Recommendation: Led by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), DOD and its Military Departments/Agencies, working with their system suppliers, must develop a plan of action that encompasses both short- and long-term technology, acquisition and manufacturing capabilities needed to assure on-going availability of supplies of trusted microelectronic components. This plan of action requires both a steady-state vision and implementation plans for both standard and special technology components….


Recommendation: The Wassenaar Arrangement covering exports of sensitive, leading edge semiconductor manufacturing equipment (SME) is not an effective tool for assuring that potential adversaries do not have access to leading edge design and wafer fabrication equipment, technology and cell libraries. The U.S. should act to strengthen export controls by:

  • Negotiating bilateral agreements or understandings with Wassenaar members in which advanced SME and design tools are made with the objective of harmonizing export licensing practices and standards,

  • Concluding a similar bilateral agreement or understanding with Taiwan,

  • Giving the Department of Commerce a mandate and resources to compile an up-to-date catalogue of the global availability (including foreign availability) of state-of-the-art SME and design tools in designated foreign countries….

Recommendation: DOD must continue to support research and development of the special technologies it requires. This includes ongoing radiation hardened and electromagnetic pulse (EMP)-resistant component design and process development. The emergence of requirements for trustworthiness requires new efforts in technologies to embed, assure and protect component trust. The Department will require additional technology development efforts, including:

  • Reducing barriers to radiation-tolerant “standard” designs,

  • Increasing efforts to develop tamper protection technology, and

  • Developing design and production techniques for disguising the true function of ICs….

Recommendation: Accurate characterization and assessment of adversaries’ “dirty tricks” is essential to develop an effective U.S. counter tamper strategy. The Task Force addressed many of these issues relative to the security challenges of information sharing, but opportunities, methods and threats change continuously. The Director, Defense Research & Engineering (DDR&E) in conjunction with the Intelligence Community should develop risk mitigating technical approaches to support the risk management function. DDR&E should take the lead in defining the requirements and making the necessary investments to realize the needed security breakthroughs.

FOREIGN SOURCES OF SUPPLY: ASSESSMENT OF THE UNITED STATES DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE: REPORT REQUIRED BY SECTION 812 OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004 (PUBLIC LAW 108-136) (2004)

The following is reprinted from Office of the Secretary of Defense, Foreign Sources of Supply: Assessment of the United States Defense Industrial Base: Report Required by Section 812 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-136), November 2004, p. 22. Available online at http://www.acq.osd.mil/ip/docs/812_report.pdf. Last accessed on September 19, 2007.



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