Below is the uncorrected machine-read text of this chapter, intended to provide our own search engines and external engines with highly rich, chapter-representative searchable text of each book. Because it is UNCORRECTED material, please consider the following text as a useful but insufficient proxy for the authoritative book pages.
96 A p p e n d i x Viability Assessments
97 ENACT LEGISLATION TO LEGALIZE AV TESTING Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale Eï¬ ec ti ve ne ss If the strategy is economic, how well does it internalize external costs into private actorsâ decision making? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely N/A Quite a few states have proclaimed the legality of AVs, but few have attracted private companies. Even if a private company came and tested its AVs in a given locality, it does not follow that this testing will improve or accelerate the adoption of AVs in that locality. The Patchwork of Regulations. A frequent concern raised from the AV industry is that many states will all enact a conï¬icting patchwork of regulations on AVs, whichâthe industry fearsâwould slow AV implementation. This negative, unintended consequence could be realized if many states go beyond legalizing and/or funding testing and enact custom sets of regulations governing vehicle operation. If not economic, how likely is it to achieve its desired policy outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 2 Is the strategy likely to result in unintended consequences? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 3 Eï¬ ci en cy If the strategy is economic, how well does the strategy recover the costs from the externality? 1=not at all, 5=extremely well N/A Based on current experiences, state and local governments enacting pronouncements of AVsâ legality or a willingness to test CV/AV systems have had limited success. As a public good, absent funding for CV systems, testing is unlikely. How likely is the strategy to produce a net-positive socially beneï¬cial outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 2 Eq ui ty How likely is the strategy to increase costs or place burden on low-income or other socially disadvantaged groups? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 5 There is no funding associated with this policy; it is limited to public proclamations and is unlikely to result in increased burdens on low-income or other socially disadvantaged groups. Since the strategies do not generally increase costs or create burdens, this does not apply. Since the strategy does not increase costs and is unlikely to create societal beneï¬ts, it is unlikely to create an inequitable distribution of societal beneï¬ts. How likely is the strategy to increase costs or burden on the groups responsible for the initial externality? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely NA How likely is the strategy to result in an unfair distribution of beneï¬ts across society? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 5
98 Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale Po liti ca l Are any politically powerful stakeholders likely to oppose the strategy? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 2 Unless a state passes many additional regulations, simply legalizing or supporting testing is unlikely to result in pushback from stakeholders. Because the policy does not require funding and is unlikely to harm stakeholders, the public is likely to accept the strategy. The policy does not harm stakeholders, but there is funding associated with it. How likely is the general public to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 5 How likely are decision makers to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 3 O pe ra ti on al How disruptive is implementation of the strategy to the implementing agency? 1=very disruptive, 5=not at all disruptive 3 Since regulatory structures required by law require agencies to take actions, it is disruptive. Legalization may require new structures. Legalization would incur additional expenses if a regulatory framework were required. Legalization may require additional skills to implement regulations. Legalization would not require new infrastructure. Legalization would not create any challenges. Does implementing the strategy require new or complex governing structures? 1=requires, 5=does not require 3 How expensive is it to implement the strategy? 1=extremely expensive, 5=minimal expense to implement 3 Does the agency workforce have the necessary skills and knowledge to implement the strategy? 1=does not have skills and knowledge, 5=skill-and knowledge-ready to implement 4 Does implementing the strategy require new infrastructure or adaptations to existing infrastructure? 1=new infrastructure, 3=adapting infrastructure, 5=neither 5 What is the overall scale of the technical, institutional, political, or ï¬nancial challenge to implementing the strategy? 1=many challenges, 5=no challenges 3
99 ENACT LEGISLATION TO STIMULATE CV OR AV TESTING THROUGH DIRECT FUNDING Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale Eï¬ ec ti ve ne ss If the strategy is economic, how well does it internalize external costs into private actorsâ decision making? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 3 This strategy would provide a Pigouvian subsidy to state and local governments for a good (V2I) that provides a public beneï¬t. The subsidy makes the agencies more likely to adopt the systems, which directly internalizes the positive externality associated with V2I. The Patchwork of Regulations. A frequent concern raised from the AV industry is that many states will all enact a conï¬icting patchwork of regulations on AVs, whichâthe industry fearsâwould slow AV implementation. This negative, unintended consequence could be realized if many states go beyond legalizing and/or funding testing and enact custom sets of regulations governing vehicle operation. If not economic, how likely is it to achieve its desired policy outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely N/A Is the strategy likely to result in unintended consequences? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 3 Eï¬ ci en cy If the strategy is economic, how well does the strategy recover the costs from the externality? 1=not at all, 5=extremely well 3 The strategy involves creating a Pigouvian subsidy on a good with positive externalities, and the funding would go to the entities to test the goods. This would incentivize the entities to adopt the good (V2I) with socially beneï¬cial outcomes, internalizing the external costs. The public agencies testing CV systems would gain experience implementing and operating CV infrastructure and systems. Such institutional knowledge and experience could increase the likelihood of future adoptions and deployments. How likely is the strategy to produce a net-positive socially beneï¬cial outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 3 Eq ui ty How likely is the strategy to increase costs or place burden on low-income or other socially disadvantaged groups? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 5 There is little funding associated with this policy; it is limited to testing systems and, as such, is unlikely to result in increased burdens on low-income or other socially disadvantaged groups. Since the strategies do not generally increase costs or create burdens, this does not apply. The policy involves testing only, the CV system provides beneï¬ts to all equipped vehicles, and since the equipment is expected to be mandated by NHTSA, equity issues are not a concern. How likely is the strategy to increase costs or burden on the groups responsible for the initial externality? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely unlikely N/A How likely is the strategy to result in an unfair distribution of beneï¬ts across society? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely 5
100 Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale Po liti ca l Are any politically powerful stakeholders likely to oppose the strategy? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 2 Funding is commonly a contentious subject in legislative bodies, and any policy that requires it will likely meet some level of resistance. Despite the funding concerns, the strategy is unlikely to harm any stakeholders, is technically oriented, and is unlikely to attract much public attention or pushback. The policy does not harm stakeholders, but there is funding required to test CV systems. How likely is the general public to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 3 How likely are decision makers to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 2 O pe ra ti on al How disruptive is implementation of the strategy to the implementing agency? 1=very disruptive, 5=not at all disruptive 3 The amount of disruption will depend on the agencyâs background, although in general there should be little disruption for an agency to test CV systems. Agencies with experience testing and evaluating new technologies, a preexisting research and development division, or those able to contract out the testing and evaluation process would face little disruption. Agencies testing CV systems may require some interagency coordination and cooperation. For example, a state DOT might need to contract with a municipal government agency to test CV systems, which might require additional coordination with local utilities, law enforcement, etc. Testing costs for CVs will vary, but in comparison to the costs associated with many transportation infrastructure projects, the costs would be minimal. The agencies overseeing, and especially conducting, testing will likely require some new skills and training to conduct the testing and evaluate the results. At a minimum, testing a CV system would require the agency to modify existing backhaul, modify traï¬c signal controllers, and install new DSRC radiosâall of which would require modifying the infrastructure. Testing CV systems would likely present some challenges to the agency across all these areas. Does implementing the strategy require new or complex governing structures? 1=requires, 5=does not require 3 How expensive is it to implement the strategy? 1=extremely expensive, 5=minimal expense to implement 3 Does the agency workforce have the necessary skills and knowledge to implement the strategy? 1=does not have skills and knowledge, 5=skill- and knowledge-ready to implement 3 Does implementing the strategy require new infrastructure or adaptations to existing infrastructure? 1=new infrastructure, 3=adapting infrastructure, 5=neither 3 What is the overall scale of the technical, institutional, political, or ï¬nancial challenge to implementing the strategy? 1=many challenges, 5=no challenges 3
101 MODIFY DRIVER TRAINING STANDARDS AND CURRICULA Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale E f fe ct iv en e s s If the strategy is economic, how well does it internalize external costs into private actorsâ decision making? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely N/A The desired policy outcome is correct and safe use of CV and AV technologies by drivers. Changing driver/operator licensing and training requirements to reï¬ect the changing driver capabilities and skills needed to operate vehicles with CV and AV technologies has a reasonable chance of encouraging this outcome, but the results are likely to be complicated by the wide range of technologies in the vehicle ï¬eet. If not economic, how likely is it to achieve its desired policy outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 3 Is the strategy likely to result in unintended consequences? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 3 Ef fic ie nc y If the strategy is economic, how well does the strategy recover the costs from the externality? 1=not at all, 5=extremely well N/A The strategy is likely to contribute to improved roadway safety and greater mobility for some groups of road users. There is also potential for less-desirable side eï¬ects such as loss of employment in some driving-related job sectors. How likely is the strategy to produce a net-positive socially beneï¬cial outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 3 Eq ui ty How likely is the strategy to increase costs or place burden on low-income or other socially disadvantaged groups? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 5 While low-income groups are not likely to bear the costs of implemented changes to driver licensing, they may not be able to take advantage of those changes to improve personal mobility due to the likely cost of more-advanced vehicle technologies (including associated costs such as re-training). How likely is the strategy to increase costs or burden on the groups responsible for the initial externality? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 5 How likely is the strategy to result in an unfair distribution of beneï¬ts across society? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 2 Po lit ic al Are any politically powerful stakeholders likely to oppose the strategy? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 2 Determining and implementing changes to existing training materials and licensing requirements may be met with resistance by the personnel responsible for actually conducting driver education and by those who conduct on-road tests. New testing procedures to accommodate input/involvement from CV/AV technologies may be resisted by driving examiners and trainers. How likely is the general public to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 5=extremely likely 3 How likely are decision makers to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 3
102 Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale O pe r a tio na l How disruptive is implementation of the strategy to the implementing agency? 1=very disruptive, 5=not at all disruptive 1 Altering driver training and licensing requirements for AV Level 3 vehicles will require signiï¬cant restructuring of driver training and of licensing requirements and testing. AV Level 4/5 vehicles could lead eventually to the elimination of driver training, examining, and licensing as it currently exists. Does implementing the strategy require new or complex governing structures? 1=requires, 5=does not require 5 How expensive is it to implement the strategy? 1=extremely expensive, 5=minimal expense to implement 2 Does the agency workforce have the necessary skills and knowledge to implement the strategy? 1=does not have skills and knowledge, 5=skill-and knowledge-ready to implement 1 Does implementing the strategy require new infrastructure or adaptations to existing infrastructure? 1=new infrastructure, 3=adapting infrastructure, 5=neither N/A What is the overall scale of the technical, institutional, political, or ï¬nancial challenge to implementing the strategy? 1=many challenges, 5=no challenges 1
103 INCREASE PUBLIC AWARENESS OF BENEFITS AND RISKS Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale Eï¬ ec ti ve ne ss If the strategy is economic, how well does it internalize external costs into private actorsâ decision making? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely N/A Public outreach and education by itself is not an economic strategy, but it can include information about an economic strategy. It can also contain or impart information that will make it easier (or harder) to achieve policy objectives. This will depend on how the message is received and whether or not it renders a response, positive or negative, by the receiver. If not economic, how likely is it to achieve its desired policy outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 2 Is the strategy likely to result in unintended consequences? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 5 Eï¬ ci en cy If the strategy is economic, how well does the strategy recover the costs from the externality? 1=not at all, 5=extremely well N/A Public outreach, education, and communication can have a positive society beneï¬t, as evidenced in driver safety campaigns, health education campaigns, anti-litter campaigns, and a plethora of other local initiatives. The eï¬ectiveness of the campaign and the ability to achieve a positive societal outcome will be determined by acceptance of the message, the credibility of the messenger, and the perception of the receiver about the necessity and validity of the message. Additionally, if the public education campaign can spur capital investment, it may accelerate the development and implementation of CV infrastructure. Likewise, if the public perceives a beneï¬t of AV technology, they may more readily accept and purchase AVs, increasing market penetration. How likely is the strategy to produce a net-positive socially beneï¬cial outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 5 Eq ui ty How likely is the strategy to increase costs or place burden on low-income or other socially disadvantaged groups? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 5 Successful outreach, education, and communication appeal to a broad spectrum of people. Assuming an eï¬ort is made to be inclusive in messaging (e.g., messages in multiple languages, messages targeted and appropriate for speciï¬c audiences) and that messages extoll the beneï¬ts of CV/AV technologies, public education can increase equity among society. As noted earlier, there is a proportion of society that is transportation disadvantaged. These technologies oï¬er a way to overcome those disadvantages. Education and communication should focus on How likely is the strategy to increase costs or burden on the groups responsible for the initial externality? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 3
104 Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale How likely is the strategy to result in an unfair distribution of beneï¬ts across society? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 5 how to access these technologies. Investment decisions should be made equitably, as required by numerous federal and state statutes. Po liti ca l Are any politically powerful stakeholders likely to oppose the strategy? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 4 Certainly politically powerful stakeholders have the opportunity to inï¬uence public education eï¬orts either by causing the eï¬orts to be withheld or by actively promoting them. It seems unlikely that CV/AV technology implementation would get to the point of public education and information campaigns if there were powerful opposition. However, an unlikely opponent could emerge after education and outreach eï¬orts have begun. That is why it is a public engagement best practice to conduct a thorough stakeholder and audience analysis at the beginning of a process. This will identify any potential opponents and allow them to proactively be contacted and have their concerns addressed. Public acceptance of the outreach will depend on the credibility of the message, the messenger, and the perceived need for the information. Again, decision makers will have likely already accepted the programs and policies surrounding this technology by the time a public education campaign is advanced. Public support for these technologies will also inï¬uence decision making for investment and ease of implementation through rulemaking and legislation or adoption of policies that promote or hinder advancement. How likely is the general public to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 3 How likely are decision makers to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 4 O pe ra ti on al How disruptive is implementation of the strategy to the implementing agency? 1=very disruptive, 5=not at all disruptive 5 Public outreach, education, and communication programs will not be disruptive to the implementing agency(ies). This is something they do on a daily basis. Because this concept is new and has the ability to be transformative, it is likely that an implementer or associated agency will want to go above and beyond its standard messaging protocols. This may require cooperative relationships with other agencies and the private sector. It will be important to ensure that the education and messages reach all audiences. It is also likely that implementers will want to use new and/or diï¬erent technology to communicate. The Does implementing the strategy require new or complex governing structures? 1=requires, 5=does not require 5 How expensive is it to implement the strategy? 1=extremely expensive, 5=minimal expense to implement 2
105 Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale Does the agency workforce have the necessary skills and knowledge to implement the strategy? 1=does not have skills and knowledge, 5=skill-and knowledge-ready to implement 4 responsible workforce should be knowledgeable and possess the skill sets to be as innovative as the technology. Special attention should be paid to the transportation disadvantaged that stand to beneï¬t from these technologies. This will likely need an increase in manpower to identify their groups, tailor messages appropriate to them, and ensure that delivery of the messages is conducted in such a way as to be trusted and valued by the receiver. These eï¬orts could increase the costs associated with public outreach and education. Does implementing the strategy require new infrastructure or adaptations to existing infrastructure? 1=new infrastructure, 3=adapting infrastructure, 5=neither 5 What is the overall scale of the technical, institutional, political, or ï¬nancial challenge to implementing the strategy? 1=many challenges, 5=no challenges 3
106 SUBSIDIZE SHARED AV USE If the strategy is economic, how well does it internalize external costs into private actorsâ decision making? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 2 Based on what is currently happening with TNCs, it seems likely that the strategy is not needed to encourage SAV alternatives to AVs. Growth in the TNC market has been market-driven, and the market has worked well; however, it could be used to encourage SAV ï¬eets to provide ï¬rst/last- mile service and service for targeted populations. Most policies have some unintended consequences. These are not reasons to not implement the policy but may reduce its beneï¬t. For example, the policy may end up further cannibalizing ridership from traditional public transit, requiring ever-larger public subsidies to provide such service. As another example, it may entice taxi and livery services to re-brand themselves as TNCs to get around all fare regulation. If not economic, how likely is it to achieve its desired policy outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely N/A Is the strategy likely to result in unintended consequences? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 2 If the strategy is economic, how well does the strategy recover the costs from the externality? 1=not at all, 5=extremely well 3 Reallocating a portion of the subsidies that currently support public transit for speciï¬c SAV usesâï¬rst-mile/last-mile service, paratransit service, transit deserts, and rural areasâwould have the outcome of mitigating congestion and emissions because it could bolster or maintain ridership on traditional public transit, as well as in serving special populations (low income, disabled, elderly, and rural) because it would enhance mobility and improve transportation equity. Society could beneï¬t if public subsidies for transit capital investments or operations were reduced. How likely is the strategy to produce a net-positive socially beneï¬cial outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 3 How likely is the strategy to increase costs or place burden on low-income or other socially disadvantaged groups? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 3 SAVs should lower the cost of conventional paratransit, ride-sourcing, or taxi companies. Thus, there should be lower costs to use them for all potential users. The strategy has been developed to improve transportation equity, not diminish it.How likely is the strategy to increase costs or burden on the groups responsible for the initial externality? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 3 How likely is the strategy to result in an unfair distribution of beneï¬ts across society? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 3 Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale Eï¬ ec ti ve ne ss Eï¬ ci en cy Eq ui ty
107 Are any politically powerful stakeholders likely to oppose the strategy? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 2 The taxi or livery industries may oppose the strategy for the same reasons that they currently oppose TNCs. It is uncertain what impact SAVs will have on these industries. Will they morph into SAVs or somehow remain distinct? It is likely that some politicians will oppose the strategy in that they might oppose public subsidies for transit in general, or alternatively seek to protect jobs that they see as threatened by SAVs. How likely is the general public to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 3 How likely are decision makers to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 2 How disruptive is implementation of the strategy to the implementing agency? 1=very disruptive, 5=not at all disruptive 3 At the time of implementation, the implementing agencies (public transit agencies or cities) would already have implementing analog programs pertaining to TNCs. Thus, the extension to SAVs should not be disruptive. This is a reallocating or re-targeting of a portion of public subsidies to SAVs. There should be no additional cost to implement, assuming an external agreement is already in place, and net agency savings may be possible if some paratransit are able to be served on a cheaper per-trip basis. Does implementing the strategy require new or complex governing structures? 1=requires, 5=does not require 3 How expensive is it to implement the strategy? 1=extremely expensive, 5=minimal expense to implement 4 Does the agency workforce have the necessary skills and knowledge to implement the strategy? 1=does not have skills and knowledge, 5=skill-and knowledge-ready to implement 4 Does implementing the strategy require new infrastructure or adaptations to existing infrastructure? 1=new infrastructure, 3=adapting infrastructure, 5=neither 5 What is the overall scale of the technical, institutional, political, or ï¬nancial challenge to implementing the strategy? 1=many challenges, 5=no challenges 3 Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale Po liti ca l O pe ra ti on al
108 IMPLEMENT TRANSIT BENEFITS Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale If the strategy is economic, how well does it internalize external costs into private actorsâ decision making? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 3 Transit beneï¬ts are not by themselves particularly successful in increasing transit use because use depends much more heavily on service provision and user convenience. It could be more eï¬ective with an SAV ï¬eet since origins and destinations are less important, but service characteristics could still be important (How quickly does a vehicle come? How much longer does it take than other modes?). The diï¬erential between the cost of an SAV ride and the amount available for pre-tax could also be important. If a one-way ride that includes both transit and an SAV costs $10 (meaning that a commute would cost $440 per month), and a rider can obtain the current $255 from an employer, this might not induce a person to ride since it would still mean $185 out of pocket, which might be more expensive than driving. Currently, the transit beneï¬ts law allows the ceiling to rise with inï¬ation, but Congress could change this. Currently, the main unintended consequence from transit beneï¬ts is fraud. A GAO investigation easily identiï¬ed employees who were selling their beneï¬ts, although the law clearly states they are for the use of the employer only. However, if people are using them to commute via transit (or SAV ï¬eet), the main unintended consequence is to the employer, who is subsidizing the commute of a non-employee. This would not be a major overall negative since it would still provide an incentive for somebody to use transit or SAV ï¬eets. If not economic, how likely is it to achieve its desired policy outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely N/A Is the strategy likely to result in unintended consequences? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 4 If the strategy is economic, how well does the strategy recover the costs from the externality? 1=not at all, 5=extremely well 2 While transit beneï¬ts are not particularly costly to implement, they also do not tend to encourage a very large uptake in transit use. They tend to be used by persons for whom transit already serves their origins and destinations with relatively convenient service. They could well be more eï¬ective in terms of an SAV ï¬eet, in which any origins and destinations can be served. However, without knowing the cost of such a service, it is diï¬cult to say what fraction of ridersâ costs could be covered by this incentive. The time diï¬erential between solo How likely is the strategy to produce a net-positive socially beneï¬cial outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 3 Eï¬ ec ti ve ne ss Eï¬ ci en cy
109 Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale driving and riding in an SAV might also aï¬ect their use; if an SAV functioned like a shared-ride taxi service, picking up riders at multiple origins and dropping them oï¬ at multiple destinations, the additional time could be a detriment to adoption for all commute trips. (Some of this additional time could be oï¬set by the ability to use the time in vehicle for other purposes, but riders might have other trips for which speed is important and would therefore prefer to travel alone.) Transit beneï¬ts can result in a positive outcome if they encourage more people to use SAV ï¬eets by reducing the out-of-pocket cost to commuters. The likelihood would probably increase as the diï¬erence between the level of subsidy and the out-of-pocket cost decreased; that is, if it were fairly inexpensive to switch to using an SAV ï¬eet from driving, some people might switch. This policy would likely be net- positive regardless, although the total beneï¬t might be relatively small. Eq ui ty How likely is the strategy to increase costs or place burden on low-income or other socially disadvantaged groups? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 5 Transit beneï¬ts lower the overall cost of riding transit, so it should be positive for low-income groups. There are no ï¬nancial costs to drivers to participate in a transit beneï¬t program, regardless of whether the program is employer subsidized or pre-tax. Thus, it should not create any additional inequity. This assessment might not be accurate if SAV riders are advantaged over transit riders in some way. Much will depend on the actual cost of an SAV ride vis-à - vis a transit ride, and the actual amount of the transit beneï¬t. How likely is the strategy to increase costs or burden on the groups responsible for the initial externality? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 5 How likely is the strategy to result in an unfair distribution of beneï¬ts across society? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 5 Po lit ic al Are any politically powerful stakeholders likely to oppose the strategy? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 4 Generally, this is not particularly politically controversial. However, employers might object to mandatory programs, particularly subsidy programs. SAV operators might object to working with transit agencies and vice versa; while the current track record is fairly good on How likely is the general public to 5
110 Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely this score, over time the groups might become antagonistic if they view each other as competitors for the same riders. Transit beneï¬ts should be an easy sell to the public; they already exist and just need to be extended. While Congressional action would be required to allow the use of transit beneï¬ts for SAV ï¬eets, since currently they are not an eligible expenditure, this would not be controversial, just time consuming and unpredictable (a member would have to sponsor a bill, it might be tied up with other, more controversial legislation, and so forth). How likely are decision makers to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 4 O pe ra tio na l How disruptive is implementation of the strategy to the implementing agency? 1=very disruptive, 5=not at all disruptive 5 Transit beneï¬ts are already in place, so they require adjustments rather than a new strategy. In terms of governance, agreements in individual regions between transit agencies and SAV operators would be needed. Developing a multiagency technology for fare payment can cost hundreds of millions of dollars. However, it could cost considerably less if there were smaller and fewer systems to integrate within a region. Conversely, it could also cost less if one technology were adopted very widely (such as EZPass for electronic toll collection) due to economies of scale. Various agencies might bear these costs. Extending transit beneï¬ts should not require new skills from transit agencies in terms of implementation, but it does require developing new payment and accounting mechanisms, and SAV operators must ensure that their customers are paying the appropriate fare. No new physical infrastructure is required. There are two main challenges: developing the payment mechanism and changing the existing legislation to expand use to SAV ï¬eets (and possibly increasing the upper limit). Does implementing the strategy require new or complex governing structures? 1=requires, 5=does not require 4 How expensive is it to implement the strategy? 1=extremely expensive, 5=minimal expense to implement 3 Does the agency workforce have the necessary skills and knowledge to implement the strategy? 1=does not have skills and knowledge, 5=skill-and knowledge-ready to implement 3 Does implementing the strategy require new infrastructure or adaptations to existing infrastructure? 1=new infrastructure, 3=adapting infrastructure, 5=neither 5 What is the overall scale of the technical, institutional, political, or ï¬nancial challenge to implementing the strategy? 1=many challenges, 5=no challenges 4
111 IMPLEMENT A PARKING CASH-OUT STRATEGY Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale Ef fe ct iv en es s If the strategy is economic, how well does it internalize external costs into private actorsâ decision making? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 2 While parking cash-out has been fairly successful where adopted, its success also depends on the availability of other commute options. However, even making the program mandatory would not necessarily encourage SAV use since employees might opt for free parking instead. For unintended consequences, the main concern would likely be fraud. Employees could receive the beneï¬t and continue driving to work if, for example, the employer did not adequately enforce parking restrictions. The main consequence would be to employers, not society overall, but unlike illegal sales of transit beneï¬ts, there would be no incentive to use SAVs. If not economic, how likely is it to achieve its desired policy outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely N/A Is the strategy likely to result in unintended consequences? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 4 Ef fic ie nc y If the strategy is economic, how well does the strategy recover the costs from the externality? 1=not at all, 5=extremely well 3 Parking cash-out has tended to be somewhat eï¬ective in terms of encouraging mode switching since drivers can opt for multiple modes. Presuming the costs are not high, this is likely more eï¬cient than transit beneï¬ts since it can appeal to a larger group of users. While parking cash-out can result in a net- positive outcome, in that it takes single- occupant vehicles oï¬ the road, those former drivers may or may not use SAVs. Also, because this has been used by so few employers, given that many employers would see no beneï¬t, it is likely that any positive impacts would be fairly small. The magnitude of the change will vary by employerâin the best-known evaluation of the eï¬ects of parking cash-out at eight employers, the change in the percent share of employees driving alone decreased from 3 to 22 percent. How likely is the strategy to produce a net-positive socially beneï¬cial outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 2 Eq ui ty How likely is the strategy to increase costs or place burden on low-income or other socially disadvantaged groups? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 4 In theory, this should not increase costs or burdens because employees should be making their own decision. However, in practice it is possible that people who accept parking cash-out do not understand the cost of other commuting options. Thus, there is a slight risk here of disadvantaging some groups. While there are no ï¬nancial costs to drivers How likely is the strategy to increase costs or burden on the groups responsible for the initial externality? 4
112 Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely who participate in a parking cash-out program, it is possible that participants may pay more for alternate options than their parking cash-out is worth. In theory, people could compare their cash-out amount to their out-of-pocket cost for alternate modes and accept cash-out only if it saves them money, but the cost of the alternate mode might increase over time while the cash-out amount might not. Thus, widespread usecould create a group of people who would prefer to drive to work but who are no longer able to. How likely is the strategy to result in an unfair distribution of beneï¬ts across society? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 4 Po lit ic al Are any politically powerful stakeholders likely to oppose the strategy? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 5 Absent a mandate, this is entirely an employer and employee decision, so it seems unlikely that powerful stakeholders, the general public, or decision makers would have strong objections. How likely is the general public to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 5 How likely are decision makers to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 5 O pe ra tio na l How disruptive is implementation of the strategy to the implementing agency? 1=very disruptive, 5=not at all disruptive 5 This is not disruptive for employers to implement, and no new governance structure is required. Local organizations that already encourage TDM measures can easily add this to their outreach materials, so costs to public agencies should be minimal; the cost would be a local decision. However, if they wanted to encourage adoption, they might provide subsidies to employers. The direct costs to implement parking cash-out would be borne by employers, who would pay employees to give up parking. Whether they would recoup these costs through giving up parking spaces depends on how much they pay for the spaces (lease costs for rented spaces, whether they are bundled with the lease, and maintenance and operations costs for spaces that are owned). Indirect costs could be borne by real estate owners or developers, if Does implementing the strategy require new or complex governing structures? 1=requires, 5=does not require 5 How expensive is it to implement the strategy? 1=extremely expensive, 5=minimal expense to implement 4 Does the agency workforce have the necessary skills and knowledge to implement the strategy? 1=does not have skills and knowledge, 5=skill-and knowledge-ready to implement 1
113 Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale Does implementing the strategy require new infrastructure or adaptations to existing infrastructure? 1=new infrastructure, 3=adapting infrastructure, 5=neither 4 employers give up parking spaces that they cannot re-lease to others or use as short-term paid parking. The main challenge is that employers may not see the beneï¬t of adopting this policy. Some minor changes to physical infrastructure would be required if employers have to reconï¬gure their parking facilities. What is the overall scale of the technical, institutional, political, or ï¬nancial challenge to implementing the strategy? 1=many challenges, 5=no challenges 4
114 IMPLEMENT LOCATION-EFFICIENT MORTGAGES Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale Eï¬ ec ti ve ne ss If the strategy is economic, how well does it internalize external costs into private actorsâ decision making? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 1 Price is undoubtedly an important component of home buying decisions, but there is no evidence that LEMs make a major diï¬erence. When home buyers did take out larger loans than they otherwise might have, the additional increment available to qualiï¬ed buyers was generally in the range of $15,000, which is probably not suï¬cient in many markets to make a diï¬erence in the number of homes aï¬ordable to the borrower. In expensive or gentrifying cities, widespread use of LEMs could have an impact on housing prices overall, or in particular neighborhoods, in ways that are diï¬cult to predict. As Chatman and Voorhoeve (2010) noted, in a constrained housing market with permanent LEM lending, âone would expect a one-time windfall for landowners and a permanent increase in the price of housing in targeted areasâ (p. 377). If not economic, how likely is it to achieve its desired policy outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely NA Is the strategy likely to result in unintended consequences? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 2 Eï¬ ci en cy If the strategy is economic, how well does the strategy recover the costs from the externality? 1=not at all, 5=extremely well 1 Since the pilot LEM programs did not require borrowers to prove they were using transit, it is impossible to say if the program even achieves its goal of encouraging transit use. It would be politically diï¬cult to force home buyers not to own vehicles or drive, not to mention nearly impossible to enforce. Given the past diï¬culties with implementation and the prospect for unintended consequences to housing prices, LEMs do not seem likely to result in a net- positive outcome. How likely is the strategy to produce a net-positive socially beneï¬cial outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 1 Eq ui ty How likely is the strategy to increase costs or place burden on low-income or other socially disadvantaged groups? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely unlikely 2 For several reasons, LEMs could disadvantage lower- income groups. First, they could encourage people to purchase larger and less aï¬ordable homes. This can leave homeowners vulnerable to the type of house price declines and reductions in wealth that occurred in the 2008 recession, which was triggered by a collapse in the subprime mortgage market. Second, they could lead to higher housing prices in areas near transit, which would likely induce price increases in other areas as well. Finally, it is unlikely that lower-income homebuyers can outbid more-aï¬uent buyers for individual houses, given the relatively modest increase in purchasing power. Although in theory an LEM should lower overall housing and transportation costs for those homeowners with an LEM, in practice there may be reasons why they experience higher costs than with a conventional mortgage. Much would depend on both the terms of How likely is the strategy to increase costs or burden on the groups responsible for the initial externality? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 3 How likely is the strategy to result in an unfair distribution of beneï¬ts across society? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely 3 the LEM and the individual circumstances. For example,
115 Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale the homeowner may have a larger mortgage payment than with a conventional mortgage if they purchase a larger house but spend the same amount on transportation than they would have (e.g., the homeowner might have been willing to take transit even if he/she bought a house outside the LEM zone). Or, the homeownerâs commute pattern might change, resulting in higher commuting costs. These would of course be costs borne voluntarily, but they would still constitute ï¬nancial costs. Po liti ca l Are any politically powerful stakeholders likely to oppose the strategy? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 3 Generally, it is diï¬cult to imagine home buyers opposing a strategy that, at least in theory, could increase their borrowing power. Opposition could arise from three groups. First, if designed to make homeownership more aï¬ordable to lower-income groups, LEMs could trigger the types of opposition often seen in response to other aï¬ordable housing programs, which can take the form of concerns about declines in property values. Second, if the programs make housing less aï¬ordable (by spurring housing price increases or a loss of aï¬ordable housing), opposition could arise from aï¬ordable housing advocates. Finally, lenders might oppose mandates to oï¬er LEMs. When ï¬rst introduced, press coverage tended to be positive. If not mandated, it should not be particularly controversial to either the general public or decision makers. How likely is the general public to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 3 How likely are decision makers to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 4 O pe ra ti on al How disruptive is implementation of the strategy to the implementing agency? 1=very disruptive, 5=not at all disruptive 3 The pilots were found to be somewhat disruptive to lenders. The original LEM pilot was complicated by the complex formulas that determined the additional amount of the loan, which varies not only with the borrowersâ characteristics but by neighborhood. Of course, this could be simpliï¬ed, as in the second pilot, but in this case the formulaswere not integrated into existing Fannie Mae software, making it harder for national and more-standardized lenders to change their underwriting formulas (Chatman and Voorhoeve 2010). However, no new governance structures are required. In terms of direct costs, LEMs should not incur any costs to state or local governments and, as noted above, might even increase property tax revenues. However, costs to lenders may increase because they need to incorporate adjustments to the formulas by which they Does implementing the strategy require new or complex governing structures? 1=requires, 5=does not require 5 How expensive is it to implement the strategy? 1=extremely expensive, 5=minimal expense to implement 5
116 Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale Does the agency workforce have the necessary skills and knowledge to implement the strategy? 1=does not have skills and knowledge, 5=skill-and knowledge-ready to implement 2 determine the amount a prospective home buyer can borrow. Home buyers may pay higher fees if they borrow larger amounts of money than they otherwise would, given that some fees are based on the loan amount or house price. Lenders may need to train employees on accurately using modiï¬ed loan formulas. If LEMs prove popular, there may be demands for new infrastructure in the form of stations and additional housing (to the extent housing is considered infrastructure). Overall, these programs have proven diï¬cult to implement under existing conditions. Adoption of CV/AV technology would not change these conditions. In addition, the potential beneï¬ts are unproven, and the potential for negative consequences is a concern. Does implementing the strategy require new infrastructure or adaptations to existing infrastructure? 1=new infrastructure, 3=adapting infrastructure, 5=neither 2 What is the overall scale of the technical, institutional, political, or ï¬nancial challenge to implementing the strategy? 1=many challenges, 5=no challenges 2
117 IMPLEMENT LAND USE POLICIESâTOD Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale Eï¬ ec ti ve ne ss If the strategy is economic, how well does it internalize external costs into private actorsâ decision making? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely N/A TOD is not an economic strategy but a planning tool that can help to create a built environment that may incentivize developers and mobility providers to provide and incorporate SAVs with transit. Land use strategies allow, incentivize, or mandate development features but they do not ensure that developers will provide them, or that the realized design will function as envisioned. For example, an allowance for higher-density development adjacent to transit does not ensure that residents will want or be able to use transit to commute. Existing examples of TOD reveal mixed success that is highly dependent on the individual projectâs attributes and context. As seen with conventional land use, the outcomes have economic, environmental, and social impacts. TOD would likely have consequences beyond transportation impacts. Some of these may be positive, such as increasing land values, and some may be negative, such as increasing costs for driving and parking. The likelihood that TOD will generate a large shift to SAV use must be compared to existing eï¬orts to promote shared mobility. However, these examples are still quite limited, though they show signs of success where they do exist (for instance, car-sharing). There is a risk that encouraging SAV use could generate more trips and more VMT. This would not achieve the objective to decrease excessive land use consumption. If not economic, how likely is it to achieve its desired policy outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 2 Is the strategy likely to result in unintended consequences? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 3 Eï¬ ci en cy If the strategy is economic, how well does the strategy recover the costs from the externality? 1=not at all, 5=extremely well N/A TOD can have a positive social beneï¬t by increasing travel options, supporting transit use, decreasing congestion, and creating active social and economic hubs. The eï¬ects of TOD and the likelihood to achieve a positive societal outcome will be determined by the implementation at a particular site or neighborhood and the actions of the individuals who live or use the space. For example, a TOD that most riders access by driving will not have the environmental beneï¬ts of a station that is generally accessed on foot. Furthermore, although the potential for beneï¬ts is high, existing TOD eï¬orts have not dramatically altered car-focused, suburban land use patterns. If the public perceives a greater beneï¬t of SAVs, they may be more likely to accept and use SAVs, increasing demand for the service and development that supports it. However, the limited extent of current TOD projects in the How likely is the strategy to produce a net-positive socially beneï¬cial outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 3 United States suggests that land use strategies alone are not enough to change travel behavior.
118 Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale Eq ui ty How likely is the strategy to increase costs or place burden on low-income or other socially disadvantaged groups? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 3 Using TOD to support SAVs can improve access to transit and activity centers, creating the potential to provide broad economic and environmental beneï¬ts. It allows some residents to live without a vehicle, which can provide monetary savings. Low- income residents are often disproportionately aï¬ected by air and noise pollution, which may be mitigated by increased transit use. However, some TOD has been criticized for failing to provide low- income or aï¬ordable housing and serving mainly higher-income individuals. Some projects may also displace current residents. Historical land use patterns supported automobile owners and suburban residents while underfunding infrastructure for transit and shifting public investment away from urban areas, so a shift toward TOD development may be seen as a tool to counteract this existing imbalance. How likely is the strategy to increase costs or burden on the groups responsible for the initial externality? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 2 How likely is the strategy to result in an unfair distribution of beneï¬ts across society? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 4 Po liti ca l Are any politically powerful stakeholders likely to oppose the strategy? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 3 Developers are the party most impacted by changes to development code. New code or zoning requirements may impose costs or be perceived as a burden, and may be opposed by developers. However, TOD is being implemented by developers across many U.S. cities. The public is likely to have mixed acceptance levels, depending on the location and the impact of the strategy on homeowners. Neighbors of TOD may have concerns about increased local congestion and changes to neighborhood character. The likelihood of acceptance is low based on current evidence that suburban, car-oriented development is still preferred by the majority of Americans. TOD represents a shift away from the status quo in development patterns, and this can be a barrier. Although TOD and similar strategies are gaining popularity in some urban and suburban core areas, they are also met with NIMBYism in many areas. TOD is gaining support from federal, state, and local planning and transportation programs that may contribute to wider acceptance in the long term. How likely is the general public to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 2 How likely are decision makers to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 4
119 Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale O pe ra ti on al How disruptive is implementation of the strategy to the implementing agency? 1=very disruptive, 5=not at all disruptive 4 TOD strategies have been implemented in many cities for years, and there is an existing institutional, technical, and ï¬nancial foundation that can be used to guide future eï¬orts to incorporate SAV into these strategies. However, they are not common in all municipalities and often require changes to legal statutes and regulations, which can pose a burden on local agencies. Increasing support from state and federal programs may mitigate these burdens. TOD development can also require collaboration between multiple agencies (e.g., transit agencies, planning departments, zoning departments, and developers) and, with SAV ï¬eets, the addition of more private partners as well. Overall, the operational challenges are larger in communities that do not have experience with TOD, but a growing body of knowledge can support implementation. Does implementing the strategy require new or complex governing structures? 1=requires, 5=does not require 3 How expensive is it to implement the strategy? 1=extremely expensive, 5=minimal expense to implement 3 Does the agency workforce have the necessary skills and knowledge to implement the strategy? 1=does not have skills and knowledge, 5=skill-and knowledge-ready to implement 4 Does implementing the strategy require new infrastructure or adaptations to existing infrastructure? 1=new infrastructure, 3=adapting infrastructure, 5=neither 4 What is the overall scale of the technical, institutional, political, or ï¬nancial challenge to implementing the strategy? 1=many challenges, 5=no challenges 4
120 IMPLEMENT LAND USE POLICIESâREDUCED PARKING REQUIREMENTS Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale Eï¬ ec ti ve ne ss If the strategy is economic, how well does it internalize external costs into private actorsâ decision making? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely N/A Reduced parking requirements are associated with decreasing the costs of development for TOD and smart growth projects. This can provide a strong incentive for developers and property owners to develop land that encourages shared mobility and enables SAV use. However, the likelihood of generating a large shift toward SAVs must be compared to existing eï¬orts to promote shared mobility, which are still quite limited, though they show signs of success where they do exist. There is a risk that encouraging SAVs would generate more VMT and replace transit trips instead of complement them. If not economic, how likely is it to achieve its desired policy outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 4 Is the strategy likely to result in unintended consequences? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 3 Eï¬ ci en cy If the strategy is economic, how well does the strategy recover the costs from the externality? 1=not at all, 5=extremely well N/A Parking requirements can increase the costs of development, pushing projects to undeveloped areas and overbuilding parking in high-value, urban areas. With reductions, developers should be able to build other facilities and more housing. Currently, parking is often provided for free, acting as an incentive to increase personal vehicle trip- making. Limited or costly parking correlates with decreased vehicle use, suggesting that this strategy may be an eï¬ective policy strategy in shifting demand from personal vehicles to shared vehicles. It should be implemented along with other TOD policies. How likely is the strategy to produce a net-positive socially beneï¬cial outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 4 Eq ui ty How likely is the strategy to increase costs or place burden on low-income or other socially disadvantaged groups? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 3 Reduced parking requirements may reduce the supply of parking for low-income travelers, but that would be most likely oï¬set by the potential for increasing alternative travel options that are already used more by disadvantaged groups. SAVs as a mobility option may not be cheaper on a per- trip basis, but they can provide a safety net for regular transit users. There is also a possibility that if SAVs are successful, they will draw funding away from mass transit. If SAV service is not aï¬ordable to low-income individuals, their mobility will be negatively impacted. How likely is the strategy to increase costs or burden on the groups responsible for the initial externality? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 2 How likely is the strategy to result in an unfair distribution of beneï¬ts across society? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 4
121 Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale Po liti ca l Are any politically powerful stakeholders likely to oppose the strategy? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 2 Developers and property owners who beneï¬t from parking revenue or existing development patterns may oppose a shift away from existing parking policy. However, in many cities parking can be a very expensive element of projects, and many developers are pursuing opportunities aï¬orded by land use codes to reduce parking development. Car manufacturers may also oppose incentives for transit and SAVs, but companies such as Ford and GM are already investigating SAVs and AVs for future investments. Policy makers in many areas have to face proponents of conventional development patterns who disapprove of investing in high-density, urban development. This could present a challenge to changing existing laws, and parking in particular can inspire strong opposition from neighborhood groups. How likely is the general public to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 3 How likely are decision makers to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 3 O pe ra ti on al How disruptive is implementation of the strategy to the implementing agency? 1=very disruptive, 5=not at all disruptive 4 A challenge to implementing reduced parking requirements is the process of changing local regulations. However, implementing the strategy would not be expensive; changes to development codes are made regularly, and local agencies can adjust procedures as necessary. Cities and towns are changing parking requirements in many areas and provide a growing body of knowledge on the process. Reduced parking requirements mainly apply to new construction, but if SAV use increases, there may also be a need to retroï¬t existing property. This would require adapting infrastructure; developers may be eager to do so on high-value development opportunities. Does implementing the strategy require new or complex governing structures? 1=requires, 5=does not require 3 How expensive is it to implement the strategy? 1=extremely expensive, 5=minimal expense to implement 4 Does the agency workforce have the necessary skills and knowledge to implement the strategy? 1=does not have skills and knowledge, 5=skill-and knowledge-ready to implement 4 Does implementing the strategy require new infrastructure or adaptations to existing infrastructure? 1=new infrastructure, 3=adapting infrastructure, 5=neither 3 What is the overall scale of the technical, institutional, political, or ï¬nancial challenge to implementing the strategy? 1=many challenges, 5=no challenges 3
122 APPLY ROAD USE PRICINGâSTATE-LEVEL ROAD USER CHARGES Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale Eï¬ ec ti ve ne ss If the strategy is economic, how well does it internalize external costs into private actorsâ decision making? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 5 Pricing represents one of the best policy actions for internalizing the external costs associated with transportation. The policy levies a charge directly on travel within a very large area and can be structured to account for any potential travel cost over a very large area. As such, it is among the best pricing options for fully internalizing the costs of travel. An unintended consequence of an RUC is that travel could be reduced as drivers attempt to minimize their exposure to the charge. If not economic, how likely is it to achieve its desired policy outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely N/A Is the strategy likely to result in unintended consequences? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 3 Eï¬ ci en cy If the strategy is economic, how well does the strategy recover the costs from the externality? 1=not at all, 5=extremely well 5 As a direct economic instrument, pricing is very eï¬cient at recovering the costs of externalities because those costs can be directly incorporated into the charge itself. Furthermore, because pricing can be structured to incorporate and account for any number of factors (congestion, pollution, etc.), it is more likely to result in a net-positive beneï¬cial income because it can achieve numerous transportation policy objectives. How likely is the strategy to produce a net-positive socially beneï¬cial outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 4 Eq ui ty How likely is the strategy to increase costs or place burden on low-income or other socially disadvantaged groups? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 2 Pricing is likely to illicit equity concerns from lower- income drivers who would see a larger percentage of their income dedicated to travel expenses relative to middle- and upper-income drivers. However, pricing systems can be structured in any number of ways to address these concerns. Within the context of a statewide pricing system, it is likely that discounts could be oï¬ered to low-income drivers. Road users (in this case, drivers) are the ones who bear the burden of the RUC. They are primarily responsible for the externalities being internalized, so impacts to other groups are minimized. Furthermore, the beneï¬ts of an enhanced transportation system due to the increases in transportation revenue are likely to result in a fair distribution of impacts across society. How likely is the strategy to increase costs or burden on the groups responsible for the initial externality? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 4 How likely is the strategy to result in an unfair distribution of beneï¬ts across society? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 3
123 Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale Po liti ca l Are any politically powerful stakeholders likely to oppose the strategy? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 2 RUCs are among the most unpopular of pricing applications. Drivers in general do not support paying more for transportation, and RUCs are viewed as being particularly onerous because the public is not accustomed to knowing exactly what it is paying for transportation in the form of fuel taxes. Furthermore, the trucking industry views RUCs as being burdensome given the number of transportation-related fees and taxes that are already paid by the industry. Drivers and the trucking industry are likely to apply intense pressure to public oï¬cials opposing road user fees, meaning that decision makers are unlikely to immediately support such mechanisms. How likely is the general public to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 1 How likely are decision makers to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 1 O pe ra ti on al How disruptive is implementation of the strategy to the implementing agency? 1=very disruptive, 5=not at all disruptive 2 RUCs are new in the United States, and there are a number of questions about how they would be deployed. Regardless, they would represent a signiï¬cant increase in administrative capability since the current fuel tax regime collects taxes from only a few points (fuel distributors) as opposed to collecting from all drivers/vehicles. New accounting systems will need to be developed, and it is possible that new technologies would need to be developed for the metering of road usage and collection of associated charges. There is a strong potential for these aspects of system implementation and operation to be handled by the private sector, but even then, public agencies will need to ensure that private-sector vendors are meeting their obligations. Does implementing the strategy require new or complex governing structures? 1=requires, 5=does not require 2 How expensive is it to implement the strategy? 1=extremely expensive, 5=minimal expense to implement 3 Does the agency workforce have the necessary skills and knowledge to implement the strategy? 1=does not have skills and knowledge, 5=skill-and knowledge-ready to implement 3 Does implementing the strategy require new infrastructure or adaptations to existing infrastructure? 1=new infrastructure, 3=adapting infrastructure, 5=neither challenges 4 What is the overall scale of the technical, institutional, political, or ï¬nancial challenge to implementing the strategy? 1=many challenges, 5=no 2
124 APPLY ROAD USE PRICINGâFACILITY PRICING Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale Ef fe ct iv en es s If the strategy is economic, how well does it internalize external costs into private actorsâ decision making? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 4 Pricing in general represents one of the best policy actions for internalizing the external costs associated with transportation. However, facility pricing is less eï¬ective than RUCs only because it is limited in its scope to certain facilities. It is eï¬ective at internalizing costs for users of the priced facility, not all road users. Price, though, may still be based on any number of factors and internalize any number of costs associated with use of a particular facility. There is a likelihood with facility pricing that drivers will divert to non-tolled roads as a means of reducing their ï¬nancial exposure to the new charges. If not economic, how likely is it to achieve its desired policy outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely N/A Is the strategy likely to result in unintended consequences? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 2 Ef fic ie nc y If the strategy is economic, how well does the strategy recover the costs from the externality? 1=not at all, 5=extremely well 4 As a direct economic instrument, pricing is very eï¬cient at recovering the costs of externalities since those costs can be directly incorporated into the charge itself. However, facility-speciï¬c pricing is only eï¬ective at improving eï¬ciencies within the priced infrastructure, not among all users. A net-positive outcome will depend on the particulars of the project and the goals and objectives behind the pricing regime. Pricing based on wider-scale societal factors, such as environmental goals, may yield wider beneï¬ts to society. Pricing systems with facility-speciï¬c objectives, such as revenue generation in support of ï¬nancing, may yield narrower beneï¬ts. How likely is the strategy to produce a net-positive socially beneï¬cial outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 3 Eq ui ty How likely is the strategy to increase costs or place burden on low-income or other socially disadvantaged groups? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 4 Facility pricing will illicit equity concerns from lower-income drivers who would see a larger percentage of their income dedicated to travel expenses relative to middle- and upper-income drivers. However, pricing systems can be structured in any number of ways to address these concerns. Within the context of a statewide pricing system, it is likely that discounts could be oï¬ered to low-income drivers. Furthermore, with facility- speciï¬c pricing, there are likely to be non-priced alternatives that those wishing to avoid the charge may use. Unlike an RUC, facility-speciï¬c pricing generally only requires the users of a speciï¬c facility to pay. Improved traï¬c ï¬ows resulting from pricing may beneï¬t adjacent general purpose lane users. How likely is the strategy to increase costs or burden on the groups responsible for the initial externality? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 4 How likely is the strategy to result in an unfair distribution of beneï¬ts across society? 3
125 Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely Furthermore, reduced congestion may lead to improvements in air quality, which beneï¬t society as a whole. Po lit ic al Are any politically powerful stakeholders likely to oppose the strategy? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 2 Pricing is generally opposed by the public since it results in additional travel costs. However, facility- speciï¬c pricing is more acceptable because it is limited to the users of the priced facility, not all drivers. Furthermore, the public and political acceptability increases when free alternatives are provided, or when discounts for certain vehicle classes and users (such as transit users and carpoolers) are oï¬ered. How likely is the general public to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 2 How likely are decision makers to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 3 O pe ra tio na l How disruptive is implementation of the strategy to the implementing agency? 1=very disruptive, 5=not at all disruptive 4 The operational challenges associated with facility- speciï¬c pricing will depend on the particular agenciesâ past experiences with pricing. Implementing new pricing systems in areas with an established experience in pricing will be relatively straightforward, even though there will likely need to be capital investments in technology and infrastructure and back-oï¬ce systems. These costs will be more signiï¬cant for agencies with no experience in pricing, and signiï¬cant investment may be required in order to establish necessary institutional and workforce capabilities. Does implementing the strategy require new or complex governing structures? 1=requires, 5=does not require 4 How expensive is it to implement the strategy? 1=extremely expensive, 5=minimal expense to implement 2 Does the agency workforce have the necessary skills and knowledge to implement the strategy? 1=does not have skills and knowledge, 5=skill-and knowledge-ready to implement 4 Does implementing the strategy require new infrastructure or adaptations to existing infrastructure? 1=new infrastructure, 3=adapting infrastructure, 5=neither 2 What is the overall scale of the technical, institutional, political, or ï¬nancial challenge to implementing the strategy? 1=many challenges, 5=no challenges 3
126 APPLY ROAD USE PRICINGâCORDON PRICING Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale Ef fe ct iv en es s If the strategy is economic, how well does it internalize external costs into private actorsâ decision making? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 3 Pricing in general represents one of the best policy actions for internalizing the external costs associated with transportation. Cordon pricing systems can be structured to account for any number of externalities, but they only internalize the costs associated with travel into particular areas. Cordon pricing could impact business within the charged zone by reducing vehicular traï¬c into the area. If not economic, how likely is it to achieve its desired policy outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely N/A Is the strategy likely to result in unintended consequences? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 2 Ef fic ie nc y If the strategy is economic, how well does the strategy recover the costs from the externality? 1=not at all, 5=extremely well 3 As a direct economic instrument, pricing is very eï¬cient at recovering the costs of externalities since those costs can be directly incorporated into the charge itself. However, cordon pricing is only eï¬ective at improving eï¬ciencies within the priced area. Eï¬ciency gains are improved if the pricing structure includes a distance-based element (for all travel within the cordon) as opposed to a fee for simply passing the cordon line. How likely is the strategy to produce a net-positive socially beneï¬cial outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 3 Eq ui ty How likely is the strategy to increase costs or place burden on low-income or other socially disadvantaged groups? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 3 Cordon pricing may illicit equity concerns from travelers who have no other modal option for entering the cordon area. Equity may be improved by providing additional modal options and providing monetary incentives for the use of those modes. How likely is the strategy to increase costs or burden on the groups responsible for the initial externality? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 3 How likely is the strategy to result in an unfair distribution of beneï¬ts across society? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 3
127 Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale Po lit ic al Are any politically powerful stakeholders likely to oppose the strategy? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 1 Pricing is generally opposed by the public since it results in additional travel costs. However, cordon pricing is more acceptable because it is limited to the road users in a speciï¬c area, not all drivers. Furthermore, the public and political acceptability increases when free alternatives are provided, or when discounts for certain vehicle classes and users (such as transit users and carpoolers) are oï¬ered. However, businesses within the cordon are likely to oppose the system because it makes travel into the area costlier, which may reduce revenues. These interests may be more concentrated and organized than general public stakeholder groups, meaning that pressure can be more speciï¬cally applied to elected oï¬cials. This increases the political diï¬culty of implementing cordon pricing systems. How likely is the general public to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 2 How likely are decision makers to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 3 O pe ra tio na l How disruptive is implementation of the strategy to the implementing agency? 1=very disruptive, 5=not at all disruptive 2 Cordon pricing systems have never been implemented in the United States, meaning that any agency implementing them will be faced with new implementation challenges in terms of operating, administering, and enforcing the system. However, agencies with a history of pricing might ï¬nd these challenges easier to overcome than agencies with no experience in pricing, who may require signiï¬cant investment to establish the necessary institutional and workforce skills and capabilities. Does implementing the strategy require new or complex governing structures? 1=requires, 5=does not require 3 How expensive is it to implement the strategy? 1=extremely expensive, 5=minimal expense to implement 2 Does the agency workforce have the necessary skills and knowledge to implement the strategy? 1=does not have skills and knowledge, 5=skill-and knowledge-ready to implement 2 Does implementing the strategy require new infrastructure or adaptations to existing infrastructure? 1=new infrastructure, 3=adapting infrastructure, 5=neither 2
128 Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale What is the overall scale of the technical, institutional, political, or ï¬nancial challenge to implementing the strategy? 1=many challenges, 5=no challenges 2
129 APPLY ROAD USE PRICINGâPARKING PRICING Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale Ef fe ct iv en es s If the strategy is economic, how well does it internalize external costs into private actorsâ decision making? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 2 Pricing in general represents one of the best policy actions for internalizing the external costs associated with transportation. Parking pricing systems can be structured to account for any number of externalities, but they only internalize the costs associated with parking, not overall travel. Parking pricing could impact area business by raising the costs associated with parking. If not economic, how likely is it to achieve its desired policy outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely NA Is the strategy likely to result in unintended consequences? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 3 Ef fic ie nc y If the strategy is economic, how well does the strategy recover the costs from the externality? 1=not at all, 5=extremely well 2 Parking pricing only results in improved eï¬ciency for parking operations. Beneï¬ts are likely to accrue only in the speciï¬c areas where the strategy is applied, not among the general public. How likely is the strategy to produce a net-positive socially beneï¬cial outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 3 Eq ui ty How likely is the strategy to increase costs or place burden on low-income or other socially disadvantaged groups? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 3 Parking pricing may illicit equity concerns from travelers who have no other modal options and cannot avoid parking their car in the charged area. Equity may be improved by providing additional modal options and providing monetary incentives for the use of those modes. How likely is the strategy to increase costs or burden on the groups responsible for the initial externality? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 3 How likely is the strategy to result in an unfair distribution of beneï¬ts across society? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 3
130 Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale Po lit ic al Are any politically powerful stakeholders likely to oppose the strategy? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 3 Pricing is generally opposed by the public since it results in additional travel costs. However, parking pricing is more acceptable because it is limited to parking in speciï¬c areas as opposed to general travel or travel on major roadways. Public and political acceptability increases when modal alternatives are provided or when discounts for certain vehicle classes and users are oï¬ered. Businesses within the priced area are likely to oppose the system because it makes accessing area businesses with a personal vehicle costlier, which may reduce revenues. These interests may be more concentrated and organized than general public stakeholder groups, meaning that pressure can be more speciï¬cally applied to elected oï¬cials. This increases the political diï¬culty of implementing a pricing system, but the overall number of aï¬ected stakeholders is likely to be lower than other pricing mechanisms. How likely is the general public to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 3 How likely are decision makers to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 4 O pe ra tio na l How disruptive is implementation of the strategy to the implementing agency? 1=very disruptive, 5=not at all disruptive 2 If an agency is looking to implement a parking pricing system, it is likely that it already has parking facilities it is managing. Pricing represents a new operating component, but it is smaller in scale relative to other pricing systems. It is likely that signiï¬cant capital investments in new technology and infrastructure will be required. Does implementing the strategy require new or complex governing structures? 1=requires, 5=does not require 3 How expensive is it to implement the strategy? 1=extremely expensive, 5=minimal expense to implement 3 Does the agency workforce have the necessary skills and knowledge to implement the strategy? 1=does not have skills and knowledge, 5=skill-and knowledge-ready to implement 2 Does implementing the strategy require new infrastructure or adaptations to existing infrastructure? 1=new infrastructure, 3=adapting infrastructure, 5=neither 2
131 Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale What is the overall scale of the technical, institutional, political, or ï¬nancial challenge to implementing the strategy? 1=many challenges, 5=no challenges 3
132 IMPLEMENT A NO-FAULT INSURANCE APPROACH Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale Eï¬ ec ti ve ne ss If the strategy is economic, how well does it internalize external costs into private actorsâ decision making? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 1 State-level no-fault automobile insurance would likely accomplish goals of clarifying assignment of liability and, depending on the statutory language, reducing or eliminating manufacturer liability. If one believes that the tort system creates externalities, reducing tort liability would reduce externalities. No-fault automobile insurance in the United States had the unintended consequence of increasing costs. It is possible that the same would be true for a new no-fault approach, though there may be ways to control this. If not economic, how likely is it to achieve its desired policy outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 4 Is the strategy likely to result in unintended consequences? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 2 Eï¬ ci en cy If the strategy is economic, how well does the strategy recover the costs from the externality? 1=not at all, 5=extremely well 1 The likelihood of the strategy producing a net- positive socially beneï¬cial outcome depends on how important it is to (a) clarify liability, and (b) reduce manufacturer liability. At this point, it is not clear how socially important those goals are.How likely is the strategy to produce a net-positive socially beneï¬cial outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 2 Eq ui ty How likely is the strategy to increase costs or place burden on low-income or other socially disadvantaged groups? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 2 Historically, state no-fault automobile insurance has increased auto insurance costs. This may harm the urban poor for whom auto insurance costs are particularly high. Eliminating a right to sue either another motorist or an auto manufacturer may increase the perception of inequity. How likely is the strategy to increase costs or burden on the groups responsible for the initial externality? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely NA How likely is the strategy to result in an unfair distribution of beneï¬ts across society? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 3 Po liti ca l Are any politically powerful stakeholders likely to oppose the strategy? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 2 Plaintiï¬sâ lawyers and consumer groups are likely to oppose this strategy. The general public may support the idea of simplifying liability, though past state no-fault statutes have not been especially popular. How likely is the general public to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 3
133 Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale How likely are decision makers to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 2 O pe ra ti on al How disruptive is implementation of the strategy to the implementing agency? 1=very disruptive, 5=not at all disruptive 3 The operational challenges depend on the statute and whether the state has experience with no-fault automobile insurance. If the state has experience with no-fault automobile insurance, the operational challenges are likely to be fairly minimal. However, if the state has not had no-fault automobile insurance recently, the operational challenges are likely to be greater since lawyers, judges, consumers, and insurance adjusters all need to learn how this approach works. Does implementing the strategy require new or complex governing structures? 1=requires, 5=does not require 3 How expensive is it to implement the strategy? 1=extremely expensive, 5=minimal expense to implement 5 Does the agency workforce have the necessary skills and knowledge to implement the strategy? 1=does not have skills and knowledge, 5=skill-and knowledge-ready to implement 2 Does implementing the strategy require new infrastructure or adaptations to existing infrastructure? 1=new infrastructure, 3=adapting infrastructure, 5=neither 5 What is the overall scale of the technical, institutional, political, or ï¬nancial challenge to implementing the strategy? 1=many challenges, 5=no challenges 3
134 REQUIRE MOTORISTS TO CARRY MORE INSURANCE Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale Ef fe ct iv en es s If the strategy is economic, how well does it internalize external costs into private actorsâ decision making? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 5 The economic eï¬ectiveness of eliminating the existing negative externality would be very high with the use of this strategy. Without enforcement, the strategy may have unintended consequences, namely increased incidence of consumers not purchasing any insurance. It may also exacerbate existing inequalities because many of the urban poor have very high automobile insurance costs. If not economic, how likely is it to achieve its desired policy outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely NA Is the strategy likely to result in unintended consequences? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 3 Ef fic ie nc y If the strategy is economic, how well does the strategy recover the costs from the externality? 1=not at all, 5=extremely well 5 The strategy is very eï¬cient because it eliminates the existing externality. It is very likely to produce a net-positive socially beneï¬cial outcome because it will eliminate the existing subsidy for unsafe vehicles and drivers. How likely is the strategy to produce a net-positive socially beneï¬cial outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 5 Eq ui ty How likely is the strategy to increase costs or place burden on low-income or other socially disadvantaged groups? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 1 The strategy will likely increase costs placed on low-income urban groups. It will also increase costs on groups that most beneï¬ted from this negative externality. It is not likely that this strategy will result in an unfair or inequitable distribution across society because insurance costs will roughly reï¬ect the actual costs that are imposed on others. How likely is the strategy to increase costs or burden on the groups responsible for the initial externality? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 1 How likely is the strategy to result in an unfair distribution of beneï¬ts across society? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 3 Po lit ic al Are any politically powerful stakeholders likely to oppose the strategy? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 3 It is diï¬cult to predict whether insurers would support or oppose this measure. While one might think that insurers would support state laws that required the purchase of more insurance, insurers may fear additional regulation that may go along with this. Plaintiï¬sâ attorneys are likely to support this measure. Absent education about the beneï¬ts of this How likely is the general public to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 2
135 Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale How likely are decision makers to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 4 approach, the general public may oppose this strategy because it will result in an increase in their insurance costs, at least in the short term. This may result in widespread opposition. One group of beneï¬ciaries of this approachâthose who will be seriously injured as a result of crashes and who are now able to recover damages that they would not have been able toâare impossible to identify ex ante, prior to the crashes occurring. The societal beneï¬ts that result from increased incentives to adopt safer automobile technology are diï¬use. Policy makers may accept this approach based on the arguments raised above. There are also other variations that would accomplish similar ends of reducing the negative externality created by underinsurance. For example, a state may enact an under-insured motorists pool that would pay the diï¬erence between the victimâs damages and the at-fault defendantâs insurance coverage. If this were funded by a tax on dangerous cars/drivers, many of the same goals would be accomplished and might well be more politically palatable than a mandatory across-the-board increase in insurance coverage. This would represent a state-run mandatory insurance policy that would cover all drivers. Assessing premiums/taxes based on true crash risk would have a similar eï¬ect in reducing externalities as requiring an increase in mandatory insurance. If the taxes to fund this pool were funded in other ways (e.g., gas tax), the incentives to shift toward safer transportation modes would be weaker. O pe ra tio na l How disruptive is implementation of the strategy to the implementing agency? 1=very disruptive, 5=not at all disruptive 5 The policy would not be operationally disruptive to the implementing entity. It would not require any new or complex governance structures if enacted at the state level. Every state already has an existing mechanism to determine whether motorists have purchased the required auto insurance. However, it may require increasing resources devoted to enforcement of these requirements. Does implementing the strategy require new or complex governing structures? 1=requires, 5=does not require 5=minimal expense to implement 5 How expensive is it to implement the strategy? 1=extremely expensive, 5
136 Does the agency workforce have the necessary skills and knowledge to implement the strategy? 1=does not have skills and knowledge, 5=skill-and knowledge-ready to implement 5 Does implementing the strategy require new infrastructure or adaptations to existing infrastructure? 1=new infrastructure, 3=adapting infrastructure, 5=neither 5 What is the overall scale of the technical, institutional, political, or ï¬nancial challenge to implementing the strategy? 1=many challenges, 5=no challenges 2.5 Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale
137 SUBSIDIZE CV-EQUIPPED VEHICLES Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale Eï¬ ec ti ve ne ss If the strategy is economic, how well does it internalize external costs into private actorsâ decision making? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 4 The subsidy strategy for CV technologies will enable stakeholders to internalize the costs associated with the externalities that have been identiï¬ed by responding to a speciï¬c price signal that encourages the adoption of this technology. However, subsidizing this technology will, by design, accelerate the adoption of the technology, which will be disruptive even for many unrelated segments of the economy. If not economic, how likely is it to achieve its desired policy outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely N/A Is the strategy likely to result in unintended consequences? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 2 Eï¬ ci en cy If the strategy is economic, how well does the strategy recover the costs from the externality? 1=not at all, 5=extremely well 5 CV technology subsidies would eï¬ectively recover costs from the externalities identiï¬ed and would produce a net-positive outcome for society. How likely is the strategy to produce a net- positive socially beneï¬cial outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 4 Eq ui ty How likely is the strategy to increase costs or place burden on low-income or other socially disadvantaged groups? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 5 This strategy is likely to positively aï¬ect most segments of society, although in the short term, some segments will be economically disrupted. How likely is the strategy to increase costs or burden on the groups responsible for the initial externality? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 4 How likely is the strategy to result in an unfair distribution of beneï¬ts across society? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 4 Po liti ca l Are any politically powerful stakeholders likely to oppose the strategy? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 3 The general public is and will be very accepting of this technology except in the area of privacy and security, as are/will be decision makers who are responsible for deployment and management of a subsidy program, whereas decision makers in Congress may be less enamored with funding a technology subsidy. How likely is the general public to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 5=extremely likely 5 How likely are decision makers to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 3
138 O pe ra ti on al How disruptive is implementation of the strategy to the implementing agency? 1=very disruptive, 5=not at all disruptive 3 Implementing a subsidy program would not be disruptive to USDOT or to vehicle OEMs since it would not involve any governing structures that have not been implemented in the past. The cost to implement this program would be nominal despite its size, and the stakeholders involved already have the staï¬ and skills necessary. However, the scale of the challenges for implementation is large. Does implementing the strategy require new or complex governing structures? 1=requires, 5=does not require 3 How expensive is it to implement the strategy? 1=extremely expensive, 5=minimal expense to implement 3 Does the agency workforce have the necessary skills and knowledge to implement the strategy? 1=does not have skills and knowledge, 5=skill-and knowledge-ready to implement 5 Does implementing the strategy require new infrastructure or adaptations to existing infrastructure? 1=new infrastructure, 3=adapting infrastructure, 5=neither 5 What is the overall scale of the technical, institutional, political, or ï¬nancial challenge to implementing the strategy? 1=many challenges, 5=no challenges 2 Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale
139 INVEST IN CV INFRASTRUCTURE Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale Eï¬ ec ti ve ne ss If the strategy is economic, how well does it internalize external costs into private actorsâ decision making? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely NA CV infrastructure funding is marginally likely to aï¬ect the overall development of CV technologies and is unlikely to have unintended consequences. If not economic, how likely is it to achieve its desired policy outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 3 Is the strategy likely to result in unintended consequences? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 5 Eï¬ ci en cy If the strategy is economic, how well does the strategy recover the costs from the externality? 1=not at all, 5=extremely well NA It is still unclear whether the beneï¬ts of increased funding for CV infrastructure will be greater than its costs. How likely is the strategy to produce a net- positive socially beneï¬cial outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 3 Eq ui ty How likely is the strategy to increase costs or place burden on low-income or other socially disadvantaged groups? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 4 CV infrastructure funding is unlikely to increase costs for any end users; however, depending on where the funding is applied, the distribution of beneï¬ts could be unevenly distributed in society. How likely is the strategy to increase costs or burden on the groups responsible for the initial externality? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 4 How likely is the strategy to result in an unfair distribution of beneï¬ts across society? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 2 Po liti ca l Are any politically powerful stakeholders likely to oppose the strategy? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 4 There is no signiï¬cant political opposition to this strategy, other than general opposition to spending money on transportation infrastructure. How likely is the general public to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 5=extremely likely 4 How likely are decision makers to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 2
140 O pe ra ti on al How disruptive is implementation of the strategy to the implementing agency? 1=very disruptive, 5=not at all disruptive 4 Funding of CV infrastructure is unlikely to be disruptive and could easily be managed by existing resources within USDOT; however, the scale for CV infrastructure deployment is potentially massive.Does implementing the strategy require new or complex governing structures? 1=requires, 5=does not require 5 How expensive is it to implement the strategy? 1=extremely expensive, 5=minimal expense to implement 3 Does the agency workforce have the necessary skills and knowledge to implement the strategy? 1=does not have skills and knowledge, 5=skill-and knowledge-ready to implement 3 Does implementing the strategy require new infrastructure or adaptations to existing infrastructure? 1=new infrastructure, 3=adapting infrastructure, 5=neither 4 What is the overall scale of the technical, institutional, political, or ï¬nancial challenge to implementing the strategy? 1=many challenges, 5=no challenges 2 Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale
141 GRANT AV- AND CV-EQUIPPED VEHICLES PRIVILEGED ACCESS TO DEDICATED LANES Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale Eï¬ ec ti ve ne ss If the strategy is economic, how well does it internalize external costs into private actorsâ decision making? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely N/A If the intent is to increase market penetration of equipped vehicles, success will depend on road operatorsâ willingness to dedicate lanes to AVs and CVs. If the intent is to reduce VMT in a restricted district or area (like an urban center), success will depend on how well the supply of SAVs matches demand. If not economic, how likely is it to achieve its desired policy outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 3 Is the strategy likely to result in unintended consequences? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 5 Eï¬ ci en cy If the strategy is economic, how well does the strategy recover the costs from the externality? 1=not at all, 5=extremely well N/A For minimal cost, the potential societal beneï¬ts in (primarily) reduced travel time are very large and could incentivize acceptance and adoption. How likely is the strategy to produce a net- positive socially beneï¬cial outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 4 Eq ui ty How likely is the strategy to increase costs or place burden on low-income or other socially disadvantaged groups? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 5 This strategy could beneï¬t users of both dedicated lanes and general purpose lanes. How likely is the strategy to increase costs or burden on the groups responsible for the initial externality? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely NA How likely is the strategy to result in an unfair distribution of beneï¬ts across society? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 4 Po liti ca l Are any politically powerful stakeholders likely to oppose the strategy? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 4 As long as the MLs still operate at a high level of service, opposition should be relatively minimal. However, increased use of MLs will face some opposition from current users of the MLs, such as transit, low- or zero-emission vehicles, carpools, etc. How likely is the general public to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 4
142 Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale How likely are decision makers to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 5 O pe ra ti on al How disruptive is implementation of the strategy to the implementing agency? 1=very disruptive, 5=not at all disruptive 3 The amount of disruption varies directly with the market penetration of AVs and CVs. If there is a small percentage and only a few users of dedicated lanes, the disruption would be minimal. If there is a large percentage, then they may comprise the entire system, which would disrupt current users. However, those current users should beneï¬t due to the large increase in capacity overall. Allowing AVs and CVs in dedicated lanes will require little to no change in governing structure since it is an extension of current ML practice. In addition, if using existing lanes, the strategy requires minimal cost to implement. The current workforce has the skills to incorporate another user group on MLs. This strategy represents relatively small challenges, many that are similar to ones that have been overcome on MLs already when adding other vehicle groups. Does implementing the strategy require new or complex governing structures? 1=requires, 5=does not require 5 How expensive is it to implement the strategy? 1=extremely expensive, 5=minimal expense to implement 4 Does the agency workforce have the necessary skills and knowledge to implement the strategy? 1=does not have skills and knowledge, 5=skill-and knowledge-ready to implement 3 Does implementing the strategy require new infrastructure or adaptations to existing infrastructure? 1=new infrastructure, 3=adapting infrastructure, 5=neither 3 What is the overall scale of the technical, institutional, political, or ï¬nancial challenge to implementing the strategy? 1=many challenges, 5=no challenges 4
143 GRANT SIGNAL PRIORITY TO CVS Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale Eï¬ ec ti ve ne ss If the strategy is economic, how well does it internalize external costs into private actorsâ decision making? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely N/A It is unlikely that this policy will be the driving force to increase market penetration because the travel time beneï¬ts will be minimal. It may also have the negative outcome of reduced priority treatment for transit. If not economic, how likely is it to achieve its desired policy outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 1 Is the strategy likely to result in unintended consequences? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 2 Eï¬ ci en cy If the strategy is economic, how well does the strategy recover the costs from the externality? 1=not at all, 5=extremely well N/A This strategy will require a large percentage of the ï¬eet to be CV to obtain beneï¬ts that would exceed costs because the travel time savings will be minimal and can only be used when conditions are right.How likely is the strategy to produce a net- positive socially beneï¬cial outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 2 Eq ui ty How likely is the strategy to increase costs or place burden on low-income or other socially disadvantaged groups? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 2 This strategy could increase travel time delay for non-CV and transit riders. It may beneï¬t only those who own CVs, likely the more well oï¬ travelers. It will likely have the most negative impact on transit bus travelers. How likely is the strategy to increase costs or burden on the groups responsible for the initial externality? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely NA How likely is the strategy to result in an unfair distribution of beneï¬ts across society? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 2 Po liti ca l Are any politically powerful stakeholders likely to oppose the strategy? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 3 Transit operators may oppose the implementation of this strategy. There are likely to be mixed feelings among the general public since some non-CVs experience longer travel times and fewer green lights. However, this may encourage these individuals to consider owning or using CV-equipped vehicles. How likely is the general public to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 5=extremely likely 3 How likely are decision makers to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 3
144 O pe ra ti on al How disruptive is implementation of the strategy to the implementing agency? 1=very disruptive, 5=not at all disruptive 4 Providing priority treatment for CVs will likely result in limited impact or disruption in traï¬c ï¬ow and require little to no change in government structures since it is an extension of current practice with transit sign priority treatments. Likewise, there is minimal expense to implement the strategy. The strategy is somewhat more complex than transit signal priority since there are a limited number of calls for green time by transit vehicles at any given intersection. New algorithms overseeing the priority treatment for CVs would be needed. The technical and ï¬nancial challenges are minimal, but the potential positive impact of this preferential treatment is limited. Plus, CVs and transit vehicles that currently have preferential treatment may be worse oï¬. Does implementing the strategy require new or complex governing structures? 1=requires, 5=does not require 5 How expensive is it to implement the strategy? 1=extremely expensive, 5=minimal expense to implement 4 Does the agency workforce have the necessary skills and knowledge to implement the strategy? 1=does not have skills and knowledge, 5=skill-and knowledge-ready to implement 3 Does implementing the strategy require new infrastructure or adaptations to existing infrastructure? 1=new infrastructure, 3=adapting infrastructure, 5=neither 3 What is the overall scale of the technical, institutional, political, or ï¬nancial challenge to implementing the strategy? 1=many challenges, 5=no challenges 3 Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale
145 GRANT PARKING ACCESS TO AV- AND CV-EQUIPPED VEHICLES Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale Eï¬ ec ti ve ne ss If the strategy is economic, how well does it internalize external costs into private actorsâ decision making? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely N/A Priority parking will have little to no eï¬ect on the market penetration of AVs and CVs. The ability of an AV to park itself will likely increase the market penetration of AVs and CVs. If implemented, it would reduce some parking availability for non-AVs.If not economic, how likely is it to achieve its desired policy outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 1 Is the strategy likely to result in unintended consequences? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 5 Eï¬ ci en cy If the strategy is economic, how well does the strategy recover the costs from the externality? 1=not at all, 5=extremely well N/A Costs may be minimal, but beneï¬ts will also be minimal. When AVs are in an SAV model and they are provided with priority pick- up/drop-oï¬ locations, there will likely be some positive social outcome. How likely is the strategy to produce a net-positive socially beneï¬cial outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 3 Eq ui ty How likely is the strategy to increase costs or place burden on low-income or other socially disadvantaged groups? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 3 Well-oï¬ travelers who privately own an AV will beneï¬t from convenient access because the vehicle itself can be parked remotely at no disadvantage to the owner. Consequently, travelers who do not own AVs also beneï¬t because convenient parking locations are freed up for non-AV owners. How likely is the strategy to increase costs or burden on the groups responsible for the initial externality? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely NA How likely is the strategy to result in an unfair distribution of beneï¬ts across society? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 3 Po liti ca l Are any politically powerful stakeholders likely to oppose the strategy? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 4 Since AVs can be parked remotely in parking areas that are rarely used, drivers of conventional vehicles may not be in support of providing limited priority parking spaces to owners of these vehicles. Developers, typically politically powerful stakeholders, would not want to give up valuable parking to a vehicle type unlikely to use it. Policy How likely is the general public to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 2
146 Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale How likely are decision makers to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 4 makers may support the strategy if it were proven to be eï¬ective in spurring market penetration. However, with electric vehicles, the provision of preferential parking has only shown limited eï¬ectiveness. O pe ra ti on al How disruptive is implementation of the strategy to the implementing agency? 1=very disruptive, 5=not at all disruptive 3 The use of parking spaces will fundamentally shift. Areas of parking that are rarely used (remote parking in a shopping center or remote spaces downtown) can now be used for CV/AV parking as long as convenient curb access is provided. This allows more balanced use of parking resources and frees up close-in parking for non-CV/AV use. Additionally, if AVs are used in an SAV model, the number of parking spaces needed may be reduced and the need for curb access will increase. CV/AVs will enable reevaluation of parking criteria and space allocation. It is likely that new city codes will be needed that reduce the amount of parking required by a development. The expense to deï¬ne and implement new parking guidelines will be minimal in dollars but will require careful consideration and time to develop. The current workforce lacks information about CV/AV market penetration and timing to thoughtfully provide new parking requirements. There is unlikely to be new infrastructure adaptations for AVs. If parking infrastructure is to communicate with CVs, new technology would need to be installed in parking facilities. The political forces that have interest in parking requirements are likely to be on opposite sides of the issue for CV/AVs. Developers will desire reduced parking requirements on the basis that AVs can be parked remotely and an SAV reduces the number of spaces needed. On the other hand, businesses may see reduced parking as a threat to customer access. Does implementing the strategy require new or complex governing structures? 1=requires, 5=does not require 3 How expensive is it to implement the strategy? 1=extremely expensive, 5=minimal expense to implement 4 Does the agency workforce have the necessary skills and knowledge to implement the strategy? 1=does not have skills and knowledge, 5=skill-and knowledge-ready to implement 2 Does implementing the strategy require new infrastructure or adaptations to existing infrastructure? 1=new infrastructure, 3=adapting infrastructure, 5=neither 3 What is the overall scale of the technical, institutional, political, or ï¬nancial challenge to implementing the strategy? 1=many challenges, 5=no challenges 4
147 IMPLEMENT NEW CONTRACTUAL MECHANISMS WITH PRIVATE SERVICE PROVIDERS Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale Eï¬ ec ti ve ne ss If the strategy is economic, how well does it internalize external costs into private actorsâ decision making? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely NA P3 arrangements are very eï¬ective at bringing to a market new products and services that beneï¬t the public interest while providing ï¬nancial incentives for private- sector investment. Each P3 is diï¬erent, so unintended consequences are certainly a possibility with this strategy. If not economic, how likely is it to achieve its desired policy outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 5 Is the strategy likely to result in unintended consequences? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 3 Eï¬ ci en cy If the strategy is economic, how well does the strategy recover the costs from the externality? 1=not at all, 5=extremely well NA P3 arrangements have a long history of creating net-positive beneï¬ts to society, so this strategy for CV/AV technologies would likely have similar outcomes. How likely is the strategy to produce a net-positive socially beneï¬cial outcome? 1=not at all likely, 5=extremely likely 4 Eq ui ty How likely is the strategy to increase costs or place burden on low-income or other socially disadvantaged groups? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 4 This strategy is unlikely to increase costs or impose other burdens on low-income groups since one of the primary focuses of P3 projects is on the public interest. However, P3s do have the potential to distribute beneï¬ts unequally across society, depending on the particular structure of the arrangement. How likely is the strategy to increase costs or burden on the groups responsible for the initial externality? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 4 How likely is the strategy to result in an unfair distribution of beneï¬ts across society? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 3 Po liti ca l Are any politically powerful stakeholders likely to oppose the strategy? 1=extremely likely, 5=extremely unlikely 3 This strategy has the potential to elicit opposition regardless of the P3 structure; however, if approached as a beneï¬t to a large cross-section of society and industry, opposition would likely be minimal. How likely is the general public to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 4
148 Criteria Consideration Likert Rating Rationale How likely are decision makers to accept this strategy? 1=extremely unlikely, 5=extremely likely 4 O pe ra ti on al How disruptive is implementation of the strategy to the implementing agency? 1=very disruptive, 5=not at all disruptive 4 This strategy by itself is not disruptive to an implementing agency, and although it does require detailed and often complex governing structures, local agencies are becoming more familiar with these, and USDOT oï¬ers toolkits and conferences around forming P3s. Implementing this strategy can be expensive, but no more so than any other contract. In the case of CV/AV technology, new infrastructure would be needed. Does implementing the strategy require new or complex governing structures? 1=requires, 5=does not require 3 How expensive is it to implement the strategy? 1=extremely expensive, 5=minimal expense to implement 5 Does the agency workforce have the necessary skills and knowledge to implement the strategy? 1=does not have skills and knowledge, 5=skill-and knowledge-ready to implement 5 Does implementing the strategy require new infrastructure or adaptations to existing infrastructure? 1=new infrastructure, 3=adapting infrastructure, 5=neither 2 What is the overall scale of the technical, institutional, political, or ï¬nancial challenge to implementing the strategy? 1=many challenges, 5=no challenges 3
149 REFERENCES Chatman, D. G., and N. Voorhoeve. (2010). The transportation-credit mortgage: a post-mortem. Housing Policy Debate, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 355â382.
Abbreviations and acronyms used without definitions in TRB publications: A4A Airlines for America AAAE American Association of Airport Executives AASHO American Association of State Highway Officials AASHTO American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials ACIâNA Airports Council InternationalâNorth America ACRP Airport Cooperative Research Program ADA Americans with Disabilities Act APTA American Public Transportation Association ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials ATA American Trucking Associations CTAA Community Transportation Association of America CTBSSP Commercial Truck and Bus Safety Synthesis Program DHS Department of Homeland Security DOE Department of Energy EPA Environmental Protection Agency FAA Federal Aviation Administration FAST Fixing Americaâs Surface Transportation Act (2015) FHWA Federal Highway Administration FMCSA Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration FRA Federal Railroad Administration FTA Federal Transit Administration HMCRP Hazardous Materials Cooperative Research Program IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers ISTEA Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 ITE Institute of Transportation Engineers MAP-21 Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (2012) NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASAO National Association of State Aviation Officials NCFRP National Cooperative Freight Research Program NCHRP National Cooperative Highway Research Program NHTSA National Highway Traffic Safety Administration NTSB National Transportation Safety Board PHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration RITA Research and Innovative Technology Administration SAE Society of Automotive Engineers SAFETEA-LU Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (2005) TCRP Transit Cooperative Research Program TDC Transit Development Corporation TEA-21 Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (1998) TRB Transportation Research Board TSA Transportation Security Administration U.S.DOT United States Department of Transportation
TRA N SPO RTATIO N RESEA RCH BO A RD 500 Fifth Street, N W W ashington, D C 20001 A D D RESS SERV ICE REQ U ESTED N O N -PR O FIT O R G . U .S. PO STA G E PA ID C O LU M B IA , M D PER M IT N O . 88 A dvancing A utom ated and Connected V ehicles: Policy and Planning Strategies for State and Local Transportation A gencies N CH RP Research Report 845 TRB ISBN 978-0-309-44646-4 9 7 8 0 3 0 9 4 4 6 4 6 4 9 0 0 0 0