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Appendix A Meetings, Site Visits, and Discussions COMMITTEE MEETING: DECEMBER 21-22, 1994 WASHINGTON, D.C. Participants Committee except Charles Crawford, Atari Epstein, Don Giadrosich, Robert Loewy (see page iii for a list of committee members); NRC staff (Mike Clarke, Bruce Braun, John Hughes, and Norm Haller); and briefers (listed with the presentations below). Objectives Complete administrative matters; agree on tasking and study plan; review tentative report outline; assign persons responsible for various sections of report; begin data gathering from selected presenters-Air Force, OSD, congressional staff, arid others as appropriate; decide what additional data are needed; and determine next steps. Presentations Threat, Mission, and Operational Requirements for the F-22. Presented by Brig. Gen. William S. Hinton, Ir., U.S. Air Combat Compared, Requirements. OSD Views on Waiver. Presented by Dr. Albert Rainis, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Tactical Warfare Program. Discussion of Waiver of Live Fire Tests. Presented by Lt. Gen. Richard E. Hawley, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Acquisition. Overview of the F-22 Program. Presented by Maj. Gen. Robert F. Raggio, F-22 System Program Office. 99
100 Live Fire Testing of the F-22 Congressional Views on Waiver. Presented by Mark Forrnan, Senate Staff. Discussion of Live Fire Testing Philosophy =d the History Associated with First Report. Presented by James O'Bryon, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Live Fire Testing. Air Force Test and Evaluation Pearls for F-22 and Other Applicable Air Force Aircraft. Presented by Lt. Gen. Howard W. Leaf (Ret.), Air Force Test and Evaluation, Ralph Mae, Wright Laboratories; and Jon Ogg, F-22 System Program Office. Discussion of Testing for Navy Of-. Presented by John Aldridge, Naval Air Systems Commas. Discussion of Other Views on Waivers in General. Presented by Louis I. Morgues, General Accounting Office. COMMITTEE MEETING AND SITE VISIT: JANUARY 19-20, 1995 F-22 SYSTEM PROGRAM OFFICE, WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE, OHIO Participants Committee except Charles Crawford, Robert Loewy, and Larry Ullyatt; NRC staff; and briefers. Objectives Complete admiriistrative matters; review updated report outline; continue data gathering from selected presenters representing OSD, the Anny, the Air Force, and the Navy; furler refine report storyboards; panel chairs brief report status; decide what additional data are needed; and determine next steps.
Meetings and Discussions 101 Presentations Special Topics. Presented by LTC John Lawless, Joint Technical Coordinating Group, and Kevin Crosthwaite, Survivability/VuInerability Information Analysis Center. Vulnerability Program Overview. Presented by Jon Ogg, F-22 System Program Office. Vulnerability Reduction Features. Presented by John Donnelly, Lockheed Corp., and Jim Shipman, Pratt and Whitney. High Power Microwave. Presented by Joe GiorIando, Lockheed Corp. Ballistic Vulnerability Analysis. Presented by Mark Stewart, Lockheed Corp., and Jim Shipman, Pratt and Whitney. Live Fire Test Program. Presented by Hugh Griffis, F-22 System Program Office. Joint Live Fire Testing. Presented by Ralph La~z~e, Wright Laboratories. Cost Benefit Analysis Methodology. Presented by Hugh Griffis, F-22 System Program Office, and Ralph Mae, Wright Laboratories. MEETING TO DISCUSS PREVIOUS NRC REPORT: FEBRUARY 8, 199S, SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION (SAIC), TYSONS CORNER, VIRGINIA Participants Committee member Harry Reed; NRC staff member Mike Clarke; Pete Adolph, SAIC (formerly with the Of lice of the Secretary of Defense); Albert Ravines, Of lice of the Secretary of Defense; and Larry Stanford, TRW.
I02 Live Fire Testing of the F-22 Objective Discuss responses to various findings in the previous NRC report regarding live fire testing, Vulnerability Assessment of Aircraft. COMMITTEE MEETING: FEBRUARY 16-17, 1995 WASHINGTON, D.C. Participants Committee, NRC staff, briefers, and additional participants listed below. Objectives Continue data gathering through (a) briefings, and (b) a rourld-table question-and- answer session with invited participants. Presentations Live Fire Test and Evaluation of He F-22 Aircraft. Presented by Lowell Tonnessen and Larry Eusanio, Institute for Defense Analyses. Naw Vulnerability Testing- Results, Methodology & Modeling. Presented by David Hall, Naval Air Warfare Center. Army Vulnerability Testing Results Methodology and Modeling. Presented by Paul H. Deitz, Anny Research Laboratory. Knowledge-Based Benefit/Cost Methodology for Live Fire Test Evaluation. Presented by TetTy Klopcic, Almy Research Laboratory. RouncI-Table Question-and-Answer Session Survivability and live fire testing issues were discussed by He committee, NRC staff, and the following participants:
Meetings an'`! Discussions 103 Chuck Brammeier, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Test and Evaluation Paul Deitz, Army Research Laboratory Larry Eusanio, Institute for Defense Analyses Lee Frame, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Test and Evaluation Hugh Griffis, F-22 System Program Office David Hall, Naval Air Warfare Center LCDR David Hattery, Joint Technical Coordinating Group on Aircraft Survivability Terry Klopcic, Army Research Laboratory Ralph dazzle, Wright Laboratories LTC John Lawless, Joint Technical Coordinating Group on Aircraft Survivability km O'Bryon, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Live Fire Testing Al Rabbis, Office of the Secretary of Defense Arthur Stein, Institute for Defense Analyses Jetty Wallick, Logistics Management Institute SITE VISIT: FEBRUARY 2l, 1995 NAVAL AIR WARFARE CENTER, CHINA LAKE, CALIFORNIA Participants Committee members Dale Atkinson, Charles Crawford, Alan Epstein, Donald Giadrosich, Robert Hillyer, and Milton Margolis; NRC staff members Mike Clarke and John Hughes; and representatives from the Air Force, the Institute for Defense Analyses, and the ITCG/AS. Objective To gather data regarding existing live fire test programs. Presentations Uses and Limits of Vulnerability Models. Presented by Dave Hall, Naval Air Warfare Center. The Test Data Integration Process arid Results. Presented by John Mansion, Naval Air Warfare Center. F/A-~8E/F and V-22 Live Fire Test Program. Presented by I. Hardy Tyson and Tim Wise, Naval Air Warfare Center
104 Live Fire Testing of the F-22 COMMITTEE MEETING: MARCH 21-22, 1995 WASHINGTON, D.C. Participants Committee except Cynthia Volkert and NRC staff. Objective Writing meeting held in executive session. COMMITTEE MEETING: APRIL 27-2S, 1995 WASHINGTON, D.C. Participants Committee except Laity Ullaytt; arid NRC staff. Objective Writing meeting held in executive session. PANEL MEETING: MARCH 3, 1995 ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO Participants Committee panel members John Bode, Delores Etter, Don Giadrosich, and Milton Margolis. Objective Writing meeting.
Appendix B Live Fire Test Law U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 2366, 1994 2366. Major systems and munitions programs: survivability testing and lethality testing required before fi~-scale production (a) Requirements - ~) The Secretary of Defense shall provide that (A) a covered system may not proceed beyond low-rate initial production until realistic survivability testing of the system is completed in accordance with this section and the report required by subsection (~) with respect to that testing is submitted in accordance with that subsection; and (B) a major munition program or a missile program may not proceed beyond low-rate initial production until realistic lethality testing of the program is completed in accordance with this section and the report required by subsection (~) with respect to that testing is submitted in accordance with that subsection. (2) The Secretary of Defense shall provide that a covered product improvement program may not proceed beyond low-rate initial production until- (A) in the case of a product unprovement to a covered system, realistic survivability testing is completed in accordance with this section; and (B) in the case of a product improvement to a major munitions program or a missile program, realistic lethality testing is completed in accordance with this section. (b) Test guidelines - ~) Survivability and lethality tests required ureter subsection (a) shall be carried out sufficiently early in the development phase of the system or program (including a covered product improvement program) to allow any design deficiency demonstrated by the testing to be corrected in the design of the system, munition, or missile (or in the product modification or upgrade to the system, munition, or missile) before proceeding beyond low-rate initial production. 105
106 Live Fire Testing of the F-22 (2) The costs of all tests required under that subsection shall be paid from funds available for the system being tested. (c) Waiver authority (~) The Secretary of Defense may waive the application of the survivability and lethality tests of this section to a covered system, munitions program, missile program, or covered product improvement program if the Secretary, before the system or program enters engineering and manufacturing development, certifies to Congress that live-fire testing of such system or program would be unreasonably expensive and impractical. (2) In the case of a covered system (or covered product improvement program for a covered system), the Secretary may waive the application of the survivability and lethality tests of this section to such system or program and instead allow testing of the system or program in combat by firing munitions likely to be encountered in combat at components, subsystems, and subassemblies, together with performing design analyses, modeling and simulation, and analysis of combat data. Such alternative testing may not be carried out in the case of any covered system (or covered product improvement program for a covered system) urdess the Secretary certifies to Congress, before the system or program enters engineering and manufacturing development, that the survivability and lethality testing of such system or program otherwise required by this section would be unreasonably expensive and impracticable. (3) The Secretary shall include with any certification under paragraph (~) or (2) a report explaining how the Secretary plans to evaluate the survivability or the lethality of the system or program and assessing possible alternatives to realistic survivability testing of the system or program. (4) In time of war or mobilization, Me President may suspend the operation of any provision of this section. (~) Reporting to Congress At the conclusion of survivability or lethality testing under subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report on the testing to the Committees on Armed Services and on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives. Each such report shall describe the results of the survivability or lethality testing and shall give the Secretary's overall assessment of the testing. (e) Definitions In this section: (~) The tenn "covered system" means a vehicle, weapon platform, or conventional weapon system (A) that includes features designed to provide some degree of protection to users in combat; and
Live Test Law 107 . (B) that is a major system within the meaning of that term in section 2302(5) of this title. (2) The term "major munitions program" means (A) a munition program for which more than 1,000,000 rounds are planned to be acquired; or (B) a conventional munitions program that is a major system within the meaning of that term in section 2302(5) of this title. (3) The term "realistic survivability testing" means, in the case of a covered system (or a covered product improvement program for a covered system), testing for vulnerability of the system in combat by firing munitions likely to be encountered in combat (or murutions with a capability similar to such munitions) at the system configured for combat, with the primary emphasis on testing vulnerability with respect to potential user casualties and taking into equal consideration the susceptibility to attack and combat performance of the system. (4) The term "realistic lethality testing" means, in the case of a major munitions program or a missile program (or a covered product improvement program for such a program), testing for lethality by firing the munition or missile concerned at appropriate targets configured for combat. (~) The term "configured for combat," with respect to a weapon system, platform, or vehicle, means loaded or equipped with all dangerous materials (including all flammables and explosives) that would normally be on board in combat. (6) The term "covered product improvement program" means a program under which (A) a modification or upgrade will be made to a covered system which (as determined by the Secretary of Defense) is likely to affect significantly the survivability of such system; or (B) a modification or upgrade watt be made to a major munitions program or a missile program which (as detennined by the Secretary of Defense) is likely to affect significantly the lethality of the munition or missile produced under the program.
Appendix C Department of Defense F-22 Waiver Request This appendix reproduces verbatim the letter submitted by the Department of Defense to Congress (Letterhead of the General Coarse! of the Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. 20301-1600, dated October 8, 1993) requesting a waiver of live fire testing for the F-22. Included are attachments (a) Draft Legislation; (b) Plan for Alternative Assessment; and (c) Section by Section Analysis. 108
Reproduced from DoD F-22 Waiver Request 109 The Honorable Al Gore President of the Senate Washington, DC 20510 Dear Mr. President: Enclosed is draft legislation, "To authorize a retroactive waiver of the survivability and lethality testing procedures that apply to the F-22 program." This proposal is part of the Department of Defense Legislative Program for the 103d Congress and the Office of Management and Budget advises that, from the standpoint of the Administration's program, there is no objection to the presentation of this proposal for the consideration of Congress. Purpose of the Legislation Section 2366 of title 10, United States Code, requires realistic survivability and lethality testing of covered systems and munitions programs prior to fill-rate production. The requirement is that the covered system must be tested for vulnerability in combat by firing munitions, likely to be encountered in combat, at the system configured for combat. Section 2366 of title 10 allows the Secretary of Defense to waive the requirement if, before the system enters fill-scale engineering development, the Secretary certifies to Congress that live fire testing, of the system would be unreasonably expensive and impractical. Because of the cost of an F-22 aircraft, such testing is both unreasonably expensive and impractical. Since the F-22 has already entered fill-scale engineering development, legislation is needed to allow the Secretary of Defense to grant a waiver. In order for the Secretary of Defense to evaluate the survivability of the F-22 aircraft, the Air Force developed the revised live fire test program that is summarized In an enclosure to this letter. This plan includes detailed analyses, review of historical test data, and incremental build-up testing that includes material characterization tests and live fire testing of selected components and subassemblies. Information from the results of these tests will be taken into account in the F-22's design. In this way, we plan to achieve Filly the objective of section 2366 in as realistic a manner as is consistent with cost effectiveness and practicality. The proposed legislation will authorize the Secretary of Defense to grant a waiver to the survivability testing requirements in section 2366 as they apply to the F-22 system. Cost and Budget Data The enactment of this legislative proposal shall not cause any increase in appropriated Finding for the Department of Defense or have any budgetary impact. Sincerely, {Signed Jamie S. Gorelick] Jamie S. Gorelick Enclosures: Draft Legislation Plan for Altemative Assessment Section by Section Analysis
110 Live Fire Testing of the F-22 A BILL [ENCLOSURE A] To authorize a retroactive waiver of the survivability testing procedures that apply to the F-22 program Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America. in Congress assembled That SECTION LIVE-FIRE SURVIVABILIlY TESTING OF F-22 AIRCRAFT (a) AUTHORITY FOR RETROACTIVE WAIVER.--The Secretary of Defense may exercise the waiver authority in section 2366(c) of title 10, United States Code, with respect to the application of the survivability tests of that section to the F-22 aircraft, notwithstanding that such program has entered fi~-scaTe engineering development. (b) REPORTING REQUIREMENT.--If the Secretary of Defense submits a certification under section 2366(c) of such title 10 that live-fire testing of the F-22 system under such section would be unreasonably expensive or impractical, the Secretary of Defense shall require that sufficiently large and realistic components and subsystems that could affect the survivability of the F-22 system be made available for any alternative live-fire test program. (c) FUNDING.--The funds required to carry out any alternative live-fire testing program for the F-22 aircraft system shall be made available from amounts appropriated for the F-22 program.
Reproduced from DoD F-22 Waiver Request PLAN FOR ALTERNATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE VULNERABILITY OF THE F-22 AIRCRAFT [ENCLOSURE By EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 111 The Air Force, in consultation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, proposes the following plan to evaluate the survivability of the F-22 aircraft. In order to assess the adequacy of the testing and to provide the report to Congress required by section 2366 of title 10, United States Code, the Office of the Secretary of Defense will review and comment to the Air Force on their test and evaluation plans, Will observe testing, we obtain all relevant test results from the Air Force in a timely manner, and will review the Air Force's Live Fire Test and Evaluation (LFT&E) report. The Air Force - - ~. ~. ~. ~_ ~ IS conuuctmg a planned vulnerability reduction program which Includes the Lie 1 dab; program. The F-22 vulnerability reduction/LFT&E program uses detailed requirements analyses, vulnerability reduction design features, and a build-up ballistic testing approach to verify the combat survivability of the air vehicle design. Tests are being completed in parallel with the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (ENO) [sic] design activity. This concurrent design/test approach ensures vulnerability reduction features are addressed as early as possible in the development process, thus resulting in overall cost and risk reduction. The data we collected by combining the F-22 Demonstration and Validation (Dem/Val) Program with the EMD vulnerability reduction program showed two major damage mechanisms that are potentially the most serious and likely sources of aircraft loss: Fire/explosion within the dry bay and/or fuel tank ulIage areas. Hydrodynamic ram-induced structural failure of the filet cells. The Air Force assessment plan calls for extensive analysis of these potential damage mechanisms, followed by testing of unique materials, components and then larger realistic aircraft subsystems to verify the predicted vulnerability results. Several other vulnerability issues have been addressed in the Air Force plan. These are: · Separation and redundancy of critical components, hydraulic and electrical lines. Flight and engine control. On-board ordnance. Directed energy threats.
112 Live Fire Testing of the F-22 Chemical threats. Crew casualties. Some of these issues currently are being addressed by analysis, testing, or, in most cases, a combination of the two. The current EFT plan calls for continuing analysis of these issues. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING APPROACH The vulnerability reduction program is based upon the system engineering process of understanding user needs, defining vulnerability requirements which meet system requirements, developing balanced design solutions and testing. Each of these pieces of the program will be described in the following paragraphs. Requirements Definition. The baseline threats are derived from the Operational Requirements Document (ORD) and documented in the System Threat Assessment Report (STAR). Given these threats, the results of vulnerability analysis are compared against system requirements. An iterative design process continues until the vulnerability level meets the system requirements. As an example, in the Dem/Val program, three major iterations occurred before the vulnerability levels were determined to be adequate. Detailed AnalYses. The vulnerability analysis is based upon standard digital computer models, such as those sponsored by the Joint Technical Coordinating Group/Aircraft Survivability (ITCG/AS). Major elements of the vulnerability assessment include the threat definition, Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analyses (FMECA), Damage Modes and Effects Analysis (DMEA), system description, shotline generation model, and component probability of kill given a hit (Pk/h) curves. The analysis outputs are vulnerable areas and overall system Pklh. Ballistic Tests. Ballistic tests will be conducted to fill voids in historical vulnerability data, obtain test data on unique F-22 materials or components, and to verify model analyses. During the EMD Program both development and verification testing are considered part of the F-22 vulnerability reduction/LFT program. Some of the planned major tests are outlined below. TEST DESCRIPTIONS Three categories of ballistic tests will be performed: I) material, 2) component, and 3) subassembly.
Reproduced from DoD F-22 Waiver Request ~3 Material Tests. Penetration equations are required for vulnerability analysis. These equations are used to predict whether a specified projectile or warhead fragment can penetrate the aircraft materials it impacts along its trajectory and predict the residual mass and velocity after impact. Penetration equations for a material unique to the F-22 do not exist. Penetration tests watt be performed on small panels of this material. Projectile type and size, impact angle, impact velocity, and material thickness will be test variables. Test results wait be used to develop penetration equations and fire starting equations. Component Tests. Component probability of kill given a hit (Pk/h) data are the heart of any vulnerability analysis. Component Pk/h curves for all critical components will be determined by analysis. A selected sample of components will be tested to verify the analysis method used to calculate the component Pk/h data. The selection of components to be tested wall be based upon component availability, critical nature of the component, and uncertainty in the component Pk/h analysis. Subassembly Tests. A number of subassembly tests will be conducted to cover the critical regions of the aircraft as described below. Wing Box Subassembly Tests. Hydrodynamic ram phenomena have not been adequately modeled. Hydrodynamic ram testing comprises a significant portion of the F-22 ballistic testing because of its importance in aircraft survivability and because of mode! inadequacies. Tests to determine hydrodynamic ram damage to the wings will start with a small section of wing (wing box) containing 3 spars and eventually build up in a step-w~se manner to larger sections containing spars. The first tests watt hydrodynamic ram effects. The final test will be used to verify that the design finally selected can survive the specified threats. (A 30mm HEl round wait be used in this test.) It wall demonstrate the survivability of the wing design to both hydrodynamic ram effects and fire/explosion in the ulIage (air space in the fuel tack above the fuel) under expected combat conditions. Fuel tank ulIage will be inerted to simulate He effects of the On-Board Inert Gas Generation System (OBIGGS). During the test, the test article watt be subjected to an airflow and watt be structurally loaded to simulate flight conditions. The conditions established for the above test assume that the OBIGGS has adequate capacity to produce sufficient inertant for all expected flight profiles and has a distribution system to adequately disseminate the inertant gas within all of the fuel tanks. The capabilities of the OBIGGS design to produce and distribute adequate inertant will be verified by analysis and tests. be used to identify design features to withstand
114 Live Fire Testing of the F-22 Aft Side of Body Subassembly Tests. Two aft side of body (fuselage) tests are planned. The first test will demonstrate that a 30mm HE] round will not cause massive damage to this structure. Depending upon the outcome of the first test and an updated vulnerability assessment, a second test may be conducted. This test article would be constructed using portions of the Prototype Air Vehicle (PAV), upgraded to represent the current F-22 design. The test article would be subjected to airflow and would serve to evaluate both synergistic effects and separation/isolation schemes. Fuselage Fuel Tank Subassembly. The fuselage Mel tank structural test article wait include the aft crew station bulkhead. This development test will demonstrate that structural (hydrodynamic ram) damage does not result in a catastrophic (structural or air crew) failure. The air crew is shielded by the aft crew station bulkhead. The tank will be filled with water to the combat fuel load level. The threat will be a 30mm HE! or AP! projectile. nrv P`av Subassemblv Tests. The orimarY objective of this test series is to address the uncertainties associated with synergistic ettects, ye., the Interaction ot damaged components on nearby components. A test article watt be fabricated to represent various F-22 configurations and wall include F-22 representative components. The tests will be conducted to demonstrate the synergistic effects of electrical, hydraulic, filet, and coolant components. Actual fluids (fuel, hydraulic, coolant) watt be used. Airflow watt be provided as required to simulate internal and external conditions. Various combinations of threats and shotI~nes watt be tested. In addition, fire protection system effectiveness watt be demonstrated. Some of the tests in the series will include active fire suppression systems identical to those used on the F-22. Engine Tests. The results ofthe extensive ballistic testing on the F-15's FI00 engine are applicable to the F-22's FIl9 engine. The response of the engine diffuser case and the Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC) to ballistic threats are of particular interest. Test results which apply to the F-22 are being factored into the vulnerability analysis. The F-22's F-l 19 engine introduces thrust vectoring to combat aircraft. An analysis wall be conducted to detennine whether a ballistic impact can cause the first vectoring system to lock in a hard-over position. If it appears Mat ballistic impacts or Directed Energy Weapons can produce ur~controlIable flight conditions, then the vulnerability analysis watt be modified to reflect this damage mode. If needed, testing will be accomplished to confirm this analysis. On-board Ordnance. The F-22 SPO is monitoring the on-board ordnance testing being conducted as part of the Joint Live Fire (OF) Program. F-22 SPO
Reproduced from DoD F-22 Waiver Request 115 engineers have attended meetings with Wricht LaboratorY test engineers leading _ _ _ ~ ~ O the test planning effort, so this series of tests can be performed in a manner which will provide information useful to the F-22 program. Test results which can be applied to the F-22 will be factored into the F-~. vl~lnt?r~h~litv rearm A_ ~ · , ~e ~ ^ ~^ -d r~ ~ ^ ~^- Depending on the review of the generic test results, some F-22 specific testing may be required to confirm the vulnerability analysis. Aircraft Battle Damage Repair (ABDR!. In conjunction with subassembly ballistic testing, ABDR procedures and techniques wait be developed, validated, and verified. The Air Force ABDR Program Office from Sacramento Air Logistics Center wall participate in this activity. The above ballistic test articles wail be made available for ABDR activities. High Power Microwave (HPM) Test. HEM tests will include coupling energy into wires and connectors as well as conducted and radiated antenna tests. Laser Tests. Laser testing wall be conducted on applicable components based upon vulnerability reduction requirements. Chemical Testing. The F-22 weapon system is being hardened to withstand chemical weapons. The effects of chemical agents on the F-22 materials is being tested using coupons (small panels) of the materials in question. Based upon this coupon testing, materials and coatings will be selected. Selection of chemical resistant materials and coatings will improve the F-22's ability to operate in a chemical environment. Hardening a fighter aircraft to chemical weapons has never been attempted. Hence, the F-22 program has requested and received support from the Human Systems Center (HSC) at Brooks Air Force Base and U.S. Army Dugway Proving Grounds (DPG). HSC and DPG plan to perform a series of system level "proof-of- concept" decontamination tests on a surrogate fighter aircraft. Availability of this test data will allow F-22 designers to make timely and informed design decisions. Late in EMD, the F-22 air vehicle will be exposed to a chemical agent simulant and then be decontaminated to demonstrate the F-22 decontamination capability. MODEL ENHANCEMENTS As stated earlier, some of the ballistic tests selected were based upon the fact that existing models are not adequate for all situations of interest. For example, they are not adequate for predicting penetration of new materials, for predicting sustained fires, arid for predicting damage when there are synergistic effects. Ballistic test results will be used to reduce the uncertainties. Enhanced models will in turn provide increased fidelity and confidence in the vulnerability analyses. The
116 Live Fire Testinc of the F-22 F-22 SPO has initiated vulnerability model code enhancements. Additionally, the F-22 SPO has requested and received Joint Technical Coordinating Group (JTCG) support in accomplishing additional improvements. CREW CASUALTIES Crew casualty reduction is one of the critical factors identified in the Live Fire Test legislation. A number of the tests described above wait yield information which will be used to minimize crew casualties. In keeping with the spirit of the legislation, an effort has been made to design the aircraft for reduced casualties from all sources (e.g., ballistic impact, fire, smoke) and to facilitate Me safe escape of the crew in the event the aircraft is lost. SECTION BY SECTION ANALYSIS [ENCLOSURE C; LIVE-FIRE SURVIVABILITY TESTING OF F-22 AIRCRAFT This amendment would require the Secretary of Defense to submit a report explaining how the Secretary plans to evaluate the survivability of the F-22 system and assessing various alternatives to realistic survivability testing. The provision also would require the Secretary to ensure that major components and subsystems that could significantly affect the survivability of the F-22 be made available for live-fire testing.
Appendix D VuInerabili~cy Assessment Process The body of this appendix reproduces pages 1 1 to 18 (numbered here as pages D-1 to D-8) of the National Research CounciT's 1993 report Vulnerability Assessment of Aircraft. Citations called out within the text are included in a reference section from the original report, at the end of the text. What Are the ~aS to Military Aircraft? When the military began to use aid ~ Woo, ~ oppos- mg forces began mug weapons ~ an ~ ~ destroy them. In the ~ half of Me twentic~ century, guns were the primary weapons used against assail These gum were either s~ce-based or Ted by enemy ~ They ranged from the small alms weapons, such as the 0.3/0.303- mch (7.62~7.7-minimc=) and 050<aliber (12.7-miBime- ter) machine guns, to a3r~d-a~alk ardlle~y (AAA), such as the 44minime~ and 88-minimeter caliber guns of World Was VW By. Con~y guns that can be o~ against away include the 556-mimmc~r' 7.62-'nimmeter, 12~7- millimeter, 14.s-minm~eter' and 20~nillimeter small arms, and Me 23-'nillime-, I, 37-minime~ 57 mil- lime - , 7~milT;m~er, IS, and 120~ncer ALA The small alms weapons Epically fi= ball autumn_ don, or mnor-pi~g projectiles, known ~ AP rounds, or AP projectiles with ~diaries, known ~ API nomads. Lee AAA weapons and Tic Tier calmer aid guns u~y are bulimic projectiles Woo a high-ea~lo~ve (HE) core and a su~und~g metal =~e These arc refaretl to as HE warheads or HE! warheads when incendiaries are ~1~ 2 . IMuch of He 3~1 Cal m dis clot is bmed upon BE (198S). 2SOmc of die mall AAA also fit AH 117 The HE warheads may de~am on contact tenth the away (con~-fuzed HE warheads), after an elapsed time since Hog (~ne-fuzed HE we), or in proof to the oxim:0r-fuzed HE withes). At Wodd War is, NEW mimics, bow s~ce-based and airborne, were developed to kill at These ~i- air weapons typically cony come- or pro~ty-fi,zed warheads designed to kill affray win Fragments and blast Guns and Tided mimes ~ skill He primary threat few by away today. However, several new Is to aid am ~ dc~rclopment. Di~i energy weapons, ~ the form of Lowe powe~lascrs~ 1dgh-power microwaves, have do potential to damage or Troy sensors on do mr- c.~t "d Tic weapons Hey are a'I7ymg, and high-power balms c" damage major airman shuck. Chemical and biological weapons pose a tot to ~aft, particularly on the surface, and nuclei weapons are a tot to al on Tic surfs and ~ Tic air. West ~ AL Vulnerability? Ahmoft swore a mission in hostile fly by "avoiding" tic damage~sing mcch~i~nc of the enemy's air defense and by "wi~nding'~ the age Iced by these mocha c when they c~notbe avoi loll The aimaft attribute lalown as suscepubiliq, refers to He inability of
118 Live Fire Testing: of the F-22 tile airman to avoid (being damaged by) the man-made hostile en~arnent and is mcasumd by Pa, the probability Me airway is bit by a wan while on its minion. the aid atrnbac known as ~rulnerabili~ refers to the inabilitr of We abesaft to wind Idle damage causal by the) hostile env~ment and is meal by P-~ the City the aid Is killed giveD Eat it is hit Ihc pso~r tbc his killcdby ap~arwcapon while onthc~on is PA which is equal to PH.P - . The probability the ahoy sunrives the encounter wide the weapon is Ps, which is equal to 1-Pa, which is Be sync as 1-POP - . Thus, Cog an aimeft's sub (PH) add w1~ (do) to the weapons likely to be expound in Cal increases its s~vi~ity. An aimaR's susceptibility c" be sit be, desu-D - g the enemy ad detessc dana=, by reducing Be t~s signatures (st~hh), by Oblong outboard and off-board ~ w=Dmg Cons "d eclectic comeamca- su~es, and by the ~ 0,plc~yst. An simah's wIn~- I~ - ~g~ nam, bar locating ads to mint; the "ssibilhy and Cal of damage, by dig al to cam or m~ the effem of ~e, by Cog so em newt to suppress Tic damask by shielding comb and by removing mlnelablc co~xmcms Tom the ~cigm A tray imps aspect of vu~abiligr Induction is do my design flanks arc effects ages a namer of diffe~em don weapons. For cxa~lc, locating abundant flit con- mol hydraulic Cubs on opposite sides of the aircraft and inking the fill ionic pulses will pm~dc pi ham both gun projectiles and pro~y-fuzed missiles in most simations. Thus, ~ Boy siphons it is not necessary to consider aII of die individual Is when designing the abaft. Cr~ComponentsandEsscr~lFun~ons. E=hcom- ponent in the Allah has a level, die. or amok of Salability to the Dane ~i~ genmated by tic Cat weapon; ~ - cut h cc~o~t's ~1 contributes ~ some mat ~ do vu~abilit,,r of die Cot ~e wow lcill IS used bees m ~ ~1 ~ 1~ vul~ mad cot uses HI defied of~lcill. TO _olldI1 he the ambim 1511 ant Be ~ abon AIL 1~ ~ ~1 levels of An bed upon ~ ~ ~ ~m ~ - ~ Fat ~ ~ Kit rcl ~ IciII Us did as ~ ~ m ~ Me ad ~11s om of coal ~ 30 ~ after tie ha, and We A Icon is deft-d as which me ad fills om of coda ~ 5 ~ Par the ~ 'Dam, I, ~ en, ~ai~ ac tie Ott-of die the-Ward ~ Cager ~ ~ do ~CafL The Apes of Amp ~ ~- and ~ pastor "d ~v agleam am _ hag- ~smd~LD~Fp~s~ of ~cd~ _ tubed-dies_- Ibex pew ~ ash ~ deaf ~ ~ here ~ bend ~ ~ ~ ED (m me form of ~ fin or e - - an), hyd~nlie or hy~c saw "d bled bet airman The critical components on an aircraft are Bose componeDss whose kill result in Me loss of an essential fimcdo~L Esscadal functions are those fimcuons mogul to prevent an aid 1511. The essential functions that prevent an antilog kin am ii*, dam and control of Bight, "d the ability to land safely. Na~ga*on and wee ons delivery am two possible ~ fusions for a Con am lcilL AD epic of a critical con~onent for the anion Icil1 is the ~ingac pilot who controls the digllt of the aid If the pilot ~ killed tic., helshe is unable to persona the Unseal f~on of control of tic ahead) the d is go killed An exile of a apical component ~ an ~ al for the Con abort kill ~ tic weapons ddiYe~y cony. ~ Tic computer is Kim, the weapons canon be Leased at the cost time; I, the pilot will rc~ to base "or to Con co~letion. Cw~ems that do not co~ibu~ to any of the essa~al from Axle ethical When they response to a ha tie., Weir kill mode) cmses Be kill of another colons that is critical ~ it colltributes to an essential fimctiom For aulmple, Wader the by Gamed on-bo~d an ark ~ ~hc bombs do not contribute to the ~ f~c- dons for flight of lift, ~ and control However, if one of the bombs explodes why hit by a flagmen or bullet. Id the e~l~on kills t}lC pilot or any over critical cat Ned on the aid the bombs arc critical components bounce their ~11 mode (explosion) e~rcn~lly le" to a ~1 of the airman The propagation of damage In tic hit cw~ to other u~mpona~s is known as ~;ng dam- age. Pyrotechnic hems, such as inhaled flame, are also ~- cal comports when Bed Revlon to a hit Lads to a fi= and Be eternal loss of the airman The cndcal components can be nonred~m~, su:h as Be single pilot and single Cole on a single-pilo~ sm~e- et~ =aft, 0~ reduced such as the nvo end on a two~giDed ail When Be cnuca1 components are redundant, a ~ of more In one of Be redo compo nab is ~ for a 1~11 of the aid In get, the c~iacal component on a particular aircraft depend only Won the sd~ 1511 Argosy (and leveL if alias) Ed the assumed kill maws), and not upon the dead wend The probe used to die all of the no and Imp ~ compounds on ~ Ada* is lcoown At the cubical component Crisis. Two direct types of ;~lyscs c" be used, ~ Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FLEA) and Be Fault Tree Analysis - -A). ~ the FMEA, all possible failure, damage, or kill modes of a component or subsystem me identified and the consequence of each by Marc cad mum wines mug ·~ ~nu~- met ~ to the Em. ~iy for ~ grids in ~ Sb~ nip concern is Id In tic ~ opt 2 - d4. Graft to follow 3 for several exiles of 1~ dots
Reproduced from Vulnerability Assessment of Aircraft ~9 _ TABLE l-1 List of Some Subsystem Damage Caused Failure (Kill) Modes [BalL 1985] Fuel Subsystem Fuel supply depletion In tank S=/e~10s~on Void spa" fi~/e~losion Summed c~or Hydraulic ram Power TrainlRotor BladclPropc~lor Subsystem Loss of lubrication Mech~ical/~al damage Etec~ical Subsystem Scv~g or grolmd~g Mechanical failure 0~8 Propulsion Subsystem Fuel mignon _ . . . . . Foragn object mScsDon Inlet flow di~rnon ricanon station Compressor case p~f~= Combustor case pofo~on T - inc section fable F~h~l'~ dun few Eng~c c=~ol/acc~oncs flub Crew Subsystem Icy, incapaci~o~ or Ash Aunt Subsystem F=Jc - 106ioc Flight Control Subsystem Disruption of corm al path Loss of control power Loss of airy motion data Damage to control surfaces Hydraulic fluid fire Seal Subsystem SO removal EN of - cad Normal wig Pa~oD AYiO~ Subsystem PeDamor~t damage F-c~los~o~o~ cat component failure/dam~ge~ll mode upon each of the essen- hal functions Is de~amincd.' Id He FTA, those component or subsystem kill modes Red to cause the loss of Tic essential fi,ncuons a" deter Kill Modes. For many yew the aimah vulnerability com- muni~ has observed He results of live fire testing of compo nests, subsystems, and aircraft and has examined the combat data on damaged and killed ai~af' ~ order to define ~ of He kill modes associate with each of He airman subsystems. For example, Mete are Eve ~11 modes ass~ wad He feel subsystem. When a fuel milk is holed by a pene~or or fragment, a catastrophic explosion or major fi= may occur inside He lank or foci may leak from He hole ~ the tank into an adjacent void space or dry bay and catch 0, or hy~ic ram Arm to die fuel tank wall may cause a major special failure of He tank or allow fuel to dump into engine in ok:e dents, causing an engime kill A list of some of Tic possible kill mom far each of the major subsystems on an alphas been compiled based Ron these observations and studies. Figs List is presented In Table 1-1. "lbe kill modes listed in Table 1-l describe different types of Ron the: components or subsystems in He aimah exhibit when the aircraft is hit. In some of the kill modes, the component hit is Tic only component lulled whereas in others, the component hit Is ~ the hit in a mode that Abbe rcladon between a co~o~ or swam flails mode and comb - - causet damage or kill mocks ~ developed m the Damage Mode and Effects Ad. kills other components. An example of the former is the loss of flight control due to a hit ~ a hydraulic power actuator But causes a jam of the actuator and a loss of control of the con-1 surface. An example of the lam is a foci ingestion kill of an endue due to a hit on a fuel tank adjacent to the am inlet. Reducing the v~erabili~ of an airman to the Heat weapons and Heir damage mechanisms involves rc- ducing Tic likelihood the kill modes given ~ Table 1-1 will occur when He airman is hit. The Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA'. As an example of the FMEA process, consider a s~gle~ngine airman with only two fuel tang, one ~ each Hog. The tam are partially full, and there He fuel vapors in the 'alleges of Tie Am. The possible kill modes for Tic fuel subsystem am given ~ Table 1-1. One fuel tank kill mode is an comply soon ids the tank. If the consequence of the internal e~lo- sion in either wing tank is Tic destruction of the wing con- ~g ~ mnlc which then ~ a kill of the airman disc to loss of lift, both Hug *eel tanks are no~undane Critical components for the amition kill for He Renal explosion kin mode. On the other hand, suppose the kill mode of the tanks is a loss of fuel storage c~abiliy due to one or more holes in the bonom of the tang If this ~11 mode occurs only one tank, this Bill not lead to a loss of Rust due to fuel supply depletion when the Damaged tank can provide fuel to the engine. However, if both tanlcs are holed and lose their suffrage capability, then a fuel supply depletion *{be allege is the volume of we Tic above the fuel lc~cL Fun ~5 arc m the ullage.
120 Live Fire Testing of the F-22 kill will occur, the ~ will lose Bush and an aurinon kill win result Thus, for this kill mode, the fuel tonics am It cnU~ ~. The Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). In He FTA process, the sell kill category (and possibly level) is dewed as tic to~level undes~le evem, and the component Icm to carted the Imdes~le erred "c died. Tic compo mat kill that cult ~ the Impel Chew are links togt~ber ~ the fault Ned by Dig logical AND and OR gales. Fir example, consider an away with components A, B. C, and D. An undesirable kiI1 will occur if em colonel A OR B is killed, or it may occur if both component C AND D ~ killed. Thus, c~ponc~ts A and B are non~du~ mdcal combs, Hi components C and D arc Tunic conical colons. Id using FTA for tic feel mnlc expels glares above, one undac~le eared leading to ~ anon kill is loss of lift. If loss of lift occurs due to an e~l~oa inside the left wmg fuel ~ a campone~ A kid OR if it occurs due to am c~plmio~ mode the light wmg Em, a componem B Ici8, bow wing foci tanks me n cndcal component forge explosion kill motile Oar the of hand a loss of ~ will occur if Bog tanks A AND B are killed Our die fuel sway depledon ~11 mode). Thus, the ~ arc ~m~ conical components for this ~11 modic. As another example of FTA, Add a two~gmcd ahaafL The ~ even' of loss of Bust, which leads go ~ attrition kin, will of when die led engine AND He right come ale km~ Thus, dress two comes are ndant cnucal components. A list of tic ~yEncal Local component on a siDgl~piloted, tweed helicopter is gi~rcn in Table 1-2. The Kill Tree. A view Ivan of all of the conical components and their redundancies is provided by the kill ~ee,9 such as the one shown in Ogre 1-1 for an anon kill of a Nero engined, two-piloted helicopter. A complete honzontal or diagonal cut Lough the tree tnmk any~erc along tic trunk ~1 ~a't~ a kilt For example, a ~11 of die pilot and either die copilot or He copilot's consuls iNiI1 cause a kin, as will a kill of the drive main or alar of die He cyclic Its. If the Em mode of the left- and ngb~- band fuel tails is fuel supply depletion' bob tam must be killed to Cause a ~11 of do aims On Be other he- if Be kill mode is a fuel fin: or Close then a kill of cipher omk will Ici]1 Be Cafe Once Be mucal component have be" imbibed and amaged in the 1611 ~e, a vulnmabiliy assessment can be pet med. Wbat Id a V - embed ~n~t? A vu~aa~ibr ~meSl' is brolly defined hoe die sync demon, delineation, test and e~ral~ion, analysis, orq~ificanon of the vuloasbility of the ind~id- ual critical component and of die total aid When as al is hit by one or more damage mechanisms Ed by Be dam weapon, the outcome of those hits is not deter- minishc; it Is random or s~a~c.'° For ex~lc, when 15 hagmcn~ from ~ pro~ty-fuzed high~~losi~c ~rarhcad pme~e Tic upper wall of an Aft's Bog fuel Ala the Epic veer inside die tank may explode, des~ymg the wmg and killing Tic ad or the orator may not by ~ sac is also reared to as the few ~c. HA d~icplocess has ar~blc outcome that c~bc~dic~d with Icy if all of Tic if pars "d govem~g he's sac ~ R~or~cp~es he~re~plc ore, any or of whim may os may Dot oar: on my ogle ~aL TABLE 1-2 List of Typical Nomedundant and Redundant Cridcal Components on a S=gle-Piloted. TwmE~i Helicopter (Bali, 1985) Norman Crime Condones R~a Conical Components 1 Flight Control Subsystan Co~onasu Red I, pitch ~ Splay hy~ic ac~S co~ec~rc Icver, asked cordon pahls Rotor Blade and Power Tray Consonants Blades, disc sham, moor heads, ~ _om "d gc~xes Fud Subsystem Consonants Fun cells, sump, lid, "d valves Sure Subsystem Con~ponen~ Tail boom Propulsion Subsystem Componam 1~5 and "gme mousers Hydraulic Subsystem Components Hydraulic reservoirs, lines, and co~o~ts S~c~al Subsystem Components Redundant Cal clemc~ts
Reproduced from Vulnerability Assessment o f Aircraft ,~, ~ PtL0T >(COtilDT ~ . 'I ~ ( COIITROLS' ) ( COIITI DLS, ) L . I l Us, . ~-~ ( HID~UUC ( H'OReWLC ) ~# Cal ~ bib r FUEL SU,P~ I DEPL£ItO! 1~ , . FEEL FIRES C ~t ~ElPLOS101 FIGURE 1-1 TO amidon l~l~cf~atw~piloted, two~gined helicoper(BaLt, 198S). C~ght ~ ALAA 1985 - Jsed m~ pamisnom explode, and Me annular sunrives We 15 hits. The Iilcel~ood of an explosion inside Tic rank depends upon mmy random variables, such as Me amount of fuel vapor, Me oxygen conception in the Enemy of the Sagmcats, and the tan- pera~e of me fragments. How 16; Vulnerability Meas~? As a consequence of the random nature of vulnerability, the metric most often ~ to q~n~ Me vulnerability of an airways conical componen~c is Pall,, the probability the component is killed Even a random hit on the component by a tow weapon or damage m~hanism.~' The value of P.,,. depends upon Me Away ofthe~ effects parame- t~ ass~iamd with the damage minim such as mass and impact velocity on the component for pene~s and fragments. The set of come PA values for different masses and impea velocities is known ~ He Pa,, from A Pond metric used to q~r a component's vulnerabil- i~ is As, the vulnerable area of the componcDt Component vulnerable area is defined ~ c presented Ma of He compo nent that, if hit, would cause a kill of die component and is equal to He product of the components Rented area Ap in the Mat approach Lion and its P'`h, i.e., As = A, Up,, ItOther my somber used for component ~b~ ~ Pa the pr~bili~ a compC is ~ ~ a hit, arcs ~cmov~, eden y, and buss l 1 Ihc metrics used to quantify me vulnerability of tic airman to a single random hit by a penetmor or a~- fi'~1 warhead include Ply. the probability the away is killed given a random hit on the aid and An, the aims single hit vulne~lc archly The metric Ad to quantify the vuln~abilin~r of an ahead to tile proximity- and dme-fuzed B warheads on AAA projectiles and Sidled missiles is Plus, the probability the ad is killed given ~ external detona- lion by a high+XPIOSiVe Warh-C1 The PI S a function Of the 10CaiiOn Of the detODaDOn point USA respect to the aircraft. What Are me Two Methodologies Used to Assess Vulnerability? ID gee . there are two methodologies Used to assess affray VUI~eiaBiii~Y. One method is the a Ron Pads On Of aid VUIneraBiiitY by usmg analyses Or modeling. AS mC`hOd iS nearly always SUPPOr~d by prior live fire test data on component Pith values for He venous kill modes. However, the Ads have open been obtained on older equips mend The odor method is tile a postenon observation and ~- :~rcrmsc ~ 0= to a compa~ asd uppamsc ~5 Oft to Tic Dow Thus. P" is me By a c_ is killed ~ a random hit on the comport I'M is Me prob~ili~ a composer is Pact given a ~ hit on the airway and P,UH is the probability the Emit is wed gum ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
122 possible measllrEment of airman ~nerabili~r by using em- pincal dam obtained mom either actual combat, aberaR ~- dlents, or controlled live fire ~g,13 This method is nearly always suppmed by a pnon predictions of vulnerability psiorto testing to dome me test conditions Id by apos~non analyses or evaluation of He ~ A brief renew of the stste-of-thc-an of vulnerability analysis/modeling "d vol- nelabiligr tog is Men below. An~sis/ModeZ~g~ Ibep~ediction of ~ ai~'s vulner- ability to the balls projectiles and gaidlcd Similes likely to be cocounen:d ~ combat can be accompanist by mug stand~di~d computer pi One set of prams is applicable to ~ Ogle hit by im~cHng pcueualor or ftag- me~ Compulsion of V~nasble Area and Repair r~mc (COVART) is the Joim Tecimical C~ Group on A0mft Stability (]TCGlAS) sods Pogrom for com- pu~g the critical component vul~adble areas Al and tic a~'s truly-le area ^' far a single random hit by a penes or Foment (lTCG/ME, 1984). Anodler set of Logjams comma; ~ ~rulne~iliy to con~ct-fi=ed HE warheads that dHonatc on the space or within the at High Explosive Vulnerable Area and Reps r~mc (HEVAR13 (BRL, 1978 and HEI Vulaasbiligr Assessment Modd1 0=VAM) ~ In:., 1979) are exiles of this type of ~gram. A did set, Mown as endgame programs, computes the probabBi~ an aid ~ killed due to an ex~r- na1 but of ~ HE wash - ~1 SCAN (Damon U~ersit~r Ohio Research minter 1976) is tbe current ITCGlAS endgame model for computing ~ aids PAD. Modally Endg~ Computer Asses~em (MECA), Jowt Sennces Endgamc Model Asset. SESTEM ~ (ASD/WPAFB. 1981), and SHAZAM (Air Force AlmamcIlt LAb.lE0in AFB, 1983) are four over widely used endgame programs. All of these vuln~abiligr assessment programs require as Out a ~e~mens~1 data base Cat defines the geo medic model of the aid Me geometric modal may be combed within the Addability assessmaa program, ~ in SCAN, or it may be developed in a Mate program' such as MAGIC, Balliaic Research Many Compaer- Aidled Design (BRL CAD) package, or PASTGEN m' which are '`~ as prowesses for COVART. Ibis model should contain all of the airways components, equipment, and supplies, induding such items as fun, hy~ic fluids 'A and awn ~ are cry Music ~ "~ ~ tic od~cr~hg~ but Hey arc limited m scope, limited m Be infon~ on do ~c of the Crew and cot always mi~blc for dada ~ '~be shim T~l ~ng Gap on AT Sw~ has chablis a Lucy of compute ohms for assessing die Ability. vuh~abil~r, ~ Viva of I. Be Libra is-~ "d Opined by ~ Sub - /V_y Afoot ~ A - Us Can tcr (St'RWAC) at the WE A_l hobo - ~ Live Fire Testing of the F-22 and ordnance. However, because of He limitations on pros gram size, av~lahle time, and manpower, many small non- cniical components that are not expect to influence the results are oft omi.tted.~5 Another sub-mm that has oven been omit in vulnerability ~nemS ~ the on-board Penance in the fog of bombs, missile warheads and propel- lants, and Audubon Mums. On most aircraft, bombs and similes a" ~cd cxtanally. Id this position, play may shield other compote Cam proje~es and f = s, or they may mat ~riol~ndy to a ballistic impala (e.g., die) and destroy the away The new scald at cony ord Dance intanaBy m order to reduce signatures. Adverse rcac- tions of any in~a11y canted ordnance, such as a dedagra- tion or a lion have ~ even greeter probibili~ of desb~o~g the Mafia Me omission of on-board "dnancc mom He as~sCatad is ~c~ in more detail ~ Oapters 2 and 4. Anod~r if reqli~sement for the assessment is the kill tam (or logical kill expressions for the smiled kill category (and level if ap~iatc). As tam defines the r~mdaI't Ad n~ond~ components that if lulled India tally The single engine on a sm~e~cogmed ~ah) or in ~bina~ion (bosh engmeson a two engmedaimah~willcauscaDai~ kin. Assumed with em critical componcm on the Sac is a ~ base that contains He PA or Av value for the component that is based upon He selected it weapon or die mech~m and He possible ~angc of impact eclectics on Tie insured component, for tie kill modes cons~dacd Tic conical componem analysis. Vulnerability to a Single Hit by a Penetrator or Frag- ment. All of the vulnerability assessment programs contain an assumption ~ to how the itemize mechanic; as~iamd wad the weapon proceed through the Cam The COVART methodology resumes that the penetrator or fragment from any selected diamond is equally likely to impact He aiIcraR at any lion and that it propagates along a sage lme, lmown as a shoddy, Hugh the abaft slo~gdown and possibly Hang up tic itpene~s the venous camponems. l~c amount of Tent or penet~tor slowdown is dd=- mined by tic peDe~:ion equations that are a part of He built-m data ~c. Ricochet of the Cement or for is not cousin An additional assumption often made is that only the components that arc intersected by one shotline can be lulled by the hit along Hat shodine. This assamphon rules out He possibility of caching damage away from the shodine." ~ the analysis, me presented area of the airman Gibe COVART model f" ~ F-= ~ =13 ~= of which ~iy hi arc AL 'A dew Any sd~ i - ~ ~ six ~ ~5 ~ lop, Aim Ic£t side. and next 5idc' and may include me 45~ee angles bin these six ~news. '7It '5 possible to ~ He idled componeDt's PI to At l~c of adjacent COlDpO~
Reproduced from Vulnerability Assessment o f Aircraft 123 . ~ FIGURE 1-2 Example of a grid and it showed ~ FASIGEN for COVART (BalL 1985). Ccpyri~ ~ ALLA 1985 - Jsod with pamissiom mom He smelted &-eaion is coved by a usifo~ ~d' and one sbodine is Icy local wow etch call An example of tile Tom shotlincs within the cells for apanic- ular away is show ~ Algae I-2. The user has the option of sag We Miff cell size. Typical cell sew range Hem 12 inches to 1 inch on a side, win 2 Inches being typical A ~ssorprogram~ known as a shone generator program, such as MAGIC. BRL- CAD, or FASTGEN m, i~ifies all of the cndcal compo nents ink by each shodine. This infammion is Out "a for COVART. COVART composes Me vulnerable area of each Critical component and the aberaft's single hit ~ neable area, as well as the probability We aid is killed by a random hit For componem vu~emble areas, each Ad cell containing a sho~ne that Insets a component has a vulnerable area equal to the product of Be presented area of the cell Andre P`,,, fought shore Rough the component The total vul~eshle area of the component is the sum of the vulnerable areas of those cans wide shotlines ~ int=- sect Me component For the aberah vulnerable arm An, ~ Ed cell shown in Fanfare 1-2 contributes a ~rulne~abk area equal to the Product of the preset area of He cell and the probability the aircraft is killed by a hit along Arc shotline in Cat ccll.l' Lee total al vulnerable area is equal to the stun of the vu~asble areas of each of Arc cells. Consequently, r~dant compose-, if sepma~ that bow are not ink by one shoreline' do not contnbum to the aids single hit vulnerable area for that shodinc.'9 Ihc P'c,ff for the airman is equal to the A., of the airman divided by As, He aiders presented area from die sclec~d di~om armed. mom ~ one DQ~ on, c_ is ill by a sew die p~bili~ the ~ is lulled is equal to the cam of the ~ ~bifides of IcilL 'Ws s the result of He qrdon Cat only He compoDam ~- sa:~1 by Be show can be ~ A moddi~on of the PA value for a component can be Inane to Flow a hit on oac component to cause a ~11 offs Vulnerability to a Co~t-Fuzed High-~xploswe War- h~ fly dot sync cat l~dUD IS foBo~ for con~-fuzed high~c~pl~vc warheads. A tic model ofthea~aft: ekill~c, "d the cndcal condone PA or At ~ are I A Ed is Unposed on the aircrew and a shodine is randomly local wok each cclL lbe differ - oc between this analysis for the cod-* HE warhead and the analysis for He single pene~or or knew is He fast that componems in the Unity of the shodinc can be lulled by the blast and Intents from tie demotion of the HE warhead Thus, Indent Focal com- poncnn that arc Maturely close together can be hilled by a single bit, causing a 1611 of the Adam Flgme 1-3 shows die Ed cell and randomly located shodines for this type of analysis. Note ~ ~ this fight the HE warhead detonation ~ cause a kill of bod1 the foci tank and the en~c even though neither component was hit dinky by the whom Vulnerability to an E=ernally Detonanng High-Explosive Warhead. The analysis for the exumally detonating HE washed, shown in Alga 1 - , follows the same McClure used for the single pene~or or fragment, except that the fragment shodines fig mom He c~temal dc~adon are radial Car then parallel, "d He aid can suffer mu~plc fragment impels over its surface rather ~ a single hit Id addidon, the blast from the detonation can ~11 do aid Me ~ssmcut of the hill of the aid by external blast is usually made independently from the fiag- ment assessment Three~mensional blast contours around the aircraft am Mined as a function of HE weight Within a p~cular blast kill contour for particular explosive choke weight, a detonanon of a warhead with that charge weigh or larger fill kill He a~af.L Resultsirom the Analyses. The results or islformmon ok ~cd from an analyncal assessment of aid ~Inerabili~
BURST POINTS PK.IHb 1 . _ ~ . ~ Ha. - . ~\ ~ _ ~ _ . ~ At& Ab Live Fire Testing of the F-22 ~: FIGURE 1-3 Grid cats ant ~ for the -fizzed high arplo5Nc weapon (BalL 1985) Colt 6:} AIDE 198~Jset With . . ~om _ ~ VQO ~> ~C ~,_, FRAG~TS~ a' "a - ~ FIGURE 1 4 ~ ~ - ~ ~ By fig ~ ~ ~^ 1985). C~= ~ ~ 198~U~ m~ ~i~ for the single hit bar a pme~amr or Anew Epically con- s~ts of predictions of the values of vulne~lc area At for all of the Micas comports - , the aimoft vul~ablc Ma A:,' Me probability the Ada* is killed Ben a bit wow each and cell and the probabiligr the aimaff is killed gnrcn a random hit P - . The assessment results for the single hit by the con~-fi:zed high~xplosi~re warhead colt of the aid vulnerable Sea A, Ad Tic probability of ~ gird a random hit on the aircraft PA- Ins results of an agent for the cx~nally dog warhead consist of the probabil- iffy of kill of do critical components inte~l by the hag- ment shotlines Tom He warhead detonation, Tic prob~li~
Reproduced from Vulnerability Assessment of Aircraft 125 of aircraft kill due to blast, and Me probability of aircraft kill given a detonation PIUD References Aerlmaunca1 Systems Dixon (ASD), 1981. l~pacm of Engine Vul~aabili~r Unca~es on AS Sumvabilincs, Wnght Pa~ Air Force Base, Ohio, AD N~ber:C037839. Air Form A_ Tory, 1983. User Manual for sac Aim - Air Mime Tam SHAZAM, Eglin AD Fox BE Fla' AD N~B1049S9. · Balk RE. 198S. Tic Fu~aaals of AT S~`raWity Analysis and Desigm African TO of Aamautics "d As~cs. 1^ New Yam · Ballistic Research I_y (BRL), 19?8. "=VART-An Id- ~ Sit on PA forthc lion of HEI Vulnes~- blc AS Ed R - ir Ramsey Abe P"~g G==d' ME AD Numbe~30817L · ~ ldc., 1979. High-Exploa~rc incendiary Vuinasbiligr Model VAMP, Volume 1, Us" May, For' Walton Bc~ Fly, AD Number.B107811L · Dayton Uni~raspy Ohio Reseezch Impinge, 1976. SCAN-A Conquer Program for Stability Analysis, Volume 1, User Manual, AD N~:8068149L. · Dcim P.~, a al * 1990. Cur Sun~*on Methods in Military Systems Vulnerability Assessment, Ballistic Research l~bora- tory, Ab~n proving Gm~md* ML. BRL-MR-3880. · Joint Typical C - Indicating Gmop for Mentions Efic~vcDcss (]TCGJME), COVART II -A Simulation Program for Computa- tion of Vul~c~sblc Areas end Repair Lyrics -Users Manual. 1984. Government Rc~t Number:61 ~TCG/ME 84 3. · National Research Council (NRC), 1989. Am~ored Combat Vehicle VuL~c~ili~r to An~i-annor Weapons, A Review of the Amy's Assessmcat Methodology, Committee on a Review of Army VuLdc~ability Ass~nent Methods. Board on Anny Science and Technology, Colon on En~een~g and Tecimical Systems, Washington, D.C: National A~ny PI . O'BIYOn, James F.. 1991. Presen~On made IO the Committee On WaN>0nS Effects On A~nC S~mS. JUIY 24. U.S. C0ngieSS, 1986 1989. SUnri~Fabili~ and LC!halitY Testing Of Major Systems, DoD AUthOnZa~iOn ACE, FY86~Sec. 123, PY87~ec. 910 Sa:. 910, FY88 89 See. 80~ · U.S. COQgrCSS, 1988. FY88~9 DoD Authon~on Act Contcr- encc Report Li~c-F'rc Testing (Sec. 802~. · U. S. General Accounting Office (GAO), 1987. Live Fire Tcs'- ing, Evaluating DOD's Programs, GAO/PEMD-87-17, Wash- ington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Officc.
