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HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITY SITING: COMMUNITY, FIRM, AND 134 GOVERNMENTAL PERSPECTIVES original typesetting files. Page breaks are true to the original; line lengths, word breaks, heading styles, and other typesetting-specific formatting, however, cannot be About this PDF file: This new digital representation of the original work has been recomposed from XML files created from the original paper book, not from the retained, and some typographic errors may have been accidentally inserted. Please use the print version of this publication as the authoritative version for attribution. ent in radioactive waste management programs. For example, the selection of the Hanford Reservation as the candidate site for a potential high-level radioactive waste repository despite evident problems with the geological medium is related to the presumed favorable inclination of local populations. The apparent favorable political response of residents in the host area has also undoubtedly played a role in the exploration at the Yucca Mountain site adjacent to the Nevada Test Site. But the more striking recent case is that of Naturita, Colorado, and Edgemont, South Dakota, two communities that have competed to be the site of a low-level waste repository within the regional compact system. Both are small, rural communities with boom-and-bust historiesâformer uranium mining towns that are now suffering from depressed economies and unemployment. Both have been pursued by a private developer, Chem-Nuclear, with the blessing of regional compact officials who need a site. Naturita was disqualified, however, because of an evident potential for geological faulting and flash floods; Edgemont is still in the running with apparent local support but opposition from nearby communities and state environmental groups. Why would one object to such schemes, which deliver efficient market solutions? First, it is apparent that such procedures are objectionable on equity grounds, since burdens are disproportionately allocated either to poor communities that usually share little in the benefits of waste generation or to localities already so contaminated that additional health burdens are viewed passively. Second, the process of risk imposition is almost always objectionable: developers tend to withhold information or create intentional ambiguity (Seley, 1983, p. 34), the capacity for community participation tends to be minimal, and the means of redress are few. Finally, political opportunism in siting carries a potential for eroding the technical criteria necessary to ensure the safety of present and future generations and the economic efficiency of the waste disposal system. Approach 2: Imposition by Central Authority The rationale for the exercise of centralized state authority in the selection of sites in local areas is that the general well-being of society requires overriding individual (or local) interests. This may be done with or without compensation arrangements for redressing inequities and with varying degrees of local participation. The actual selection process frequently includes safeguards to ensure that the decision is fair and unbiased, guided by technical criteria aimed at protecting health and safety. A modified version of this approach is a higher authority's overriding, usually according to specified conditions, of a lower authority's decision accepting or rejecting a