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Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction Appendix I Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs PROGRAMS The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program pursues four objectives to reduce the present threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and guarantee national security. Objective 1: Dismantle former Soviet Union (FSU) WMD and associated infrastructure Objective 2: Consolidate and secure FSU WMD and related technology and materials Objective 3: Increase transparency and encourage higher standards of conduct Objective 4: Support defense and military cooperation with the objective of preventing proliferation There are several programs aimed to meet each objective. OBJECTIVE 1: DISMANTLE FSU WMD AND ASSOCIATED INFRASTRUCTURE Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE) Program–Russia: Department of Defense (DOD) continues to assist Russia by contracting for and overseeing destruction of strategic weapons delivery systems in accordance with the SOAE Implementing Agreement and applicable Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) provisions, including the START Conversion or Elimination Protocol. CTR program assistance remains an incentive for Russia to draw down its Soviet-legacy nuclear forces, thereby reducing opportunities for their
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Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction proliferation or use. DOD provides equipment and services to destroy or dismantle intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), ICBM silo launchers, road and rail mobile launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), SLBM launchers, reactor cores of associated strategic nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, and WMD infrastructure. DOD also supports placement of spent fuel from naval nuclear reactors, referred to as Spent Naval Fuel, prior to its elimination, into casks designed for long-term storage as well as logistical and maintenance support for equipment. Chemical Weapons Destruction (CWD) Program–Russia: In accordance with the CWD Implementing Agreement, DOD is assisting Russia with the safe, secure, and environmentally sound destruction of the most proliferable portion of its chemical weapons nerve-agent stockpile. The Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility and the former Chemical Weapons Production Facility demilitarization projects support this effort. Strategic Nuclear Arms Elimination (SNAE) Program–Ukraine: CTR program assistance, consistent with the SNAE Implementing Agreement, includes elimination of Tu 22M Backfire and Tu-142 Bear nuclear-capable maritime patrol aircraft that are modifications of START-accountable heavy bombers, Kh 22 nuclear air-to-surface missiles, and strategic bomber trainers. Weapons of Mass Destruction Infrastructure Elimination (WMDIE) Program–Ukraine: In accordance with the WMDIE Implementing Agreement, the Nuclear Weapons Storage Area project will eliminate infrastructure at sites formerly associated with nuclear weapons and warhead storage, operations, and maintenance that supported the forward-deployed nuclear weapons arsenals of the Soviet armed forces and assist in preventing the proliferation of associated design data, materials, equipment, and technologies. Biological Threat Reduction Prevention (BTRP) Program–FSU: The BTRP program’s objectives are to reduce the risk of bioterrorism and prevent the proliferation of biological weapons technology, expertise, and extremely dangerous pathogens (EDPs). The United States has CTR implementing agreements with Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan, to assist them in preventing the proliferation of biological weapons materials and expertise to rogue states and terrorist groups, increase transparency, encourage high standards of conduct by scientists, and preempt a “brain drain” of bio-related expertise. All BTRP projects in Russia fall under the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) Agreement and the ISTC Funding Memorandum of Agreement. The U.S.–Kazakhstan WMDIE Implementing Agreement covers BTRP projects in Kazakhstan. Biological Threat Reduction Implementing Agreements have been signed with Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. This program is executed through three projects, each of which serves a different objective of the CTR program:
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Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction Biological Weapons Infrastructure Elimination – Objective 1 Biosecurity and Biosafety (BS&S) and Threat Agent Detection and Response (TADR) Network – Objective 2 Cooperative Biological Research – Objective 3 OBJECTIVE 2: CONSOLIDATE AND SECURE FSU WMD AND RELATED TECHNOLOGY AND MATERIALS Nuclear Weapons Storage Security (NWSS) Program–Russia: In accordance with the NWSS Implementing Agreement, this program helps support proliferation prevention by providing enhancements to the security systems of nuclear weapons storage sites. The Personnel Reliability Program project was completed in August 2005, with delivery of the final 5,000 test cups. The Russian Ministry of Defense’s 12th Main Directorate assumed full responsibility for the project. Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security (NWTS) Program–Russia: In accordance with the NWTS Implementing Agreement, this program supports proliferation prevention by enhancing the security and safety of nuclear weapons during shipment. Much of the DOD-provided equipment is located at sensitive Ministry of Defense locations. It is shipped to less sensitive locations when DOD conducts audits and examinations. Fissile Material Storage Facility (FMSF) Program–Russia: In accordance with the Fissile Material Storage Facility (FMSF) Construction Implementing Agreement, the facility will provide centralized, safe, secure, and ecologically sound storage for weapons-grade fissile material. The facility was completed and commissioned on December 11, 2003. Biological Threat Reduction Prevention (BTRP) Program–FSU: DOD combined the BS&S and TADR programs into one project because of their close relationship and common objective. Their goals are to prevent the theft, sale, diversion, and accidental or intentional release of pathogens; consolidate pathogen collections and work at safe, secure centralized repositories; and strengthen the recipient states’ detection and response networks for dangerous pathogens. Combining them enables a more integrated and streamlined approach to engaging institutes in the BTRP Program. BS&S-TADR efforts target dangerous pathogens that pose particular risks for theft, diversion, accidental release, or use by terrorists. In Russia, work is focused on BS&S enhancements, with no plans to create a TADR system. OBJECTIVE 3: INCREASE TRANSPARENCY AND ENCOURAGE HIGHER STANDARDS OF CONDUCT Biological Threat Reduction Prevention (BTRP) Program–FSU: Through the Cooperative Biological Research (CBR) program, DOD works with insti-
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Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction tutes and scientists previously involved in biological weapons research to employ them in peaceful research focusing on investigating dangerous pathogens for prophylactic, preventive, or other peaceful purposes. By so engaging former biological weapons scientists, CBR helps to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons scientific expertise and preempt potential “brain drain” of scientists to rogue states; increase the transparency at biological institutes and encourage higher standards of openness, ethics, and conduct by scientists; provide the United States access to expertise that can enhance preparedness against biological threats; enable the transfer of EDPs to the United States for study to improve public health; and enable forensics reference research. OBJECTIVE 4: SUPPORT DEFENSE AND MILITARY COOPERATION WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF PREVENTING PROLIFERATION Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation Prevention Initiative (WMDPPI) Program–FSU, Except Russia: The WMD-PPI Program addresses the potential vulnerability of the non-Russian FSU states’ borders to smuggling of WMD and related components. WMD-PPI attempts to complement the CTR program’s traditional focus, WMD at its source, by addressing WMD on the move. Currently, DOD is helping Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan to develop and sustain capabilities to prevent the proliferation of WMD-related materials, components, and technologies across their borders. Agreements are made with the recipient states to have them report any WMD detections made with U.S. government-supplied equipment to the in-country U.S. embassy, for forwarding to the U.S. government. Defense and Military Contacts (DMC): The DMC program was created in 1993 as a part of the larger CTR program and attempts to develop positive relationships between the defense, military, and security communities of the United States and FSU states. Bilateral activities are designed to engage the military and defense officials of FSU states in activities that promote demilitarization and defense reform, further proliferation prevention efforts, and endorse regional stability and cooperation. The program is developed by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, through the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Eurasia Policy, in close coordination with the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, and the U.S. military services to ensure that scheduled events support the secretary of defense’s Security Cooperation Guidance and regional commands’ country and regional campaign plans.