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Protection, Control, and Accounting of Nuclear Materials: International Challenges and National Programs - Workshop Summary Domestic MPC&A Programs Although, as the preceding sections illustrate, the majority of presentations at the workshop addressed the context in which materials protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) programs operate, much of the discussion focused on the particulars of specific programs. These presentations sought not only to share ideas about MPC&A practice, but to demonstrate the importance of sharing these ideas for increasing security around the globe. For each of the five countries whose MPC&A programs were discussed, this section summarizes what the presenter (or presenters) saw as the most important features and challenges of MPC&A activity in their country. INDIA K. Raghuraman of India’s Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) introduced India’s nuclear energy program by explaining that the program has developed in three stages. Stage one has emphasized pressurized heavy water reactors (PHWR), with more than 18 reactors operating, under construction, or planned. This stage also includes two operating boiling water reactors (BWR) and two pressurized water reactors (PWR) under construction. Fast breeder reactors are being developed under stage two, with one reactor in operation and another under construction. Stage three focuses on thorium-based reactors, with one reactor in operation and another in development. Raghuraman then explained that India’s MPC&A program comprises three basic elements: the legislative and regulatory framework, an integrated physical protection program for facilities and materials, and a comprehensive “Nuclear
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Protection, Control, and Accounting of Nuclear Materials: International Challenges and National Programs - Workshop Summary Material Accounting and Control System” (NUMAC). The NUMAC cell of the Department of Atomic Energy is primarily responsible for nuclear material control and accounting activities in India and for meeting India’s international safeguards obligations. Raghuraman reviewed the elements of the NUMAC structure. There are facility-specific NUMAC arrangements at nuclear fuel cycle facilities, research and development complexes handling nuclear materials, and heavy water plants. An Officer in Charge oversees each facility. There is also an Inventory Information and Control and Data Management Section and a control laboratory. The activities of all NUMAC facilities are coordinated through the central NUMAC cell at DAE. Above this there is a Senior Coordination Committee, which reviews NUMAC reports and initiates actions as needed. NUMAC has a number of responsibilities. These include identification of nuclear material by type, nature, and amount; implementation of accounting and control mechanisms; ensuring that measurement capabilities and statistical analysis of reported data are efficient; overseeing auditing practices and implementing inspection and verification practices; and ensuring the compliance of containment and surveillance measures. NUMAC activities include non-destructive and destructive measurements, periodic inspection, verification and auditing, and documentation of inventory changes and discrepancies. Raghuraman said that DAE has taken the physical protection of nuclear facilities and material against theft and sabotage very seriously from the program’s inception. A multi-layered security system has evolved over the years to address the complexities of security. An integrated system of physical protection for nuclear facilities and materials—during use, storage, and transport—has been established. A Design Basis Threat analysis has been performed following international guidelines but taking the Indian perspective and context into account regarding external and internal threats. DAE has also developed technical measures for physical protection, including an access control and delay system; access control for personnel and for nuclear materials; surveillance, intrusion, detection, and alarm systems; training on operation and maintenance of security systems; technical reviews to address obsolescence issues; and reviews and audits of physical protection systems to ensure that they are functioning properly and maintained appropriately. Raghuraman reported that a review of security systems and procedures took place after the terrorist attacks of September 2001, and that DAE determined that the old approach to security was no longer valid. As a result, efforts were made to quickly and comprehensively strengthen nuclear security. A new assessment of threats was performed and various terrorism scenarios considered. DAE also explored the linkages between safety and security and their impacts on one another. In addition, the Indian authorities have undertaken “root cause analysis” to improve counter-terrorism efforts by developing a better understanding of why terrorism occurs. They determined that renewed vigilance, as well as improved
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Protection, Control, and Accounting of Nuclear Materials: International Challenges and National Programs - Workshop Summary cooperation to facilitate information sharing and agreed-upon minimum physical protection standards, was necessary. Next, Raghuraman discussed his organization’s approach to security culture. Elements of this approach include encouraging a positive security culture as a goal and value of the organization, commitments by senior managers to serve as role models, a belief that it is possible to change culture both through human interaction and objective systems, a goal to set security indicators and follow up on them, encouraging participatory management, and changing perceptions so that security is seen as everyone’s responsibility, not an external requirement. Raghuraman argued that, to foster a positive security culture, it is important to foster comradeship, identify weak links through participation, emphasize involvement, communication, training, and effective management, pay due attention to internal threats, ensure that workers have appropriate support and encouragement, and train supervisors to notice even small changes in behavioral patterns. Next, Raghuraman described some of his views on the appropriate approach to MPC&A. He said that his perspective can be summarized in a question that he often puts to himself and his colleagues: “when was the last time that you did something for the first time for MPC&A?” Continuous improvement toward excellence, in his view, is a journey and not a destination. He believes that globalization of MPC&A practices is an ideal concept but may not be feasible. Instead, country-specific practices, in line with international guidelines, may be the best approach. Raghuraman asserted that international cooperation and commerce will not be permitted to degrade MPC&A practice in India. He also noted that the most significant recent change in approaches to physical protection has been the growing interdependence of safety and security, as security has become more important in ensuring safety. More specifically for the Indian context, Raghuraman noted that technological changes are expected to be evolutionary rather than revolutionary, and that they should be cost effective, reliable, and convenient. He noted that the increase in restrictions (i.e. screening personnel and materials) will probably be unpopular with operators, who are expected to deliver goods and services within time and cost limits. Further, construction of new facilities should factor in the additional cost of increased security. Finally, he explained that aging of the workforce—a problem in some countries—is not a consideration for India. JAPAN The presentation on Japan was given by Keisuke Kaieda of the Nuclear Material Control Center (NMCC) in Tokyo, and described Japan’s State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material (SSAC). The domestic legal basis for Japan’s SSAC is the “Law Concerning Regulation of Nuclear Raw Materials, Nuclear Fuel Materials and Nuclear Reactors,” which was enacted in 1957, four years after U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s famous “Atoms for Peace”
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Protection, Control, and Accounting of Nuclear Materials: International Challenges and National Programs - Workshop Summary speech. The international basis for Japan’s SSAC is embodied in a series of bilateral agreements between Japan and six other states. These agreements facilitate the trade in nuclear components and materials that is necessary to sustain Japan’s nuclear energy industry. By 1977, Japan had joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and ratified its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Japan was one of the first states to ratify an Additional Protocol, in 1999. To meet its domestic and international legal obligations, Japan created an SSAC that features regular national and international reviews of its safeguards system. SSAC activities include providing accounting reports, accompanying of IAEA inspectors during inspections, performing destructive assays, and organizing seminars and working groups. As of October 1, 2002, there were 33 government-authorized nuclear inspectors on the staff of the Japanese government. The Nuclear Materials Control Center (NMCC), a non-profit organization of which Kaieda is Executive Director, was established in 1999 to provide independent verification of Japan’s nuclear safeguards. NMCC’s activities include managing safeguards information; compiling reports required by IAEA safeguards inspectors, including those stipulated by the Additional Protocol to Japan’s Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA; inspections and analysis of samples; and research and development in support of safeguards and physical protection. NMCC is the only organization that has been approved by federal law to carry out national safeguards inspections in Japan. NMCC uses potentiometric titration and isotopic dilution mass spectrometry to analyze uranium concentrations, and surface ionization mass spectrometry to assess the isotopic composition of uranium samples. For analyzing plutonium concentrations, NMCC uses isotopic dilution mass spectrometry; to identify the isotopic composition of plutonium, the agency uses surface ionization mass spectrometry and alpha spectrometry. As of December 31, 2002, NMCC inspectors had spent 2,311 person/days doing safeguards inspections at 259 locations in Japan, filing 4,143 reports. Kaieda noted that Japan took an active role in developing and negotiating the model Additional Protocol, which is the basis for Additional Protocols to individual nations’ safeguards agreements. Japan’s MPC&A system, regarded by many as representing the state of the art, is designed to facilitate and complement the safeguards activities of the IAEA. Cooperation between Japan’s SSAC and IAEA included preparation of technical procedures for implementing integrated safeguards for light water reactors that do not use mixed-oxide fuels. One of Japan’s goals for its MPC&A system is the establishment of a State System of Accountancy and Control that is operated cooperatively with the IAEA. Kaieda concluded by explaining the goals of Japan’s nuclear control complex. They are ensuring that nuclear material is used for peaceful activities, providing assurance of planned uses of nuclear materials, protecting nuclear materials, and implementing international agreements.
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Protection, Control, and Accounting of Nuclear Materials: International Challenges and National Programs - Workshop Summary KAZAKHSTAN Timur Zhantikin of the Committee on Atomic Energy in Kazakhstan began by explaining that his committee is responsible for nuclear and radiation safety and security and for nuclear nonproliferation operations in Kazakhstan. He described Kazakhstan’s nuclear complex, which comprises three facilities: the National Nuclear Center, which is a nuclear reactor research facility with four research reactors; the Mangyshlak Nuclear Power Plant, featuring a BN-350 fast breeder reactor that is in the process of being decommissioned; and the Ulba nuclear fuel fabrication plant in Ust-Kamenogorsk. The government has been working to consolidate the country’s nuclear materials, including those from the decommissioned power plant, at one site. Kazakhstan joined the NPT in 1993 and was in the process of negotiating its Additional Protocol with the IAEA at the time of the workshop.1 Preparing the initial declaration needed to finalize the Additional Protocol was a challenge in part because of uncertainties about materials remaining at Soviet-built nuclear sites. Their efforts to consolidate nuclear materials in one storage site and to decommission their BN-350 reactor are also among Kazakhstan’s challenges. Kazakhstan’s MPC&A system includes safeguards, export control, and nuclear security measures. The country’s technical policy goals are to develop its domestic nuclear material control capabilities and to minimize the costs of safeguards both for Kazakhstan and the IAEA by using advanced technology and methods. Zhantikin argued that, in Kazakhstan at least, an effective safeguards system must operate on a number of fronts, including legal and organizational as well as technical measures. This has included preparing to operate under the Additional Protocol, ensuring the security of nuclear material transfers, and adapting to the nuclear-weapon States’ differing approaches to export controls. Zhantikin concluded by observing that safeguards practices include legal, organizational, and technical measures. RUSSIA There were several presentations about MPC&A in Russia. Evgeny Avrorin discussed the MPC&A system at the Zababakhin Russian Federal Nuclear Center-All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics (VNIITF) in Snezhinsk. VNIITF is one of the largest scientific research institutes in Russia. Since 1955, it has been involved in developing nuclear weapons and studying the effects of nuclear explosions. The institute carries out the full cycle of nuclear weapon activities, from basic and applied physics, to designing weapons, to developing instruments for studying nuclear explosions. VNIITF began collabo- 1 Kazakhstan signed its Additional Protocol on February 6, 2004. Source: http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol.html, accessed April 20, 2005.
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Protection, Control, and Accounting of Nuclear Materials: International Challenges and National Programs - Workshop Summary rating on MPC&A with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in 1995, with the goal of improving nuclear materials protection, control, and accounting systems. The agreement supporting this work was signed in 1999, and the following goals were identified: further developing existing national MPC&A programs; improving MPC&A systems, including those related to transporting nuclear materials; installing modern MPC&A systems at Russian facilities with material that can be used in nuclear weapons; and combating illicit nuclear trafficking. Avrorin explained that the Pulse Research Reactor Facility at VNIITF was chosen as a test site for cooperative MPC&A activities because of the large amount of nuclear materials at the site, the wide array of types of nuclear materials at the site, and the facility’s physical layout, which facilitated the creation of a prototype “mini-site” that was somewhat independent of the rest of the facility. VNIITF established a special research center intended to carry out the MPC&A work and coordinate with other VNIITF divisions. The U.S. project team includes representatives of many of the U.S. national laboratories. Trial operations began at the Pulse Research Reactor Facility in May 1998. A demonstration for officials from DOE and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (now the Federal Atomic Energy Agency) examined the upgraded systems and decided to further develop and strengthen work in this area. Avrorin argued that the adoption of new MPC&A technology is only successful when nuclear technicians and security staff receive appropriate training. Therefore, VNIITF established the Ural-Siberian Methodology and Training Center. According to Avrorin, the United States was in favor of this idea, but did not provide funding for it; funding was provided by European institutes. The scope of work for upgrading physical protection systems at VNIITF includes alarm and video assessment systems (including intrusion detection sensors, tv surveillance equipment, and information transfer facilities) physical barriers (metal grates on windows and vents, enhanced metal doors, anti-burglary equipment, and “safe”-type doors) automated systems for personnel access control (including pin-code plastic card readers, access control booths, biometric identification systems, and scales) monitoring systems to prevent access with weapons and unauthorized exit (such as metal detectors and nuclear material detectors) effective telephone and radio communications computer software and hardware to coordinate and interconnect alarm, video assessment, access control, and monitoring systems Other facilities where VNIITF has worked to improve MPC&A include the Beloyarsk Nuclear Power Plant, the Ural Electrochemical Integrated Plant, the State Scientific Center for Virology and Biotechnology (Vector), and the Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant.
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Protection, Control, and Accounting of Nuclear Materials: International Challenges and National Programs - Workshop Summary The remaining presentations about MPC&A in Russia focused on the Kurchatov Institute in Moscow. Alexander N. Rumyantsev described Kurchatov’s participation in U.S.-funded cooperative MPC&A programs in Russia. He began by explaining that the efforts of states to contribute to nuclear nonproliferation and prevent nuclear terrorism rely on: preventing unauthorized access to nuclear facilities, nuclear material, nuclear technologies, and knowledge of nuclear technologies improving MPC&A systems as well as systems for handling nuclear material research and development of nuclear energy technology that is proliferation resistant, increases nuclear and radiation safety, and mitigates the risks of terrorism and sabotage strengthening the national and international legal basis for the nuclear nonproliferation regime to support efforts to curb nuclear trafficking and mitigate the dangers of nuclear terrorism developing and improving national and international safeguards against proliferation. The Kurchatov Institute is one of Russia’s largest nuclear research centers, located in downtown Moscow about 10-12 km from the Kremlin. The facility faces threats of unauthorized access, sabotage, and terrorism. Intensive international cooperation, primarily with the United States, has provided Kurchatov with modern MPC&A systems. MPC&A upgrades, which have emphasized radiological as well as nuclear threats, include a modern computerized material control and accounting system that provides real-time control and accounting of nuclear material, radioactive material, and radioactive sources and development of an improved access control system that includes sensitive systems for detecting nuclear or radiological materials. Rumyantsev explained that Kurchatov has also worked to improve MPC&A at Russian Ministry of Defense sites. With financial support from the United States, Kurchatov has installed MPC&A upgrades at many Russian Navy sites. Work performed at the sites varied from full upgrades of physical protection systems, to computerized control and accounting systems, to short-term “rapid upgrades.” Rumyantsev explained that quantitative risk assessment methodology was developed during the 1970s and 1980s to assess nuclear safety. This risk assessment approach is also useful for comparative evaluations of safety at nuclear facilities. Rumyantsev explained that the institute’s scientists devised a sophisticated methodology for assessing proliferation threats, comparing highly enriched uranium (HEU), low enriched uranium (LEU), plutonium from spent fuel, and weapons-grade plutonium. Most MPC&A experts would argue that, of the various forms and grades of nuclear materials that exist, HEU and weapons-grade
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Protection, Control, and Accounting of Nuclear Materials: International Challenges and National Programs - Workshop Summary plutonium should receive the highest degree of protection because they can most readily be used in an atomic weapon. In the opinion of Rumyantsev and his co-authors at Kurchatov, however, this prevailing view is incorrect. Rumyantsev argued instead that, according to his institute’s analysis, LEU poses the greatest proliferation risk. This assertion is based on an assessment of a number of factors. According to the analysis, the most important of these factors for LEU are that the process of building a nuclear arsenal starting with LEU would be highly secret (thus, in Rumyantsev’s view, increasing the proliferation risk), and that LEU is extremely plentiful relative to the other materials. Therefore, Rumyantsev recommended that maximum efforts should be put into reducing the availability, production, and consumption of LEU; that spent fuel should be reprocessed for use in nuclear reactors without separating plutonium and uranium; that thorium be used as a nuclear fuel; that fission products be included in nuclear fuel to increase its resistance to theft or tampering; and that work on the international fuel center concept be continued. Rumyantsev offered several conclusions from his presentation: Analyses of proliferation risks associated with nuclear materials should include the risk of radiological terrorism and unauthorized use of radioactive material and sources. Further improvements to MPC&A should include improvements to the security of radioactive material and sources. Quantitative methods for assessing proliferation risk should be developed. Attention in nonproliferation efforts should be refocused on LEU and natural uranium. Future development of the nuclear energy industry should emphasize building proliferation resistance into nuclear energy technologies and on international nuclear fuel centers. An analysis of all uncertainties linked to economics, nuclear and radiation safety, and nonproliferation should inform future development of nuclear power and innovative nuclear technologies. Vladimir Sukhoruchkin, also of the Kurchatov Institute, provided an overview of some of the institute’s MPC&A challenges. Because of the institute’s proximity to residential areas, he argued, the facility’s perimeter should be very heavily protected, as if it were a national border. The Kurchatov staff had been unable to convince their American colleagues of the need to fortify the institute’s perimeter, however, so it was being upgraded at the expense of the Russian government. He also noted that Kurchatov had installed MPC&A upgrades at a number of facilities elsewhere in Russia. The Kurchatov staff was especially proud, however, of the new computerized material accounting and security system that had been installed at the institute.
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Protection, Control, and Accounting of Nuclear Materials: International Challenges and National Programs - Workshop Summary Alexander Grigoriev of the Kurchatov Institute provided further details on this new system, dubbed the “MPC&A Operations Monitoring System,” or MOM. He began by discussing the definition of safety: “safety means reliable protection of personal and national interests against internal and external threats.” The goals of safety are to protect personal rights and freedoms, the material and spiritual values of society, and the state’s social and political system, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Components of national security include economic security, internal political security, social security, international security, information security, military security, border security, and ecological security. Elements of the safety of hazardous nuclear sites include nuclear, radiological, technical, and physical safety; nuclear and radiological safety includes protection against possible military nuclear threats, protection against the consequences of nuclear and radiological accidents, and assurance that materials are used for peaceful purposes. Components of the technical safety of hazardous sites include safe operation and minimizing the number of human errors. Physical protection of hazardous nuclear sites comprises protection against internal and external threats without impeding normal operations. The goals of physical protection at nuclear facilities include preventing unauthorized actions, quickly detecting unauthorized actions, impeding the activities of attackers or violators, suppressing unauthorized actions, and detaining persons involved in such actions. Grigoriev described the characteristics of the nuclear materials at the Kurchatov Institute site. Enrichment of uranium at the site ranges from 5 percent to 90 percent 235U. The institute has nuclear materials in a number of different forms, including 3 mm-diameters spheres of uranium and graphite, bulk materials, fuel elements, and fuel rod arrays. The sensitivity of the materials ranges from unclassified to highly classified. Storage periods for the materials vary from one or two days at the Central Storage Facility to tens of years at the Central Storage and Test Benches. Grigoriev noted that although great investments have been made to upgrade physical protection and accounting systems for nuclear materials, decreasing the risk that nuclear material will be lost, problems remain. These include: Keeping nuclear materials in the line of sight. Due to the sensitive nature of some of the materials, guards are not permitted to conduct surveillance of nuclear materials. Verifying that the physical protection system is operating in accordance with requirements. Precisely tracking personnel activities; knowing where they are and why they are there. Identifying perpetrators and violations. Grigoriev noted that the institute had recently been putting greater emphasis on the “insider threat.”
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Protection, Control, and Accounting of Nuclear Materials: International Challenges and National Programs - Workshop Summary The institute has 35 “material balance areas”2 for nuclear materials. Each material balance area is assigned custodians, who are grouped into five departments. The facility has two territories, the “Main” territory and the “Gas Plant.” Grigoriev noted that there has been a reduction in the number of custodians, and that there has been a weakening of discipline among institute personnel and guards. Grigoriev explained that the MPC&A Operations Monitoring (MOM) system, proposed by DOE, was selected as a solution to these problems. The system was installed in Kurchatov’s Building 135 and covered three material balance areas and one set of access points. Three additional buildings were under contract for the system. The basic components of the system include equipment to collect and store data, the system server, communication lines, and monitoring stations. Grigoriev’s presentation included graphical representations and photos from each of the four groups of video cameras (one for each of the three material balance areas and one group for the access points). Grigoriev closed by describing some of the barriers to further implementation of the MOM system in Russian facilities. These include MOM’s lack of encryption capabilities, the need to use indigenous Russian technology, and the lack of a requirement for a MOM-type system from Russia’s federal nuclear regulatory authority. UNITED STATES Donald Solich of the U.S. Department of Energy gave a presentation on DOE’s current efforts to strengthen the MPC&A system in the United States. As part of its Material Consolidation program, DOE is closing sites it no longer needs, consolidating nuclear materials, upgrading aging facilities, and building new “hardened” facilities. DOE is also bolstering protection against insider threats through its Insider Protection program, which enhances existing personnel security and human reliability programs and emphasizes administrative procedures, such as the “two-person rule” and the use of passwords or pass codes, where appropriate. The Materials Control and Accounting Modernization program strives to achieve continuous monitoring of protected materials, uses the insider 2 Material balance areas are basic units for the accounting of nuclear material. A nuclear facility is sub-divided into multiple material balance areas, and records are kept indicating quantities and types of material for each area. When inventory is taken, the inventory within each material balance area is compared to the previous inventory so that movements, gains, or losses may be tracked. The IAEA’s use of material balance areas is explained, for example, in IAEA INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), June 1972, paragraph 46. The document is available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf153.shtml, accessed April 20, 2005.
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Protection, Control, and Accounting of Nuclear Materials: International Challenges and National Programs - Workshop Summary threat as its security benchmark, and is implementing an automated process for entering data into the accounting system. DOE also has a New Technology Implementation program. This program incorporates security technologies into the design and construction of nuclear facilities. It also seeks to achieve “Enhanced Protection Capabilities” by integrating strategy, system technology, and operations. DOE’s efforts to enhance information security include improved security protections and transparencies and innovative information security protection and accountability tools and practices. Training programs include a Comprehensive Security-Related Career Development Program and distance learning programs. DOE has changed its Design Basis Threat assessment (DBT) in response to the events of September 2001 and intelligence information. The new DBT incorporates a graded approach. Implementing the new threat assessment will require funding, upgrades, and a risk management approach. Solich closed by discussing some of the new technologies DOE is developing, including integrated access controls, advanced measurement technologies, new simulation tools for vulnerability analyses and attack modeling, active denial capabilities, and new capabilities for detecting explosives.
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