Design Considerations for Airport EOCs (2018)

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30 Introduction This section of the Guidebook builds on the planning process outlined in Section 4, which described three options for EOC improvements: update a current EOC within existing space, relocate to an existing facility, or build a new greenfield site. There are many factors to consider when evaluating existing or new sites, including topography and environmental constraints along with adjacent conditions involving any existing and planned support facilities such as operations offices, including fire departments and communications centers. Environmental protection, health, safety and zoning code requirements also come into play. Other considerations include noise protection from adjacent land use or flight approach and takeoff corridors, and the ability to provide a safe and sustainable environment during a crisis. In addition, an assessment of surrounding vulnerabilities, overlaid with the national terrorist profile will need to be taken into consideration. Alternate site locations that can provide minimum redundant infrastructure should be considered in the evaluation. The following sections provide planning considerations to help airports of all sizes and com- plexities address the adequacy of their current EOC, as well as aid in the identification and evaluation of new sites. Planning considerations will focus on selection criteria for both existing and new sites including: • Accessibility, • Serviceability, • Safety and security, • Size, • Environmental constraints, • Versatility and adjacency, and • Resiliency and TVA. A site evaluation checklist (Figure 5-6) is provided at the end of this section, to help airport operators and their various stakeholders make informed decisions regarding site selection. Site Evaluation The primary goal of any EOC site, whether existing or new, is to provide a safe and operational effective area for the emergency management staff to carry out their duties and responsibili- ties. The key evaluation components for existing and new sites are described below. Section 4 provided a Decision Tree to help airports choose among the three potential site scenarios. For scenarios where a new site will be considered, conduct and document independent site visits, and rank them based on their ability to meet the site evaluation criteria outlined. S E C T I O N 5 Site Selection

Site Selection 31 Existing Sites and Buildings If the Decision Tree identifies the EOC to be updated or relocated to an existing site, the guidelines to consider include the following. Accessibility The existing building or site should be readily accessible in the event of an emergent event for airport personnel and various stakeholders involved in the emergency response management and support. • Public Roadway Access—For EOCs located outside of airport property-controlled access points, assess the site for quick and convenient access from the public roadway system, while also surveying potential congested areas that could hinder access. Survey the existing site for roadways that may become flooded during heavy periods of rain or buried by drifting snow. Road access that is elevated above low-lying areas helps avoid such incidents during inclement weather. Review the site against routes that may permit unimpeded access to the site, such as those that cross rail lines or those areas with low underpass clearances that may not permit large emergency vehicles to access the site. While limiting access to the EOC through a single controlled point of entry enhances security of the site, consider alternate points of access and egress should the primary become compromised. Additionally, a separate service access away from the main point of entry may be desirable.1 • Airfield and Perimeter Road Access—For sites being considered within the airport secured perimeter, assess the building’s location from the entry point for long routes around the airfield system that could hinder access response time. Locate the building far enough inside the airport perimeter fence to enhance security effectiveness, supported by a large open space between the building and the perimeter access road or fence to mitigate the effect of potential blast effects.2 • Parking—Provide ample, well-lit parking in a secured environment with enough capacity to serve all stakeholder requirements, such as small vehicles, buses, mobile command units, and large emergency response vehicles such as those used by the fire department. • Existing Building Access—If the EOC site is within the existing building such as a terminal, wayfinding and signage will be critical for personnel to quickly access the area. If the area is on the SIDA side of the terminal or within the existing Airport Operations Area (AOA) requiring badged or permit access to the site, appropriate measures to allow personnel secure access to these areas will need to be considered. Additionally, assess the location for ADA compliance. Section 6 provides additional information on building accessibility. • Counter-Surveillance—Assess views of the building from the non-secure side of the site; e.g., does the building have unrestricted visual access from street corners, is its purpose obvious, can potential surveillance be detected via CCTV or security patrols? Serviceability and Infrastructure To ascertain the ability of the existing site or building to support the required infrastructure needed to access and operate an EOC, conduct a survey of existing site conditions while consid- ering the following: • The site must support required infrastructure such as water, power, gas, fiber cabling, and communications systems. While Ethernet provides the most reliable, stable, and fast source for LAN communication, Wi-Fi provides freedom of travel around the building and site. However, consider evaluating Wi-Fi for inside and outside sources that may interfere with network stability. Likewise, for voice communication, evaluate potential cellular inter- ference from nearby structures or existing building systems. Ideally, the existing building or site will be located away from radio interference or other tall metal structures,3 which may interfere with communications requirements.4

32 Design Considerations for Airport EOCs • Assess the building for convenient and adequate access to fire hydrants.5 • Review the building or site for critical redundant utility systems that may be needed to support site security, life safety, and rescue functions in the EOC. • Assess the building location for potential vulnerabilities to wind-blown debris.4 • Ideally, existing structures being considered for an EOC will be located on higher ground to avoid potential flooding. • EOCs being considered on upper floors of an existing building must provide adequate vertical circulation such as stairs and elevators, with assessment of how they might be compromised during severe weather events or a fire in the building. Higher floors could also be more susceptible to windstorm damage depending on the location of the building.4 • If desired, assess the site or existing building for opportunities to implement sustainable design measures such as Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED). At a minimum, consider best practices associated with sustainable design. • Consider conducting a noise analysis to ensure adjacent surroundings will not affect the oper- ation of the EOC during an emergency crisis and, if so, what steps will be taken to mitigate the issue. • Assess and review existing building systems (HVAC access and service, electrical redundancy, wall, ceiling, floor engineering, etc.). Systems, to the extent possible, should be compartmen- talized or segregated from other building systems. Safety and Security Safety and security are critical to the site functioning and remaining secure during emergent situations. Security for the existing site or building is discussed in the TVA section. Consider the following principles6 outlined below when evaluating the existing site’s ability to protect the EOC from outside threats. • Wayfinding and signage—Wayfinding is important to the security of the site. Measures need be taken to reduce the number of persons with knowledge concerning sensitive areas of the site such as communications or utility areas. A means to provide stakeholders with the required information to access the EOC will be established and distributed on a need-to-know basis only. • Controlled access—Ideally, existing sites will have pull-off areas at the entrance for vehicle checks if parking is set within a controlled access area. Avoid existing buildings with per- pendicular or straight-line of vehicle access. Buildings sited with parallel access mitigate the potential for vehicles to ram the building from the entrance. Study the site for existing service access and its location with respect to potentially affecting critical functions of the building, such as utilities, during a blast event. • Parking—In review of existing vehicle access, remove all “under building” or inside drives from consideration, and assess the addition of structures that support keeping vehicles on the designated roadway: e.g., curves, curbs, trees, berms, speed bumps, etc., while allowing for emergency response access if needed. At a minimum, consider inspecting vehicles prior to entering the underground parking area. For any parking areas adjacent to the controlled EOC site that are utilized for general parking, review existing setbacks to minimize the effects of potential vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). • Lighting—Evaluate existing lighting for its effectiveness to help prevent or minimize poten- tial intruders from gaining undetected access to the controlled area of the site or building. Consider backup or emergency power as practical. Critical areas to evaluate include any essential utility pathways, including power, communications, HVAC, and water distribution. • Weather protection—Assess the existing site against potential flooding and ponding due to severe weather if located in a depressed area within the airport surroundings. Analyze an exist- ing building for proper structural protection against earthquakes and high wind events such as those from tornadoes and hurricanes.

Site Selection 33 Size The size of the site or existing building plays a key role in the ability of the EOC to provide all the necessary functions and supporting infrastructure, including safety and security, needed to operate the facility. Section 7 provides information on size and layout requirements for the building. Consider the following when evaluating the existing site or building for the location of the potential EOC: • Identify all stakeholders to ascertain the site’s ability to support the required building envelope and necessary parking spaces. • The initial driver to design will be the intended ConOps of the facility—how it will work, who will be there, policies and procedures during an event response—then design to support that function. • Assess the site or building for flexibility to expand the EOC, if required, beyond its current envelope, including the associated infrastructure requirements needed to operate a larger facility as well as security enhancements required for proper protection. • Assess the site for adequate clear zones and setbacks from the perimeter, which provide necessary security for the building. • The site must be clear from runway protection zone (RPZ) penetrations. Versatility and Adjacency Flexibility is key to successful EOC site planning including the ability to accommodate emerging technologies and future functional requirements. See Section 7 for additional infor- mation on building flexibility and adaptability. Consider the following factors to ascertain the existing site’s ability to provide the following: • If the EOC will be co-utilized with different non-emergency functions, conduct a study to determine if separate secured access and increased security such as wall hardening is required and any impacts to the other tenants. • If the facility will be co-utilized or shared with other stakeholders such as Operations, Emer- gency Management, fire, police, etc., a survey of the existing building’s area will be required to ensure proper space is available to meet the needs of all the stakeholders’ programmatic requirements. • Assess locations within the non-secure portions of the terminal for any potential security vulnerabilities, especially various attack vectors using public space. • Make dedicating an EOC facility a goal so that there can be quick set up and start up for EOC functions during crisis management. See Section 7 for additional information on co-utilization. • Study buildings under consideration for an EOC remote from the main stakeholder locations for quick and convenient access during emergency situations. See Section 7 for additional information on adjacencies. New or Greenfield Sites If the Decision Tree referenced in Section 4 identifies a new site, guidelines to consider include the following. Accessibility • Public roadway access—For EOCs located outside of Airport controlled access points, assess the site for quick and convenient access from the public roadway system while also avoiding congested areas that could hinder access. Avoid placing the EOC off roadways that may become flooded during heavy periods of rain or buried by drifting snow. Elevate new

34 Design Considerations for Airport EOCs access roads above low-lying areas to avoid such incidents during inclement weather. Con- sider locating the EOC along routes that permit unimpeded access to the site. Avoid roads that cross rail lines or those with low underpass clearances as they may impede access or not permit large emergency vehicles to access the site. While limiting access to the EOC through a single controlled point of entry enhances security of the site, consider an alternate point of access should the primary become compromised.1 • Airfield and perimeter road access—For sites within the airport secured perimeter (the AOA) consider locating the EOC in an area that avoids long routes around the airfield system from the point of entry. Locate the EOC far enough away from the airport perimeter fence to meet security stand-off guidelines. Larger open spaces between the EOC and the perimeter access road or fence will mitigate the effects of potential threats or attacks against the facility.2 • Parking—Provide ample, well-lit parking in a secured environment with enough vehicle capacity to serve all stakeholder requirements, including small vehicles, buses, mobile com- mand units, and large emergency response vehicles used by fire departments. • Building access—If the area is on the SIDA side of the terminal or within the existing AOA that require badged or permit access to the site, appropriate measures will need to be taken to allow personnel secure access to these areas. Additionally, assess the location for ADA compliance concerning vehicular parking and building access. Section 7 provides additional information on Building Accessibility. • Counter-surveillance—Assess views of the building from the non-secure side of the site; e.g., does the building have unrestricted visual access from street corners, is its purpose obvious, can potential surveillance be detected via CCTV or security patrols? Serviceability and Infrastructure To determine the ability of the new site to support the required infrastructure needed for access, operation, and support functions of the EOC, consider the following. • Adequate, convenient, and quick access to the site or building is critical during an emergency crisis. • The site must support required infrastructure such as water, power, gas, HVAC, fiber cabling, and communications systems. While an ethernet provides the most reliable, stable, and fast source for LAN communication, Wi-Fi provides freedom of travel around the building and site. However, consider evaluating Wi-Fi for both inside and outside sources that may inter- fere with network stability, which is critical for data communication during emergency situa- tions. Likewise, for voice communication, evaluate potential cellular interference from nearby structures or existing building materials. Ideally, the new site will be located away from radio interference and tall metal structures.4 • Assess the site for convenient and adequate access to fire hydrants in case of fire.3 • Review the site for critical redundant utility systems. • Assess the new building location for potential vulnerabilities to wind-blown debris.4 • Ideally, the new EOC facility will be located on higher ground to avert potential flooding. • If desired, assess the site for opportunities to implement sustainable design measures such as LEED. At a minimum, consider best practices associated with sustainable design. • Consider conducting a noise analysis to determine if adjacent surroundings have the potential to affect the operation of the EOC and, if so, what steps will be taken to mitigate the noise issue. Safety and Security Safety and security are essential in ensuring the site will function and remain secure during emergent situations. Security of the site will be discussed in the TVA section. Consider the fol- lowing principles5 outlined below when evaluating the site’s ability to protect the EOC from outside threats.

Site Selection 35 • Wayfinding and signage—Wayfinding is important to the security of the site. Measures need be taken to reduce the number of persons with knowledge concerning sensitive areas of the site such as communications or utility areas. A means to provide stakeholders with the required information to access the EOC will be established and distributed on a need-to-know basis only. • Controlled access—Consider a pull-off area at an entry point with adequate stand-off distance for vehicle checks, if parking is set within the controlled access area. Avoid perpen- dicular or straight-line of access to the new site while considering parallel access that mitigates the potential for vehicles to ram the building from the site entrance. Study the new site for service access and its location with respect to potentially affecting critical functions of the building, such as utilities, from a blast event. Avoid access drives into or under the building. Other site design techniques that help keep vehicles within the roadway include curbs, trees, berms, speed bumps, etc. These measures, however, will need to be studied to avoid inter- fering with emergency response times. • Parking—If possible, prohibit parking in areas below the building. If the EOC is within a secured zone, limit interior parking to employees. Provide proper setbacks from the general parking areas to mitigate potential blast effects of VBIED. • Lighting—Evaluate lighting plans for effectiveness to prevent or detect potential intruders from accessing the controlled area of the site or building. Consider backup lighting or emergency power as appropriate. Cover critical areas with lighting, including site access, building perimeter areas, any essential utility locations such as power, communications, and water distribution. • Weather protection—Avoid new sites at risk for flooding or excessive ponding. Provide the new building with proper structural protection against earthquakes, and high wind events such as those from tornadoes and hurricanes. Size The size of the site plays a key role in the ability of the EOC to provide all the necessary func- tions and supporting infrastructure, including safety and security needed to operate the facility. Section 7 provides information on size and layout requirements for the building itself. Consider the following when evaluating the new EOC site: • Identify all stakeholders to ascertain the site’s ability to support the required building enve- lope and supporting parking spaces. • The initial driver to design will be the intended ConOps of the facility—how it will work, who will be there, policies and procedures during an event response—then design to support that function. • Assess the site for flexibility to expand the EOC if required beyond its planned envelope, including the associated infrastructure requirements needed to operate a larger facility as well as security enhancements required for proper protection. • Assess the site for adequate clear zones and setbacks from the perimeter, which provide necessary security for the building. • The site must be clear from RPZ penetrations. Versatility and Adjacency Flexibility is key to successful EOC site planning including the ability to accommodate emerging technologies and future functional requirements. See Section 7 for additional infor- mation on building flexibility and adaptability. Consider the following factors to ascertain the new site’s ability to provide the following: • If the EOC will be co-utilized with different non-emergency functions, conduct a study to determine if separate secured access and increased security such as wall hardening is required and any impacts to the other tenants.

36 Design Considerations for Airport EOCs • If the facility will be co-utilized or shared with other stakeholders such as Operations, Emer- gency Management, Fire, Police, etc., a survey of the existing building’s area will be required to ensure proper space is available to meet the needs of all the stakeholders’ programmatic requirements. • Assess locations within the non-secure portions of the terminal for any potential security vulnerabilities, especially various attack vectors using public space. • Non-dedicated space will promote quick set up and start up for EOC functions during crisis management. See Section 7 for additional information on co-utilization. • Study remote sites under consideration for an EOC from the main stakeholder locations for quick and convenient access during emergency situations. See Section 7 for additional information on adjacencies. TVA This process may be used when analyzing site alternatives from a facility TVA and risk per- spective to help the airport narrow down the selection process to the optimum location from a TVA perspective. When considering risk factors of threat (likelihood of that threat and extent of damage or impact) associated with the facility vulnerability, this approach endeavors to reach an overall risk ranking for the use of airport managers. The analysis should consider location and resilience of potential sites under consideration, the operational characteristics and a set of assumptions associated with security measures envisioned for each. The specific vulnerability analysis against the following attack scenarios is recommended: • Active Shooter (including coordinated armed assault, hostage takers, and lone wolf attacks); • VBIED (including IEDs placed on the target and suicide bombers); • Chemical, Biological, Nuclear (CBN) (including a radiological dispersing device); and • Natural Causes (earthquake, tornado, etc.). This approach applies a recognized methodology used by practitioners in DHS and other federal, state, and local agencies for human-caused threats. The approach necessarily involves airport law enforcement, adjacent law enforcement agencies (including state and local, FBI, TSA, and CBP, as appropriate), as well as emergency responders, ARFF, adjacent fire and EMS responders, and state emergency management. This method attempts to identify potential threats at a high level, considering both national- level threat assessments and any reasonable, localized criminal activities that may be associated with or modeled with attack vectors on the facility. Once the threats can be bucketed into catego- ries, scenarios will be developed, again at a high level, to assist in determining how they may be executed in the existing environs at the airport. This process is known as “Red Teaming,” which assigns the task of formulating reasonable attack profiles against the facility. The final piece of the threat assessment will be to determine the risk of such an attack, weighing impact of the attack against likelihood to determine risk and considering known practices already in place called Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP). Figure 5-1 provides an overview of the TVA process, covering the steps necessary to successfully measure risk associated with each potential site. Conduct site surveys to determine vulnerability issues resident with each consideration, using the scoresheet shown in Figure 5-2. Conduct these assessments with the background informa- tion derived from local SMEs, research of local criminal profiles, and national antiterrorism/ counterterrorism documents, allowing the assessor to view the vulnerability assessment through the attacker’s eyes. Finally, the process delivers a high-level rating that allows the user to apply results to decision making and displays scenario-specific vulnerabilities for each site.

Baseline Threat Identification Baseline Threat Profile Threat Scenario Development Red Team Effort Stakeholder Validation TVA Findings TVA ScoringScenario Package Survey Client Threat Profile Community Profile TTP Access Points and Security Facility Vulnerability Assessment Survey Local Law Enforcement National Threat Research Source: Faith Group, LLC. Figure 5-1. TVA process.

38 Design Considerations for Airport EOCs Figure 5-2. Vulnerability assessment scoresheet.

Site Selection 39 The more common attack vectors utilized at airports by terrorists in terms of attack trajecto- ries tend to remain in the realm of low-complexity/high-impact events. IEDs, whether suicide, stand-alone, VBIED, or a combination of delivery methods, or small arms assaults/active shooter attacks, remain the vector of choice for terrorist/extremist operatives. The Guidebook will first provide an approach to dealing with the IED/VBIED threats. From the IED/VBIED perspective, this TVA approach assumes that all sites require a stan- dard package of blast protection and a 300 foot stand-off distance from any public parking area, secured parking for non-badged responders and visitors, a hardened perimeter utilizing the airport fencing and gate standards guidelines, such as K12 rated7 gate drop arms (see Table 5-1); that each site should have the necessary CCTV and ACS in place to provide the requisite level of security; and that each facility should be outfitted with blast mitigation building systems, includ- ing window glazing, limiting windows along public roadways, blast deflection wall systems, and designs that allow for blast wave compression and management. When discussing stand-off distances, several sources point to safe distances for parking struc- tures, passenger terminals (PAX), large gathering spots, or other potential locations where a large Source: Faith Group, LLC. Figure 5-2. (Continued). Source: Department of State standard and found in TSA Airport Design Guidelines, 2011. Table 5-1. Department of State barrier ratings K12 rated gate drop arms.

40 Design Considerations for Airport EOCs IED could be used. Most prudent planners will point to a box van or cargo van for a baseline factor in terms of potential explosive power. As Table 5-2 from the TSA Transportation Security Working Group (TSWG) indicates, these kinds of vehicles can pack explosives with lethal air blast ranges of between 200 and 450 feet. These standards are in keeping with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (BATF) guidance, also adopted by the FBI’s National Counterterrorism Center’s (NCTC’s) blast damage chart. Positive factors in ranking vulnerability include access to the public safety staff (operations, ARFF, EMS, and police). For instance, if the necessary infrastructure is already in place or adjacent to the site (utilities, IT infrastructure, and others), the site will most likely gain some advantages in the selection process. Consider all the baseline data for each site in the process and roll that data into the overall analysis of the TVA. Threat As a starting point for threat assessment associated with airport operations, utilize the 15 National Planning Scenarios identified by the DHS (see list below) when conducting threat assessments for national critical infrastructure. These scenarios can serve as an initial list of poten- tial threats, though not all apply to all airport site locations. For example, an improvised nuclear device, pandemic influenza, earthquake, hurricane, and foreign animal disease are not considered appropriate threats for consideration in this Guidebook. Either they will cause a regional disaster on a big enough scale to trigger an Incident of National Significance (INS), or they are probably not considered likely threats from an EOC facility perspective (earthquake or hurricane). • Nuclear—Improvised Nuclear Device, • Biological—Aerosol Anthrax, • Biological—Pandemic Influenza, • Biological—Plague, • Chemical—Blister Agent, • Chemical—Toxic Industrial Chemical, • Chemical—Nerve Agent, • Chemical—Chlorine Tank Explosions, • Natural—Earthquake, Source: Transportation Security Working Group, Terrorist Bomb Threat Stand-off (Card), Government Printing Office. Table 5-2. TSWG blast effects chart.

Site Selection 41 • Natural—Hurricane, • Radiological—Radiological Dispersal Device (“Dirty Bomb”), • Explosives—Improvised Explosive Device, • Biological—Food Contamination, • Biological—Foreign Animal Disease, and • Cyber. In addition, airports are no strangers to active shooters, as outlined in Table 5-3. The TSA Recommended Security Guidelines for Airport Planning, Design and Construction provides a sample chart of threats (see Table 5-4) from a historical perspective. These attacks can be traced to terrorist organizations and individual lone wolf attackers. While there may not be a specific terrorism target profile aimed at any specific airport, the fact is that air travel, and the FAA National Air Space System (NAS), are long-standing targets for terror attacks. These attacks can also take on the profile of a homegrown or domestic terrorist who may not necessarily be responding to orders from established leaders of terror organizations. Rather, they indoctrinate the philosophy of that organization and move on their own volition. Attack Site Weapon Used Date Fort Lauderdale Hollywood International Airport Lone Wolf/Active Shooter 2017 Will Rogers World Airport Lone Wolf/Active Shooter 2016 Brussels Airport VBIED 2016 Atatürk Airport Armed Assault 2016 Sabiha Gökçen Airport VBIED 2015 Los Angeles International Airport Lone Wolf/Active Shooter 2013 Frankfurt International Airport Lone Wolf/Active Shooter 2011 Glasgow International Airport VBIED 2007 New Orleans International Lone Wolf/Active Shooter 2002 Source: Faith Group, LLC. Table 5-3. List of recent airport attacks. Type of Attack Historical Examples Type of Weapons Explosive and Incendiary Devices 2011—Attack on Domodedovo Airport, Moscow, Russia Suicide bomb; Incendiary device 2010—Hidden explosives in cylinder of thermal liquid containers at screening checkpoint Improvised explosive device 2010—Discovery of explosive devices hidden in printer toner cartridges on all-cargo flights from Yemen Improvised explosive device 2010—Incendiary devices mailed to Maryland and Washington, D.C., area facilities Incendiary device 2009—Attempt to detonate device on-board Northwest Airlines Flight 253 Concealed body-worn plastic explosives 2007—Attack on Glasgow International Airport Incendiary device 2001—Attempt to detonate device on-board American Airlines Flight 93 Concealed body-worn plastic explosives 2001—World Trade Center 1995—Oklahoma City bombing Proximity bombs, incendiary & secondary devices Stand-Off Attack 2001—Tamil Tiger mortar attack and bombing of Sri Lanka's national Airport Anti-tank rockets, mortars Cyber Attack 2002—Code Red Worm Worms, Viruses, Denial of Service Programs Chem-bio, Radiological & Nuclear (CBRN) 1995—Aum Shinrikyo Sarin agent release in Tokyo Subway Chemical, biological, or radiological or nuclear aerosolized Source: TSA Recommended Security Guidelines for Airport Planning, Design and Construction, May 2011. Table 5-4. Examples of terrorist attacks and weapon8.

42 Design Considerations for Airport EOCs Likewise, TSA has documented that Command Centers or Security Operations Centers can be specifically threatened by many potential issues. The potential attack profiles are in the range of those discussed in Table 5-4. This study is focused strictly on the likelihood and impact of terrorist attacks like those outlined in Table 5-4. However, the site vulnerability analysis does consider adjacent environmental elements that do affect the severity of a given threat, including proximity and response time associated with law enforcement (a positive impact), and proximity to HAZMAT or other man- made disaster incidents (a negative impact). Attack Scenarios The Guidebook suggests that threat analysis be accomplished utilizing a specific vulnerability analysis against the following attack scenarios: • Active Shooter (including coordinated armed assault, hostage takers, and lone wolf attacks); • VBIED (including IEDs placed on the target and suicide bombers); and • CBN (including a radiological dispersing device). Utilize supporting scenario development to consider how an attack may be planned and executed. While these attack profiles do not have evidence to support an acute or active moti- vation for the attack, it will consider the likely attack, develop likely approaches, and use them to determine facility vulnerability to such scenarios. Under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 16 (HSPD-16), the DHS analysis of attack scenarios associated with airport infrastruc- ture has narrowed the focus of attacks believed to be the most likely or most attractive attack profiles for airports. Scenarios from the HSPD-16 include the list in Table 5-5. PAX attacks are included to assess potential risk associated with locating the EOC in or adjacent to passenger movement areas. Based upon expert judgment, there are three violent threat areas to consider in this process, developed from the lists discussed above: (a) active shooter, (b) VBIED, and (c) CBN. These scenarios are by no means all inclusive, but they represent what the analysis considers the most likely attack profiles based upon the information and history available. Target Attack Scenario EOC Suicide Bomber Attacker enters facility with 20 lb. of explosives. EOC VBIED Attacker drives truck of explosives into facility. EOC IED Attacker brings roll-along bag containing explosives into facility, leaves it behind and remote detonates. EOC Active Shooter Gunman enters facility and begins killing people. EOC Hostage Taker Attacker enters facility and takes hostages. EOC CBN Attacker enters facility with dispersing device containing chemical, radiological or biological agents. Passenger Terminal (PAX) Suicide Bomber Attacker enters facility with 20 lb. of explosives. PAX VBIED Attacker drives truck of explosives into facility. PAX IED Attacker brings roll-along bag containing explosives into facility, leaves it behind and remote detonates. PAX Armed Assault Handful of attackers enter facility during peak and begin killing people. PAX Active Shooter Gunman enters facility and begins killing people. Source: Homeland Security Presidential Directive. Table 5-5. HSPD-16 threat list for airports.

Site Selection 43 Suicide Bomber—This being a classic terrorist modality, it presumes an attacker could enter the facility (either posing as an “insider” delivery man or other innocuous visitor) with a nominal amount of explosives and shrapnel strapped to his or her body and initiate the explosive upon entering the center. The explosion will destroy the equipment and personnel exposed to the blast within the confines of the EOC, rendering it unusable, and leaving the EOC staff either dead or critically injured. VBIED—This attack envisions up to 400 pounds of explosives in a vehicle (sedan), driven into the building or wall and igniting. The ensuing blast will most probably collapse the building wall, throwing chunks of the facility throughout the operating areas and rendering it unusable, with associated injury and death of its occupants. Not only will the adjacent wall be affected, but potentially the underground infrastructure around the car will also be compromised due to cratering, collapsing the facility and causing widespread casualties. IED Insertion into Facility—This scenario uses similar entry techniques as the suicide bomber, except that the device is left behind and remotely detonated. The device size could range from 30–150 pounds depending on the package and cause extensive damage (in a confined space, 30 pounds of explosives will cause multiple blast and overpressure injuries to any humans exposed, most likely render the facility unusable). CBN—A more complex scenario in some cases, this attack profile envisions the attacker gaining access to the air handling equipment, water supply, or simply entering the facility and releasing an agent. Depending on the agent, the result could range from immediate effects (VX/Sarin or Mustard Agent) to incapacitating agents with symptoms that have delayed onset (Botulism or Anthrax). Another potential route of attack could be an insider-spawned attack, where a refueling truck or other such HAZMAT gains relatively close access to facilities located on the AOA. While it has been some time since any attacker has used chemical or biological agents as a weapon9, the threat still exists and, from an asymmetric attack perspective, remains a viable option. Armed Assault, Active Shooter and Hostage—This scenario envisions an armed assault in the building interior to either inflict maximum casualties or take a hostage(s). The active shooter will begin discharging his weapon upon entry into the facility, or at some point when the largest target group is in range, inflicting maximum casualties. Unless there is a sworn officer on duty in the facility (armed), the shooter will be unopposed. The damage will be done to both system and operators with total damage depending on extent of the rampage. A mapping technique displayed in Figure 5-3 is an example of how the TVA stakeholders can come to a consensus regarding risk of any event. It is used to consider the scenario from the attacker’s perspective, associated with the specific asset, and what the stakeholders and SMEs assess the likelihood and impact of each attack. Based upon expert judgment on how attack scenarios may be carried out, the potential difficulty encountered by the attacker in the execu- tion, and the potential outcome, the vulnerability is ranked as High, Serious, or Low to assist in guiding resource allocation decisions. Add these findings to the individual assessment checklists outlined in the following pages to reach an overall perspective of the assessment. Table 5-6 displays the range of assessment elements. On the vertical axis of the Criticality Matrix is the range of vulnerability, ranging from A–E: (A) “Very Easy,” indicating virtually open and unfettered access to the target to (E) “Too Difficult,” which, in the opinion of the assessor, will be associated with a scenario virtually impossible from the attacker’s perspective. The horizontal axis of the Criticality Matrix considers the potential impacts of the attack, ranging from I–IV: (I), “Loss of Life,” indicating strong possibility of casualties, to (IV), “No Injury, No Service Impact.” Where these assessments come together is an overall assessment of risk

44 Design Considerations for Airport EOCs Im pa ct H ig h Im pa ct L ow Likelihood Low Likelihood High Suicide Bomber Active ShooterIntrusion Fire Earth quake IED VBIED Specific Threat Scenario Mapping Source: Faith Group, LLC. Figure 5-3. Scenario mapping against threat. Source: TSA Recommended Security Guidelines for Airport Planning, Design and Construction, May 2011, Appendix A. Table 5-6. Consequence Mapping Chart (TSA, 2011).

Site Selection 45 including (H) “High,” (S) “Serious,” and (L) “Low.” This assessment used in conjunction with the site Vulnerability Assessment Scoresheet (Figure 5-2) provides a measured sense of risk for each site. While none of these tools is perfect, used together they can help the evaluator consider the problem from several perspectives and prevent overlooking a potential threat. This is termed as “mirror imaging” of the analysis. Mirror imaging is an intelligence analysis term used to describe how an analyst will consider the potential threat based upon their personal, moral, and ethical compass, or on TTP. To reduce this, it is recommended that the threat be analyzed from many different angles and perspectives, which these tools enable, polling many stakeholders in order to fully vet the findings. Site-Specific Assessment To determine overall facility threat and risk, utilize the Vulnerability Assessment Scoresheet (Figure 5-2) when making site-specific assessments. The form considers the seven factors that help better understand the risk associated with each facility, or in this case, each facility location. This assessment considers the overall resilience of the facility to withstand the proposed attack scenarios and will help direct the owner to a more balanced decision regarding site selection. • Level of Visibility—This factor considers the overall SA of the existence of the facility and its functions in the community and the public. If, for instance, the facility has large signs indicat- ing its location and purpose, and is adjacent to easy access from major roadways, it offers a higher risk of being targeted. • Criticality of Target Site to Jurisdiction—For this study, it is assumed that all sites carry the same ranking for this assessment element. As the central point for command and control for airport public safety, it is deemed to be at the “High” level of criticality to the operation. While the airport will not necessarily stop operating without it, law enforcement, operations, and other emergency response events will become challenging. • Impact Outside the Jurisdiction—This assesses the potential impact to other jurisdictions, including national ramifications. For instance, if an IED and/or CBN attack was staged at a major airport or its EOC (especially if coincident with a second attack on similar target), it could potentially trigger a ripple effect across the nation. Again, the assessment in this element will remain constant for each site. • PTE Access to Target—This element considers the obvious: access control, fencing, barriers, vehicle parking lot adjacencies, ease of access and egress to and from major roadways, adja- cencies to public roads, and CCTV and other limiting measures to physical and visual access to the facility. Additionally, stand-off distances will be assessed based upon the FBI’s NCTC Bomb Stand-off Distances Charts (see Figure 5-4 and Figure 5-5). • Potential Target Threat of Hazard—There may be adjacencies such as fuel storage areas or other threats to consider, such as mobile HAZMAT threats (fuel tankers and freight rail). • Potential Target Site Population Capacity—This assessment is based on estimated census of the site and adjacencies. Each site will be assessed to determine the ranking. • Potential for Collateral Mass Casualties—This will assess potential collateral damage within a one-mile radius of the site. This potential for collateral mass casualties assessment considers WMDs (large explosives and biological/chemical weapons) and the value of locating this site away from large populations. Once completed, each site should be assigned a Basic Vulnerability Assessment Rating from 1 to 12, 12 being the highest risk from a threat and vulnerability perspective. While still depend- ing on many subjective assessment tools, utilizing the Vulnerability Assessment Scoresheet (Figure 5-2) will help decision makers ascertain, from a risk perspective, which site is most advantageous. See Figure 5-6 for a site evaluation plan checklist.

46 Design Considerations for Airport EOCs Source: FBI. Figure 5-4. Bomb stand-off chart. Source: FBI. Figure 5-5. Stand-off distance chart.

Site Selection 47 Checklist: Site Evaluation Plan The evaluation checklist provided below identifies key criteria and issues to consider when evaluating sites for a potential EOC. The checklist is organized using the same categories as previously described in this chapter. Existing and New Facilities Accessibility ADA compliance Driving and parking Public roadway access Perimeter road access Airfield access Quick access from terminal and other stakeholder locations Secure Serviceability and Infrastructure Site must support required infrastructure needed to run the EOC Utilities Primary and emergency power Water Communications (landline, cellular, LAN, Wi-Fi) Redundant infrastructure Fire hydrant access Locate away from radio interference and tall metal structures Avoid vulnerabilities to wind-blown debris Locate on higher ground Noise mitigation Safety and Security Wayfinding and directions to the EOC should be distributed on a need-to-know basis Controlled access with secondary access considerations Sterile vs. non-sterile area Vulnerability to HAZMAT (e.g., freight train, truck traffic) Protection from potential blast effects Adequate site area for stand-off distances Adequate site lighting Weather protection Conduct TVA Size Adequate to support required building envelope and supporting parking spaces Flexibility to expand facility if required beyond current envelope Adequate clear zones and setbacks Clear from RPZ penetration Versatility and Adjacency Will facility be co-utilized with a different non-emergency function? Will it be shared with other agencies (i.e. emergency management, fire, and police)? If yes, determine needs of all stakeholders Can site support quick access/start up of facility, i.e., location to terminal and other important stakeholders? ConOps Consult ConOps plan and update as required Once site selection(s) is finalized, update ROM costs Once funding is approved, update ConOps Source: Faith Group, LLC. Figure 5-6. Site evaluation plan checklist.

48 Design Considerations for Airport EOCs Other Considerations Consider a backup site location should the primary EOC become compromised and unable to perform the functions of a fully operational EOC. Ideally, the backup site should be capable of immediate activation and located to minimize the factors that disabled the primary site. Con- sider alternate access routes and a separate power grid from the primary site. Should the backup site be co-utilized with other non-emergency agencies, consider studying impacts to the resident agency to understand if their functions can still be performed or if temporary suspension of their activities is warranted. The minimum infrastructure required to run and support the alternate facility includes all the considerations of the primary EOC site10. Another consideration for an alternative site involves a ready “To Go Bag” with resources necessary to establish a temporary EOC anywhere. “Bag” provisions will ideally include phones, radios and chargers, pencil, paper, all applicable response binders, checklists, forms, as well as a flashlight, emergency-kit stabilized food, and water for at least 48 hours. Do not keep the pro- visions at the airport. They can be kept at an alternative, off-site facility or in the personal care of pre-assigned positions such as the EOC manager and command staff.