• Security Culture: According to a recent report, nuclear security culture has three elements: “the degree to which all personnel, from senior managers and supervisors down to the most junior operators, are aware of and committed to widely understood security requirements and best practices; the degree to which available and affordable security technology is put to use, kept in good working condition, and improved; and the degree to which security regulations and procedures are implemented and personnel are motivated to accomplish their security-related tasks.”2

  • Safeguards Culture: This term encompasses the notion that a robust security culture requires the appropriate national context. One article defines it as a “pervasive, shared belief among political leaders, senior managers, and operating personnel that effective MPC&A is critically important, as manifested in decisions and actions, large and small.”3

A number of presentations at the workshop touched on issues related to safeguards culture and security culture, but three focused primarily on these themes.

Lars van Dassen of the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate manages international projects that help former Soviet Union states establish effective MPC&A systems. He began his presentation by pointing out that “human factor” issues constitute a significant portion of the challenges to effective MPC&A. Nuclear safeguards activities, for example, entail substantial amounts of time spent searching for errors. Human culture issues are also important for physical security, as demonstrated by incidents of illicit nuclear trafficking. For these and other reasons, van Dassen argued, it is of paramount importance that the nuclear work force is educated about its responsibilities in mitigating the dangers of nuclear proliferation and well trained to carry out those responsibilities effectively.

Several issues must be addressed, however, in the course of creating a well-trained nuclear work force. One is that an effective legal and regulatory structure must be in place. It is difficult, however, for experts in nuclear regulation to manage the establishment of a regulatory structure in another culture. Van Dassen suggested that an incremental approach, relying on local expertise, offers the best chance of success. Another issue is that finding and keeping competent staff can be a significant challenge. Facility managers with little MPC&A experience often find it difficult to determine their own staffing needs. Further, in newly-independent states, security personnel who have gone through intensive training at the expense

2  

Igor Khripunov, et al., Nuclear Security Culture: The Case of Russia. (Athens, Ga.: Center for International Trade and Security, University of Georgia, 2004), p. 9. Available online athttp://www.uga.edu/cits/documents/pdf/Security%20Culture%20Report%2020041118.pdf, accessed April 20, 2005.

3  

James Doyle and Stephen Mladineo, “Viewpoint: Assessing the Development of Modern Safeguards Culture in the NIS,” The Nonproliferation Review 5 (Winter 1998): 91, available at http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol05/52/doyle52.pdf, accessed April 20, 2005.



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