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HAZARDS EQUITY: A PERSPECTIVE ON THE COMPENSATION SYSTEM 117 original typesetting files. Page breaks are true to the original; line lengths, word breaks, heading styles, and other typesetting-specific formatting, however, cannot be About this PDF file: This new digital representation of the original work has been recomposed from XML files created from the original paper book, not from the retained, and some typographic errors may have been accidentally inserted. Please use the print version of this publication as the authoritative version for attribution. One reasonably can argue that liability to the injured party should be allocated among responsible parties on the basis of available facts at the time liability is determined. It may well be equitable and appropriate to determine a percentage of overall responsibility on the basis of multiple factors as in the Gore amendment approach under CERCLA. Foreseeability and fault, among other considerations, would influence but not define the allocation of damages. The extent of allocable liability of a given party would be the result of the balancing of relevant factors among liable parties. If the extent of the liability of a responsible party was limited through allocation, there would be no need for one responsible party to seek contribution from other responsible parties. No one would pay more than his allocable share of damages in the first instance. CONCLUSION An appropriate starting place for an equitable modernization of the American system of compensation is to remodel the application of the principles of foreseeability and joint and several liability. Environmental and public health matters provide a logical starting point because of the potentially catastrophic burden on one liable party who alone must bear the financial responsibility for damages and may have no realistic hope for allocation of damages among other liable parties. References Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe R. R. Co. v. Stanford, 12 Kan. 354, 15 Am. Rep. 362 (1874). Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Calif. 1968). Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436 (Calif. 1944). Homac v. Sun Oil Co., 180 N. E. 172 (N.Y. 1932). Jelley v. La Flame, 238 A.2d 728 (N.H. 1968). Keeton, W. P., and W. L. Prosser. 1984. The Law of Torts (5th ed.). St. Paul, Minn.: West. Ryan v. New York Central R. R. Co., 354 N.Y. 210 (1866). Silver Falls Timber Co. v. Eastern & Western Lumber Co., 40 P.2d 703 (Oreg. 1935). State of Colorado v. Asarco, Inc., No. 83-C-2388 (Colo. 1985). Towns v. Anderson, 579 P.2d 1163 (Colo. 1978). United States v. A & F Materials Co., Inc., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1255â57 (Ill. 1984). U.S. Congress, House. 1980. H.R. 7020, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. sec. 3071 (126 Cong. Rec. 26,779). Wegman, R. A. 1966. Cigarettes and health: A legal analysis. Cornell Law Quarterly 51:678.
