SECURING THE VOTE
Protecting American Democracy

The 2016 presidential election made clear the vulnerability of America’s election infrastructure to foreign cyberattacks. Such attacks represent a new threat to the nation’s system of representative democracy. A new report from the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine recommends concerted action by Congress, federal agencies, and state and local governments to protect the security and integrity of U.S. elections.

Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy recommends that focused attention be directed at strengthening cybersecurity for election systems. In addition, the report recommends that all U.S. elections be conducted with human-readable paper ballots by the 2020 presidential election. Risk-limiting audits should be implemented for all federal and state elections within a decade. And election systems should continue to be considered as U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)-designated critical infrastructure. In addition, the report states that Internet voting should not be used for the return of marked ballots at the present time, as no known technology guarantees the secrecy, security, and verifiability of a marked ballot transmitted over the Internet.

STEPS FEDERAL POLICYMAKERS SHOULD TAKE TO SECURE U.S. ELECTIONS

The report recommends that Congress:

- provide funding for state and local governments to improve their cybersecurity capabilities on an ongoing basis;
- create incentive programs for public-private partnerships to develop modern election technology; and
- authorize and fund immediately a major initiative on voting that supports research relevant to the administration, conduct, and performance of elections. This initiative should include academic centers to foster collaboration both across disciplines and with state and local election officials and industry.

The U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) has a vital role to play in improving election administration, the report says. It urges the president to nominate and Congress to confirm a full commission and to ensure that the commission has sufficient members to sustain a quorum.
The report also recommends steps Congress should take to support the EAC’s work, including:

- appropriating funds for distribution by the EAC for the ongoing modernization of election systems;
- authorizing and funding the EAC to develop voluntary certification standards for voter registration databases, electronic pollbooks, chain-of-custody procedures, and auditing;
- providing the funding necessary to sustain the EAC’s Voluntary Funding System Guidelines standard-setting process and certification program;
- requiring state and local election officials to provide the EAC with data on voting system failures and information on other difficulties arising during elections (for example, long lines, fraudulent voting, intrusions into voter registration databases); this information should be made publicly available; and
- fully funding the EAC to carry out its existing functions, as well as additional ones articulated in the report. For example, the report recommends that the EAC and DHS continue to develop and maintain a detailed set of cybersecurity best practices for state and local election officials. And it urges the EAC to closely monitor the expenditure of federal funds made available to states for the purposes of enhancing election security.

The report also recommends that Congress take steps to support work by the National Institutes of Standards and Technology (NIST) around election systems, including:

- authorizing and appropriating funds to NIST to establish Common Data Formats for auditing, voter registration, and other election systems;
- authorizing and providing appropriate funding to NIST to carry out its current elections-related functions and to perform the additional functions articulated in the report; and
- authorizing and funding NIST, in consultation with the EAC, to develop security standards and verification and validation protocols for electronic pollbooks, in addition to those standards and protocols developed for voting systems.

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