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5. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF COCOM CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES In order to understand the implications of the revolutionary events during the Fall of 1989 and 1990 for the future of CoCom is necessary to go back to its original ob jective . Accordingly "the purpose of the embargo is to restrict the export of only those goods and technologies conf arming with three strategic criteria" that were designed to ensure that exports to the Eastern bloc would not have "an adverse effect on the security of the [CoCom] member states" . The discussion of the West German and European perspectives on CoCom lead to the conclusion that the very notion of strategic as defined in CoCom must be reconsidered. The F.R.G., other European nations and the European Community leave no doubt that given the radically transformed political and military situation in Europe it is in their security interest not to continue to restrict the flow of high technology in the dual use area to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, but to promote and to enhance it. In other words, the strategic criteria that outline the aspects of Western security must be geared not only towards the military aspects of national security but must encompass a broader definition of security that includes among other things a) the stabilization of the economic and political reform efforts in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union; and by the avoidance of a nuclear disaster caused by inadequate safety standards in nuclear reactors and the drastic reduction of pollution in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 102
Given the improved relations between East and West, such variations in national interests among the allies that were long suppressed because of the military threat from the East are now coming to the fore. While difficult, this plurality has to be taken into account when devising a scheme for the future of export controls. As one respondent stated, "the perception of common interests in the Alliance is not automatic, it requires constant redefinltion.''236 Thus, any attempt at reform of the export control system must reflect these concerns by the Europeans. If they are not taken into account there is a real danger that continued multilateral efforts to control those exports that do remain vital to Western security will fail. Unilateral control mechanisms would undermine these security interests. In an integrated and highly competitive global market, national export controls that differ across countries amount to competitive asymmetries. As the experience in other areas of the global economy has shown, such asymmetries are likely to lead a process of competitive deregulation that would undermine the real purpose of export controls. However, the redef Ignition of Western strategic criteria and the subsequent streaml ining of the CoCom ~ ist, is only a necessary condition for successful reform, but not a suf f icient one. Two additional considerations must inform the reform process . First, the urgent need to reconsider the West' s traditional concept of export controls comes as an immediate 236 Interview. 103
result of the revolutionary changes currently under way in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Thus any new control scheme must be embedded in and be a part of the new security structure that is currently emerging in Europe. The CSCE process, whose objective is the establishment of a system of cooperative security, is likely to provide the basis of such a new European security structure as it embodies the mutual interests of both East and West.237 However, to be fully operational and to become the basis for an effective partnership between East and West, the CSCE must be strengthened and institutionalized. In this context a center for the settlement of regional conflicts in Europe has recently been proposed. Another component of this newly institutionalized collective security structure would be the creation of a technology transfer agency. This agency which controls the exports of goods and technologies that affect the security interests of all CSCE members and verifies their end use would both reflect the new realities of East-West relations and at the same time avoid some of the flaws characteristic of CoCom. With respect to the latter, CoCom has long been criticized as a secret club in which individual countries wield disproportionate power. A 237 This is also supported by the EC; "the Helsinki process is expected to assist in overcoming the divisions in Europe which prevented the development of normal pol itical and economic ~ inks with the Community, its member States and other Western countries, " Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council: implications c: f the recent changes in central and eastern Europe for the Commuity' s relations with the countries concerned, op . cit . 104
multilateral export regime that embodies mutuaiTy binding rules, which are transparent and openly accessible to the private sector could avoid such criticisms. With respect to the new relationship between East and West, an export verification agency in the CSCE framework can provide substance to the calls of policy makers to develop new political tasks for the disintegrating military al fiances in both East and West. If created under the COCK umbrel la this agency would include the countries from Eastern Europe as well as the Soviet Union. Such an interlocking institution which is structured around openness, transparency, and the capacity to judge each other creates mutual trust and thus becomes is an important part of the new European security partnership.238 The joint membership of East and West in a control and verification agency also addresses the second element that must be part of a reform effort. CoCom has failed to respond to the new security threats both from potential military powers elsewhere in the world as well as new technologies and weapons that have surfaced during the last decade. 80th East and West have a common interest to halt the proliferation of these technologies that for the most part are geared towards the production of A, B. and C weapons which are exported to areas of regional conflict or other countries. Since unilateral controls have been proven ineffective time and again only a global 238 Several European countries have been approached by the Soviets to establish such a regime. 105
solution will be able to control and monitor the proliferation of sensitive technology. The need for a new multilateral overarching export control agency raises serious doubts about the future of CoCom. CoCom neither-has the capability to cope with the challenges from new technologies and third countries nor can it take advantage of the new opportunities that have emerged from the changing East-West relationship. This should not cause any fear. To the contrary, CoCom is both the product and the reflection of the Cold War and the uniquely dominant role of the United States in the Western Alliance. Both these characteristics of the international system have come to an end which will improve the overall relationships among nations states. First, with respect to the Western Alliance a more balanced distribution of power will cause less strain among the allies and opens the opportunity for a new phase in the transatlantic partnership. Second, as to the new era in East-West relations, the dramatically reduced military tension will allow the two superpowers to free resources in order to address the problems that each faces in their own country and both confront in the global political economy. 106
