Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.
THE RC)IF~ OF HIS ~ MARS ~ SPAR David L. Axis lN~l~JCllON lbr~ghout the history of the Apace prugrzan, there has been a dichotomy of Opinions on Be relative importance of manned and used (i.e., robotic) applications. Until the arrival of the chute, Inner and unmanned operations occupied different sections of NASA Headquarters, involved differed grow of NOVA field centers, awl were generally viewer} an citing for Be 1;mi~ furls available. There were (and still are) areas, such as planetary exploration, where there were no viable Scions to the use of used systems. The adherents, rather, tied to the utilit~r of hum ~ space, and the cost of replacing each of their factions with robotic alternatives. Any self~contained devil performing a useful fur~tion in ~pace, whether a human or a robot, must contain the same set of < tic functions to ad~at~ly perform the mission. In many Em=, of Carrie, the mission is actually constrained to work amours the limitation of the state-of-ff~e-art in one or mom of these areas. these basic functions for autonomy include: Sensation In order to Irate on Be local ~riron~nt, a s~ em ~ sensors for detectir~ Objects. these topically break dawn mto redate sensors (such as erosion or ogler raring systems) arm proximal (such as tactile and fore sensors) . taticn Having the capability ~ den Objects does not translate directly =to the capability for manipulation. Ending the spatial relationships, having a knowledge base of both general activities probes, forces and nations) as well as specific knowledge (specific satellite design Metal s) are necessary for effecting a complete system. Manipulation -this area has trailed Be opera considerably, as many of the original Apace Objectives clid not involve manipulative activities. Manipulation to date has been 405
406 perform by the sample arm of the Surveyor and Viking lar~ir~ Aft ~ small Ale, and tar He Pate manipulator System of Be shuttle in larger ~e. None of these systems has involved any appreciable dexterity in either the arms or the end effec~cors. Nonetheless, this area is pivotal for future apace activities, as it relates to the capability of the spacecraft system to interact winch, arm to alar, its 1~1 e~riro~nt. Ion His is a necessary function, often relegated to a supporting role. me capability to Tnaneu~rer around in space, either on an existir~ stun re or in free scare. ~ ~ _ . is rewire for any robotic system to be generally useful. It might be anticipated that apace system; will evolve a wider range of lo~ti~re capabilities than hens have evolved in ~ gravity field. For example, legs on a human provide both Action arm angering factions. In the m~cragravi~r ernrirc~t of apace, Icxx~ion might well be relegate to the equivalent of arms, which have the finer dexterity and force control Aid in the absence of damping, arm armoring left to sets of specialized manipulators with sty, but little other capability. Ihrusc~s for free~flight prevision will also be An, at Hat for the situations not Hairy to minimize us. of acns~mables. Sort This category includes all the other functions n£~c~'y for the system to exist. This would include power, cooling/ structural integration, navigaticn, and . . . COllllmBllCatlOrlS . It is interesting to exam me a known autonomous system (a human) in the context of these functions. the head is the sensor platform, located in the optimal location for biracial locomotion. The c~tic~nal A (brain) is Coca with the sensors in the head, to minimize the length farm vuln~bilit~r) of the high-bar~idth data paths, particularly vision. me arms form a Anus manipulative system, arm the legs similarly perform location tasks. He torso Is Aces ~ of the short functions, as well as Firm all of the other systems together ~ a self~contain~ unit. the human boxy ~ thus a Powerful exhale of a possible design for a rat. Hover, the human paradigm phalli rat be ~ +~ far, as many of the decimal choirs for a system which stares Eric in a gravity field may have little logical a~lica~cion in a An optimized for weightlessness. He task, therefore, is to cane to an und~sta~ir~ of the past arrt present roles of Hans arm Famines in apace activities, and extrapolate ~ ache fur to acne ~ a ~nir01 Restaging of the capabilities and limitations of each. In fact, it is worth emphasizing at this point an ~=sentia1 carrion of this pair: it is not an
407 "either' Dice between humans and machines. There are necessary are sufficient roles for both ~ the foreseeable fur In Space. H~RICAL PERSPECIIV~ ED SPAC:E: FI,IGHr With ~ limier payback capability of party Mauri systems, there was no viable alternative to the use of unmanned sand ~ ites. -these party payloads wed ~ of sensor packages, cc~nications gel', arxl support systems, anti were rehire to do ncrthing mod than c~ser~/F~asure and report their firings. Even t - my, many of the sat=llit== being launched to orbit are still limit to these functions; for the Dreg Of this paper, these systems may be considers to be s~rcibotic ~ems. It sag clear that Be original intention of the Mercury program was to use Be humans as an e~riment=1 subject, ~ order to study the effects of spaceflight en humans. the choice of e~peri~ Dairy test pilots for May astronauts led to scam predictable <iissat~faction with ~ his role, arxt Be ~~=i:m for incorporation of meal oo~=ol r~pab;li~ in the vehicle. -this led to the use of ache human as a controller, albeit primarily in the backup ~de. A case in point was the Mary audible Castro system. Be primary system was an automatic one, Dish Stairs the capsule ~ redefine audible darers orbital Aerations. A second selection was "fly-¢y~ire", which Be as~r~aut cauld Smears abide maneuvers by w=- of a sid~stick owner, which wed then be performed by the ace contra system. me final ~de, however, was purely marshal, as the atonal actuate push-pull nods Dish Mechanically capered and cl thrower valves. His "sue of humans as Off final backup Is a pivotal one. For example, MY was a single spacecraft, designs primarily for a single, sequentially organized mission. Tt carried ran on-~ard Dater, ~ instead relied on activating system at set Dies on a mission clock. Contingencies, such as Be dec:~sion to enter we jettisc~ir~ the repack on J~ Glenn's orbital mission, relied on many activation of retrc fire Is to prevent Be Or flea au~mati~ly separate Be ~trc~adk folla~rir~ Afire. As, Shalt the Mercury program, the human represented Be adaptable (configurable) eland of the DZY control system. The Gemini program was an interesting 'backwater" of spa-= flight develcpment. Criginally conceived as a Mark I] version of the Mercury capsule, GE mini was developed as an interim program to increase space flight experience while waiting for the development of the Apollo system. Since it represented to some an evolutionary dead-end ~ d space flight, the manned elements were Hermits ~ to have unusual _ _.. ~ ~ =~ ._ i., ~~_~ "W"] ~1 ~~= =~ ~~V~'I~-e thus, where Mercury was largely automatic, Gemini was almost entirely manual. It might induce be argue] that, more so than any other space program before or since (including Shuttle), Gemini was a pilots spacecraft. There were no automatic abort modes: the crew had to decide the appropriate action based on the reports of the instruments. For the first the, a space
408 vehicle cad be acutely described as a Spacecraft, since Hi had ache capability ~ Lange orbits and achieve rendezvous. The New had windage which faced forward, and hushes Pith card be Honed and closed again in flight. Even in larding, the vehicle was positioned to allow the crew to sit upright, and much development effort took place tcwar~s a Rcgallo~wing recovery system which would have allowed Gemini to maneuver to a landing on the dry lake Ken at Edwards Air Force Base. Even ~ the midst of this manual spacecraft, additional elements of automation had to be incorporated. me Gemini was the first spacecraft to fly with an on-koard computer, used for calculating rendezvcus maneuvers and for control of the lifting reentry. Althcogh many of the procedures used for rendezvous and docking were natal in nature, the complexities of orbital mechanics require] the use of ground or on-board computer calculations; the crew were primarily used as interpreters of visual and rater data. m e presence of humans on board Apollo may be considered as entirely a political dec ~ ion, as the entire objective of the Apollo program was to place a man an the moon and safely return him to earth. He greater complexities of the spacecraft and mission led to a return to automated systems, after the largely manual nature of the Gemini spacecraft. Thus, [or exe - le. many of the abort modes were autc'Datic=1ly initiate, although the crew did agitate for pal cancel of launch vehicle trajectory as a backup for the Saturn flight control stern. the manual clodlcir~g tec~hnigges Merely during Gemini were utilized by Apollo in lunar orbit. Apollo age m showed the utility of humans as a robust backup system. It was not possible to do a survey of landing sires down to the ~ Hen of all possible hazards to the Lunar Mbdule; it was therefore planned that the pilot Could take over and steer the lunar lander to a safe landing site. A his system worked well in every instance: the initial aim point for Apollo ll, for example, turned cut to be right the middle of a boulder field. M~nu21 control of the landing vehicle allowed the targeting of landings next to an unmarred Surveyor spacecraft, adjacent to a deep lunar rid le. and in the lunar highlands. This greatly auymentcl the data return, as later flights were t~e~ into areas of greater geologist impost, winch fewer Lions for cafe lay sites. me presence of humans to pilaf the landers into safe locations may be ~ to the Viking Bandits on Mars a few yeah; later: since the up Fiches did not have the image processing and decision nuking capabilities of humans, both of ye larxling craft had to be targeted to the flattest, poshest, and therefore least tah~ting larkling sips available. Similarly, ye Soviet Uhi~ performed lunar e~lorati~ with Canard vehicles. Hover, the quantity of staples retard differed Rae Apollo by 3-4 orders of magnitude; since t^he samples wed selects rarxianly frown the immediate location of the landing vehicle, it may be assumed that the quality of samples varied widely form Apollo as wEl1. Skylab, as the first American space station, involved the long-term habitation of space by humans. Indeed, one of the major objectives of Skylab was to study the effects of long-term space flight on human
409 physiology; hardener, to use this Objective as a justification for manned space flight constitutes circular logic. Ah mare may ins~cead be said of the other science cibjecti~res of Skylab, such as earth He ~ r ~ s, solar physics, and E pace Operatic s. In all of these, the Skylab crews played an essential role in the sucks of the mission. since Skylab was constructed of surplus Apollo components, there was little significant difference between the two programs in the automation levels of the vehicle system themselves. m e only significant difference was in tile experiment packages, which in Skylab represented a later generation of technology from the spacecraft hardware. For example, the solar observing instruments ~ the Apollo Telescope Mbunt couId be (and were) operated remotely from the ground. Howe van', the Inboard crewmen could provide more immediate decisions when faced with fast-breaking phenomena, and ~ fact managed to record solar flares from their inception. Modifications to the Inboard control panel of these instruments Curing the course of the Skylab mission were primarily to increase the ate; 1 ity of. the crew to make initiate Eta records for use orient, by the addition of an ins~cant-prmt scope camera. Of greatest signifiable, perhaps, was the role played by He crew in the repay of the workshop and Invasion of the mission. Pensive e~crav~hicular activities (E~s) were perform to free the jangle solar array, and to depth a sample to reduce temperatures ~ Be workshop to habit~hie levels. me three Skylab As Clearly repair fails equipment, Bach inside arm abusive of the apace station, ark con rly made possible the such=== of the pro3ran: had Skylab been an unmanned station with the state-of-the-art robotics of its time, it clearly would have had little or no recourse beyond those capabilities left by the launch accident. The greater complexity of the Space Shuttle has led to the greatest amount of automation yet. Flight crews have referred to the Orbiter as the Selectric airplane", since almost all functions are controlled through the four general-purpose computers (GPCs). The atmospheric flight characteristics of the Orbiter are such as to be Dracti~lY unflyable without stability augmentation. Although a manNa1 direct Mae does exist, few of the flight crew have Ah success In this Moe In trait simulations, arm even this male relies on Be GPCs ~n~rpret harm controller Eta arxi nary motions of the flight acn~cro surfaces. A though the flight con~crol system is capable of flying the vehicle all the way through larking ("autolarxI"), it is interesting to Rae that no crew has yet allowed this to be testy cn they" recession: the Per always takes curer in control stick steering Ale (i.e., sthl3ilit~r augment - ) at subsonic transition, or Mainly by Me pre flare maneuver at 2000 feet altitude. this Is representative of many of Me lessons lean-to face Chute Cations: ache flight crew have now beer cat in the role of systems managers, but still d~ active involvement In all safer, critical a~*s of the mission. It ~d be unwise to assume Cat this tram will not contirme into the era of the apace station. - -
410 CAPABILITIES AND I~qArIONS It has been said hat humans are the only self-pr~ra~ing, hippy is aut~c~us debris= capable of Beirut ma~s-pr~:ed by unskilled fair. Be Cat as it may, there are significant 1;m;tations on both humans and machines In ache space ~riro~ment. H;avir~ evolved In he environment of the earth's surface, it is necessary ~ (= same degree) take the conditions of earth along with humans In Apace. Constraints to be consider~l include atmosphere, ~s~m~bles, volume, work Ales, ail Gravity. Humans reed Bert above a partial pressure of approximately 3 psi ~ order to survive. through the Apollo program, ppace~xaft were sallied Offs a pup antigen a~sphe~ at 4 psi. This simplified several operational problem: the stnlcLures could be simpler, as the internal prep were lee=; Only a Girdle gas had to be stored and deliver - ; arm there was no r ~ in ~ t for dent ~ genification prior to an extravehicular activity. However, the Apollo 1 fire showed graphically the primary d;C~*vantage of a singlergas system. In Skylab, the atmosF here was kept as 5 psi, with m tragen forming the additional partial pressure beyond that required for oxygen. While this reduced the flame propagation problem, the crew was 1~== than satisfied pith the atmosphere, as it was difficult to carry =~ corwersations beyond their initiate vicinity. Current plans for the Space Station assume a sea-le~rel pressure of 14.7 psi, as used cn the Oliver. Delis decision Is coupled into the choice of avionics: the soa-le~rel pressure of ache Orbiter was partially chosen to allow the use of "off-~clf" Spooled Aries. this had an effect cn habitability, as the Her of coolers fans ~ the Biter cr'3a+== an appreciable aunt of raise, thus limiting co~nrersatims to the IBM ~ ia ~ vicinity of the irxli~riduals. The Orbiter has been c ~ rated extensively at 10.2 psi during pre-breathe cycles prior to an EVA, but this requires a significant pcher-~own of avionics to prevent overheating. A biological or ~ , such as a human, ~ powered by a series of chaff reactions, and must be repl ~ regularly. In a totally open-loop system (that is, no attempt at recycling anything), humans will require approximately 5 kg/day of food, water, and oxygen. Recycling water and air will reduce this to 1 kg/person-day: this is equivalent to 540 ha of claimables for a span crew aver a 90 day resupply cycle. Even without recycling, then, Disables are not a pacing icon for a space station if the crew sizes are key ~1. Hose figures also do not talce into at: such Operational factors as air lop, inefficiencies ~ recycling, or food carried for reasons Mayors base~le~rel nutrition, and therefore the actual figurer play for consoles ~ apace stations will be higher than these academic = . Many of the technic; for effective Steeling are Adherently highly ex~rir~n+~1, and ~1 r - iire a great ,~ of Avert prior to operational use. Sixties have shown a dirt zelationdhip been habitable volume arm crew performance; the minim volume is also a furx~tion of mission ~ration. In a - ;tion to He working volume, humans need ~ have
411 Fred facilities for eating, exercising, and personal hyger~e, and are usually best provided with scan private Portions for radiation arxt sleep. Deciding con Pose issues are same of the most difficult choices In interior statics Reign, as there is often no clear relationship between prod timidity arxi volume; irked, there ~ often no generally agreed-upon metric for pr~uctivi~r i~f. Other desirable Edifications ~ a spay designed for lor'~cerm hen ~ include windows (es many errias large as the structural designers can be forced to in~rpo~te), a=loblcs, and radiant escape paths in case of co~inger~cies such as hull penetration or fire. Fens are not capahie of working "art the cloaks: say amount of relation is repair", along with natural ha~keeping art other support functions art a sufficient amount of sleep. A normal 40 hair week represents a 24% Fly Cycle for a human. Assigning fire hours per day for normals, hying, and excercise represents a further 23% of the tine, leaving 55% of the duly for sleep, radiation, art germinal off-key activities. this may be Gary ~ ache averages for Skylab: 25.6% excerpt cooperation (work), 33.9% reals, hoping, ark exercise, ark 40.5% for sleep, rest, and other. It is interesting that the net percentage of time spent on experiments ~ so close to that of a typical 40 hour week; the exhaustive pace reported by the Skylab crews clearly demonstrated the increased overhead associat ~ with living in space. Evidence indicates that the work pace established in Skylab wand be difficult to maintain cover indefinite periods on a Apace station: therefore, planners ~st either accept icier than Donna guy circles on experiments ark other axtput~rien~ activities, or plan ways of au ~ mating ~ e house ~ ping fur ~ ions deco bring these back ~ line (frump a perspective of limed with comparable activities associated with living an earth. One of the origins of the increased housekeeping times is the necessity of adapting to acetone living in the weightless environment. Althcogh it can certainly be maintained that insufficient experience has yet been obtained to provide definitive conclusions in this area, clearly it will be difficult to overcome the ~ [lions of years of evolution in a gravity field in a brief time, an] some performance degradation In weightlessness is to be expected in the foreseeable future. Physiological reactions to expensed ~crogravity include a Dyer of hormone ark flay shifts: the only long-term effect which seems ~ be both serious ark progressively degenerative is a d~alcificaticn of bone material. this effect can be retarded to same degree by sty ~ Ads exercise, particularly involving compression of the large bones of the leg: this has led to the development of treadmills with elastic cords replacing some of the force of gravity, aliening aerobic running exercises. Some effort has gone into exams Ming the options for providing appreciable gravity on a space station, by rotating the components to provide a centripet~ alteration. His effect can be quantified as g = w2r
412 where w is the angular velocity, and g is the effective acceleration at a radius of r. rally plans (prior to Skylab) indicated that an angular velocity of 4 rpm would be acceptable, producing a required radius of 55.8 m for earth-normal gravity. Some research has suggested that 3 zisu (99.3 m) might be a better rotational velocity for human adaptation, even with a select crew pupation. If selection straps are relaxed to most of the gentry population, that implies a rotation sap of ~ by, with a resultant radius of 894 m rehire. Viably, it would be Ply caroled and expensive to provide stations of ~ is size. One method of easing this r ~ ir ~ t would be to provide partial gravity: an early space station proposed with a radius of 25 m at a sp ~ rate of 4 rem would have produced an apparent gravity of .45 g. However, nothing is known of the effects of partial gravity on bone decalcification or other microgravity effects; this is cleanly an important reseat issue to be Ames by a space static. Short of this information, He logical approach is probably that being considered: ~ not provide artificial gravity, arm route the crews at intervals ~ n to be safe, such as three conchs. It would be unwise, however, to overly emphasize the limitations of humans, without sump equal attention to their assets. The capabilities of humans have been ~~nnstrat~d reneabed1v thrcu~hout the history of ~~_~ ~~ ¢1: ~ - - . _ ~ IG" -~ i- The list of experiments repaired! satellites retrieved' and messiahs saved would be +~ lord to go into In this paper. Of Grater imE'ortarK:e than reviewing the indivi~1 performer Is to memorize Be individual capabilities which Inane 1:hen possible. ~ al dexterity '~ ~ria~sly highly critical for those tasks requiring physical manipulations. No manipulator has yet been developed with affirm remotely aE~prna~ir~ the dexterity of the human hand. See experimented efforts ~ this direction (the u~I hand and the Saliency hand) have priced impressive manipulator arm at the current time. me apE?rnadh taken In the rn~cl~' arm the ~ nitie; (the o ~ r two areas for application of general-purpose robotics) have tended towards the use of simple and effectors, and the alteration of tasks to allow for limited dexterity. To some extent, the same ~ true of space systems designed for EVA involvement: current pressure suit gloves are sit 1 far more dexterous than manipulator and effecters, and are likely to continue to evolve in the future. Strength ~~ (perhaps surprisingly) sat 1 an important issue in m~crogravity. The Remote Manipulator system of the Orbiter is capable of manipulating payloads up to the Orbiter limit of 65,000 lbs., but is severely strength-limited, and therefore handling time goes up as mass goes down. me most capable system for retrieval has been shown to be an EVA astronaut in the Manip~a~r Foot Restra=ts, attached to an RME; with its joints lo~. this configuration was used for grappling He two HS-376 sat-1 lites retrieved on subtle mission She 51-A, as well as He I-~-C~t H3-393 satellite captured, repairs, arm re released on Sale 51-~. this last pure es - :ially, with the It to despin and capture, and later Aspen and deploy a massive satellite, could not have ~ effected without the strum and dexterity of a human.
413 finis raises an interesting side point: In mast robotic systems available today, manipulators are specialized for either stretch of dexterity, but not both. moss an use for positioning large maS=Pc generally do not have the positioning accuracy of arm used for exact pointy or positioning tasks with lightweight payloads. 1~ some extent, the ~c~grzlvity e~riron~t of space may thy to help this problem, as no appreciable str~ of the art will go to maintaining its position in ache absence of external forces. At ache same time, Pass limitations tend to price lightweight space manipulator designs, raring either tasks adapt to their fle~cibili~<, or sc~phisticat ensatory oo~l systems to actively reduce the structural ryes. In goal, humans are excellent adaptive control systems. humans routinely change gains artful algorithms ~ on ye ~hysi~1 parented; of the system being controlled, arm are capable of adapting and changing to a acutirmously varying system, within limits. humans improve with practice, arm can transfer learnt rinses to new control tasks of a sitar nature. Herons are e ~ curly suited for rapid processing art Integration of visual data. From the first manned orbital flights, crews have reported being able to =~= features an the ground indistinguishable from the best photographic records. Nuances of color, sharing, and pattern may be instantly apparent to a human, yet be below the resolution of an electronic Imaging system. Humans have the capability to receive and derive ppacial information from both static arm dynamic manes, and contirmously redate they world model based on visual dsta. The human capacity, for judgemnt is certainly well~isa~ss", but it ght be maintained that there Is a greater utility for lav-lesrel r ~ it than for Shall ~ tual decision-making capabilit~r. For example, neutral buoyancy tests of EVA show a human capacity for instinctive maneuvering ~ the simulated weightiest environment, resulting ~ improvement in task performance without the need for restraints, and without consci ~ consideration of body actions. m is sort of maneuvering, which is computationally complex for a robot, can be performed by a human ~ "backgrcond" mode while concentrating on task plane mg. While expert system shells will be important for error diagnosis and strategic planning, it is the robotic equivalent of reflexes, instincts, and common sense which will provide the greatest challenge for the artificial intelligence community. nmmE RE;E~ Arm Quantitization Many of the important derisions on the applications of humans and machines in space have been (and are currently being) Act on prejl~;r== from limited prior experience, a priori arguments, and large, costly system ant yses which have no meaningful underlying data base. Certainly, the path of following East experience will probably result in an operable space station. However, much could and should be done to formulate and follow a logical plan for grcNnd-based analyses
414 and simulations/ and flight experiments, which would produce a rEacirgfu1 data base an human and machine capabilities and limitations ~ each of the cperational categories needed for a successful space station program. There are two caveats for such a program: first, of course, the research must be performed. But equally important, the pruyr~m managers must be willing to listen and act on the outcomes of the research, and not revert to ''tried and true" solutions for the sake of engineering conservatism. Apprcpriate Roles One of the cutgrc~ths of the data base development described above would be a greater quantitative undersban~ing of the appropriate role= of humans and machines in space operations, and the most favorable cabbinations of each to ac~npli~h any particular task. Ihis nay imply He altering of traditional roles. For example, as ctiscus-~ earlier, the flight crew has insist can ma=tair~ an active, controlled role In he areas critical to safer of flight, or of mission suedes. Hirer, the happy - riate) rising adversity of mission planners prohibits Intuitive solutions to any problem Rich can be foreseen prior to flight. This has led to ~ plead of chaises which die the appropr late actions of b ~ the flight c ~ w are the go ~ controllers in any contingency. But, it might be argued, this algorithmic approach cbvia+=c the need for most of those capabilities currently unique to humans, such as insight and judgement. Shouldn't this argue for automated s ~ to implement corrective action in the Event of critical malfunctions? ~~ In response to this question, an interesting parallel may be drawn from current findings in aeronautical human factors. With the increased autonomy of transport flight control systems, the airline flight crew are assuring to greater extents than ever the role of system managers. Flight control ~ s have become capable of completely controlling the aircraft from liftoff through touchdown and rollout. However, serious accidents have already oocurreS in airline ~rice, due to a flight crew which Is neither fully aware of the intricacies of the flight control Tyson, nor highly practiced In marshal control of the aircraft. It so cI-=r that, Short of removing the flight Tic crew and automating airliners;, too Ah automation brad amen onfid=mce and inatt==tiv=~ess In the cockpit; the same ~~l probably be found in E\pace flight. the oar fusion of this aft is ~ s;ha~r that it is not enough to fully Understand the limitations and capabilities of each of the Arena tOlogies: the interactions of the pin= may be far Ore important to safer and minion sac than the pin= Chores. since the possible ~ er of infractions Is a oabbinatorial problem, it ~ h ~ GAS to pow ~ ate a rigorous or analytical solution to th'= problem. It is clear, however, that it must be approached in a logical and methodic=] way if programs as complex as space station are to be successful.
415 Grave Metrics A E~1~ With ~ at ~ conceptually sin pie arm, in i~ler~ntatio',, difficult ~ ~t of appropriate metrics for human arm machine performance ~ Space. Performance irxlices he on took performance ~ ~ be unique, or specialize to ~ small su~et of tasks. TrXtif~= had ~ mare generic factors, sum as motions or s~bba~, ~st Scale in account ~ fact that humans arm machines may be able to perform Off same tad;, }'ut will likely use different techniques a~pli~g Off. Even Tong 1;~;~ ~Nniti~, ~= ~ An, = has yet to form any Is on the appropriate Its to ice neani~1 ~arisons between tasks; or experiments. his will be tale ~ larger measure as the field Awards to income a wider Garde of human arm rcibc~ic activities. An Assent of Art tr; Almost all of Off designs currently pry for telercitx)tic systems are highly anthr~tric: that is, hey term towards a robotic Application of ache human focal. Artist's concepts s;haw a head (sensor platform), with two an County on a toy, arm with one or two "legs" ,,~1 for gra~lir~. -this approach is understandable for a pyst~snwhi~h is designed to incorporate (or at Act Alice) Desperation, but its ass~m~ion for a fully robotic Tyson can only be apprised to Engineering consezvatism ("stick with a known configurations. Scam recent r~:s fee simulation indicate that a ~ of manipulators much lirni~ Frees of Freon, designee] to perform ~ I; or dedicated tasks, may offer performance increased over ~ anthr~r~?hic general-purpose manipulators. me human form, evolved a Gravity field for~effective protection Frau pr~a~rs, :~ not drily ~ best adaptation for Apace activities, arm alternate for arxt technologies phalli be encourage arm studied carefully. CON=rlSI~ IME: (FAR?) FUI=E Given sufficient tone, support, arm determination, human beings have d~nstra- - ~t they are capable of doing almost any physical or int=~tual task. Ibey have shown aver the last quart~tury Bat they are fully capable of living and working in space, performing a wide varied of tasks, freon the routine arm Insane to innovative, initiate actions needed ~ save a mission or a life. One may estate a row unit of ~rent: the "h~nff~ivalent", or a system in Apace with the sad effectiveness as a single human. Such a syst~n might be cadged of a full-time human, living and wor}cing in ~pace; of a human in Space working part-time with a robotic system; of a tele~rated sylvan controlled for a human on ache grad; or even of a fully autofocus root with learner and reasoning capabilities.
416 It is cheer that the "h~nan~ivalent" presence ~ Space is on a monoton~ca1ly-~ncr-~=ing acre. As ache societies on earth start to gem advantages Frau Apace, the nor for capabilities in Apace will continue ~ grow. This implies a parallel grc~;h ~ the z~t to curate musingly ~ Apace. As a fraught experiment, let us pink that pomt In Me future at which machine svs~ have became as capable as a human. - It may e~ren be MacPaint that this point is not ~ the far distar~c frame: manipulative capabilities are airhead approadhi~ that of a human In a pressure suit, and human Elisions on-orbit have been constricted to aigori~m~ic logic trees "gaily implement on modern computers. It is cl-=' that, at scam pout in time, machines will be capable of performing ev~ythi~ currently done by has in Apace. At that point, will we (as a nation, or a civilization) pull all Me people Ant of space, and Ray totally on robotic systems to continue ache exploration and exploitation of this last, infinite frontier? At this philosophical question, the author has reached the limits of his original Earl. History indicate= that humans are capable of perfor~ung important, complex tasks in the space err=. As adaptive Mania, hens have only begun to learn how to Rate this near e~riron~nt. However, much of mane" space flight to date has been involved with avert the I;,nitations of biological orb. Are evolution of robotic syrups he been orders of magnitude Ore rapid than Mat of biologic=] so; Mere ~ no reason to assume that this new evolution will stop Art of full human capacities, partiYearly if asu~ against the Array Ignited capabilities of humans ~ space. It is clear that both systems have s ~ the are ~ sea; that the best mixture of each is a time-depen~ent solution; and that, for the foreseeable future, the presence of each in space Is an absolute neaeC=ity for the effective use of the other. . _ . . . · . . If continued aeve~cpmene or robotic systems renters numans on space obsolete, that sect be a rational, conscious decision made by society as a whole, based on factors beyond these appropriate to an er~iT~rir~ Nervier paper. BTpr.T~IY At}cins~, J. D., Jr., arx] Shaf~ritz, J. M. 1985 The Real Stuff: A History of NASA's Atonal R~litment P=g~-cuu. praeg~r Scientific. B; ~ stein, R. E. Stages to Saturn: ~ A l~nologi~1 History of the Apollo/Saturn Munch Vehicles. National Aerana~rtics arx! Space Administration. NA5A SP~4206
417 Brooks, C. G., Grit, J. M., art S · n, L. S., Jr. 1979 C=riots for Apo110: A History of M~ed lunar Spacecraft. National Aeronautics art Space Administration. NOVA S - 4205. Collins, M. 1974 Graying the Fire. Ballantine Books. In, W. D., arm In, C. D. 1983 - - ~ Living art Working in Space: A History of Skylab. National Aeror~uti~ arrt Space Administration. NAG S - 4208. I;, M. M., Hdrrisc~n, A. A., arx!Akins, F. R. 1985 Living Aloft: Oman Requirements for Ex~ed Spacefli~ht. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. NASA S - 483. Fumess, To 1983 Mated Spaceflight log. Van Nostrand Reir~old Co., zinc. Hair B. C., and Grit J. M. 1977 - - ~ con the Shauders of Titans: A History of It ~i. National A~na~ics art Space ~iDi~ration. . NAG S - 4203. National Academy of Science National R - east Muncie 1972 In Factors ~ or-ration Space Flight. Spat Science Board. _; Statics Aeronautics and Space P0i~ati~ 1969 Exceedings of the Winter Study on Uses of Red Space Flight. NAG Science art T0hnoloqY Advisory Committee for ~ Space Flight, NOVA S - 196. Pitts, J. A. 1985 me In Factor: Bia~icine in me ME Space Program to 1980. National Aeronautics arm Space Ministration. NAG S - 4213. Smith, D. B. S., ed. 1976 ~ Design for a F~t~ Spat Qolory. Carat of Aeronautics arm Astronautics, M~ssac~husetts Institute of Technology. Son, L. S., Jr., Grit, J. M., arrl Alexar~er, C. C. 1966 This New Oman: A History of Project Mercury. National nautics art Space Administration. NASA SP~4210.
