Post-Cold War Conflict Deterrence
NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS
Washington, D.C. 1997
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NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The report has been reviewed by a group other than the authors according to procedures approved by a Report Review Committee consisting of members of the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine.
This work was performed under Department of Navy Contract N00014-93-C-0089 issued by the Office of Naval Research under contract authority NR 201-124. However, the content does not necessarily reflect the position or the policy of the Department of the Navy or the government, and no official endorsement should be inferred.
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Copyright 1997 by the National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
Printed in the United States of America
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PARTICIPANTS IN THE POST-COLD WAR CONFLICT DETERRENCE STUDY
Andrew J. Goodpaster, The Atlantic Council, Chair
Seymour J. Deitchman, Chevy Chase, Maryland, Vice
Chair
David S.C. Chu, Rand
Paul K. Davis, Rand
Richard L. Garwin, IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center
John C. Hopkins, Los Alamos, New Mexico
Benjamin Huberman, Huberman Consulting Group
Glenn A. Kent, Rand
Robert L.J. Long, Annapolis, Maryland
C. Richard Nelson, The Atlantic Council
Paul H. Nitze, Johns Hopkins University
Robert B. Oakley, National Defense University
W.K.H. Panofsky, Stanford, California
Thomas C. Schelling, University of Maryland
Brent Scowcroft, Scowcroft Group
William Y. Smith, Falls Church, Virginia
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Brookings Institution
David L. Stanford, Science Applications International
Corporation
John D. Steinbruner, Brookings Institution
Victor A. Utgoff, Institute for Defense Analyses
Paul Wolfowitz, Johns Hopkins University
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NAVAL STUDIES BOARD
* David R. Heebner, Science
Applications International Corporation (ret.), Chair
George M. Whitesides, Harvard University, Vice Chair
* Albert J. Baciocco, Jr.,
The Baciocco Group, Inc.
* Alan Berman, Applied Research
Laboratory, Pennsylvania State University
Norman E. Betaque, Logistics Management Institute
Norval L. Broome, Mitre Corporation
* Gerald A. Cann, Raytheon
Company
* Seymour J. Deitchman, Chevy
Chase, Maryland, Special Advisor
Anthony J. DeMaria, DeMaria ElectroOptics Systems, Inc.
John F. Egan, Lockheed Martin Corporation
* Andrew J. Goodpaster, The
Atlantic Council, Special Advisor
Robert Hummel, Courant Institute of Mathematical Sciences, New
York
University
David W. McCall, AT&T Bell Laboratories (ret.)
Robert J. Murray, Center for Naval Analyses
* Robert B. Oakley, National
Defense University
William J. Phillips, Northstar Associates, Inc.
Mara G. Prentiss, Jefferson Laboratory, Harvard University
* Herbert Rabin, University of
Maryland
Julie JCH Ryan, Booz, Allen and Hamilton
Harrison Shull, Naval Postgraduate School (ret.)
* Keith A. Smith, U.S. Marine
Corps (ret.)
Robert C. Spindel, Applied Physics Laboratory, University of
Washington
* David L. Stanford, Science
Applications International Corporation
H. Gregory Tornatore, Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins
University
J. Pace VanDevender, Prosperity Institute
Vincent Vitto, Lincoln Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology
* Bruce Wald, Arlington Education
Consultants
Navy Liaison Representatives
RADM John W. Craine, Jr., USN, Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations (N81)
RADM Richard A. Riddell, USN, Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations (N91)
Paul G. Blatch, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
(N911T1)
Ronald N. Kostoff, Office of Naval Research
Staff
Ronald D. Taylor, Director (as of October 2, 1995)
Associate Director (July 1, 1994, through September 29, 1995)
Lee M. Hunt, Director (through September 29, 1995)
Susan G. Campbell, Administrative Assistant
Mary (Dixie) Gordon, Information Officer
Christopher Hanna, Project Assistant
* Members who also participated in the post-Cold War conflict deterrence study.
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COMMISSION ON PHYSICAL SCIENCES, MATHEMATICS, AND APPLICATIONS
Robert J. Hermann, United Technologies Corporation,
Co-chair
W. Carl Lineberger, University of Colorado, Co-chair
Peter M. Banks, Environmental Research Institute of
Michigan
Lawrence D. Brown, University of Pennsylvania
Ronald G. Douglas, Texas A&M University
John E. Estes, University of California at Santa Barbara
L. Louis Hegedus, Elf Atochem North America, Inc.
John E. Hopcroft, Cornell University
Rhonda J. Hughes, Bryn Mawr College
Shirley A. Jackson, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Kenneth H. Keller, University of Minnesota
Kenneth I. Kellermann, National Radio Astronomy Observatory
Margaret G. Kivelson, University of California at Los Angeles
Daniel Kleppner, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
John Kreick, Sanders, a Lockheed Martin Company
Marsha I. Lester, University of Pennsylvania
Thomas A. Prince, California Institute of Technology
Nicholas P. Samios, Brookhaven National Laboratory
L.E. Scriven, University of Minnesota
Shmuel Winograd, IBM T.J. Watson Research Center
Charles A. Zraket, Mitre Corporation (ret.)
Norman Metzger, Executive Director
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Preface
This report responds to a request made by RADM T.D. Ryan, USN, Director, Submarine Warfare Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, in a letter sent on January 6, 1994. The letter asked the Naval Studies Board, National Research Council, to conduct a study of deterrence in the emerging post-Cold War environment, including attention to nuclear, conventional, economic, diplomatic, and other means of deterring potential adversaries in the acquisition and utilization of military capabilities, state-sponsored terrorism, and interference with international commerce and rights of free passage. The terms of reference for the study resulting from Admiral Ryan's request called for efforts in the following three areas:
• Based on the experience of the past 45 years, and with due attention to the altered environment of international security and the emerging characteristics of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, what constitutes a reasonable set of deterrence objectives and what metrics are available for their quantitative assessment?
• From a comprehensive evaluation of existing deterrence decision aids and simulations, as well as those adaptable to such purposes, and utilizing a definition of the appropriate elements of a deterrence decision aid, determine their adequacy as a tool for shaping the Navy's deterrence posture, and recommend means for their improvement.
• Utilizing the results of the first bulleted item above, and drawing on the results of past Naval Studies Board and related studies, evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of existing and emerging technologies and systems to carry out the various elements of the deterrence mission of the Navy and Marine Corps.
As the Board began its work on the problem, extensive preliminary effort was devoted to devising an approach that would yield credible and useful results for the highest levels of government and the Navy Department. It became clear that the Cold War concept of deterrence had become so imbedded in all aspects of the thinking of the national security community, and therefore the Navy-in terms of Cold War conditions and relationships in the international environment, U.S. understanding of the kinds of threatening activities to be deterred, and U.S. military force structure and force posture--that a study of the subject under the new post-Cold War conditions would have to go back to first principles. This meant that before starting to examine Navy and Marine Corps technology and decision aids relating to deterrence, it would be necessary to explore the meaning and the viability of the deterrence concept itself in the new environment. Only then could the subordinate technical questions posed in the terms of reference be taken up. It was therefore decided to divide the study into
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two phases along these lines: first, an effort to define the meaning and the elements of deterrence under the new world conditions, and then, an examination of the significance of this new understanding of the concept of deterrence for the Navy and Marine Corps, including the technical issues raised in the terms of reference.
To carry out the first phase of the study, a special group of participants1 was convened under the chairmanship of GEN Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA (retired), who prepared a detailed outline to guide that part of the study. The group consisted of individuals who could bring to bear from their own experience the knowledge and understanding that had accumulated over the five decades since World War II, in both the practice of deterrence and in the measurement of its effectiveness. The group explored the meaning of deterrence in the post-Cold War world, identified enduring principles for the practice of deterrence, and developed insights for new approaches to the practice of deterrence and to associated analysis, modeling, and planning.
The special group of participants met only twice and received and discussed the inputs reflected in the individual essays presented in the appendixes. They made no attempt to reach consensus on the wide variety of issues introduced. In this respect this study and report differ from what is customary in studies carried out under the aegis of the National Research Council. The study participants' discussions served the valuable purpose of clarifying the various ideas of individuals irrespective of the different views introduced and still remaining after the discussions.
The second phase of the study was carried out under the leadership of David Heebner, the Naval Studies Board's chairman, by Board members2with extensive experience in evaluating, inserting, and using technology in the armed forces, especially in the Navy and Marine Corps. This group also included experts in modeling and simulation and their application to problems arising in evaluation of systems and operations. The group was knowledgeable about instances in the nation's history where actions of military forces and deterrence policy interacted, and about elements of prior Board studies that could contribute to consideration of the subject at hand.
The two groups interacted to ensure a seamless connection in the results of the two phases of the study. GEN Goodpaster was appointed a special advisor to the Naval Studies Board for the duration of the study. Several members of the Board participated in the discussions by the special group of study participants, with one Board member, Seymour Deitchman, serving as GEN Goodpaster's vice chairman for that group. Richard Nelson, a member of the special group of participants, contributed to the Board's deliberations in the second phase of the study.
The chairman and the vice chairman of the special group of study participants, together with Dr. Nelson, prepared this report's first chapter,
1 The participants in this group are listed on page iii.
2 These members are also identified on page iv.
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entitled "Deterrence: An Overview." The chapter represents the authors' summary and interpretation of the key points that emerged from the special group of participants' examination of the meaning of deterrence in the post-Cold War world. In addition, several of these participants prepared papers on different aspects of the problem of deterrence. These papers, signed by and the sole responsibility of their authors, are provided in the appendixes to this report. As a source of the richness of the ideas summarized in Chapter 1's new look at the subject of deterrence, these papers offer an opportunity for deeper understanding, and the reader is therefore urged to explore them.
It is also the case that a subject of this complexity is not easily assimilated during the conduct of urgent business in the policy-making environment. To assist in this process, GEN Goodpaster prepared a "bridging" chapter, Chapter 2, "Implications for Deterrence Policy: Tasks for Policy Makers." This chapter outlines in concrete terms the key changes from the old to the new international environment, the major challenges presented to policy makers by those changes, and the main areas in which important unresolved issues remain.
The Naval Studies Board prepared Chapter 3, "Significance of Post-Cold War Deterrence Concepts for the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps." This chapter takes up the specific questions posed in the terms of reference, listing objectives of deterrence as well as qualitative and quantitative measures by which the potential success of any deterrent action might be judged. Specific emphases in naval forces' capabilities that appear to be called for by the review of deterrence policy needs are also presented and discussed, and decision aids and their application in the deterrence context are examined.
It should not be surprising that a subject as broad and fundamental to U.S. national security posture as deterrence should call forth diverse and often contradictory views of both the concept and its implications for policy. As is pointed out in Chapter 1, many such differences remain to be resolved through experience in the international context, and in many cases resolution will await the advent of specific circumstances and the consequent need for decisions in matters of policy and application. Areas of policy requiring continuing attention are highlighted in context throughout the report. Many of the unresolved differences regarding policy were also reflected as differences of view among the study group participants. Every attempt has been made, in Chapter 1, to acknowledge such differences. Special comments made by study group participants in connection with statements in Chapter 1 are included as footnotes at the appropriate points. These views are enlarged on in the papers in the appendixes. All special study group participants and participating Board members also had the opportunity to review, comment on, and influence this, the overall report of the study.
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Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY |
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WHAT IS DETERRENCE IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD? |
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ENDURING PRINCIPLES IN DETERRENCE STRATEGY |
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DERIVATIVE POLICIES AND KEY ISSUES |
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SIGNIFICANCE OF POST-COLD WAR DETERRENCE CONCEPTS FOR THE U.S. NAVY AND MARINE CORPS |
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METRICS AND DECISION AIDS |
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1 |
DETERRENCE: AN OVERVIEW |
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INTRODUCTION |
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THE MEANING OF DETERRENCE |
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THE NEW CONTEXT |
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ENDURING PRINCIPLES |
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DERIVATIVE POLICIES AND KEY ISSUES |
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ANALYSIS, MODELING, AND PLANNING |
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2 |
IMPLICATIONS FOR DETERRENCE POLICY: TASKS FOR POLICY MAKERS |
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THE NEW DETERRENCE ENVIRONMENT |
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CREATING A FABRIC OF DETERRENCE |
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SOME DIFFICULT CHOICES |
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CONCLUDING REMARKS |
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3 |
SIGNIFICANCE OF POST-COLD WAR DETERRENCE CONCEPTS FOR THE U.S. NAVY AND MARINE CORPS |
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INTRODUCTION |
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OBJECTIVES AND METRICS IN DETERRENCE STRATEGY |
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ENSURING U.S. NAVAL FORCES' CAPABILITY FOR DETERRENCE |
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DECISION AIDS: INTELLIGENCE, GAMES, MODELING, AND SIMULATION |
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APPENDIX A: REVISING THE PRACTICE OF DETERRENCE |
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CHANGING CONTEXT |
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STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS |
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THE RUSSIAN CASE |
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THE SUBORDINATION AND REVISION OF DETERRENCE |
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CONCLUDING PERSPECTIVE |
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APPENDIX B: CONTEMPORARY STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND PRECISION-GUIDED MUNITIONS |
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WHAT IS DETERRENCE? WHY AND HOW? |
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COLD WAR DETERRENCE AND THE LIMITS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS |
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POST-COLD WAR STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND THE PERSIAN GULF WAR |
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CURRENT CHALLENGES |
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APPENDIX C: EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND COALITIONS FOR DEFENDING AGAINST REGIONAL CHALLENGERS ARMED WITH WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION |
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INTRODUCTION |
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POTENTIAL FOR CHALLENGES TO A VITAL U.S. REGIONAL INTEREST |
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NUCLEAR DETERRENCE IN CONFRONTATIONS WITH REGIONAL PROLIFERATORS |
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CHANGED ASPECTS OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE |
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IMPLEMENTING NUCLEAR DETERRENCE UNILATERALLY |
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IMPLEMENTING NUCLEAR DETERRENCE THROUGH A COALITION |
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INCENTIVES TO JOIN THE COALITION AND SUPPORT ITS NUCLEAR DETERRENCE STRATEGY |
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ADVANCE PREPARATIONS FOR COALITION INVOLVEMENT IN NUCLEAR DETERRENCE |
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CONCLUSIONS |
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APPENDIX D: THE REMAINING UNIQUE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN POST-COLD WAR DETERRENCE |
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BACKGROUND |
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THE HISTORY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE |
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FUTURE NUCLEAR WEAPONS MISSION |
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CONCLUSIONS |
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APPENDIX E: NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN POST-COLD WAR DETERRENCE |
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INTRODUCTION: A DEFINITION OF DETERRENCE |
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NUCLEAR VS. CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE |
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DETERRENCE VIA NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE FUTURE |
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REQUIREMENTS FOR MAINTAINING NUCLEAR DETERRENCE |
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APPENDIX F: NOTES ON THE ''BAND" BETWEEN "EXISTENTIAL DETERRENCE" AND THE ACTUAL USE OF FORCE |
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APPENDIX G.1: SPECIAL CHALLENGES IN EXTENDING DETERRENCE IN THE NEW ERA |
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A PROVOCATIVE PREMISE |
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TOWARD A STRATEGY FOR DETERRING THREATS TO NONVITAL INTERESTS |
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POTENTIAL ACTIONS |
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APPENDIX G.2: DECISION MODELING AS AN AID TO STRATEGIC PLANNING AND CRISIS ACTION |
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ABSTRACT |
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INTRODUCTION |
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MODELING OPPONENTS AND THEIR ASSESSMENT OF OPTIONS |
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FACTORS TENDING TO INCREASE RISK TAKING |
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A GENERIC SITUATION ENCOURAGING AGGRESSION |
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CONCLUSIONS |
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BIBLIOGRAPHY |
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APPENDIX G.3: PROTECTING WEAK AND MEDIUM STRENGTH STATES: ISSUES OF DETERRENCE, STABILITY, AND DECISION MAKING |
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ABSTRACT |
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INTRODUCTION |
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DETERRENCE AT THE BEGINNING OF A NEW CENTURY |
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AN APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF DETERRENCE |
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DETERRING STRONG NEIGHBORS: STRATEGIES FOR WEAK OR MEDIUM-STRONG STATES |
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EXTENDING DETERRENCE IN DEFENSE OF WEAK OR MEDIUM STRONG STATES |
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RECOGNIZING THAT IMMEDIATE EXTENDED DETERRENCE MAY FAIL |
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CONCLUSIONS: CHALLENGES FOR SECURITY STRATEGY, DEFENSE PLANNING, AND CRISIS DECISION MAKING |
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BIBLIOGRAPHY |
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APPENDIX H: THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE, NATIONAL ABM SYSTEMS, AND THE FUTURE OF DETERRENCE |
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CONTEXT |
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BACKGROUND |
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THE PROBLEM |
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NEAR-TERM OPTIONS FOR U.S. THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE |
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WHAT IS THE THREAT? |
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THE BIG PROBLEM FOR CITY DEFENSE |
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REGIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE IN RELATION TO THE ABM TREATY |
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CONCLUSIONS |
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APPENDIX I: DETERRENCE: CLASH AND UTILIZATION OF VALUE SYSTEMS |
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INTRODUCTION |
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BACKGROUND |
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VALUE SYSTEMS IN THE CURRENT WORLD |
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CASE STUDIES |
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CONCLUSION |
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NAVY- AND MARINE CORPS-SPECIFIC IMPLICATIONS |
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APPENDIX J: CONTROLLING INSTABILITIES CAUSED BY ROGUE GOVERNMENTS |
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THE EMERGING THREAT |
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IMPLICATIONS OF THIS THREAT |
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A DEFENSE IN DEPTH |
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AN APPROACH TO INTERCEPTING BALLISTIC MISSILES AFTER LAUNCH |
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SUGGESTED ACTIONS |
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APPENDIX K: DETERRENCE-QUO VADIS? |