Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.
MPP!~!IX A 107
existence and agreements reached in COCOM have consequently no legal status."233 This led many respondents to conlcude that the EC cannot enter into any kind of official agreement with Cocom.234 An additional problem arises because Ireland is not a member of CoCom.235 If the EC joins CoCom, Ireland would automatically become a member. Finally, the question must be raised whether the EC should join CoCom even if it could. The transformation in the Eastern bloc has dramatically altered the overall political and economic situation in Europe. The post World War Two European security order and its numerous support structures --including CoCom-- must adapt to these changes. Many EC officials agreed that the EC should focus on playing a constructive role in shaping the future of Europe, rather than joining an outmoded institution which derives its legitimacy from the continued existence of the Cold War. This would involve the creation of an entirely restructured export control regime that reflects the changing nature of East-West relations, as well as new security threats ~ . from novel technology and from countries that have not previously been the main focus of attention in CoCom. Although a discussion of these issues is not the focus of this study, the concluding 233 Note D'Information A La Commission, Achievement De La Politique Com~erciale Dans La Perspective Ou Marche Unique, 1.9.1990. 234 Intervies; this assertion is not entirely correct as the EC is also a member of the Australian group. 235 However, Ireland operates an export control system that is similar to that of CoCom. 100
Qume 1: UNTIED S=qI5 AND EN 1~AIE~ a~N(a) ( ~ billions ) I; 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1 U.S. _ 2.11 2.05 2.12 2.16 2.C6 ~ of Anal 1mports F.~.G- (b) % of tote imports . 58 .53 .50 .48 .43 8.99 10.09 11.13 12.73 12.27 5.70 S.32 4.89 5.11 4.55 EXIT; 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 U.S. % of total exports F.~.G. (b) % of 0~1 exports 3.12 1.96 1.50 2.19 3.64 5~29 .89 1.12 1.45 10.01 12.47 14.02 15.29 17. 34 ~ .46 5. 14 4.77 4 .74 ~ . 07 1 . 1 - (a) a~N = ~:on Europe (USSR t G~Rt Pola~, Cze~celc~vakia, ~Yr Romania, Bulgaria). (b) lhis ir~ll~-c intra-Ge=~an trade. Ace: Offal' Foreign Trade by Edifies, Fold 1 & 2 (new series), Paris: 1990; ogres, Envy Statistics of Foreign Trade, Paris OK=, April 1990; Statitis~hes Bur~eiamt, War~kehr mit der DO trod .Rm~l~n (at), Fachserie 6, Reibe 6, variants years; OF International Financial Statistics, Hey 1990. 108
MACE 2: S~UCI=E OF U.S" AND WEE CEYLON HE Wow Horn 1988(a) EXCESS , U.S. F.~.G. (b) l I S mi11. % $ ~iil1. ~ 4 -4636 .7 }00 .0 11159.9 1CO. 0 Of- click: sync oil 2239.2 Gi.6 S86.5 5.3 SITC 2+4 446.2 12.3 2}2 .0 1. g srrc 3 127.0 3.5 20.3 0.2 arm: 5 1 336 3 9.2 1965.2 17.6 S=C 7 2S8.5 7.1 4394.9 39.4 so= 6~8 222.0 6.1 3847.1 34.5 . . . U.S. F.~.G. (b) _ ~ m11. % S =11. % j I=AL 1 2154. 100.0 8849.4 100.0 of --torch: Sl'l~ 0+1 275 .6 ~ 2 .8 770.2 8 . 7 S=C 2+4 61.4 2.8 735.2 8.3 Sow 3 571.8 26.S 2740.8 31.0 SIN 5 218 . 7 10 . 1 609 .7 6 . 9 Eric 7 189.4 8.8 509.8 S.8 SYNC 6+8 824.3 38.3 3300.7 37.2 (a) CON = In Europe (USSR, GOR, Polarxl, Cz~lovakia, Hungary, ~nia, Bulgaria) . (b) Ihis excludes ~n=~an trade. SI'1U 0~1: Food, beverages and tobac~ S=C 2~4: Raw materials Sl~lU 3: Enen3y ST~ 5: Chen~ s SI~ 7: +~ ~ =~= ~i~t S11~ 6+8: other manufactured go~s So~e: OECD, Forei~ Trade ~ sr~dities, Niol~e 1 & 2 (new series), Paris: 1990. 109
TABLE 3: SIPUC~E OF 7~ C~NY'S BE ~ Be: Ever UC 1980. 19801989 (a ! ~ .n Accent ) ENS ~ 1980 198S 1986 1987 1988 1989 1 'achiness, ecu:=ent, rears of ~ ~answr-. 6c . 8 67 . O Puels, ,-..i -.erai raw maters als, metals Comical prcduc~s, fertilizers, synthetic rubber Building materials Industrial consumer goods Other raw materials and Sears manufac.~red goods Raw materials and produces for the f~5t~,ff Rush other goods _ 64.0 63.0 9.1 6.0 6.6 10.3 63.3 6_ 8.9 ,- ~ _ , _ . 3 S.1 4.9 5.7 S.3 5.5 5.5 1.3 1.~ 2.1 1.7 1.6 1.6 15.0 1~.1 17.7 16.4 17.4 '7. 2.1 1.9 1.9 1.4 1.5 1.3 1.1 2.8 1.0 0.9 O.9 0.8 1.0 1.O 1.2 IS 1980 198S 1986 1987 l9B8 1989 Machinery, equipment, means of transport Fuels, mineral raw Materials, me-= ~ s Chemical products, fertilizers, synthetic nor Builds materials Industrial consumer goods other raw materials and sew manufactured gods Raw Materials and prompts for the focxistuff industry Other g ~ (a) Official trade classification of the PEA Source: Machcmski (19903. 26.7 20.4 52.6 69.8 21.3 23.5 69.6 66.9 26.4 25.4 63.7 65.1 1.7 2.0 2.2 2.5 2.6 2.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 1.0 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.S 0.7 6.7 6.2 5.4 5.4 5.2 5.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 _ 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.5 _ . 130
1P=E 4: ~PE~N BY TRADE WIIlI ~XN 1980198~3fa) (ECU bill. ~ 1980 198S 1986 1987 1988 Is ~ of all exE=rts to thy countries Ewes % of all imports frcan third countries; 20 a 4 33 ~ 9 24 ~ 8 24 ~ 4 24 ~ 8 7.2 8.3 7.4 7.2 6.4 17.2 23.4 21.3 19.2 20.7 7.9 6.2 6.2 5.6 5.7 1.. 1 ~ (a) Concern Europe, exclude trade between the G.~.R. ark] the F.R.G Source: European Parliament, O~orat:e Genera for Research, Co~n in Figures, Nb.2.(January 1990). 111
MERLE 5: Sly EUROPEAN ~ TRADE HI O~XN A, 1988(a) , 1~ EXEMPT; II . ~ Total of which: SAC 0~1 SITS 2~4 SITC 3 SAC 5 SAC 7 SITC 6~8 1832.5 7.4 1958.7 7 .9 6659 .9 26.8 i (a) Icon E=ope, excludes trade between the G.~).R. ark the F.R.G (a) For Sly legend ~ liable 2 Source: see Table 4 Mill. Ea' % 24813.8 100.0 1601. 2 6.5 1613 .6 7.8 2538.7 10.2 669.4 3 . 2 7940.8 32.0 97.S 0.5 3470.6 16.8 7097.1 34. 3 6438.3 31.1 . . 112 Mi11. E=, % I 20678.1 100.0
solution will be able to control and monitor the proliferation of sensitive technology. The need for a new multilateral overarching export control agency raises serious doubts about the future of CoCom. CoCom neither-has the capability to cope with the challenges from new technologies and third countries nor can it take advantage of the new opportunities that have emerged from the changing East-West relationship. This should not cause any fear. To the contrary, CoCom is both the product and the reflection of the Cold War and the uniquely dominant role of the United States in the Western Alliance. Both these characteristics of the international system have come to an end which will improve the overall relationships among nations states. First, with respect to the Western Alliance a more balanced distribution of power will cause less strain among the allies and opens the opportunity for a new phase in the transatlantic partnership. Second, as to the new era in East-West relations, the dramatically reduced military tension will allow the two superpowers to free resources in order to address the problems that each faces in their own country and both confront in the global political economy. 106
