Enhancing the
RESILIENCE
of the Nation’s Electricity System
Committee on Enhancing the Resilience of the
Nation’s Electric Power Transmission and Distribution System
Board on Energy and Environmental Systems
Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences
A Consensus Study Report of
THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES PRESS
Washington, DC
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This activity was supported by Grant No. EE-0007045 from the U.S. Department of Energy. Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of any organization or agency that provided support for the project.
International Standard Book Number 13: 978-0-309-46307-2
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Library of Congress Control Number: 2017953067
Digital Object Identifier: https://doi.org/10.17226/24836
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Suggested citation: National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2017. Enhancing the Resilience of the Nation’s Electricity System. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/24836.
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COMMITTEE ON ENHANCING THE RESILIENCE OF THE NATION’S ELECTRIC POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
M. GRANGER MORGAN, Chair, NAS,1 Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
DIONYSIOS ALIPRANTIS, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana
ANJAN BOSE, NAE,2 Washington State University, Pullman
W. TERRY BOSTON, NAE, PJM Interconnection (retired), Signal Mountain, Tennessee
ALLISON CLEMENTS, goodgrid, LLC, Salt Lake City, Utah
JEFFERY DAGLE, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Richland, Washington
PAUL DE MARTINI, Newport Consulting, Sausalito, California
JEANNE FOX, Columbia University, New York
ELSA GARMIRE, Dartmouth College (retired), Santa Cruz, California
RONALD E. KEYS, United States Air Force (retired), Woodbridge, Virginia
MARK McGRANAGHAN, Electric Power Research Institute, Knoxville, Tennessee
CRAIG MILLER, National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, Alexandria, Virginia
THOMAS J. OVERBYE, Texas A&M University, College Station
WILLIAM H. SANDERS, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
RICHARD E. SCHULER, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York
SUSAN TIERNEY, Analysis Group, Aurora, Colorado
DAVID G. VICTOR, University of California, San Diego
Staff
K. JOHN HOLMES, Study Director
DANA CAINES, Financial Manager
ELIZABETH EULLER, Senior Program Assistant (until June 2016)
JORDAN D. HOYT, Christine Mirzayan Science and Technology Policy Graduate Fellow
LANITA JONES, Administrative Coordinator (until August 2017)
JANKI U. PATEL, Program Assistant
BEN A. WENDER, Program Officer
E. JONATHAN YANGER, Research Associate (until April 2017)
JAMES J. ZUCCHETTO, Senior Scientist
___________________
1 NAS, National Academy of Sciences.
2 NAE, National Academy of Engineering.
NOTE: See Appendix C, Disclosure of Conflicts of Interest.
BOARD ON ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS
JARED L. COHON, Chair, NAE,1 Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania
DAVID T. ALLEN, NAE, University of Texas, Austin
W. TERRY BOSTON, NAE, PJM Interconnection (retired), Signal Mountain, Tennessee
WILLIAM BRINKMAN, NAS,2 Princeton University, New Jersey
EMILY A. CARTER, NAS/NAE, Princeton University, New Jersey
BARBARA KATES-GARNICK, Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts
JOANN MILLIKEN, Independent Consultant, Alexandria, Virginia
MARGO TSIRIGOTIS OGE, Environmental Protection Agency (retired), McLean, Virginia
JACKALYNE PFANNENSTIEL,3 Independent Consultant, Piedmont, California
MICHAEL P. RAMAGE, NAE, ExxonMobil Research and Engineering Company (retired), New York
DOROTHY ROBYN, Independent Consultant, Washington, D.C.
GARY ROGERS, Roush Industries, Livonia, Michigan
KELLY SIMS-GALLAGHER, Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts
MARK THIEMENS, NAS, University of California, San Diego
JOHN WALL, NAE, Cummins Engine Company (retired), Belvedere, California
ROBERT WEISENMILLER, California Energy Commission, Sacramento
Staff
K. JOHN HOLMES, Acting Director/Scholar
DANA CAINES, Financial Manager
LANITA JONES, Administrative Coordinator (until August 2017)
MARTIN OFFUTT, Senior Program Officer
JANKI U. PATEL, Program Assistant
BEN A. WENDER, Program Officer
JAMES J. ZUCCHETTO, Senior Scientist
___________________
1 NAE, National Academy of Engineering.
2 NAS, National Academy of Sciences.
3 Deceased on April 26, 2017.
Preface
Electricity and the underlying infrastructure for its production, transmission, and distribution are essential to the health and prosperity of all Americans. It is important to make investments that increase the reliability of the power system within reasonable cost constraints. However, the system is complex and vulnerable. Despite all best efforts, it is impossible to avoid occasional, potentially large outages caused by natural disasters or pernicious physical or cyber attacks. This report focuses on large-area, long-duration outages—considered herein as blackouts that last several days or longer and extend over multiple service areas or states. When such major electricity outages do occur, economic costs can tally in the billions of dollars and lives can be lost. Hence, there is a critical need to increase the resilience of the U.S. electric power transmission and distribution system—so that major outages are less frequent, their impacts on society are reduced, and recovery is more rapid—and to learn from these experiences so that performance in the future is better.
The many high-profile electric-service interruptions that have occurred over the past two decades, along with recent efforts to enhance the capabilities of the nation’s electricity delivery system, prompted several observers to seek an independent review of the vulnerability and resilience of the nation’s electricity delivery system. In its 2014 appropriations for the Department of Energy (DOE), Congress called for an independent assessment to “conduct a national-level comprehensive study on the future resilience and reliability of the nation’s electric power transmission and distribution system. At a minimum, the report should include technological options for strengthening the capabilities of the nation’s power grid; a review of federal, state, industry, and academic research and development programs; and an evaluation of cybersecurity for energy delivery systems.”1
The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine established the Committee on Enhancing the Resilience of the Nation’s Electric Power Transmission and Distribution System to conduct the study. On the basis of this mandate, the National Academies asked the committee to address technical, policy, and institutional factors that might affect how modern technology can be implemented to improve the resilience of the electric system; recommend strategies and priorities for how this might be achieved; and identify barriers to its implementation. The full statement of task for the committee is shown in Appendix A. The biographies of the committee members that authored this report are contained in Appendix B.
Committee members included academicians, retirees from industry, current or former employees of state government agencies, and representatives of other organizations. They brought considerable expertise on the operation and regulation of electric power networks, security, and energy economics. The committee met six times in 2016 and 2017 to gather information from public sources (listed in Appendix D) and to discuss the key issues. It also held several conference calls.
The committee operated under the auspices of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine’s Board on Energy and Environmental Systems and is grateful for the able assistance of K. John Holmes, Linda Casola, Elizabeth Euller, Jordan Hoyt, Janki U. Patel, Ben A. Wender, E. Jonathan Yanger, and James Zucchetto of the National Academies’ staff.
___________________
1 H.R. 113-486, page 103.
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Acknowledgment of Reviewers
This Consensus Study Report was reviewed in draft form by individuals chosen for their diverse perspectives and technical expertise. The purpose of this independent review is to provide candid and critical comments that will assist the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine in making each published report as sound as possible and to ensure that it meets the institutional standards for quality, objectivity, evidence, and responsiveness to the study charge. The review comments and draft manuscript remain confidential to protect the integrity of the deliberative process.
We thank the following individuals for their review of this report:
Mr. William Ball, Southern Company Services, Inc.,
Mr. Joe Brannan, North Carolina Electric Membership Corporation,
Dr. L. Berkley Davis, Jr. (NAE), GE Power & Water,
Mr. Phillip Harris, Tres Amigas LLC,
Dr. James L. Kirtley, Jr. (NAE), Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Dr. Butler W. Lampson (NAS/NAE), Microsoft Research,
Mr. Ralph LaRossa, Public Service Electric & Gas Company,
Mr. Jason McNamara, CNA,
Ms. Diane Munns, Environmental Defense Fund,
Mr. David K. Owens, Edison Electric Institute (retired),
Dr. William H. Press (NAS), The University of Texas, Austin
Dr. B. Don Russell (NAE), Texas A&M University,
Dr. Alberto Sangiovanni-Vincentelli (NAE), University of California, Berkeley,
Dr. Edmund O. Schweitzer, III (NAE), Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc.,
Mr. Rich Sedano, Regulatory Assistance Project, and
Dr. Paul Stockton, Sonecon, LLC.
Although the reviewers listed above provided many constructive comments and suggestions, they were not asked to endorse the conclusions or recommendations of this report nor did they see the final draft before its release. The review of this report was overseen by Julia M. Phillips, NAE, Sandia National Laboratories (retired), and John G. Kassakian, NAE, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (retired). They were responsible for making certain that an independent examination of this report was carried out in accordance with the standards of the National Academies and that all review comments were carefully considered. Responsibility for the final content rests entirely with the authoring committee and the National Academies.
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Contents
The Nation Depends on a Resilient Electric System
Resilience and Reliability Are Not the Same Thing
The Need for More Resilient Transmission and Distribution Systems
Improving Resilience Presents Fundamental Challenges
2 TODAY’S GRID AND THE EVOLVING SYSTEM OF THE FUTURE
Electric Industry Structure, Asset Ownership, and Operational Roles and Responsibilities
Physical Structure and Operation of the High-Voltage Transmission Systems
Physical Structure and Operation of the Distribution System
Metrics for Reliability and Resilience
Near-Term Drivers of Change and Associated Challenges and Opportunities for Resilience
Longer-Term Drivers of Change and Associated Challenges and Opportunities for Resilience
Sustaining and Improving the Resilience of a Grid That Is Changing Rapidly and in Uncertain Ways
3 THE MANY CAUSES OF GRID FAILURE
Different Causes Require Different Preparation and Have Different Consequences
Reviewing the Causes of Outages
The Life Cycle of a Power Outage
4 STRATEGIES TO PREPARE FOR AND MITIGATE LARGE-AREA, LONG-DURATION BLACKOUTS
5 STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING THE HARMFUL CONSEQUENCES FROM LOSS OF GRID POWER
Distribution System Innovations That Could Enhance Resilience
6 RESTORING GRID FUNCTION AFTER A MAJOR DISRUPTION
General Model for Electricity Restoration
Disruptions That Involve Across-the-Board Damage to the Grid and Its Supporting Infrastructure
Disruptions That Involve Damage to the Cyber Monitoring and Control Systems
Disruptions That Involve Only Physical Damage
Disruptions That Cause Both Physical and Cyber Damage
Opportunities to Improve Restoration
Overarching Insights and Recommendations
Summary of Detailed Recommendations
C Disclosure of Conflicts of Interest
Boxes, Figures, and Tables
BOXES
S.1 Causes of Most Electricity System Outages
1.1 Examples of Outages on Bulk Power Systems and Their Consequences
2.1 Examples of Four Different Electric Operational/Reliability/Ownership Structures
2.2 Common Distribution System Reliability Metrics
2.3 Federal and State Policy Drivers of Change in the Electric System
3.1 Summary of the Metcalf Substation Attack
3.2 Summary of the Cyber Attack on the Ukrainian Grid
4.2 Examples of Electric System Vulnerability to Disruptions in Natural Gas Infrastructure
5.1 Consequences and Civic Response to Damage Caused by the Ice Storm of January 1998
5.2 Superstorm Sandy: Preparation, Emergency Response, and Restoration of Services
FIGURES
2.2 Map of electric distribution utility service territories in the continental United States
2.4 The North American transmission system
2.8 Fraction of customer meters with advanced meters by state in 2015
2.9 Schematic of possible electric system configurations and interactions in the future
2.10 Different ways in which the nature and scope of the future regulatory environment might evolve
2.11 Different ways in which distributed resources might evolve in the future
2.13 Climate change can affect, and be affected by, the power system
2.14 Possible change in the sources and nature of bulk power
3.1 Mapping of events that can cause disruption of power systems
3.2 Illustration of distinct types of damages that can affect power systems
3.3 U.S. Geological Survey assessment of earthquake hazard across the United States
3.6 Map of tornado frequency from 1990 to 2009
3.7 Tornadoes show a strong (A) temporal and (B) seasonal variation
3.8 In 2006, a cluster of tornadoes caused damage across four states in 10 hours from one super cell
3.13 Volcanic hazard map for the region around Mount Rainier
3.14 Notional time series of a major power outage divided into six stages
4.4 2000-bus synthetic network sited in Texas
4.6 Power system operating states
4.7 ISO New England control room
5.1 Installation of microgrids in 2015 and expected growth to 2020
5.2 Installation of “behind the meter” battery storage systems
6.2 Example of data integration to support advanced data analytics for improved restoration efforts
6.4 Restoration of industrial control systems after a cyber breach
TABLES
6A.2 Restoration Activities Across the Six Stages of the Life Cycle of an Outage from a Cyber Attack