Preventing Vehicle-Aircraft Incidents During Winter Operations and Periods of Low Visibility (2008)

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29 Highlighted in a brochure from the FAA Great Lakes Region were three actions that an individual driver can take to help prevent incursions or incidents on the airport during snow removal activities (41): (1) maintain SA, (2) improve com- munication, and (3) follow proper procedures. In a later bulletin, the Great Lakes Region reported during the 2006 to 2007 winter season that 20 vehicle deviations had occurred on airports in the region, of which 9 involved snow removal equipment (41). Six of those were classified as run- way incursions that resulted in a conflict with an arriving or departing aircraft. The brochure went on to state the following: We see one common denominator in nearly all incidents involv- ing snow removal equipment. Please do not underestimate the importance of maintaining situational awareness while operating on the airfield at all times. Weather conditions, fatigue, and other factors play a role in detracting from optimum vehicle operator performance. Many of the collision risk factors mentioned in chapter two can be addressed by thorough and proper employee indoctri- nation and training. And while this training generally does occur, the effectiveness of such training varies widely from airport to airport. The introduction of human factors involves knowledge of those factors that affect a person’s SA. Generally, the ability of a driver to operate a vehicle safely is based on the perception of a situation, level of alertness, the amount of information available, and the ability to assimilate the available information (42). INTRODUCTION SA was previously explained as being a continuous process of attentiveness and surveillance that results in an accurate perception of the factors and conditions affecting an individ- ual and his or her environment during a defined period of time (28). Two important factors contribute to SA. First is what a driver or operator assumes to be true about the situation he or she is experiencing or facing based on the facts he or she has available at any given time. This is known as the theory of the situation. Second is the set of skills and experience a person will uti- lize to address his or her theory of the situation. This is known as the theory of practice. If an individual’s theory of the situation is aligned with reality, then a driver is more inclined to make good decisions about what actions to take. If an individual then has the set of skills and abilities to prop- erly take action based on the assumptions (theory of practice), then a safe outcome is more probable. A review of V/PD reports compiled by the FAA for FY2007 and reports culled from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) database (see Appendix C) pro- vide insight on how a lack of SA can contribute to an accident or incident. Following are two examples from the ASRS database where SA may have played a role (43): As our airplane accelerated towards V1 speed, both cockpit crew members noticed the snow removal vehicle on what appeared to be a collision course with our aircraft and continuing towards the runway at a rapid pace with no obvious signs of stopping before entering the runway. At some point very close to our V1 speed, the driver of the snow removal vehicle appeared to very abruptly stop at a very close distance from the edge of the runway just as we passed by him. We were able to continue our takeoff past him uneventfully. The snow removal vehicle driver was not exercis- ing due caution and safely operating his vehicle given the slippery taxiway conditions. [ACN 540191] We were able to visually confirm that the runway of landing was clear of snow removal equipment. We also noticed equip- ment removing snow on the crossing Runway 15/33. I men- tioned to the captain that a snow plow was moving rapidly on Runway 33, from our left toward our landing runway (Runway 28). As we descended, we discussed that if we had to go around what the process would be. With our plan in place, as we reached 200 ft AGL, the plow proceeded to cross onto our run- way. Upon entering our runway, he made a turn that looked as if he realized his mistake, but turned out to be him setting up for his u-turn to go back onto Runway 33. . . . We made a visual pattern back around and landed without further incident. Tower asked equipment people if they had been on the runway. We did not hear the reply. It pays to keep your eyes open, situ- ational awareness up, and be ready with a plan if things go awry! [ACN 496828] Loss of SA and improper communication are not issues just for vehicle operators; it applies to ATCT controllers as well. In a review of past studies, the MITRE Center for Advanced Aviation System Development, the Runway Incursion Joint Safety Analysis Team, and the Volpe National Transportation Systems Center determined an overwhelming number of both pilot and controller errors can be classified into the category of CHAPTER SIX SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

“loss of situational awareness” (44). Specifically, when tower controllers are involved in an operational error, it is typically due to one or more of the following (45): • Forgetting about an aircraft, a closed runway, a vehicle on the runway, or a clearance that the controller issued; • Miscalculation of the impending separation; • Communication error: hear-back errors (i.e., failing to catch a read-back error); • Misidentifying an aircraft or its location (and issuing an instruction to the “wrong” aircraft); and • Incomplete or inadequate coordination among controllers. For these reasons, vehicle drivers need to improve their own SA because they may be affected by others who may not have SA. Some general suggestions from the FAA for main- taining SA and improving communication follow (41): • Review current airport surface conditions before start- ing snow removal operations. • Know where you are on the airport and where you are going at all times. • Keep airport/taxi diagrams readily available during snow removal operations. • Be on the alert for aircraft, vehicle, and pedestrian activity. • Make proper contact and communication with the con- trol tower, if open. • Monitor and announce position and intention over the CTAF or be under the control of a radio-equipped vehi- cle, if there is no tower or it is closed. • Work out a method of signaling to clear the runway, etc., ahead of time. • Listen before you transmit. Monitor radio communica- tions to establish a “mental picture” of airport activity, if able. • Think before keying your transmitter. Keep communi- cations with the controller clear and concise. • Never assume. Make certain you understand all instructions. Read back runway hold-short instructions and clearances verbatim. • Follow proper procedures. • Install a compass vertical card, digital compass, or regu- lar compass in the vehicle. • Install GPS handheld displays in the vehicle. SOPs provide a structure that helps to decrease the proba- bility of human error and attempts to capture errors before they result in a runway incursion. By applying SOPs to sur- face operations, vehicle operators can reduce the probability of a runway incursion by increasing and maintaining SA within the safety of procedures previously agreed to and made clear to all. 30 Proven and effective procedures are imperative for safe ground operations. Several identified by the FAA follow (41): • Limit conversations when on runways; avoid unneces- sary communication. • Be vigilant, especially when on or near runways. • Be aware of current airport surface conditions. • If lost, notify ATC immediately. If in doubt, ask! • Make your equipment visible by appropriate use of lights. • Ensure your vehicle’s radio operates properly and use radio headsets and noise-canceling microphones as needed. • Use good judgment, should radio failure occur. • Never stop on an active runway unless coordinated with ATCT. IMPROVING SITUATIONAL AWARENESS One of the recommendations from AC 150/5200-30, Airport Winter Safety and Operations, for helping to prevent runway incursion after the runway reopens is to ensure that taxiway directional signs, runway holding position signs, and other light fixtures have been cleared of snow blockage and are legible and distinguishable to drivers and pilots (12). These actions improve SA because an operator can interpret his location on the airfield better. The following suggestions are actions derived from Advi- sory Circular 120-74A, Parts 91, 121, 125, and 135, Flight- crew Procedures During Taxi Operations that can be applied to airport vehicle operators (46). To help improve SA, it is important for a vehicle operator to • Understand and follow ATC instructions and clearances; • Have an airport diagram available for use; • Know and use all of the visual aids available at the air- port, such as the signs, markings, and lighting; • Monitor ATC instructions or clearances issued to other aircraft; • Make a mental or physical note of the position of aircraft traffic and be especially aware of the elapsed time from ATC communication to any expected aircraft operation; • Prior to entering or crossing any runway, scan the run- way, taxiway, apron, and/or final approaches for other aircraft or vehicles; • Use a “continuous loop” process for actively monitoring and updating their progress and location during snow removal or low visibility operations. This includes know- ing the vehicle’s present location and mentally calculating the next location on the route that will require increased attention (e.g., a turn onto a taxiway, an intersecting run- way, or any other transition points). As the “continuous loop” is updated, operators should verbally share relevant information with other operators in the group; and • Write down ATCT instructions, especially if you will be operating in an area for an extended time, or mark it on an airport layout drawing.

31 Other suggestions for consideration in mitigating or reduc- ing incursions are provided by survey respondents as follows: • “Make the call signs for vehicles on your airport unique from each other. Instead of having Operations 1, 2, 3, etc.; Plow 1, 2, 3, etc.; and Blower 1, 2, 3, etc.; have Operations 11, 12, 13, etc.; Plow 21, 22, 23, etc.; and Blower 31, 32, 33, etc.” • “To enhance a vehicle’s presence when on a runway, turn on driving lights day or night, similar to what large aircraft operators do when commencing their takeoff roll or landing.” • “After each snow event, have a debriefing with mem- bers of the snow committee, or at least the ATCT tower chief to discuss lessons learned. Keep written minutes for referral.” • “Install tunable radios that have at least a two-frequency quick switch (flip-flop) capability.” • “Sound deaden the vehicle cabs. Provide headphones if necessary.” • “Place FAA-provided airfield signs and marking plac- ards in vehicles.” • “Place an airport layout diagram in the cab.” • “Provide a writing instrument and pad in easy reach for writing down ATCT instructions.” • “Mark vehicle exteriors with large identification numbers.” • “Issue NOTAMs and inform FSS, TRACON, or CEN- TER of changes.” • “If radio communication is lost between ATCT personnel and the equipment operators, ATCT personnel should rapidly flash the runway lights on and off as a signal for the operator to clear the runway.” • “Repeat all instructions with ATCT.” • “Have one person monitor runway intersections.” • “Limit area of operations [to one section or one taxiway or one runway or one apron area].” • “Limit operator hours.” • “[When plowing a runway/taxiway intersection] Clear snow up to the next taxiway [rather than just to the hold line to prevent turnarounds from entering the runway safety area].” • “Specifically ask ATCT for turnarounds from a connec- tor taxiway onto the runway to clear the hold line area.” • “[For non-towered airport] All drivers should monitor CTAF or assigned frequency [while only one crew mem- ber communicates with aircraft]. Crew leader makes assignments and tracks progress. Crew leader verifies all clear, reports the same to aircraft, and directs staff on/off the runway.” • “Place compasses in the vehicles [to enhance SA].” • “Have operators not accustomed to operating regularly on the movement area or the AOA drive more frequently year around [training].” • “Require through NOTAM a 10-min notification for prior permission to land [if airport does not have an ATCT].” • “Maintenance supervisor in the lead vehicle of the snow crew activates a blue light on his vehicle to warn the snow crews of a pending aircraft operation.” SUMMARY Chapter six addresses the importance of SA as a collision risk factor. Not having SA increases the possibility for an incursion incident. An overwhelming number of both pilot and con- troller errors can be classified into the category of “loss of sit- uational awareness.” This chapter presents suggestions to increase one’s SA from the literature, FAA guidance material, and responses from the questionnaire. The application of SOPs provide a structure that helps to decrease the probability of human error and runway incursion by increasing and main- taining SA. The chapter emphasizes that training and indoctri- nation into the principles of SA can lead to safe outcomes.