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48Elimination or Reduction of Baggage Recheck for Arriving International Passengers Test 2: Information Sharing Between TSA and CBP on Connecting Bags At a number of sites interviewed for this study, CBP and TSA staff commented on the need for greater cooperation between both DHS agencies. In 2010, new positions were created in each organization in order to increase the liaison between both agencies. Responses to averted terror- ist attacks in Fall 2010 further increased the level of cooperation and advanced specific initiatives to bolster information sharing. The study team reviewed the relevance of information sharing in the context of baggage recheck elimination. A proposed model of operations in Atlanta was highlighted whereby TSA images from EDS would be available for CBP review. Like a number of airports, ATL featured a design where EDS are located immediately beneath the CBP facility, providing easy access to image review rooms. Instead, TSA agreed to host a test at the TSA Systems Integration Facility (TSIF), with a CBP- trained individual to operate a test. Test Objectives X-ray images can provide added information for CBP, but TSA equipment is currently geared toward explosive detection. In fact, CBP has its own X-ray equipment specifically designed for agricultural screening in its Secondary Processing area. Nevertheless, the ability to view the inte- rior contents of checked bags would provide more information than CBP currently has within its FIS. Therefore, the test objective was to determine whether images obtained during the screening of transfer baggage by Transportation Security Officers are useful to address the mission-critical needs of other law enforcement and regulatory agencies, such as CBP. Methodology A test kit was developed to emulate common threat objectives. No testing was done for explosive detection or prohibited items. Instead, items were selected in a test kit to emulate common threat items CBP seeks to interdict. These items included fruits and vegetables, stuffed animals, vegetable matter, pills and various powders, bars of clay, and bonds and currency. Contraband or illegal items were simulated with look-alike replacements. For more details on the methodology, see Appendix E. Key Results Key results were as follows: As shown in Figure 24, the individual trained in CBP detection processes was able to use TSA EDS images for positive matches of suspect and contraband items. A false acceptance rate of 7 percent was found, primarily around paper and items with lower densities. Figure 24. Test results for detecting contraband and clearance of checked bags.