Behavioral Science and the Secret Service: Toward the Prevention of Assassination (1981)

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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW W. Walter Menninger, M.D. Conference Chair No act is more repugnant or more upsetting to a democratic system of government than presidential assassination. During the 205 years of this Republic, one of every four presidents has been the target of an assassin's bullet. This traumatic event was again experienced by the American people last March 30 with the shooting of President Ronald Reagan as he left a speaking engagement at a Washington hotel. Charged with the protection of the president, the United States Secret Service has an enormous responsibility, a responsibility that is increasingly difficult to fulfill in our individualistic, mobile, affluent, gun-prevalent society. Ever since the assassinations of President John F. Kennedy in 1963 and his presidential-candidate brother Robert in 1968, there have been searching studies of the phenomenon of assassination and how to protect presidents and presidential candidates from such attacks. One such study, a staff report prepared for the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, concluded: We are as yet unable to comprehend the individual and social forces at work sufficiently to be able to identify potential assassins in advance of their attacks. Characteristics common to assassins are shared by a large number of citizens. It is, however, both impossible at this point and probably undesirable in a democratic political system to attempt to identify and isolate potential assassins on any broad scale based on present knowledge.* Because of the problems cited by that Commission's staff, the Secret Service has invested heavily in assuring the adequate physical *J. F. Kirkham, S. Levy, and W. J. Crotty, Assassination and Political Violence, A Staff Report to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. xviii.

protection for the president and minimizing his exposure to risk. At the same time, the Secret Service is constantly confronted with a myriad of threats against the president and other persons whom it is mandated to protect. The Service is obligated to assess and respond both to known threats and unknown dangers to those it protects, as best it can. It fully recognizes a need to increase its capacity to assess and deal with threatening persons. Approximately a year ago, following discussions initiated by the director of the Secret Service, H. S. Knight, and then-president of the Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences, David A. Hamburg, it was decided to convene a conference of behavioral scientists and clinicians to review some of the concerns of the Secret Service and explore ways behavioral science might help the Secret Service better cope with persons who threaten the president. In November 1980, after orientation by the Secret Service, a planning committee met to develop a conference agenda and to identify conference participants. Ultimately, 27 behavioral scientists met March 8 - 10, 1981, in Washington, D. C., for the formal conference. This group represented both clinical and research perspectives and included psychiatrists, psychologists, lawyers, decision theorists, and criminologists, along with staff from the Secret Service and the Institute of Medicine. Prior to the conference, the invitees were briefed in depth about the mission and procedures of the Secret Service. The conference agenda itself was designed to expose the participants further to practical case problems encountered by the Secret Service. Formal papers and presentations explored issues and problems in assessing dangerous behavior and managing persons who threaten those protected by the Service. In plenary and small group workshops, the conferees considered a list of specific questions previously prepared by the Secret Service—ranging from indicators of dangerousness and the relationship of the Service to the mental health professions to what kind of research capacity the Service should develop. (A synopsis of the conference responses to those questions is appended herewith.) As evidenced by its wholehearted support and participation, the Secret Service, and particularly its Intelligence Division, clearly wishes to learn from the behavioral science field all it can to improve its capacity to protect the president and others. Primarily action-oriented, the Service devotes most of its resources and energies to its day-to-day operations; it has little opportunity to reflect on, analyze, or evaluate some of its practices regarding the identification, assessment, and management of potential threateners. The Secret Service record-keeping and computer files emphasize actions taken rather than a comprehensive cataloguing of information that might provide a base for research and management information feedback. Not only is there a lack of standardized reporting for such things as the psychiatric and criminal history of threateners,

but the research capacity of the Service is extremely limited, restricting its ability to learn from its experience and to determine whether its agents are operating consistently in the most efficient and effective manner. From a review of the Secret Service caseload, it is evident that the Secret Service protection effort is preoccupied with a high percentage of persons with a history of mental illness, i.e., a known history of psychiatric in-patient or out-patient care. Only 10 percent of the Service's regularly-followed population of threateners has no history of mental illness. Although the attention of the Secret Service is focused on persons because of an acute threat made against the president, the threatener's behavior often reflects a chronic emotional disturbance for which the person is not receiving professional attention. While the Service must devote a great deal of energy to .the evaluation and follow-up investigation of these emotionally troubled persons, the relationship between the Service and mental health service providers has been less than ideal. As a result, the Secret Service has not always been able to determine whether a given subject has actually received adequate evaluation and/or treatment for his or her emotional problems. The conferees addressed issues of dangerousness and the limits in the prediction of dangerousness, management of dangerous persons, legal and ethical aspects of managing threatening persons, improving relationships between the Secret Service and the mental health community, research opportunities to improve Secret Service operations, and Secret Service agent training and selection—discussions that are detailed later in this report. The conferees also touched upon larger social issues, which are not under the control of the Secret Service but which nonetheless play a role in assassination: risk-taking behavior by the president or others protected by the Secret Service; the availability of the handgun as the concealable weapon of assassination; the current political climate, which is marked by polarized, highly emotional, single-issue antagonists who may express their extremism in violent confrontation; the repercussions of governmental cutbacks which may produce embittered, aggrieved persons who blame the president for their misfortune. There was a sense of urgency expressed that these were times when the president would be at greater risk and when the Secret Service should get all the help it could from the scientific community. Little did the conferees anticipate that but three weeks later the Secret Service protection would be breached. This conference was a beginning. It did not produce any startling new insights, but there was identification of areas which merit further consultation and exploration. There was a consensus that what was started here should not end here. The conferees were not pressed to make any formal recommendations, and this report reflects areas of consensus and diversity of the participants'

views. Nonetheless, from my personal vantage point, I would urge consideration of the following: By the Secret Service: • establishing a behavioral science research advisory group to assist in the development of a practical and meaningful research program • developing an interview format that will enable better data collection and provide a basis for retrospective and prospective study of threateners of persons protected by the Secret Service • conducting a detailed analysis of how agents now make their decisions about threateners • developing a training experience for agents that includes supervised interviewing of mentally ill persons • developing a relationship with mental health agencies and practitioners of recognized quality, from whom the Secret Service can obtain consultation and assistance in assessing mentally ill subjects and interpreting clinical reports. By the Institute of Medicine: • supporting the efforts of the Secret Service to develop an effective research capacity • facilitating the efforts of the Service to establish contact with recognized specialists in behavioral science research and clinical psychiatric practice and education. By mental health practitioners: • discussing in their professional associations the clinical and ethical dilemmas involved in their duty to protect the president, when caring for a patient who has made threats against the president as part of his or her illness. In addition it is clear that the task of the Secret Service is complicated by other serious ongoing problems, the solutions for which lie beyond its scope. Discussed in this conference were two problems that were considered at some length 12 years ago by the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, of which I was a member. First, the president and others protected by the Secret Service can either respect or disregard the limited capacity of the Secret Service to protect them. To the extent that they take unnecessary risks as they fulfill their responsibilities, the capability of the Service to safeguard them is diminished. Second, with regard to the elements in our society which contribute to assassination, I am again impressed—as was the Violence

Commission—with the significant risk presented by the easy access to the primary instrument of assassination, the concealable handgun. It behooves our society to c.onsider better ways to deal with this problem. ********** This conference and resultant summary are the product of a substantial effort and commitment of a great many distinguished behavioral scientists who volunteered their time and energy in planning, preparing papers, and participating in the conference. All these persons deserve special thanks for their willingness to give of their knowledge and experience in an effort to enhance the work of the Secret Service in protecting our country's leaders. In addition, the success of this effort also reflects the dedication and contributions of special agent Robert Kyanko who provided primary liason with the Secret Service; and Fredric Solomon, Director of the IOM Division of Mental Health and Behavioral Medicine; Jane Takeuchi, IOM staff officer; and Mireille Mesias, administrative secretary. I am particularly appreciative of the work of Dr. Takeuchi in reviewing the lengthy conference transcripts to prepare the initial draft of the detailed, integrated summary of workshop and plenary discussions.

QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE SECRET SERVICE AND SUMMARIES OF CONFERENCE RESPONSES The questions below were originally presented by Robert R. Burke, then Assistant Director of the United States Secret Service, Office of Protective Research, at the November 14, 1980, planning committee meeting held to prepare for this conference. 1. At what point should a person be considered dangerous? What are the objective indicators of dangerousness, and what items of information should be collected to make this determination? Conferees were generally uncomfortable about the labelling of a person as either dangerous or not dangerous. In their view, dangerousness should not be regarded as a personality trait. Rather, propensity toward violent or dangerous behavior should be viewed as fluctuating over time and elicited by particular settings, situations, or mental states of the individual. While some mentally ill persons may be more likely than "normals" to harm others or themselves, this is not the case for most of the mentally disturbed. Clinicians experienced with violent patients can often recognize behavioral indicators of imminent violence and suggest strategies for dealing with such persons, but conferees agreed that no one can make reliable long-term predictions as to whether and when a person might try to harm others or himself. If a person has behaved in ways agents feel may pose risk to those protected by the Service, he or she must be evaluated or reassessed at frequent intervals to determine present capacity for engaging in violent behavior. Agents interviewing such a person should find out what has triggered violent behavior in the past and carefully note this information for follow-up purposes. While many conferees suggested items of information they thought should be included in assessing persons for dangerousness, they admitted that there is as yet no definitive list of factors known to be associated with dangerousness toward protected persons. Much research remains to be done in this area. 2. Is there an explicit, systematic method of assigning weights and priorities to the various items of information collected for decision-making with respect to assessing dangerousness?

There are techniques available to determine what weights and priorities agents actually use at present to make their dangerousness decisions; there are also methods of specifying how such decisions should be made, given certain assumptions about the relative importance of the various items of information collected. Currently, however, the requisite knowledge base as to which variables are truly associated with dangerousness to protected persons is lacking. Only empirical research in this area will increase understanding of which variables are relevant and to what degree. 3. How can the process of eliciting information from a subject in an interview situation be improved? How should the approach to different types of subjects vary? For instance, when should a stress interview be used or not used? Conferees had many practical suggestions for improving the yield of information from subjects during an interview; many of these are discussed in presentations and in papers. Conferees offered advice not only about techniques appropriate for interviewing disturbed and potentially dangerous persons, but also about the composition of interview teams, the location of interviews, the frequency of interviewing, interview format, and the times when Secret Service subjects might be interviewed to maximize information yielded. They felt that Secret Service agents could benefit from additional training in interviewing techniques and suggested that the Service test various suggestions in controlled comparisons or "experiments" to see which of them might be worth implementing. 4. What do we know about the potential dangerousness of a person under the influence of a group—particularly an unstable individual? Conferees participating in one workshop group addressed this question briefly, at the suggestion of the group's Secret Service representative. They tended to agree with Secret Service personnel that the type of person to be most concerned about is the marginal or self-proclaimed member of a fringe group espousing extremist social, political, or religious views, especially a group with a history of violent activity. Such a person is usually not regarded by the group's leadership as a member in good standing, and may use the group to fulfill his or her own personal goals, thereby absolving himself of responsibility for his own actions. Workshop participants did caution the Secret Service not to become distracted by group membership in and of itself, and to be mindful of civil liberties issues in dealing with groups and their members. 5. How can the Secret Service become a more informed consumer of behavioral research? 8

At present, the Secret Service has extremely limited internal capacity to conduct behavioral research relevant to its mission, or to evaluate such research that may have been done elsewhere. It does, however, employ consultants to assist it in developing research ideas and strategies, to develop and conduct training programs, and to evaluate incoming behavioral research proposals. These consultants can also help the Service become a more informed consumer of behavioral research. Conferees encouraged the Service to continue to use consultants, noting that it would probably always have a need for consultants in particular substantive areas. As a next step, conferees suggested that an independent research advisory board be created to work with the Secret Service and its consultants in developing behavioral science research priorities, deciding on which of the research suggestions in this conference summary the Service should implement, evaluating incoming research proposals, examining ongoing research in other federal agencies and private institutions in areas relevant to the Secret Service mission, establishing relationships with the scientific and clinical community, and otherwise providing advice and consultation pertinent to the development of a behavioral research capability within the Secret Service itself. 6. Should the Secret Service recruit and organize an internal professional behavioral research staff? Conferees were in agreement that eventual development of a competent and highly skilled in-house research staff would best serve the needs of the Secret Service. Opinions were divided, however, as to the advisability of attempting to develop such a research capability in the immediate future. Given the small size and relative inexperience of the Secret Service in the area of behavioral research, some conferees doubted that the Service would be able to recruit such talent at this time, and thought the Service would do better by contracting with outsiders to handle most of its research needs. On the other hand, conferees recognized that there must be at least a few "educated consumers" of behavioral research within the Secret Service to be able to communicate research needs and findings to management personnel, evaluate research proposals and funded research, and translate research findings into operationally useful information. The consensus was that the Service should immediately recruit a small, in-house staff to work with its behavioral science consultants and a research advisory board external to the Service, to begin developing its research capability and to implement research recommendations. 7. How can the relationhsip between the Secret Service and the mental health professions be improved?

Conferees agreed that the relationship between the Secret Service and the mental health community should be improved, especially in view of the fact that a very high proportion of the cases presently considered dangerous to protected persons have a history of mental health problems. To develop realistic expectations of each other and an attitude of mutual trust and respect, the Secret Service and the mental health community should, as a first step, become better acquainted with each other's capabilities and limitations, both professionally and institutionally. Whatever the specific nature of the relationships developed, however, conferees were adamant that Secret Service and mental health personnel be at all times aware of their separate and distinct roles and goals when dealing with Secret Service subjects who may be mentally or emotionally disturbed. Similarly, neither Secret Service nor mental health personnel can delegate their own responsibilities to the other. In short, any relationships between the Secret Service and the mental health community should be founded on cooperation without co-optation. There are two areas in which the mental health community can assist the Secret Service in its task of assessing and managing dangerous persons: (1) it can provide consultation, evaluation, and/or diagnostic assistance with respect to Secret Service cases referred to mental health professionals and institutions, as well as in- or out-patient care, as appropriate, for cases referred; and (2) it can develop training programs for Secret Service special agents in the area of mental disorders. Conferees had many different suggestions for mechanisms by which these two forms of assistance might be provided. Some thought the Secret Service should develop formalized, long-term contractual relationships with particular mental health institutions and professionals to which agents would have access on a regular basis for consultation about cases which present evaluation or management problems. Others thought it preferable for the Secret Service to consult with a variety of mental health institutions and professionals on an informal and ad hoc basis. In the area of training, conferees agreed that Secret Service agents need a greater understanding of psychopathology and its various manifestations, exposure to a wide range of mentally disturbed persons, instruction in interviewing and management techniques appropriate for use with the mentally ill, and greater familiarity with mental health facilities and personnel. Much of the training that agents receive in the area of mental health, they felt, should be hospital-based. 8. Once a dangerous person is identified, how should he or she be managed, neutralized, deterred within the context of a free society? Conferees had many suggestions for modifying and enlarging the repertoire of management techniques the Secret Service presently uses 10

to deal with those it considers dangerous to protected persons. They felt that the range of options presently used is too narrow and insufficiently flexible to meet the varied needs and problems presented by different subjects. For instance, in the opinion of many conferees, the Secret Service places too much confidence in the admission of apparently mentally disturbed subjects to hospitals. Typically, this results in a very brief confinement with little or no change in the status of the chronic mental disorder from which the person is suffering. A more appropriate strategy might be to try to arrange for continuing and thorough out-patient psychiatric care. While almost all intervention strategies run the risk of violating individual civil liberties—especially when no prosecutable offense has been committed—conferees encouraged the Secret Service to explore and use management techniques that are unobstrusive, wherever possible, and in all cases to apply the principle of "least restrictive alternatives" in selecting particular management techniques. 11

OPENING REMARKS David A. Hamburg, M.D.* Director, Division of Health Policy, Research and Education Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts This is a distinctive venture, both for the Secret Service and for the Institute of Medicine. It has been my pleasure to work with Director Stuart Knight and his colleagues in undertaking it. At this workshop, we are addressing problems of great national importance. Who among us can forget those photographs of Dallas almost two decades ago? Those are the most vivid symbols of the awesome responsibility which the Service has and also of the courage and dedication of its staff. As I have gotten to know the leadership of the Service in these past few years, I have been deeply impressed with their professionalism and their resourcefulness. Stuart Knight has brought open-minded, farsighted leadership. The Service is open to new ideas and not defensive. We must face the fact of assassination as a part of the warp and woof of our culture and of many others. We have all preferred in this society to believe that these events are somehow rare, peculiar, haphazard and unlikely to occur again, at least for a long time; but the evidence is really overwhelming that assassination is a clear, present, and continuing danger to our political leaders. It is painful to face the reality of the frequently recurrent nature of such behavior and to recognize the powerful ramifications of leadership assassination. It seems to me that these ramifications have been profoundly damaging in our lifetime in this country; and they have adversely affected the way this country is viewed by the rest of the world. Surely there is no basis for complacency. If anything, we have more reason to be more concerned than we might have had two decades ago. There are many factors that give me concern: the instant availability of lethal weapons, the mobility of potential assassins, the media-facilitated contagion of hatred and of formulas for *President, Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences, 1975-1980. 13

assassination or other terrorist behavior, the upsurge of fanaticism both in this country and abroad, the spread of terrorism in many forms, and the vulnerability of our political leaders. The repeated killing or serious wounding of our leaders can have deeply pathological effects on democratic society. In a democratic society, who really does select our leaders? Do the voters? Does the free interplay of ideas and open competition of values? Or do assassins select our leaders? What can the Secret Service do with its awesome responsibility that it is not doing now? Is there anything more that the Service could possibly do that would make sense? The Service is here engaged in a constructive, restless searching—pushing at the boundaries of knowledge and skill. We should join them in this quest. We should help them to utilize the best available information from the scientific community about dangerous behavior and different ways of dealing with it. In principle, there should be value in a periodic update, in a regular flow of information and ideas bearing on the problems faced by the Service. These are long-term problems. There is an enduring set of issues with which they and we have to cope. Moreover, there is the real possibility of stimulating some additional research as suggested, for example, in the paper that Lincoln Moses* submitted for this workshop. I think it is, also, a part of our responsibility to help the Secret Service to face limitations in knowledge at any given time and to seek alternative strategies of protection in light of limitations of knowledge. The problems of this workshop have been of interest and concern to us for many years. As I have become increasingly familiar with the dilemmas Involved, I have concluded that the most likely way of making a major gain in protecting leaders would be through changes in their own behavior. The stakes are exceedingly high, and we must not assume that our political life is too rigid to permit adequate protection for our highest elected officials. Any prudent leader should know that there is a very high risk. It is only sensible to assume that any president or major presidential candidate is at high risk of assassination. There may have been brief intervals when presidents and even presidential candidates have met what we might properly call a presidential standard of behavior—i.e., behavior that is cautious and prudent in light of the knowledge of the high risks to which such *"Learning from Experience, the Secret Service, and Controlled Experimentation," included in this conference summary, page 113. 14

people are exposed. The issue for national leaders is not to prove their courage by exposing themselves to assassins; their calling is a higher one. In toxicology, one thinks about risk as a function both of toxicity and exposure. In this case, toxicity is very high. Therefore, the issue centers on ways in which exposure can be minimized. We must consider a wide range of options for diminishing exposure below our present dangerous levels. There is another task that we are not asked to address at the moment but that will become salient at some future time. The Service does all in its power to keep its staff in good health, high morale, and strong professionalism; but theirs is a highly stressful occupation. When the Institute of Medicine's current study on stress and disease is completed, its insights might well be applied to the Service in efforts directed toward the maintenance of health. The Institute of Medicine is a good focal point for interplay between the Service and the scientific community over a wide range of behavior as well as other sciences pertinent to health. So, in addition to the intrinsic value of this occasion, it may set in motion some long-term relationship of value to American society. We are dealing here with a set of functions in a democratic society that are crucial to the effective functioning of the electorate and the maintenance of core democratic values. 15

OPENING REMARKS H. S. Knight Director United States Secret Service Washington, D. C. It was perhaps a year or so ago when we first explored with Dr. Hamburg the possibilities of convening a workshop such as this, with the expectation that you might give us some help. That is the key word: help. It is not the cry of a drowning man. I don't want to mislead you. We think we are doing reasonably well in what we are now doing—some of you might say we have delusions of adequacy—but in an organization dedicated to excellence, "reasonably well" just does not quite make it. We want to improve on that. We want to ask you to explore with us the definition of the goals that we think we have, refine the techniques that we now employ, examine what tools we are now using and whether we are using them in a proper way and what tools we might not have that you think would be beneficial to us. We are asking you to tell us whether we are doing the right thing in the right way. This can and will be a good exercise in theory, but what we are hoping for—what we are looking for—are some data, some practical hints and suggestions that we can utilize in our day-to-day activities. I don't overstate it when I say that every agent faces a "day-to-day confrontation" with this problem on the street. We hope that out of this will come something that we can pass on to our special agents that will help them do their job better. I think if you can help us, you will, in a broader sense, be helping society. We recognize that there is no magic solution. To oversimplify, what we are asking you to do is to help refine our task of trying to predict individual human behavior. And I do wish you success. I am impressed with the assemblage, and I hope that all of our people will be as helpful to you as they possibly can be, because it is only with that kind of an attitude that we can jointly come up with something that will be beneficial to all. 17

SECRET SERVICE EXPECTATIONS FROM THE CONFERENCE Robert A. Snow Acting Assistant Director Office of Protective Research United States Secret Service Washington, D. C. When I was a young agent in Buffalo, New York, I was sent to Washington on a temporary assignment to work the Inauguration activities for President Kennedy, and then I was held over for the State of the Union speech. I will always remember my post at that State of the Union speech. It was in the balcony of the House, right up next to the clock, right over the Speaker's stand. During the speech, I found myself looking out over the group and seeing our Joint Chiefs of Staff in their full uniforms and the Justices of the Supreme Court in their black robes and the new cabinet the President had recently appointed; and here was the President, the Vice President, the Speaker of the House, and that was my entire government sitting there out in front of me, and I will always remember that feeling of awe that I had, standing there looking at that and having that experience. I have somewhat the same feeling today. I look out over this group and see the current positions you hold, the various credentials you bring to this meeting, the contributions you have made to your disciplines; and I have that same feeling of awe and I guess expectation as to what can be accomplished for the Secret Service in the next two days. Last November when we addressed the members of the planning committee for the workshop, my predecessor, Assistant Director Bob Burke, presented a list of questions and issues for consideration and study. I understand most of you had the chance to review these before coming. In the interest of brevity, because there is a great deal of work to do in the next couple of days, I would just like to co-opt those questions by way of reference. I would emphasize that the list is not, of course, cast in stone. It should not be considered all-inclusive or all-embracing. The questions are intended merely as starters for your thinking. We recognize they are not couched in scientific language, but I think we 19

are going to leave that up to you, the experts, to turn them around and see what we are talking about. I have one further point about the questions. Collectively, they represent strictly our perceptions of the problems. We hope you will see them as that and interject your own, because many of the thoughts and ideas that have already come out have been extremely valuable. Director Knight and Special Agent-in-Charge of the Intelligence Division Ed Walsh talked about the problems in predicting human behavior, and the attendant conceptualizations, interpretations, assumptions, and self-imposed constraints. We all know it is not infrequent that very complex problems are perceived initially as insoluble, but often with just a turn of mind or a fresh perception or a new way of asking a question, we can shed considerable light on those apparently insoluble problems. I am confident that you can read between the lines and see the challenge here. We have had these perceptions, and we have been asking the same questions for a number of years without getting very far. This is why we are now reaching out to you for this kind of creative thinking. I would say, though, without trying to constrain your creative thinking ability, that we must stress in the final analysis that your ideas, suggestions and recommendations must meet the test of practicality. The realities of time constraints, limited resources, and human nature permeate our daily routines. During the last couple of months you have all met with Bob Kyanko and Dwight Colley—one or the other, sometimes both—and with a field office representative. I hope that you found these brief exchanges useful and informative. I know from their standpoint it was extremely beneficial. During the last few days, I have had the opportunity to read several papers and memoranda that some of you have prepared and submitted. I and other staff people are delighted with the quality and resourcefulness of the thinking evident in just these few papers. I have a strong sense of confidence that the next two days will be very important in the history of the Secret Service. You should be aware that as participants in this endeavor you are part of an historical event. This cooperative endeavor, its nature and magnitude, are unprecedented in our 115 year history. This is a true milestone. It is something brand new to us, and we are truly looking forward to what can come of it. I would like to leave you with one final thought—a couple of lines from the sonnets of Edna St. Vincent Millay. I believe the words capture the rationale and the thrust of this entire conference: 20

Upon this gifted age, in its dark hour, Rains from the sky a meteoric shower Of facts . . . they lie unquestioned, uncombined. Wisdom enough to leach us of our ill Is daily spun; but there exists no loom To weave it into fabric . . . .* Now maybe we can start building that loom. *Edna St. Vincent Millay, from "Huntsman, What Quarry?," Collected Poems (New York: Harper and Row, 1956). 21