and managers to believe that complete knowledge and understanding on the part of the public will be followed by agreement with the scientific and management decisions. Therefore, scientists and managers may believe that if a community is not happy with a management regime or decision it is because community members do not understand the issues. However, agreement and compliance do not necessarily follow under- standing. The incorrect assumption is that an educated public is an agreeabl public.~° iORobert Bowen, University of Massachusetts. Remarks given at the Gulf of Maine Symposium on Improving Interactions Between Coastal Science and Policy, Kennebunkport, Maine, November 2-4, 1994.

58 SCIENCE, POLICY, AND THE COAST It is not enough simply to inform the public about all the information used in the policy process. The public must have the opportunity to analyze the informa- tion and to voice its concerns and desires. In recent years, public understanding of science has been increasing and there are many instances where citizens, individually and through organized efforts (such as citizen advisory committees), have played important roles in defining and overseeing the conduct of scientific studies aimed at resolving prob- lematic coastal issues. For example, each National Estuary Program includes citizen advisory groups, and those groups, in addition to more general public input, are integral to the development of comprehensive conservation and man- agement plans (e.g., see Albermarle-Pamlico Estuarine Study, 1995~. The News Media One of the most important conduits to policymakers and implementors is the popular and semipopular print and electronic news media. These media provide information directly, help shape public opinion, and affect policymakers' impres- sions of public opinion. For example, both in the case of ocean dumping in the New York Bight and offshore oil and gas development off California, Florida, and New England, the news media helped develop public fear that exceeded scientific assessment of the risks (Freudenberg and Gramling, 1994), leading to congressional bans or moratoria. If certain aspects of the issues are reported out of context or without full media understanding, those reports will play on the public's fears and emotions. Sensationalistic reporting tends to create much public sympathy over emotional issues, such as wildlife management, and may lead to clouded perspectives and calls for unreasonable, inefficient action. On the other hand, the media can also be very effective in educating the public and policymakers about rather complex environmental issues and mar- shalling support for action against more insidious threats. A good example concerns nutrient overenrichment and oxygen depletion in the Chesapeake Bay. The media need to be targeted as an important participant in coastal management that needs better access to scientific information, so that it will not sensationalize environmental issues. The scientific community has a responsibility to commu- nicate with the media and to encourage the reporting of issues in the proper context and with the correct amount of neutrality. With understandable scientific information, the media will have a basis on which to build a responsible role as an information provider to the public and to policymakers and implementers. One instance where media access to scientific data has been important is in the management issues surrounding Boston Harbor (Connor, 1995~. The Massa- chusetts Water Resources Authority published a State of the Harbor report that put issues and scientific information into lay terms, and this has led to increased media coverage of the issues. Similarly, the tabloid-style Bay Journal (see Fig- ure 5) presents scientific information about the Chesapeake Bay and its water- shed to the public and news media in an approachable and understandable form.

CHALLENGES IN MAKING AND IMPLEMENTING COASTAL POLICY B~ _ AY ~ Ad, ~0~1 so 1 - Vol. 4 No. 10 A public education service of the Chesapeake Bay Program January-February 1995 Virginia ponders withdrawal from coastal fish pane! By Knurl Ship BARELY a year after Conl;rcss breasted a law requir- ing Atlantic Coast states to comply with jointly developed fish management plans, Virginia officials are eonsiderio~ a tebeDion. Under a bill soon to be considered by the state General Assembly, Virginia would quit the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries CotnmissioD, which sets arch lirruts for fish that migrate across state borders. The bill, sponsored by Dcl. W. Tayloe Murphy Jr., D- Westmoreland County, was favorably reported out of committee last fall Its supporters object to the commission's ability to im- pose fishing restrictions on individual states. Until Con- gress passed a law ire 1993 providing federal eoforeemeot power for the commission's plans, states could ignore ASMFC catch limits. Proponents of the federal law argued that by ignoring the plans, states were allowing coastal fish species to be ovcrharvested. The issue become more heated last year when the ASMFC refused a request from Maryland and Virginia to increase the arDount of striped bass they could harvest, a move that angered some commercial fishermen. Some have argued that the Bay states, where almost all striped ban. are spawned, were being unfairly outvoted by Northern states who were bound by~even more restrictive catch limits. Virginia Gov. George Allen raised the issue at the Oct. 14 meetir~; of the Bay Program's Executive Council, say- ing, 4'We feel that we have competent expertise to manage our fisheries wisely. We do not need intrusive federal mandates that are based on polities rather than science. "We're going to fight for our rights-if we feel we arc right with our science and our evidence-when we think that others are trying to prescribe unbalanced fishery man- agement pleas that are inappropriate for our particular needs arid e~ret~Dstanees," AIICD said. A spokeswoman for Virginia Natural Resources Scetc- tarv Beckv Norton Dunlop said the Allen administration does riot have a position on Mt~rphy's specific legislation. but said that in principle it is "unhappy" about federal mandates on the state. If Virginia decides to withdrew from the eornmission. it still would have to follow restrictions set by the eommis- S,on. Phase Me AShIFC-page in _ . f ~ ~ _ r ~ Biologists use a seine Nat to collect a fish sa~npkfrorn the Ma~wonurn Creck Rating Chesapeake rivers Screniists seek 'index' that will let fish to speak for ecosystem By ICar] Blanker~ship spoeies, measured the largest and smallest among therm, and divided them by age or~year cuss." obey shouted the results to a record keeper. "White perch -25 so far." "Minirnurn white perch. zero year class, S5." "Maxirnttrn while pereb, zero year eLass, 80." The counted fish were tossed into a cooler of river water so they could later be returned to the Matta- woman. Ibis would to On for ready half ;rn hotter. Mien it Noted be done again. And then, the whole process would be repeated at four more sites in Mattawoman. & tidal fresh water river that enters the Potomac River about 20 miles south of Washington, D.C. Off~horc at each site, a boat hauled a tr&wl Det along the bottom for five m~outeS..lhen. biologists would inventory wb&tever turned up-always far AFIRE bauling a 100-foot seine net around a semi-eirele from the beach, two biologists dragged the net out of the M;lttswoman Creek arid onto dry land. Inside the net. more than a tbousaDd fish-rar~- iDg from {ingernail-size to several inches in length _ flailed about. A balf dozen biobg~sts swarmed around and began dividing up the eateh. Iincs of bluegills, piles of striped bass, and groups of bay ~nehovy been to forth on the sandy beach. "Anyone doing write perch?" one sorter called out, boldiD& a few SpCCimCDs in her hand. They counted the total number present for each P,_ ~ INDEX-pow 8 Figure 5 Cover page of January-February 1995 issue of the Bay Journal. INTEGRATED AND ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT As discussed in preceding sections, coastal environmental and resource poli- cies and management approaches have frequently focused on specific activities, resources, or environmental media and thus have failed to adequately reflect the linkages among them. Moreover, environmental and resource policies have, in part because of the failure to take into account this complexity, often not achieved the desired objectives or have had unanticipated outcomes. To address these twin problems of complexity and unpredictability, two important management con- cepts have emerged: integrated management and adaptive management.

60 SCIENCE, POLICY, AND THE COAST Integrated management attempts to encompass the complex scope of mul- tiple sectors, jurisdictions, and actors to achieve management that cuts across users, agencies, geography, resources, and disciplines. Adaptive management, aimed at the temporal dynamic aspect of management, is an approach that incor- porates, on a continuous basis, learning about natural and social environments and about the performance of government programs in the management process. Meaning and Approaches to Integrated Management There has been considerable work in recent years in defining the major characteristics of integrated management in the context of coastal areas; see, for example, Sorensen and McCreary (1990), OECD (1991), Bower (1992), Chua (1993), NRC (1993), and Van der Wiede (1993~. Although different authors emphasize somewhat different aspects of integrated coastal management (partly as a result of diverse disciplinary backgrounds and partly as a reflection of the authors' varying experiences acquired in work on integrated coastal management in different parts of the world), there appears to be growing consensus on the outlines of a general model of integrated coastal management. This is evident in recent work by the World Bank, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Orga- nization, and the United Nations Environment Programme in the preparation of international guidelines for integrated coastal management. There appears to be clear consensus that integrated coastal management represents a continuous and dynamic decisionmaking process. Integrated coastal management is a process by which decisions are made regarding the use, devel- opment, and protection of coastal areas and resources. It recognizes the distinc- tive character of the coastal zone itself a valuable resource for current and future generations. The goals of integrated coastal management are to attain sustainable development of coastal areas, to reduce vulnerability of coastal areas to natural hazards, and to maintain essential ecological processes, life support systems, and biological diversity in coastal areas. Integrated coastal management has multiple purposes in that it analyzes implications of development, conflicting uses, and interrelationships between physical processes and human activities and promotes linkages and harmonization between coastal activities among different sectors. Authors differ in terms of what areas, resources, and activities they include under the aegis of integrated coastal management. In terms of areas, integrated coastal management generally must include both coastal lands and coastal waters because of the important reciprocal effects of processes and activities in these two areas. Compared to sectoral entities and processes that tend to be concerned only with one use or resource of the coastal environment, a well-functioning inte- grated coastal management process is expected to perform three important roles: (1) as an area-based (rather than a single-use or single-resource-based) process,

CHALLENGES IN MAKING AND IMPLEMENTING COASTAL POLICY 61 integrated coastal management has a special role in planning for the uses of a coastal area in the present and into the future, in harmonizing and balancing existing and potential uses, and in providing a long-term vision; (2) in promoting particular appropriate uses of the coastal zone that may need some special en- couragement (e.g., marine aquaculture); and (3) stewardship of the ecological base of coastal areas and the promotion of public safety in areas typically prone to significant natural, as well as man-made, hazards. Achieving integrated management in the coastal context is especially com- plex because several major dimensions of integration need to be addressed: (1) integration among sectors (among coastal sectors, for example, fisheries, and tourism) and between coastal sectors and other land-based sectors such as agri- culture (intersectoral integration); (2) integration between the land and water sides of the coastal zone (spatial integration); (3) integration among levels of government (local, state, regional, and national) (intergovernmental integration) and among agencies within each level of government (interagency integration); and (4) integration among disciplines (natural sciences, social sciences, and engi- neering) and policymaking/implementation (science/policy integration). Efforts to achieve policy integration are often most successful when incen- tives are utilized to entice government agencies to cooperate. Becoming in- volved in interagency relationships implies that an agency may lose some of its freedom to act independently and must devote scarce staff and financial resources for cooperative activities. Purposeful interagency cooperation, it would seem, will tend to take place when positive incentives to begin and maintain the inter- agency relationships are present. Vanous factors that can work as incentives for interagency cooperation are analyzed by Weiss (1987~: (1) perception of a com- mon problem that cuts across various agencies, (2) monetary incentives, (3) legal mandates, (4) sharing of norms and values among agencies on the need for integration, (5) the possibility of gaining political advantage, and (6) the possibil- ity of reducing uncertainty. Meaning and Approaches to Adaptive Management Adaptive management may be defined as management systems that have the capacity to learn from their surroundings by incorporating timely information from appropriately designed sensing systems and, thus, being able to adapt to changing circumstances (see, generally, Lee, 1993~. Adaptive management ap- proaches are suggested when a capacity to cope with uncertainty and complexity is required, as is often the case in the management of natural resource systems. The conventional approach to planning and management requires a level of infor- mation "up front" that is not generally available in these cases. Adaptive management involves the concept of learning by doing. The con- duct of governance programs should be seen as opportunities to test and improve the scientific basis for action. As a strategy of implementation, adaptive manage

62 SCIENCE, POLICY, AND THE COAST ment provides a framework within which management measures can be evalu- ated systematically as they are carried out. A governance system that is fully "adaptive" would, in the committee's view, be one that is continuously learning from its ongoing management activi- ties and systematically applying that learning in such a way as to make the best possible decisions. One of the keys to success, of course, will be to conduct the requisite learning ("sensing") in the right areas so as to anticipate emerging management needs. This learning must extend beyond the physical environment targeted for management attention (e.g., erosion rates or rates of sea-level rise) to include changes in the institutional, political, social, and economic environment that could affect the behavior of the governance system. Implications for Science-Policy Interactions Both natural and social sciences must participate significantly in efforts to achieve integrated management-the former in understanding the nature and dynamics of the natural ecosystems in question, and the latter in understanding the socioeconomic factors involved as well as the full array of players, issues, and perspectives that must be reconciled and the range of incentives and tools that can be utilized to achieve such integration. Adaptive management generally requires that scientists participate in the management process on a more intimate and frequent basis than is comfortable and in roles that are nontraditional. Natural and social sciences are centrally involved in adaptive management: · in the collection and analysis of systematic data regarding natural and social systems and changes in these systems and on the performance and out- comes of governance programs, and · in developing recommendations for adaptations (changes) in management programs on the basis of the above analyses. The information presented in this chapter sets the context for understanding the present use of science in policymaking. The factors described can either hinder or encourage effective use of science. From this background can be drawn findings and recommendations for developing improved means of using science for coastal policymaking presented in the next chapter. By identifying con- straints, the committee determined that specific actions could be taken to over- come them.

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This book summarizes three symposia that were convened in the California, Gulf of Maine, and Gulf of Mexico regions to seek new ways to improve the use of science in coastal policymaking. The book recommends actions that could be taken by federal and state agencies and legislatures, local authorities, scientists, universities, the media, nongovernmental organizations, and the public to yield better coastal decisions and policies. It is unique in that it resulted from a partnership among natural scientists, social scientists, and policymakers.

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