Material Accounting and Control System” (NUMAC). The NUMAC cell of the Department of Atomic Energy is primarily responsible for nuclear material control and accounting activities in India and for meeting India’s international safeguards obligations.
Raghuraman reviewed the elements of the NUMAC structure. There are facility-specific NUMAC arrangements at nuclear fuel cycle facilities, research and development complexes handling nuclear materials, and heavy water plants. An Officer in Charge oversees each facility. There is also an Inventory Information and Control and Data Management Section and a control laboratory. The activities of all NUMAC facilities are coordinated through the central NUMAC cell at DAE. Above this there is a Senior Coordination Committee, which reviews NUMAC reports and initiates actions as needed.
NUMAC has a number of responsibilities. These include identification of nuclear material by type, nature, and amount; implementation of accounting and control mechanisms; ensuring that measurement capabilities and statistical analysis of reported data are efficient; overseeing auditing practices and implementing inspection and verification practices; and ensuring the compliance of containment and surveillance measures. NUMAC activities include non-destructive and destructive measurements, periodic inspection, verification and auditing, and documentation of inventory changes and discrepancies.
Raghuraman said that DAE has taken the physical protection of nuclear facilities and material against theft and sabotage very seriously from the program’s inception. A multi-layered security system has evolved over the years to address the complexities of security. An integrated system of physical protection for nuclear facilities and materials—during use, storage, and transport—has been established. A Design Basis Threat analysis has been performed following international guidelines but taking the Indian perspective and context into account regarding external and internal threats. DAE has also developed technical measures for physical protection, including an access control and delay system; access control for personnel and for nuclear materials; surveillance, intrusion, detection, and alarm systems; training on operation and maintenance of security systems; technical reviews to address obsolescence issues; and reviews and audits of physical protection systems to ensure that they are functioning properly and maintained appropriately.
Raghuraman reported that a review of security systems and procedures took place after the terrorist attacks of September 2001, and that DAE determined that the old approach to security was no longer valid. As a result, efforts were made to quickly and comprehensively strengthen nuclear security. A new assessment of threats was performed and various terrorism scenarios considered. DAE also explored the linkages between safety and security and their impacts on one another. In addition, the Indian authorities have undertaken “root cause analysis” to improve counter-terrorism efforts by developing a better understanding of why terrorism occurs. They determined that renewed vigilance, as well as improved