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Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society (1996)

Chapter: Cryptography: Roles, Market, and Infrastructure

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Suggested Citation:"Cryptography: Roles, Market, and Infrastructure." National Research Council. 1996. Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5131.
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2 Cryptography: Roles, Market, and Infrastructure

Cryptography is a technology that can play important roles in addressing certain types of information vulnerability, although it is not sufficient to deal with all threats to information security. As a technology, cryptography is embedded into products that are purchased by a large number of users; thus, it is important to examine various aspects of the market for cryptography. Chapter 2 describes cryptography as a technology used in products, as a product within a larger market context, and with reference to the infrastructure needed to support its large-scale use.

2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHY IN CONTEXT

Computer system security, and its extension network security, are intended to achieve many purposes. Among them are safeguarding physical assets from damage or destruction and ensuring that resources such as computer time, network connections, and access to databases are available only to individuals—or to other systems or even software processes—authorized to have them.1 Overall information security is dependent on many factors, including various technical safeguards, trustworthy and capable personnel, high degrees of physical security, competent administrative oversight, and good operational procedures. Of the avail-

1The term "information security" and shortened versions such as INFOSEC, COMPSEC, and NETSEC are also in use.

Suggested Citation:"Cryptography: Roles, Market, and Infrastructure." National Research Council. 1996. Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5131.
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able technical safeguards, cryptography has been one of the least utilized to date.2

In general, the many security safeguards in a system or network not only fulfill their principal task but also act collectively to mutually protect one another. In particular, the protection or operational functionality that can be afforded by the various cryptographic safeguards treated in this report will inevitably require that the hardware or software in question be embedded in a secure environment. To do otherwise is to risk that the cryptography might be circumvented, subverted, or misused—hence leading to a weakening or collapse of its intended protection.

As individual stand-alone computer systems have been incorporated into ever larger networks (e.g., local area networks, wide area networks, the Internet), the requirements for cryptographic safeguards have also increased. For example, users of the earliest computer systems were almost always clustered in one place and could be personally recognized as authorized individuals, and communications associated with a computer system usually were contained within a single building. Today, users of computer systems can be connected with one another worldwide, through the public switched telecommunications network, a local area network, satellites, microwave towers, and radio transmitters. Operationally, an individual or a software process in one place can request service from a system or a software process in a far distant place. Connectivity among systems is impromptu and occurs on demand; the Internet has demonstrated how to achieve it. Thus, it is now imperative for users and systems to identify themselves to one another with a high degree of certainty and for distant systems to know with certainty what privileges for accessing databases or software processes a remote request brings. Protection that could once be obtained by geographic propinquity and personal recognition of users must now be provided electronically and with extremely high levels of certainty.

2.2 WHAT IS CRYPTOGRAPHY AND WHAT CAN IT DO?

The word "cryptography" is derived from Greek words that mean secret writing. Historically, cryptography has been used to hide informa-

2 Other safeguards, in particular software safeguards, are addressed in various standard texts and reports. See, for example, National Institute of Standards and Technology, An Introduction to Computer Security, NIST Special Publication 800-12, Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C., October 1995; Department of Defense, Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria, August 15, 1983; Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council, Computers at Risk: Safe Computing in the Information Age, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1991.

Suggested Citation:"Cryptography: Roles, Market, and Infrastructure." National Research Council. 1996. Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5131.
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tion from access by unauthorized parties, especially during communications when it would be most vulnerable to interception. By preserving the secrecy, or confidentiality, of information, cryptography has played a very important role over the centuries in military and national affairs.3

In the traditional application of cryptography for confidentiality, an originator (the first party) creates a message intended for a recipient (the second party), protects (encrypts) it by a cryptographic process, and transmits it as ciphertext. The receiving party decrypts the received ciphertext message to reveal its true content, the plaintext. Anyone else (the third party) who wishes undetected and unauthorized access to the message must penetrate (by cryptanalysis) the protection afforded by the cryptographic process.

In the classical use of cryptography to protect communications, it is necessary that both the originator and the recipient(s) have common knowledge of the cryptographic process (the algorithm or cryptographic algorithm) and that both share a secret common element—typically, the key or cryptographic key, which is a piece of information, not a material object. In the encryption process, the algorithm transforms the plaintext into the ciphertext, using a particular key; the use of a different key results in a different ciphertext. In the decryption process, the algorithm transforms the ciphertext into the plaintext, using the key that was used to encrypt4the original plaintext. Such a scheme, in which both communicating parties must have a common key, is now called symmetric cryptography or secret-key cryptography; it is the kind that has been used for centuries and written about widely.5It has the property, usually an operational disadvantage, of requiring a safe method of distributing keys to relevant parties (key distribution or key management).

It can be awkward to arrange for symmetric and secret keys to be available to all parties with whom one might wish to communicate, especially when the list of parties is large. However, a scheme called asymmetric cryptography (or, equivalently, public-key cryptography), developed in the mid-1970s, helps to mitigate many of these difficulties through the use

3The classic work on the history of cryptography is David Kahn, The Codebreakers, MacMillan, New York, 1967.

4This report uses the term "encrypt" to describe the act of using an encryption algorithm with a given key to transform one block of data, usually plaintext, into another block, usually ciphertext.

5Historical perspective is provided in David Kahn, Kahn on Codes, MacMillan, New York, 1983; F.W. Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret, Harper & Row, New York, 1974; and Ronald Lewin, Ultra Goes to War, Hutchinson & Co., London, 1978. A classic reference on the fundamentals of cryptography is Dorothy Denning, Cryptography and Data Security, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1982.

Suggested Citation:"Cryptography: Roles, Market, and Infrastructure." National Research Council. 1996. Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5131.
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of different keys for encryption and decryption.6Each participant actually has two keys. The public key is published, is freely available to anyone, and is used for encryption; the private key is held in secrecy by the user and is used for decryption.7Because the two keys are inverses, knowledge of the public key enables the derivation of the private key in theory. However, in a well-designed public-key system, it is computationally infeasible in any reasonable length of time to derive the private key from knowledge of the public key.

A significant operational difference between symmetric and asymmetric cryptography is that with asymmetric cryptography anyone who knows a given person's public key can send a secure message to that person. With symmetric cryptography, only a selected set of people (those who know the private key) can communicate. While it is not mathematically provable, all known asymmetric cryptographic systems are slower than their symmetric cryptographic counterparts, and the more public nature of asymmetric systems lends credence to the belief that this will always be true. Generally, symmetric cryptography is used when a large amount of data needs to be encrypted or when the encryption must be done within a given time period; asymmetric cryptography is used for short messages, for example, to protect key distribution for a symmetric cryptographic system.

Regardless of the particular approach taken, the applications of cryptography have gone beyond its historical roots as secret writing; today, cryptography serves as a powerful tool in support of system security. Cryptography can provide many useful capabilities:

• Confidentiality—the characteristic that information is protected from being viewed in transit during communications and/or when stored in an information system. With cryptographically provided confidentiality, encrypted information can fall into the hands of someone not authorized to view it without being compromised. It is almost entirely the confidentiality aspect of cryptography that has posed public policy dilemmas.

The other capabilities, described below, can be considered collectively as nonconfidentiality or collateral uses of cryptography:

6Gustavus J. Simmons (ed.), Contemporary Cryptology: The Science of Information Integrity, IEEE Press, Piscataway, N.J., 1992; Whitfield Diffie, "The First Ten Years of Public-Key Cryptography," Proceedings of the IEEE, Volume 76, 1988, pp. 560-577.

7 The seminal paper on public-key cryptography is Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman, "New Directions in Cryptography," IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, Volume IT-22, 1976, pp. 644-654.

Suggested Citation:"Cryptography: Roles, Market, and Infrastructure." National Research Council. 1996. Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5131.
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• Authentication—cryptographically based assurance that an asserted identity is valid for a given person (or computer system). With such assurance, it is difficult for an unauthorized party to impersonate an authorized one.

• Integrity check—cryptographically based assurance that a message or computer file has not been tampered with or altered.8With such assurance, it is difficult for an unauthorized party to alter data.

• Digital signature—cryptographically based assurance that a message or file was sent or created by a given person. A digital signature cryptographically binds the identity of a person with the contents of the message or file, thus providing nonrepudiation—the inability to deny the authenticity of the message or file. The capability for nonrepudiation results from encrypting the digest (or the message or file itself) with the private key of the signer. Anyone can verify the signature of the message or file by decrypting the signature using the public key of the sender. Since only the sender should know his or her own private key, assurance is provided that the signature is valid and the sender cannot later repudiate the message. If a person divulges his or her private key to any other party, that party can impersonate the person in all electronic transactions.

• Digital date/time stamp—cryptographically based assurance that a message or file was sent or created at a given date and time. Generally, such assurance is provided by an authoritative organization that appends a date/time stamp and digitally signs the message or file.

These cryptographic capabilities can be used in complementary ways. For example, authentication is basic to controlling access to system or network resources. A person may use a password to authenticate his own identity; only when the proper password has been entered will the system allow the user to ''log on" and obtain access to files, e-mail, and so on.9But passwords have many limitations as an access control measure (e.g., people tell others their passwords or a password is learned via eavesdropping), and cryptographic authentication techniques can provide

8Digital signatures and integrity checks use a condensed form of a message or file— called a digest—which is created by passing the message or file through a one-way hash function. The digest is of fixed length and is independent of the size of the message or file. The hash function is designed to make it highly unlikely that different messages (or files) will yield the same digest, and to make it computationally very difficult to modify a message (or file) but retain the same digest.

9 An example more familiar to many is that the entry of an appropriate personal identification number into an automatic teller machine (ATM) gives the ATM user access to account balances or cash.

Suggested Citation:"Cryptography: Roles, Market, and Infrastructure." National Research Council. 1996. Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5131.
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much better and more effective mechanisms for limiting system or resource access to authorized parties.

Access controls can be applied at many different points within a system. For example, the use of a dial-in port on an information system or network can require the use of cryptographic access controls to ensure that only the proper parties can use the system or network at all. Many systems and networks accord privileges or access to resources depending on the specific identity of a user; thus, a hospital information system may grant physicians access that allows entering orders for patient treatment, whereas laboratory technicians may not have such access. Authentication mechanisms can also be used to generate an audit trail identifying those who have accessed particular data, thus facilitating a search for those known to have compromised confidential data.

In the event that access controls are successfully bypassed, the use of encryption on data stored and communicated in a system provides an extra layer of protection. Specifically, if an intruder is denied easy access to stored files and communications, he may well find it much more difficult to understand the internal workings of the system and thus be less capable of causing damage or reading the contents of encrypted inactive data files that may hold sensitive information. Of course, when an application opens a data file for processing, that data is necessarily unencrypted and is vulnerable to an intruder that might be present at that time.

Authentication and access control can also help to protect the privacy of data stored on a system or network. For example, a particular database application storing data files in a specific format could allow its users to view those files. If the access control mechanisms are set up in such a way that only certain parties can access that particular database application, then access to the database files in question can be limited and the privacy of data stored in those databases protected. On the other hand, an unauthorized user may be able to obtain access to those files through a different, uncontrolled application, or even through the operating system itself. Thus, encryption of those files is necessary to protect them against such "back-door" access.10

The various cryptographic capabilities described above may be used within a system in order to accomplish a set of tasks. For example, a

10The measure-countermeasure game can continue indefinitely. In response to file encryption, an intruder can insert into an operating system a Trojan horse program that waits for an authorized user to access the encrypted database. Since the user is authorized, the database will allow the decryption of the relevant file, and the intruder can simply "piggyback" on that decryption. Thus, those responsible for system security must provide a way to check for Trojan horses, and so the battle goes round.

Suggested Citation:"Cryptography: Roles, Market, and Infrastructure." National Research Council. 1996. Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5131.
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banking system may require confidentiality and integrity assurances on its communications links, authentication assurances for all major processing functions, and integrity and authentication assurances for high-value transactions. On the other hand, merchants may need only digital signatures and date/time stamps when dealing with external customers or cooperating banks when establishing contracts. Furthermore, depending on the type of capability to be provided, the underlying cryptographic algorithms may or may not be different.

Finally, when considering what cryptography can do, it is worth making two practical observations. First, the initial deployment of any technology often brings out unanticipated problems, simply because the products and artifacts embodying that technology have not had the benefit of successive cycles of failure and repair. Similarly, human procedures and practices have not been tested against the demands of real-life experience. Cryptography is unlikely to be any different, and so it is probable that early large-scale deployments of cryptography will exhibit exploitable vulnerabilities.1l

The second point is that against a determined opponent that is highly motivated to gain unauthorized access to data, the use of cryptography may well simply lead that opponent to exploit some other vulnerability in the system or network on which the relevant data is communicated or stored, and such an exploitation may well be successful. But the use of cryptography can help to raise the cost of gaining improper access to data and may prevent a resource-poor opponent from being successful at all.

More discussion of cryptography can be found in Appendix C.

2.3 HOW CRYPTOGRAPHY FITS INTO THE BIG SECURITY PICTURE

In the context of confidentiality, the essence of information security is a battle between information protectors and information interceptors. Protectors—who may be motivated by "good" reasons (if they are legitimate businesses) or "bad" reasons (if they are criminals)—wish to restrict access to information to a group that they select. Interceptors—who may also be motivated by "bad" reasons (if they are unethical business competitors) or ''good" reasons (if they are law enforcement agents investigating serious crimes)—wish to obtain access to the information being protected whether or not they have the permission of the information protectors. It is this dilemma that is at the heart of the public policy controversy and is addressed in greater detail in Chapter 3.

11For a discussion of this point, see Ross Anderson, "Why Cryptosystems Fail," Communications of the ACM, Volume 37(11), November 1994, pp. 32-40.

Suggested Citation:"Cryptography: Roles, Market, and Infrastructure." National Research Council. 1996. Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5131.
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From the perspective of the information interceptor, encryption is only one of the problems to be faced. In general, the complexity of today's information systems poses many technical barriers (Section 2.3.1). On the other hand, the information interceptor may be able to exploit product features or specialized techniques to gain access (Section 2.3.2).

2.3.1 Factors Inhibiting Access to Information12

Compared to the task of tapping an analog telephone line, obtaining access to the content of a digital information stream can be quite difficult. With analog "listening" (traditional telephony or radio interception), the technical challenge is obtaining access to the communications channel. When communications are digitized, gaining access to the channel is only the first step: one must then unravel the digital format, a task that can be computationally very complex. Furthermore, the complexity of the digital format tends to increase over time, because more advanced information technology generally implies increased functionality and a need for more efficient use of available communications capacity.

Increased complexity is reflected in particular in the interpretation of the digital stream that two systems might use to communicate with each other or the format of a file that a system might use to store data. Consider, for example, one particular sequence of actions used to communicate information. The original application in the sending system might have started with a plaintext message, and then compressed it (to make it smaller); encrypted it (to conceal its meaning); and appended error-control bits to the compressed, encrypted message (to prevent errors from creeping in during transmission).13 Thus, a party attempting to intercept a communication between the sender and the receiver could be faced with a data stream that would represent the combined output of many different operations that transform the data stream in some way. The interceptor would have to know the error-control scheme and the decompression algorithms as well as the key and the algorithm used to encrypt the message.

When an interceptor moves onto the lines that carry bulk traffic, iso-

12 This section addresses technical factors that inhibit access to information. But technical measures are only one class of techniques that can be used to improve information security. For example, statutory measures can help contribute to information security. Laws that impose criminal penalties for unauthorized access to computer systems have been used to prosecute intruders. Such laws are intended to deter attacks on information systems, and to the extent that individuals do not exhibit such behavior, system security is enhanced.

13Error control is a technique used to detect errors in transmission and sometimes to correct them as well.

Suggested Citation:"Cryptography: Roles, Market, and Infrastructure." National Research Council. 1996. Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5131.
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lating the bits associated with a particular communication of interest is itself quite difficult.14A high-bandwidth line (e.g., a long-haul fiber-optic cable) typically carries hundreds or thousands of different communications; any given message may be broken into distinct packets and intermingled with other packets from other contemporaneously operating applications.15The traffic on the line may be encrypted "in bulk" by the line provider, thus providing an additional layer of protection against the interceptor. Moreover, since a message traveling from point A to point B may well be broken into packets that traverse different physical paths en route, an interceptor at any given point between A and B may not even see all of the packets pass by.

Another factor inhibiting access to information is the use of technologies that facilitate anonymous communications. For the most part, intercepted communications are worthless if the identity of the communicating parties is not known. In telephony, call forwarding and pager callbacks from pay telephones have sometimes frustrated the efforts of law enforcement officials conducting wiretaps. In data communications, so-called anonymous remailers can strip out all identifying information from an Internet e-mail message sent from person A to person B in such a way that person B does not know the identity of person A. Some remailers even support return communications from person B to person A without the need for person B to know the identity of person A.

Access is made more difficult because an information protector can switch communications from one medium to another very easily without changing end-user equipment. Some forms of media may be easily accessed by an interceptor (e.g., conventional radio), whereas other forms may be much more challenging (e.g., fiber-optic cable, spread-spectrum radio). The proliferation of different media that can interoperate smoothly even at the device level will continue to complicate the interceptor's attempts to gain access to communications.

Finally, obtaining access also becomes more difficult as the number of service providers increases (Box 2.1). In the days when AT&T held a

14This point is made independently in a report that came to the attention of the committee as this report was going to press. A staff study of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, concluded that "the ability to filter through the huge volumes of data and to extract the information from the layers of formatting, multiplexing, compression, and transmission protocols applied to each message is the biggest challenge of the future, [while] increasing amounts and sophistication of encryption add another layer of complexity" (IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., p. 121).

15Paul Haskell and David G. Messerschmitt, "In Favor of an Enhanced Network Interface for Multimedia Services," submitted to IEEE Multimedia Magazine.

Suggested Citation:"Cryptography: Roles, Market, and Infrastructure." National Research Council. 1996. Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5131.
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BOX 2.1
The Evolution of the Telecommunication  Industry

Prior to 1984, the U.S. telecommunications industry was dominated by one primary player—AT&T. An elaborate regulatory structure had evolved in the preceding decades to govern what had become an essential national service on which private citizens, government, and business had come to rely.

By contrast, the watchword in telecommunications a mere decade later has become competition. AT&T is still a major player in the field, but the regional Bell operating companies (RBOCs), separated from  AT&T as part of the divestiture decision of 1984, operate entirely independently, providing local services. Indeed, the current mood in Congress toward deregulation is already causing increasingly active competition and confrontation among all of the players involved, including cable TV companies, cellular and mobile telephone companies, the long-distance telecommunications companies (AT&T, MCI, Sprint, and hundreds of others), the RBOCs and other local exchange providers, TV and radio broadcast companies, entertainment companies, and satellite communications companies. Today, all of these players compete for a share of the telecommunications pie in the same geographic area; even railroads and gas companies (which own geographic rights of way along which transmission lines can be laid) and power companies which have wires going to every house) have dreams of profiting from the telecommunications boom. The playing field is even further complicated by the fact of reselling—institutions often buy telecommunications services from "primary" providers in bulk to serve their own needs and resell the excess to other customers.

In short, today's telecommunications industry is highly heterogeneous and widely deployed with multiple public and private service providers, and will become more so in the future.

monopoly on voice communications and criminal communications could generally be assumed to be carried on AT&T-operated lines, law enforcement and national security authorities needed only one point of contact with whom to work. As the telecommunications industry becomes increasingly heterogeneous, law enforcement authorities may well be uncertain about what company to approach about implementing a wiretap request.

2.3.2 Factors Facilitating Access to Information
System or Product Design

Unauthorized access to protected information can inadvertently be facilitated by product or system features that are intended to provide legitimate access but instead create unintentional loopholes or weaknesses that can be exploited by an interceptor. Such points of access may be

Suggested Citation:"Cryptography: Roles, Market, and Infrastructure." National Research Council. 1996. Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5131.
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deliberately incorporated into product or system designs, and they include the following:

• Maintenance and monitoring ports.16For example, many telephone switches and computer systems have dial-in ports that are intended to facilitate monitoring and remote maintenance and repair by off-site technicians.

• Master keys. A product can have a single master key that allows its possessor to decrypt all ciphertext produced by the product.

• Mechanisms for key escrow or key backup. A third party, for example, may store an extra copy of a private key or a master key. Under appropriate circumstances, the third party releases the key to the appropriate individual(s), who is (are) then able to decrypt the ciphertext in question. This subject is discussed at length in Chapter 5.

• Weak encryption defaults. A product capable of providing very strong encryption may be designed in such a way that users invoke those capabilities only infrequently. For example, encryption on a secure telephone may be designed so that the use of encryption depends on the user pressing a button at the start of a telephone call. The requirement to press a button to invoke encryption is an example of a weak default, because the telephone could be designed so that encryption is invoked automatically when a call is initiated; when weak defaults are designed into systems, many users will forget to press the button.

Despite the good reasons for designing systems and products with these various points of access (e.g., facilitating remote access through maintenance ports to eliminate travel costs of system engineers), any such point of access can be exploited by unauthorized individuals as well.

Methods Facilitating Access to Information

Surreptitious access to communications can also be gained by methods such as the following:

• Interception in the ether. Many point-to-point communications make use of a wireless (usually radio) link at some point in the process. Since it is impossible to ensure that a radio broadcast reaches only its intended receiver(s), communications carried over wireless links—such as those involving cellular telephones and personal pagers—are vulnerable to interception by unauthorized parties.

16A port is a point of connection to a given information system to which another party (another system, an individual) can connect.

Suggested Citation:"Cryptography: Roles, Market, and Infrastructure." National Research Council. 1996. Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5131.
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• Use of pen registers. Telephone communications involve both the content of a call and call-setup information such as numbers called, originating number, time and length of call, and so on. Setup information is often easily accessible, some of it even to end users.17

• Wiretapping. To obtain the contents of a call carried exclusively by nonwireless means, the information carried on a circuit (actually, a replica of the information) is sent to a monitoring station. A call can be wiretapped when an eavesdropper picks up an extension on the same line, hooks up a pair of alligator clips to the right set of terminals, or obtains the cooperation of telephone company officials in monitoring a given call at a chosen location.

• Exploitation of related data. A great deal of useful information can be obtained by examining in detail a digital stream that is associated with a given communication. For example, people have developed communications protocol analyzers that examine traffic as it flows by a given point for passwords and other sensitive information.

• Reverse engineering (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5). Decompilation or disassembly of software can yield deep understanding of how that software works. One implication is that any algorithm built into software cannot be assumed to be secret for very long, since disassembly of the software will inevitably reveal it to a technically trained individual.

• Cryptanalysis (discussed in greater detail in Appendix C). Cryptanalysis is the task of recovering the plaintext corresponding to a given ciphertext without knowledge of the decrypting key. Successful cryptanalysis can be the result of:

Inadequately sized keys. A product with encryption capabilities that implements a strong cryptographic algorithm with an inadequately sized key is vulnerable to a "brute-force" attack.18Box 2.2 provides more detail.

Weak encryption algorithms. Some encryption algorithms have weaknesses that, if known to an attacker, require the testing of only a small fraction of the keys that could in principle be the proper key.

• Product flaws. Like weak encryption, certain design choices such as limits on the maximum size of a password, the lack of a reasonable lower bound on the size of a password, or use of a random number generator that is not truly random may lead to a product that presents a work factor

17"Caller ID," a feature that identifies the number of the calling party, makes use of callsetup information carried on the circuit.

18A brute-force attack against an encryption algorithm is a computer-based test of all possible keys for that algorithm undertaken in an effort to discover the key that actually has been used. Hence, the difficulty and time to complete such attacks increase markedly as the key length grows (specifically, the time doubles for every bit added to the key length).

Suggested Citation:"Cryptography: Roles, Market, and Infrastructure." National Research Council. 1996. Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5131.
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BOX 2.2
Fundamentals of Cryptographic Strength

Cryptographic strength depends on two factors: the size of the key and the mathematical structure of the algorithm itself. For well-designed symmetric cryptographic systems, "brute-force" exhaustive search—trying all possible keys with a given decryption algorithm until the (meaningful) plaintext appears—is the best publicly known cryptanalytic method. For such systems the work factor (i.e., the time to cryptanalyze) grows exponentially with key size. Hence, with a sufficiently long key, even an eavesdropper with very extensive computing resources would have to take a very long time (longer than the age of the universe) to test all possible combinations. Adding one binary digit (bit) to the length of a key doubles the length of time it takes to undertake a brute-force attack while adding only a very small increment (or sometimes none at all) to the time it takes to encrypt the plaintext.

How long is a "long" key? To decipher by brute force a message encrypted with a 40-bit key requires 240 (approximately 1012) tests. If each test takes 10-6 seconds to conduct, 1 million seconds of testing time on a single computer are required to conduct a brute-force attack, or about 11.5 days. A 56-bit key increases this time by a factor of 216, or 65,536; under the same assumptions, a brute-force attack on a message encrypted with a 56-bit key would take over 2,000 years.

Two important considerations mitigate the bleakness of this conclusion from the perspective of the interceptor. One is that computers can be expected to grow more powerful over time. Speed increases in the underlying silicon technology have exhibited a predictable pattern for the past 50 years—computational speed doubles every 18 months (Moore's law), equivalent to increasing by a factor of 10 every 5 years. Thus, if a single test takes 10-6 seconds today, in 15 years it can be expected to take 10-9 seconds. Additional speedup is possible using parallel processing. Some supercomputers use tens of thousands of microprocessors in parallel, and cryptanalytic problems are particularly well suited to parallel processing. But even 1,000 processors working in parallel, each using the underlying silicon technology of 15 years hence, would be able to decrypt a single 56-bit encrypted message in 18 hours.

As for the exploitation of alternatives to brute-force search, all known asymmetric (i.e., public-key) cryptographic systems allow shortcuts to exhaustive search. Because more information is public in such systems, it is also likely that shortcut attacks will exist for any new systems invented. Shortcut attacks also exist for poorly designed symmetric systems. Newly developed shortcut attacks constitute unforeseen breakthroughs, and so by their very nature introduce an unpredictable "wild card" into the effort to set a reasonable key size. Because such attacks are applicable primarily to public-key systems, larger key sizes and larger safety margins are needed for such systems than for symmetric cryptographic systems. For example, factoring a 512-bit number by exhaustive search would take 2256 tests (since at least one factor must be less than 2256); known shortcut attacks would allow such numbers to be factored in approximately 265 operations, a number on the order of that required to undertake a brute-force exhaustive search of a message encrypted with a 64-bit symmetric cryptographic system. While symmetric 64-bit systems are considered relatively safe, fear of future breakthroughs in cryptanalyzing public-key systems has led many cryptographers to suggest a minimum key size of 1,024 bits for public-key systems, thereby providing in key length a factor-of-two safety margin over the safety afforded by 512-bit keys.

More discussion of this topic can be found in Appendix C.

Suggested Citation:"Cryptography: Roles, Market, and Infrastructure." National Research Council. 1996. Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5131.
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for an attacker that is much smaller than the theoretical strength implied by the algorithm it uses.19

• Monitoring of electronic emissions. Most electronic communications devices emit electromagnetic radiation that is highly correlated with the information carried or displayed on them. For example, the contents of an unshielded computer display or terminal can in principle be read from a distance (estimates range from tens of meters to hundreds of meters) by equipment specially designed to do so. Coined by a U.S. government program, TEMPEST is the name of a class of techniques to safeguard against monitoring of emissions.

• Device penetration. A software-controlled device can be penetrated in a number of ways. For example, a virus may infect it, making a clandestine change. A message or a file can be sent to an unwary recipient who activates a hidden program when the message is read or the file is opened; such a program, once active, can record the keystrokes of the person at the keyboard, scan the mass storage media for sensitive data and transmit it, or make clandestine alterations to stored data.

• Infrastructure penetration. The infrastructure used to carry communications is often based on software-controlled devices such as routers. Router software can be modified as described above to copy and forward all (or selected) traffic to an unauthorized interceptor.

The last two techniques can be categorized as invasive, because they alter the operating environment in order to gather or modify information. In a network environment, the most common mechanisms of invasive attacks are called viruses and Trojan horses. A virus gains access to a system, hides within that system, and replicates itself to infect other systems. A Trojan horse exploits a weakness from within a system. Either approach can result in intentional or unintentional denial of services for the host system.20Modern techniques for combining both techniques to covertly exfiltrate data from a system are becoming increasingly powerful

19"Work factor" is used in this report to mean a measure of the difficulty of undertaking a brute-force test of all possible keys against a given ciphertext (and known algorithm). A 40-bit work factor means that a brute-force attack must test at most 240 keys to be certain that the corresponding plaintext message is retrieved. In the literature, the term "work factor" is also used to mean the ratio of work needed for brute-force cryptanalysis of an encrypted message to the work needed to encrypt that message.

20On November 2, 1988, Robert T. Morris, Jr., released a "worm" program that spread itself throughout the Internet over the course of the next day. At trial, Morris maintained that he had not intended to cause the effects that had resulted, a belief held by many in the Internet community. Morris was convicted on a felony count of unauthorized access. See Peter G. Neumann, Computer-Related Risks, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1995, p. 133.

Suggested Citation:"Cryptography: Roles, Market, and Infrastructure." National Research Council. 1996. Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5131.
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and difficult to detect.21Such attacks will gain in popularity as networks become more highly interconnected.

2.4 THE MARKET FOR CRYPTOGRAPHY

Cryptography is a product as well as a technology. Products offering cryptographic capabilities can be divided into two general classes:

• Security-specific or stand-alone products that are generally add-on items (often hardware, but sometimes software) and often require that users perform an operationally separate action to invoke the encryption capabilities. Examples include an add-on hardware board that encrypts messages or a program that accepts a plaintext file as input and generates a ciphertext file as output.

• Integrated (often "general-purpose") products in which cryptographic functions have been incorporated into some software or hardware application package as part of its overall functionality. An integrated product is designed to provide a capability that is useful in its own right, as well as encryption capabilities that a user may or may not use. Examples include a modem with on-board encryption or a word processor with an option for protecting (encrypting) files with passwords.22

21The popular World Wide Web provides an environment in which an intruder can act to steal data. For example, an industrial spy wishing to obtain data stored on the information network of a large aerospace company can set up a Web page containing information of interest to engineers at the aerospace company (e.g., information on foreign aerospace business contracts in the making), thereby making the page an attractive site for those engineers to visit through the Web. Once an engineer from the company has visited the spy's Web page, a channel is set up by which the Web page can send back a Trojan horse (TH) program for execution on the workstation being used to look at the page. The TH can be passed as part of any executable program (Java and Postscript provide two such vehicles) that otherwise does useful things but on the side collects data resident on that workstation (and any other computers to which it might be connected). Once the data is obtained, it can be sent back to the spy's Web page during the same session, or e-mailed back, or sent during the next session used to connect to that Web page. Furthermore, because contacts with a Web page by design provide the specific address from which the contact is coming, the TH can be sent only to the aerospace company (and to no one else), thus reducing the likelihood that anyone else will stumble upon it. Furthermore, the Web page contact also provides information about the workstation that is making the contact, thus permitting a customized and specially debugged TH to be sent to that workstation.

22From a system design perspective, it is reasonable to assert that word processing and database applications do not have an intrinsic requirement for encryption capabilities and that such capabilities could be better provided by the operating system on which these applications operate. But as a practical matter, operating systems often do not provide such capabilities, and so vendors have significant incentives to provide encryption capabilities that are useful to customers who want better security.

Suggested Citation:"Cryptography: Roles, Market, and Infrastructure." National Research Council. 1996. Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5131.
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In addition, an integrated product may provide sockets or hooks to user-supplied modules or components that offer additional cryptographic functionality. An example is a software product that can call upon a usersupplied package that performs certain types of file manipulation such as encryption or file compression. Cryptographic sockets are discussed in Chapter 7 as cryptographic applications programming interfaces.

A product with cryptographic capabilities can be designed to provide data confidentiality, data integrity, and user authentication in any combination; a given commercial cryptographic product may implement functionality for any or all of these capabilities. For example, a PC card may integrate cryptographic functionality for secure authentication and for encryption onto the same piece of hardware, even though the user may choose to invoke these functions independently. A groupware program for remote collaboration may implement cryptography for confidentiality (by encrypting messages sent between users) and cryptography for data integrity and user authentication (by appending a digital signature to all messages sent between users). Further, this program may be implemented in a way that these features can operate independently (either, both, or neither may be operative at the same time).

Because cryptography is usable only when it is incorporated into a product, whether integrated or security-specific, issues of supply and demand affect the use of cryptography. The remainder of this section addresses both demand and supply perspectives on the cryptography market.

2.4.1 The Demand Side of the Cryptography Market

Chapter 1 discussed vulnerabilities that put the information assets of businesses and individuals at risk. But despite the presence of such risks, many organizations do not undertake adequate information security efforts, whether those efforts involve cryptography or any other tool. This section explores some of the reasons for this behavior.

Lack of Security Awareness (and/or Need)

Most people who use electronic communications behave as though they regard their electronic communications as confidential. Even though they may know in some sense that their communications are vulnerable to compromise, they fail to take precautions to prevent breaches in communications security. Even criminals aware that they may be the subjects of wiretaps have been overheard by law enforcement officials to say,

Suggested Citation:"Cryptography: Roles, Market, and Infrastructure." National Research Council. 1996. Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5131.
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''This call is probably being wiretapped, but . . .," after which they go on to discuss incriminating topics.23

The impetus for thinking seriously about security is usually an event that is widely publicized and significant in impact.24An example of responding to publicized problems is the recent demand for encryption of cellular telephone communications. In the past several years, the public has been made aware of a number of instances in which traffic carried over cellular telephones was monitored by unauthorized parties (Appendix J). In addition, cellular telephone companies have suffered enormous financial losses as the result of "cloning," an illegal practice in which the unencrypted ID numbers of cellular telephones are recorded off the air and placed into cloned units, thereby allowing the owner of the cloned unit to masquerade as the legitimate user.25Even though many users today are aware of such practices and have altered their behavior somewhat (e.g., by avoiding discussion of sensitive information over cellular telephone lines), more secure systems such as GSM (the European standard for mobile telephones) have gained only a minimal foothold in the U.S. market.

A second area in which people have become more sensitive to the need for information security is in international commerce. Many international business users are concerned that their international business communications are being monitored, and indeed such concerns motivate a considerable amount of today's demand for secure communications.

It is true that the content of the vast majority of telephone communications in the United States (e.g., making a dinner date, taking an ordi-

23 A case in point is that the officers charged in the Rodney King beating used their electronic communications system as though it were a private telephone line, even though they had been warned that all traffic over that system was recorded. In 1992, Rodney King was beaten by members of the Los Angeles Police Department. A number of transcripts of police radio conversations describing the incident were introduced as evidence at the trial. Had they been fully cognizant at the moment of the fact that all conversations were being recorded as a matter of department policy, the police officers in question most likely would not have said what they did (personal communication, Sara Kiesler, Carnegie Mellon University, 1993).

24It is widely believed that only a few percent of computer break-ins are detected. See, for example, Jane Bird, "Hunting Down the Hackers," Management Today, July, 1994, p. 64 (reports that 1% of attacks are detected); Bob Brewin, "Info Warfare Goes on Attack," Federal Computer Week, Volume 9(31), October 23, 1995, p. 1 (reports 2% detection); and Gary Anthes, "Hackers Try New Tacks," ComputerWorld, January 30, 1995, p. 12 (reports 5% detection).

25See, for example, Bryan Miller, "Web of Cellular Phone Fraud Widens," New York Times, July 20, 1995, p. C1; and George James, "3 Men Accused of Stealing Cellular Phone ID Numbers," New York Times, October 19, 1995, p. B3.

Suggested Citation:"Cryptography: Roles, Market, and Infrastructure." National Research Council. 1996. Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5131.
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nary business call) and data communications (e.g., transferring a file from one computer to another, sending an e-mail message) is simply not valuable enough to attract the interest of most eavesdroppers. Moreover, most communications links for point-to-point communications in the United States are hard wired (e.g., fiber-optic cable) rather than wireless (e.g., microwave); hard-wired links are much more secure than wireless links.26In some instances, compromises of information security do not directly damage the interests of the persons involved. For example, an individual whose credit card number is improperly used by another party (who may have stolen his wallet or eavesdropped on a conversation) is protected by a legal cap on the liability for which he is responsible.

Other Barriers Influencing Demand for Cryptography

Even when a user is aware that communications security is threatened and wishes to take action to forestall the threat, a number of practical considerations can affect the decision to use cryptographic protection. These considerations include the following:

•· Lack of critical mass. A secure telephone is not of much use if only one person has it. Ensuring that communications are secure requires collective action—some critical mass of interoperable devices is necessary in order to stimulate demand for secure communications. To date, such a critical mass has not yet been achieved.

•· Uncertainties over government policy. Policy often has an impact on demand. A number of government policy decisions on cryptography have introduced uncertainty, fear, and doubt into the marketplace and have made it difficult for potential users to plan for the future. Seeing the controversy surrounding policy in this area, potential vendors are reluctant to bring to market products that support security, and potential users are reluctant to consider products for security that may become obsolete in the future in an unstable legal and regulatory environment.

•· Lack of a supporting infrastructure. The mere availability of devices is not necessarily sufficient. For some applications such as secure interpersonal communications, a national or international infrastructure for managing and exchanging keys could be necessary. Without such an

26A major U.S. manufacturer reported to the committee that in the late 1980s, it was alerted by the U.S. government that its microwave communications were vulnerable. In response, this manufacturer took steps to increase the capacity of its terrestrial communications links, thereby reducing its dependence on microwave communications. A similar situation was faced by IBM in the 1970s. See William Broad, "Evading the Soviet Ear at Glen Cove," Science, Volume 217(3), 1982, pp. 910-911.

Suggested Citation:"Cryptography: Roles, Market, and Infrastructure." National Research Council. 1996. Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5131.
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infrastructure, encryption may remain a niche feature that is usable only through ad hoc methods replicating some of the functions that an infrastructure would provide and for which demand would thus be limited. Section 2.5 describes some infrastructure issues in greater detail.

•  High cost. To date, hardware-based cryptographic security has been relatively expensive, in part because of the high cost of stand-alone products made in relatively small numbers. A user that initially deploys a system without security features and subsequently wants to add them can be faced with a very high cost barrier, and consequently there is a limited market for add-on security products.

On the other hand, the marginal cost of implementing cryptographic capabilities in software at the outset is rapidly becoming a minor part of the overall cost, and so cryptographic capabilities are likely to appear in all manner and types of integrated software products where there might be a need.

•· Reduced performance. The implementation of cryptographic functions often consumes computational resources (e.g., time, memory). In some cases, excessive consumption of resources makes encryption too slow or forces the user to purchase additional memory. For example, if encrypting the communications link over which a conversation is carried delays that conversation by more than a few tenths of a second, users may well choose not to use the encryption capability.

•· A generally insecure environment. A given network or operating system may be so inherently insecure that the addition of cryptographic capabilities would do little to improve overall security. Moreover, retrofitting security measures atop an inherently insecure system is generally difficult.

•· Usability. A product's usability is a critical factor in its market acceptability. Products with encryption capabilities that are available for use but are in fact unused do not increase information security. Such products may be purchased but not used for the encryption they provide because such use is too inconvenient in practice, or they may not be purchased at all because the capabilities they provide are not aligned well with the needs of their users. In general, the need to undertake even a modest amount of extra work or to tolerate even a modest inconvenience for cryptographic protection that is not directly related to the primary function of the device is likely to discourage the use of such protection.27 When cryptographic features are well integrated in a way that does not

27For example, experience with current secure telephones such as the STU-III suggests that users of such phones may be tempted, because of the need to contact many people, to use them in a nonsecure mode more often than not.

Suggested Citation:"Cryptography: Roles, Market, and Infrastructure." National Research Council. 1996. Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5131.
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demand case-by-case user intervention, i.e., when such capabilities can be invoked transparently to the average user, demand may well increase.

•· Lack of independent certification or evaluation of products. Certification of a product's quality is often sought by potential buyers who lack the technical expertise to evaluate product quality or who are trying to support certain required levels of security (e.g., as the result of bank regulations). Many potential users are also unable to detect failures in the operation of such products.28With one exception discussed in Chapter 6, independent certification for products with integrated encryption capabilities is not available, leading to market uncertainty about such products.

•· Electronic commerce. An environment in which secure communications were an essential requirement would do much to increase the demand for cryptographic security.29However, the demand for secure communications is currently nascent.

•· Uncertainties arising from intellectual property issues. Many of the algorithms that are useful in cryptography (especially public-key cryptography) are protected by patents. Some vendors are confused by the fear, uncertainty, and doubt caused by existing legal arguments among patent holders. Moreover, even when a patent on a particular algorithm is undisputed, many users may resist its use because they do not wish to pay the royalties.30

•· Lack of interoperability and standards. For cryptographic devices to be useful, they must be interoperable. In some instances, the implementation of cryptography can affect the compatibility of systems that may have interoperated  even  though  they  did  not conform  strictly  to interoperability standards. In other instances, the specific cryptographic algorithm used is yet another function that must be standardized in order for two products to interoperate. Nevertheless, an algorithm is only one piece of a cryptographic device, and so two devices that implement the

28Even users who do buy security products may still be unsatisfied with them. For example, in two consecutive surveys in 1993 and 1994, a group of users reported spending more and being less satisfied with the security products they were buying. See Dave Powell, "Annual Infosecurity Industry Survey," Infosecurity News, March/April, 1995, pp. 20-27.

29AT&T plans to take a nontechnological approach to solving some of the security problems associated with retail Internet commerce. AT&T has announced that it will insure its credit card customers against unauthorized charges, as long as those customers were using AT&T's service to connect to the Internet. This action was taken on the theory that the real issue for consumers is the fear of unauthorized charges, rather than fears that confidential data per se would be compromised. See Thomas Weber, "AT&T Will Insure Its Card Customers on Its Web Service," Wall Street Journal, February 7, 1996, p. B5.

30See, for example, James Bennett, "The Key to Universal Encryption," Strategic Investment, December 20, 1995, pp. 12-13.

Suggested Citation:"Cryptography: Roles, Market, and Infrastructure." National Research Council. 1996. Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5131.
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same cryptographic algorithm may still not interoperate.31 Only when two devices conform fully to a single interoperability standard (e.g., a standard that would specify how keys are to be exchanged, the formatting of the various data streams, the algorithms to be used for encryption and decryption, and so on) can they be expected to interoperate seamlessly.

An approach gaining favor among product developers is protocol negotiation,32which calls for two devices or products to mutually negotiate the protocol that they will use to exchange information. For example, the calling device may query the receiving device to determine the right protocol to use. Such an approach frees a device from having to conform to a single standard and also facilitates the upgrading of standards in a backward-compatible manner.

• The heterogeneity of the communications infrastructure. Communications are ubiquitous, but they are implemented through a patchwork of systems and technologies and communications protocols rather than according to a single integrated design. In some instances, they do not conform  completely  to the standards that would enable full interoperability. In other instances, interoperability is achieved by intermediate conversion from one data format to another. The result can be that transmission of encrypted data across interfaces interferes with achieving connectivity among disparate systems. Under these circumstances, users

31Consider the Data Encryption Standard (DES) as an example. DES is a symmetric encryption algorithm, first published in 1975 by the U.S. government, that specifies a unique and well-defined transformation when given a specific 56-bit key and a block of text, but the various details of operation within which DES is implemented can lead to incompatibilities with other systems that include DES, with stand-alone devices incorporating DES, and even with software-implemented DES.

Specifically, how the information is prepared prior to being encrypted (e.g., how it is blocked into chunks) and after the encryption (how the encrypted data is modulated on the communications line) will affect the interoperability of communications devices that may both use DES. In addition, key management may not be identical for DES-based devices developed independently. DES-based systems for file encryption generally require a usergenerated password to generate the appropriate 56-bit DES key, but since the DES standard does not specify how this aspect of key management is to be performed, the same password used on two independently developed DES-based systems may not result in the same 56-bit key. For these and similar reasons, independently developed DES-based systems cannot necessarily be expected to interoperate.

32Transmitting a digital bit stream requires that the hardware carrying that stream be able to interpret it. Interpretation means that regardless of the content of the communications (e.g., voice, pictures), the hardware must know what part of the bit stream represents information useful to the ultimate receiver and what part represents information useful to the carrier. A communications protocol is an agreed-upon convention about how to interpret any given bit stream and includes the specification of any encryption algorithm that may be used as part of that protocol.

Suggested Citation:"Cryptography: Roles, Market, and Infrastructure." National Research Council. 1996. Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5131.
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may be faced with a choice of using unencrypted communications or not being able to communicate with a particular other party at all.33

2.4.2 The Supply Side of the Cryptography Market

The supply of products with encryption capabilities is inherently related to the demand for them. Cryptographic products result from decisions made by potential vendors and users as well as standards determined by industry and/or government. Use depends on availability as well as other important factors such as user motivation, relevant learning curves, and other nontechnical issues. As a general rule, the availability of products to users depends on decisions made by vendors to build or not to build them, and all of the considerations faced by vendors of all types of products are relevant to products with encryption capabilities.

In addition to user demand, vendors need to consider the following issues before deciding to develop and market a product with encryption capabilities:

• Accessibility of the basic knowledge underlying cryptography. Given that various books, technical articles, and government standards on the subject of cryptography have been published widely over the past 20 years, the basic knowledge needed to design and implement cryptographic systems that can frustrate the best attempts of anyone (including government intelligence agencies) to penetrate them is available to government and nongovernment agencies and parties both here and abroad. For example, because a complete description of DES is available worldwide, it is relatively easy for anyone to develop and implement an encryption system that involves multiple uses of DES to achieve much stronger security than that provided by DES alone.

• The skill to implement basic knowledge of cryptography. A product with encryption capabilities involves much more than a cryptographic algorithm. An algorithm must be implemented in a system, and many design decisions affect the quality of a product even if its algorithm is mathematically sound. Indeed, efforts by multiple parties to develop products with encryption capabilities based on the same algorithm could result in a variety of manufactured products with varying levels of quality and resistance to attack.

33An analogous example is the fact that two Internet users may find it very difficult to use e-mail to transport a binary file between them, because the e-mail systems on either end may well implement standards for handling binary files differently, even though they may conform to all relevant standards for carrying ASCII text.

Suggested Citation:"Cryptography: Roles, Market, and Infrastructure." National Research Council. 1996. Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5131.
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For example, although cryptographic protocols are not part and parcel of a cryptographic algorithm per se, these protocols specify how critical aspects of a product will operate. Thus, weaknesses in cryptographic protocols—such as a key generation protocol specifying how to generate and exchange a specific encryption key for a given message to be passed between two parties or a key distribution protocol specifying how keys are to be distributed to users of a given product—can compromise the confidentiality that a real product actually provides, even though the cryptographic algorithm and its implementation are flawless.34

• The skill to integrate the cryptography into a usable product. Even a product that implements a strong cryptographic algorithm in a competent manner is not valuable if the product is unusable in other ways. For integrated products with encryption capabilities, the noncryptographic functions of the product are central, because the primary purpose of an integrated product is to provide some useful capability to the user (e.g., word processing, database management, communications) that does not involve cryptography per se; if cryptography interferes with this primary functionality, it detracts from the product's value.

In this area, U.S. software vendors and system integrators have distinct strengths,35even though engineering talent and cryptographic expertise are not limited to the United States. For example, foreign vendors do not market integrated products with encryption capabilities that are sold as mass-market software, whereas many such U.S. products are available.36

The cost of developing, maintaining, and upgrading an economically viable product with encryption capabilities. The technical aspects of good encryption are increasingly well understood. As a result, the incremental

34An incident that demonstrates the importance of the nonalgorithm aspects of a product is the failure of the key-generation process for the Netscape Navigator Web browser that was discovered in 1995; a faulty random number generation used in the generation of keys would enable an intruder exploiting this flaw to limit a brute-force search to a much smaller number of keys than would generally be required by the 40-bit key length used in this product. See John Markoff, "Security Flaw Is Discovered in Software Used in Shopping," New York Times, September 19, 1995, p. Al. A detailed discussion of protocol failures can be found in Gustavus Simmons, "Cryptanalysis and Protocol Failures," Communications of the ACM, Volume 37(11), 1994, pp. 56-65.

35Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council, Keeping the U.S. Computer Industry Competitive: Systems Integration, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1992.

36For example, the Department of Commerce and the National Security Agency found no general-purpose software products with encryption capability from non-U.S. manufacturers. See Department of Commerce and National Security Agency, A Study of the International Market for Computer Software with Encryption, released January 11, 1996, p. III-9.

Suggested Citation:"Cryptography: Roles, Market, and Infrastructure." National Research Council. 1996. Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5131.
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cost of designing a software product so that it can provide cryptographic functionality to end users is relatively small. As cost barriers to the inclusion of cryptographic functionality are reduced dramatically, the long-term likelihood increases that most products that process digital information will include some kinds of cryptographic functionality.

•  The suitability of hardware vs. software as a medium  in which to implement a product with encryption capabilities. The duplication and distribution costs for software are very low compared to those for hardware, and yet, trade secrets embedded in proprietary hardware are easier to keep than those included in software. Moreover, software cryptographic functions are more easily disabled.

• Nonmarket considerations and export controls. Vendors may withhold or alter their products at government request. For example, a well-documented instance is the fact that AT&T voluntarily deferred the introduction of its 3600 Secure Telephone Unit (STU) at the behest of government (see Appendix E on the history of current cryptography policy and Chapter 6 on government influence). Export controls also affect decisions to make products available even for domestic use, as described in Chapter 4.

2.5 INFRASTRUCTURE FOR WIDESPREAD USE OF CRYPTOGRAPHY

The widespread use of cryptography requires a support infrastructure that can service organizational or individual user needs with regard to cryptographic keys.

2.5.1 Key Management Infrastructure

In general, to enable use of cryptography across an enterprise, there must be a mechanism that:

• Periodically supplies all participating locations with keys (typically designated for use during a given calendar or time period—the crypto-period) for either stored materials or communications; or

• Permits any given location to generate keys for itself as needed (e.g., to protect stored files); or

• Can securely generate and transmit keys among communicating parties (e.g., for data transmissions, telephone conversations).

In the most general case, any given mechanism will have to perform all three functions. With symmetric systems, the movement of keys from place to place obviously must be done securely and with a level of protection adequate to counter the threats of concern to the using parties. What-

Suggested Citation:"Cryptography: Roles, Market, and Infrastructure." National Research Council. 1996. Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5131.
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ever the distribution system, it clearly must protect the keys with appropriate safeguards and must be prepared to identify and authenticate the source. The overall task of securely assuring the availability of keys for symmetric applications is often called key management.

If all secure communications take place within the same corporation or among locations under a common line of authority, key management is an internal or possibly a joint obligation. For parties that communicate occasionally or across organizational boundaries, mutual arrangements must be formulated for managing keys. One possibility might be a separate trusted entity whose line of business could be to supply keys of specified length and format, on demand and for a fee.

With asymmetric systems, the private keys are usually self-generated, but they may also be generated from a central source, such as a corporate security office. In all cases, however, the handling of private keys is the same for symmetric and asymmetric systems; they must be guarded with the highest levels of security. Although public keys need not be kept secret, their integrity and association with a given user are extremely important and should also be supported with extremely robust measures.

The costs of a key management infrastructure for national use are not known at this time. One benchmark figure is that the cost of the Defense Department infrastructure needed to generate and distribute keys for approximately 320,000 STU-III telephone users is somewhere in the range of $10 million to $13 million per year.37

2.5.2 Certificate Infrastructures

The association between key information (such as the name of a person and the related public key) and an individual or organization is an extremely important aspect of a cryptographic system. That is, it is undesirable for one person to be able to impersonate another. To guard against impersonation, two general types of solutions have emerged: an organization-centric approach consisting of certificate authorities and a user-centric approach consisting of a web of trust.

A certificate authority serves to validate information that is associated with a known individual or organization. Certificate authorities can exist within a single organization, across multiple related organizations, or across society in general. Any number of certificate authorities can coexist, and they may or may not have agreements for cross-certification,

37William Crowell, Deputy Director, National Security Agency, personal communication, April 1996.

Suggested Citation:"Cryptography: Roles, Market, and Infrastructure." National Research Council. 1996. Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5131.
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whereby if one authority certifies a given person, then another authority will accept that certification within its own structure. Certificate authority hierarchies are defined in the Internet RFCs 1421-1424, the X.509 standard, and other emerging commercial standards, such as that proposed by MasterCard/Visa. A number of private certificate authorities, such as VeriSign, have also begun operation to service secure mass-market software products, such as the Netscape Navigator Web browser.

Among personal acquaintances validation of public keys can be passed along from person to person or organization to organization, thus creating a web of trust in which the entire ensemble is considered to be trusted based on many individual instances of trust. Such a chain of trust can be established between immediate parties, or from one party to a second to establish the credentials of a third. This approach has been made popular by the Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) software product; all users maintain their own "key-ring," which holds the public keys of everyone with whom they want to communicate.

Importantly, it should be noted that both the certificate authority approach and the web of trust approach replicate the pattern of trust that already exists among participating parties in societal and business activities. In a sense, the certificate infrastructure for cryptography simply formalizes and makes explicit what society and its institutions are already accustomed to.

At some point, banks, corporations, and other organizations already generally trusted by society will start to issue certificates. At that time, individuals especially may begin to feel more comfortable about the cryptographic undergirding of society's electronic infrastructure, at which point the webs of trust can be expected to evolve according to individual choices and market forces. However, it should be noted that different certificates will be used for different functions, and it is unlikely that a single universal certificate infrastructure will satisfy all societal and business needs. For example, because an infrastructure designed to support electronic commerce and banking may do no more than identify valid purchasers, it may not be useful for providing interpersonal communication or corporate access control.

Certificate authorities already exist within some businesses, especially those that have moved vigorously into an electronic way of life. Generally, there is no sense of a need for a legal framework to establish relationships among organizations, each of which operates its own certificate function. Arrangements exist for them to cross-certify one another; in general, the individual(s) authorizing the arrangement will be a senior officer of the corporation, and the decision will be based on the existence of other legal agreements already in place, notably, contracts that define the relationships and obligations among organizations.

Suggested Citation:"Cryptography: Roles, Market, and Infrastructure." National Research Council. 1996. Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5131.
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For the general business world in which any individual or organization wishes to conduct a transaction with any other individual or organization, such as the sale of a house, a formal certificate infrastructure has yet to be created. There is not even one to support just a digital signature application within government. Hence, it remains to be seen how, in the general case, individuals and organizations will make the transition to an electronic society.

Certificate authorities currently operate within the framework of contractual law. That is, if some problem arises as the result of improper actions on the part of the certification authority, its subscribers will have to pursue a civil complaint. As certificate authorities grow in size and service a greater part of society, it will probably be necessary to regulate their actions under law, much like those of any major societal institutions.38It is interesting to observe that the legal and operational environment that will have to exist for certificate organizations involves the same set of issues that are pertinent to escrow organizations (as discussed in Chapter 5).

2.6 RECAP

Cryptography provides important capabilities that can help deal with the vulnerabilities of electronic information. Cryptography can help to assure the integrity of data, to authenticate the identity of specific parties, to prevent individuals from plausibly denying that they have signed something, and to preserve the confidentiality of information that may have improperly come into the possession of unauthorized parties. At the same time, cryptography is not a silver bullet, and many technical and human factors other than cryptography can improve or detract from information security. In order to preserve information security, attention must be given to all of these factors. Moreover, people can use cryptography only to the extent that it is incorporated into real products and systems; unimplemented cryptographic algorithms cannot contribute to information security. Many factors other than raw mathematical knowledge contribute to the supply of and demand for products with cryptographic functionality. Most importantly, the following aspects influence the demand for cryptographic functions in products:

• Critical mass in the marketplace,

38Shimshon Berkovits et al., Public Key Infrastructure Study: Final Report, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, Md., April 1994. Performed under contract to MITRE Corporation, this study is summarized in Appendix H.

Suggested Citation:"Cryptography: Roles, Market, and Infrastructure." National Research Council. 1996. Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5131.
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• Government policy,

• Supporting infrastructure,

• Cost,

• Performance,

• Overall security environment,

• Usability,

• Quality certification and evaluation, and

• Interoperability standards.

Finally, any large-scale use of cryptography, with or without key escrow (discussed later in Chapter 5), depends on the existence of a substantial supporting infrastructure, the deployment of which raises a different set of problems and issues.

Suggested Citation:"Cryptography: Roles, Market, and Infrastructure." National Research Council. 1996. Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/5131.
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For every opportunity presented by the information age, there is an opening to invade the privacy and threaten the security of the nation, U.S. businesses, and citizens in their private lives. The more information that is transmitted in computer-readable form, the more vulnerable we become to automated spying. It's been estimated that some 10 billion words of computer-readable data can be searched for as little as $1. Rival companies can glean proprietary secrets . . . anti-U.S. terrorists can research targets . . . network hackers can do anything from charging purchases on someone else's credit card to accessing military installations. With patience and persistence, numerous pieces of data can be assembled into a revealing mosaic. Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society addresses the urgent need for a strong national policy on cryptography that promotes and encourages the widespread use of this powerful tool for protecting of the information interests of individuals, businesses, and the nation as a whole, while respecting legitimate national needs of law enforcement and intelligence for national security and foreign policy purposes. This book presents a comprehensive examination of cryptography--the representation of messages in code--and its transformation from a national security tool to a key component of the global information superhighway. The committee enlarges the scope of policy options and offers specific conclusions and recommendations for decision makers. Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society explores how all of us are affected by information security issues: private companies and businesses; law enforcement and other agencies; people in their private lives. This volume takes a realistic look at what cryptography can and cannot do and how its development has been shaped by the forces of supply and demand. How can a business ensure that employees use encryption to protect proprietary data but not to conceal illegal actions? Is encryption of voice traffic a serious threat to legitimate law enforcement wiretaps? What is the systemic threat to the nation's information infrastructure? These and other thought-provoking questions are explored. Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society provides a detailed review of the Escrowed Encryption Standard (known informally as the Clipper chip proposal), a federal cryptography standard for telephony promulgated in 1994 that raised nationwide controversy over its "Big Brother" implications. The committee examines the strategy of export control over cryptography: although this tool has been used for years in support of national security, it is increasingly criticized by the vendors who are subject to federal export regulation. The book also examines other less well known but nevertheless critical issues in national cryptography policy such as digital telephony and the interplay between international and national issues. The themes of Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society are illustrated throughout with many examples -- some alarming and all instructive -- from the worlds of government and business as well as the international network of hackers. This book will be of critical importance to everyone concerned about electronic security: policymakers, regulators, attorneys, security officials, law enforcement agents, business leaders, information managers, program developers, privacy advocates, and Internet users.

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