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SYNOPSIS OF GENERAL AUDIENCE: DISaJSSICN Folly the presentations by the invited ~x3sium firs, tee pros were fined to dimension arx! =ent Frau the floor. A synapsis of the Marks macle Ming this Orion of coven discussion Is printed belabor. Stephen Hall, NASA Marshall Apace Flight Center, referring to the ap~t lack of acceptance of Bert systems by many potential users (mentioned by Struck) asks, "Is this a fury limitation of exert sy~;t~c; or if not, Mat can be force to =# potential user acceptance?" In reply W;llimn Star~k of New York University suggests that there are ways to teach people to trust eat systems. Starbuck pointed Ant that there are factory so irk prorate;, for example, that people now trust. Many factory schedulers use Smith padres but have no idea how they work arxt couldn't replicate then if they wanted ha. After Bird them for a Period of time Off learn to adopt then. One key to acceptance ~ that ~ users learn that Bran · . . . . · · . · . if Be ~ may not be able to explain Law it derived me answers to a prdblen, it can present the sol~icn arx} provide an indication of has good it firm the archer or solution is. Over tom, the correlation of predict arm coed resays instills confiders In the user. Guilio Varsi, NA5A Headquarters, sagest that act erg attention he been paid to the in pact Rich Be degree of media gauze can have on the acceptance art performance of Apace missions, art raised Be question of the agree to which such Aura ~ appropriate. He cited the heroic image of the as~cronauts created to Ate. He Ice whether they are likely to receive this sod degree of Sure in the future arm ho this he or lack of it may influence future performs e. Varsi also twenty on Be issue of mission safety, Pointing cut that in addition ~ the criteria of Performance and fit, _ - , , e ~ _ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 8 safety especially as relet" to humar1 safeW ached be of continuing concerns. Varsi ashy the question "As we more from the heroic to the routine, what ~ the real level of risk we are prepare to sustain?" As a final point, Varsi Twenty that many interesting ~r~ issues ark questions for investigation were raised Muir the sy~6iurn arx] he s~estei that an ordering Of these mead issues should be pmvic3-ed, highlighting their urgency not so Oh fern the sta~o~nt of priority but rather from ache sequencing or logic ~ be follies In atta~ir~ 451
452 these problems. He asl - , ''Is there any one reseat prearm sequence that offers a more effective parch ~ addressing the critical "sues than any Or one?" In reply to Vars~'s comments cn rink adversity art safety, David Akin of ~ T pointy ant ~ at, in his ~ risque, NASA Is already orders of magnitude more risk adversive than the undersea o ity, and if anything, MESA is kecceinq even more so in light of the Challenger accident. Akin suggested that if anything is going to drive people out of space entirely it is being absolutely risk free. The ultimate in risk adversity is for humans not to go into space at all. While robotic devices may appear to expand the options, ~ reality the considerations of risk advemi~ apply to equipment as wel1. Akin potty out that in deciding to risk a one~f-a-kir~ $100 million Sclerotic service' to service a satellite with an unfired solid rocket motor, the saw issues of risk adversity most be raised for the r ~ as w ~ d be rats ~ for the crew In a manned Hi ~ fan. To put the issue In prcger perspective it ~ necessary to consider risks and risk adversity in space in relation to potential risks and risk adversity in other fields. Allen Newell of Carnegie-Mellon cbeerveS that no Hatter how dangerous it is, people believe it to be important and still want to go into span. One of the rem ities which Ant be fact is that }fly bairn so deft for the first 25 year';, Petrels of National and World exaltations of safety ~ Apace operations are very high and as a Nation we will suffer fran that high level of expectation` In the future. Oomph Loftus of NASA Atchison Space Center observed that an airplane that is safe in peacetime is too dangerous to go to war. '~J.e pointed cut that in an adversary relationship an airplane is needed that to at the peak edge of performance in order to proceed in its mussicn. ~ flus .nted that this is an important point when thinking of space operations beta,:-=- space operation is not a venture in isolation it is a competition. It is an exploration at a frontier and safety standards carmot be set so high that the faultier is forfeited. At this point Session 7 of ~ ~;ium was concluded.
