National Academies Press: OpenBook

Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction (2009)

Chapter: Appendix E: The Evolution of U.S. Government Threat Reduction Programs

« Previous: Appendix D: List of Committee Meetings and Speakers
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: The Evolution of U.S. Government Threat Reduction Programs." National Academy of Sciences. 2009. Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12583.
×
Page 143
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: The Evolution of U.S. Government Threat Reduction Programs." National Academy of Sciences. 2009. Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12583.
×
Page 144
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: The Evolution of U.S. Government Threat Reduction Programs." National Academy of Sciences. 2009. Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12583.
×
Page 145
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: The Evolution of U.S. Government Threat Reduction Programs." National Academy of Sciences. 2009. Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12583.
×
Page 146
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: The Evolution of U.S. Government Threat Reduction Programs." National Academy of Sciences. 2009. Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12583.
×
Page 147
Suggested Citation:"Appendix E: The Evolution of U.S. Government Threat Reduction Programs." National Academy of Sciences. 2009. Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. doi: 10.17226/12583.
×
Page 148

Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.

Appendix E The Evolution of U.S. Government Threat Reduction Programs Beginning in 2002, the annual legislative process included language in authorization bills for the Departments of Defense (DOD), State, and Energy (DOE) that reflected the changing nature of the threat environment and shift- ing security priorities. In particular, Congress expressed an interest in seeing U.S. government threat reduction programs diversify beyond their previous geographic boundary of the former Soviet Union (FSU) and become more relevant to post-September 11, 2001, efforts to counter terrorism and prevent possible terrorist acquisition of weapons of mass destruction materials, tech- nologies, and expertise. The legislative evolution is summarized below by fiscal year starting in 2002. 143

144 APPENDIX E Fiscal Year Agency Congressional Action 2002 General Administration failed to certify Russia for DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) funding because it could not certify Russia’s compliance with its obligations under the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions. This finding (which continued in subsequent years) delayed several ongoing programs and required a waiver before programs could proceed. The program disruption affected principally DOD’s programs and a few State Department efforts; most DOE and State Department efforts were unaffected. Following negotiations with Congress, annual waiver authority was granted for the next 3 years. DOD Congress asked that within 180 days of enactment of the National Defense Authorization Act that DOD produce “a report to Congress describing the steps that have been taken to develop cooperative threat reduction programs with India and Pakistan.” Such a report was to include “recommendations for changes in any provision of existing law that was an impediment to the full establishment of such programs, a timetable for implementation of such programs, and an estimated 5-year budget that would be required to fully fund such programs” (HR 3338). There is no evidence that this report was ever produced. 2003 DOS The omnibus appropriations bill authorized the State Department to use Nonproliferation and Disarmament Funds (NDF) “for such countries other than the Independent States of the FSU and international organizations when it is in the national security interest of the United States to do so” (H.J. Res. 2). This language was maintained in subsequent years. The State Department had already used NDF for transporting highly enriched uranium out of Belgrade, and by 2004 would be using it to aid in Libyan Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) dismantlement. Similarly, the State Department’s program to redirect former weapon scientists began work in Iraq in 2003 and in Libya in 2004.

APPENDIX E 145 Fiscal Year Agency Congressional Action 2004 DOD Congress explicitly authorized use of DOD CTR funds outside the FSU, provided the project “will assist the United States in the resolution of a critical emerging proliferation threat or permit the United States to take advantage of opportunities to achieve long-standing nonproliferation goals, can be completed in a short period of time, and that the DOD is the entity of the Federal Government that is most capable of carrying out such project or activity” (HR 1588). No specific suggestions were given. DOE Congress authorized DOE to use international nuclear materials protection and cooperation program funds outside the former Soviet Union if it “will assist the United States in the resolution of a critical emerging proliferation threat or permit the United States to take advantage of opportunities to achieve long-standing nonproliferation goals, can be completed in a short period of time, and that the Department of Energy is the entity of the Federal Government that is most capable of carrying out such project or activity” (HR 1588). DOE soon organized its global nonproliferation efforts into the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and joined with the State Department in an effort to redirect former weapons scientists in Iraq and Libya. 2005 DOE Congress further emphasized the global role of DOE’s nonproliferation programs. The defense authorization bill stated the Sense of Congress that “the security, including the rapid removal or secure storage, of high-risk, proliferation- attractive fissile materials, radiological materials, and related equipment at vulnerable sites worldwide should be a top priority among the activities to achieve the national security of the United States.” It then authorized a range of nonproliferation efforts, including scientist redirection, that are global in scope. In addition, it proposed a DOE pilot program in Georgia, called the Silk Road Initiative, to redirect weapons of mass destruction scientists. Eventually, it may include a much wider range of former Soviet republics: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

146 APPENDIX E Fiscal Year Agency Congressional Action 2006 General Congress requested a report from the President by November 2006, that details “impediments to the effective conduct of CTR programs and related threat reduction and nonproliferation programs and activities in the states of the FSU” and steps necessary to overcome them (Public Law 109- 163). DOD The 2005 National Academies’ report Strengthening U.S.- Russian Cooperating on Nuclear Nonproliferation finds that “[t]he U.S. government’s ability to provide nonproliferation assistance to Russia has at times been severely complicated by legislative requirements stipulating that the President must certify that Russia has met standards that, in some cases, have little connection to the assistance in question. . . . The joint committee recommends that the U.S. Congress either repeal such certification requirements or provide the President with permanent waiver authority.” The defense authorization bill included permanent waiver authority, but the President must still present a waiver each year if he cannot certify Russia’s compliance with the requirements, but this authority is available to him every year. Senator Richard Lugar attempted to broaden the bill to further encourage work outside the FSU, but those provisions were not included in the final version. DOS The State Department launched its Global Biosecurity Program aimed at countries in Middle East, South and East Asia, and the Pacific. In fiscal year (FY) 2006, projects began in Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines. By FY 2007, it was working in Egypt and Yemen, with contacts also in Latin America. The program focuses on laboratory security, pathogen consolidation and security, and biosafety. 2007 DOD Waiver authority extended.

APPENDIX E 147 Fiscal Year Agency Congressional Action 2008 General The 9/11 Commission Act recommended the following: “The United States should expand, improve, increase resources for, and otherwise fully support the CTR program.” The Sense of Congress was that future funding should be increased and programs accelerated (HR 1). The act also authorized increased and accelerated funds for DOE various nonproliferation efforts. DOD Congress finally repealed the Presidential certification requirements. The act provides $10 million explicitly for new CTR initiatives that are outside the FSU (See Annex xxx, Title XIII of act), included a list of principles that should guide new initiatives, and suggested that new initiatives be considered in Asia, the Middle East, and that related to the denuclearization of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The conference report directed $5 million of the funds appropriated under chemical weapons destruction be made available as initial funding for a chemical weapons incinerator in Libya, pending authorization for such activity.

Next: Appendix F: Nunn-Lugar Scorecard »
Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction Get This Book
×
Buy Paperback | $50.00 Buy Ebook | $39.99
MyNAP members save 10% online.
Login or Register to save!
Download Free PDF

The government's first Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs were created in 1991 to eliminate the former Soviet Union's nuclear, chemical, and other weapons and prevent their proliferation. The programs have accomplished a great deal: deactivating thousands of nuclear warheads, neutralizing chemical weapons, converting weapons facilities for peaceful use, and redirecting the work of former weapons scientists and engineers, among other efforts. Originally designed to deal with immediate post-Cold War challenges, the programs must be expanded to other regions and fundamentally redesigned as an active tool of foreign policy that can address contemporary threats from groups that are that are agile, networked, and adaptable. As requested by Congress, Global Security Engagement proposes how this goal can best be achieved.

To meet the magnitude of new security challenges, particularly at the nexus of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, Global Security Engagement recommends a new, more flexible, and responsive model that will draw on a broader range of partners than current programs have. The White House, working across the Executive Branch and with Congress, must lead this effort.

  1. ×

    Welcome to OpenBook!

    You're looking at OpenBook, NAP.edu's online reading room since 1999. Based on feedback from you, our users, we've made some improvements that make it easier than ever to read thousands of publications on our website.

    Do you want to take a quick tour of the OpenBook's features?

    No Thanks Take a Tour »
  2. ×

    Show this book's table of contents, where you can jump to any chapter by name.

    « Back Next »
  3. ×

    ...or use these buttons to go back to the previous chapter or skip to the next one.

    « Back Next »
  4. ×

    Jump up to the previous page or down to the next one. Also, you can type in a page number and press Enter to go directly to that page in the book.

    « Back Next »
  5. ×

    To search the entire text of this book, type in your search term here and press Enter.

    « Back Next »
  6. ×

    Share a link to this book page on your preferred social network or via email.

    « Back Next »
  7. ×

    View our suggested citation for this chapter.

    « Back Next »
  8. ×

    Ready to take your reading offline? Click here to buy this book in print or download it as a free PDF, if available.

    « Back Next »
Stay Connected!