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Streamlining Space Launch Range Safety
ER, a “chevron display” is used to track the IIP immediately after launch. If the IIP fails to move downrange at the proper rate as shown on the chevron display, destruct commands are sent. At WR, a dedicated pitch-program display is used to track the vehicle’s position relative to the nominal programming trajectory. Prior to launch, the WR also computes how long after launch it takes a vehicle to generate enough kinetic energy to impact a region outside the ILLs. If tracking of the vehicle is not be available by that time, the flight is terminated. Differences in the assumptions and methods used at the ER and WR to determine ship and aircraft exclusion zones are discussed further in Chapter 5.
Finding 3-6. The overall modeling and analysis approaches at the Eastern and Western Ranges are similar, but there are some significant differences in analytical tools, assumptions, and operational procedures. These include differences in analysis software packages, methods of defining ship exclusion zones, and displays for monitoring the launch vehicle trajectory. The differences may increase costs because of overlap or duplication of effort in developing models, software, and hardware for the two ranges.
Although differences in geography and other factors may make it impractical for the ER and WR to use identical modeling and analysis approaches, an effort should be made to increase the degree of commonality in accordance with the Primary Recommendation on EWR 127-1.
REFERENCES
30th SW (30th Space Wing). 1999. 30th SW/SE Flight Safety Analyst Handbook. Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif.: 30th Space Wing.
45th SW (45th Space Wing). 1999. Eastern Range and Western Range Collective Risk and Associated Data. August 13, 1999. Patrick Air Force Base, Fla.: 45th Space Wing.
AFSPC/AFMC (Air Force Space Command/ Air Force Materiel Command). 1997. AFSPC/AFMC Memorandum of Agreement on Spacelift Roles and Responsibilities. January 31, 1997. Peterson Air Force Base, Colo.: Air Force Space Command.
AFSPC/AFMC. 1999. AFSPC/AFMC Memorandum of Agreement on Spacelift Roles and Responsibilities (Draft). Revision 2. May 1, 1999. Peterson Air Force Base, Colo.: Air Force Space Command.
AFMC (Air Force Materiel Command). 1998. Single Manager Roles and Responsibilities. AFMC Pamphlet 63-3, September 1, 1998. Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio: Air Force Materiel Command.
DoD (Department of Defense). 1998. Use, Management, and Operation of DoD Major Ranges and Test Facilities. Department of Defense Directive 3200.11. January 26, 1998.
LMA (Lockheed Martin Astronautics). 1999. Atlas II/IIAS Flight Data Package: GTO Class Missions Report No. LMA-AFD-98-290. May 1999. Denver, Colo.: Lockheed Martin Astronautics.
NTSB (National Transportation Safety Board). 2000. Aviation Accident Statistics. Available on line at: http://www.ntsb.gov/aviation/Stats.htm January 5, 2000.
RCC. 1997a. Supplement to Common Risk Criteria for National Test Ranges: Inert Debris. Supplement to RCC Standard 321-97. AD-A324955. February 1997. Available on line at: http://www.jcte.jcs.mil/RCC/manuals/321/index.htm January 21, 2000.
RCC (Range Commanders Council). 1997b. Common Risk Criteria for National Test Ranges: Inert Debris. AD-A324356. February 1997. Available on line at: http://www.jcte.jcs.mil/RCC/manuals/321/index.html January 21, 2000.
USAF (U.S. Air Force). 1991. Air Force Instruction (AFI) 91-202 AFSPC Sup 1. February 1, 1991. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Air Force.
Ward, J. 1997. Estimation of Downrange Risks for Northeast Titan and Athena Launches. Memo for the Record. October 31, 1997. Research Triangle Park, N.C.: Research Triangle Institute.