Airport Risk Identification and Prioritization Practices (2019)

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47 A P P E N D I X C Sample of Risk Management Reference Materials The materials included in this appendix are documents shared by participants in the ACRP synthesis survey process. The examples reflect the diversity of responses given when participants were asked to provide risk management tools and processes currently being used. As reflected throughout this synthesis, while these documents can be helpful for development of risk management tools and processes, each airport must tailor risk management tools and processes to meet the airport's established safety and/or business objectives.

Risk Assessment Table and Definitions DFW Airport Safety Risk Assessment

Risk Analysis & Assessment DFW RISK 2 Hazard #/Functional Area Hazard Existing Controls Supporting Data Alpha-numeric identifier and general description of hazard Real or potential condition that could cause accident, injury, illness, or death; or damage to equipment or property. Means currently used to reduce hazard’s cause or effect Historical evidence based on existing data Consequences Likelihood Severity Initial Risk The potential result, should the hazard come to fruition. Estimated probability of occurrence Impact of the outcome of the consequence Rating of likelihood and severity, based on the organization’s risk matrix and definitions. Mitigations Responsible Party Deadline Residual Risk Other Actions Planned response to mitigate hazard from coming to fruition. Responsible organization Deadline Estimated risk that will exist after mitigating efforts. Any additional actions, metrics, or notes of accepting risk.

Risk Analysis & Assessment—Example DFW RISK 3 Hazard #/Functional Area Hazard Existing Controls Supporting Data 1. Haul routes (contractors to and from work area) • Vehicle accidents • Pedestrian accident • Surface incident/runway incursion • ARFF route navigation change • CMAE/Flagger use • Rally points • Low-profile barriers & snow fence Previous incidents on other projects Consequences Likelihood Severity Initial Risk a) Vehicle accidents b) Personal Injury c) Regulatory non-compliance d) Environmental non-compliance e) ARFF Response increase a) Probable (4) b) Probable (4) c) Probable (4) d) Remote (3) e) Remote (3) a) Major (3) b) Major (3) c) Major (3) d) Minor (2) e) Major (3) a) M15 b) M15 c) M15 d) M12 e) M14 Mitigations Responsible Party Deadline Residual Risk Other Actions • Daily JSA • Standard DOT Signage for entry/exit onto Airfield • On-site contractor QC • Temp. AOA fencing (non AOA work) • Flagger at key points for SW entry//exit • Design team include in bid docs • Contractors, in collaboration with Operations • Airfield Operations & DCC • Date of releasing bid • Notice to proceed date • Continuous throughout project a) L8 b) L8 c) M15 d) M15 e) M12 Accept Risk

LIKELIHOOD DEFINITIONS (Probability) Score Likelihood Descriptor Percentage Likelihood Annual Likelihood 5 Frequently Greater than 75% chance of occurrence • Will occur more than 10 times each year • Occurs once every month or 49,000 commercial operations 4 Probable 50 – 74% chance of occurrence • Will occur at least once per year • Occurs once every year or 590,000 commercial operations 3 Remote 25 - 49% chance of occurrence • Will occur once every 2-5 years • Occurs once every 5 years or 2.95 mm commercial operations 2 Extremely Remote 5 - 24% chance of occurrence • Will occur once every 5-20 years • Occurs once every 10 years or 5.9 mm commercial operations 1 Extremely Improbable Less than 5% chance of occurrence • Will occur less than every 20 years • Occurs once every 20 years or 11.8 mm commercial operations

IMPACT DEFINITIONS (Severity) stcapmI elpmaxErotpircseDerocS 5 Catastrophic • Loss of aircraft or equipment; damage over $1 mm • A spill or release that is not contained and results in long term damage to the environment and fines to the airport • Fatality • Overall Financial impact ($100M or above) • Exceeding total aggregate self-insured retention levels • International media coverage, catastrophic and with deterioration of market perception 4 Hazardous • Aircraft or equipment damage that takes it out of service for an extended period of time; over $100,000 • A reportable spill or release that requires mitigation • Severe Injury, requiring hospitalization • Overall Financial impact ($25M - $100M) • National media coverage with significant deterioration of market perception 3 Major • Aircraft or equipment damage that takes it out of service for a short period of time • A reportable spill or release that is contained • Minor injury requiring medical treatment • Overall Financial impact ($5M - $25M) • Regional media impact with some deterioration of market perception 2 Minor • Minor damage; aircraft or equipment not taken out of service • A spill or release that does not require a report. • Minor injury not requiring medical treatment • Overall Financial impact ($1M - $5M) • Local media impact w/ limited impact on market perception 1 Insignificant/No Safety Effect • No aircraft or equipment damage • No impact on safety, environment, or market perception • Overall Financial impact (Below $1M)

Risk Matrix

Risk Matrix Definitions PEOPLE Life Safety Airport Operations Environmental Public Perception/Reputation NEGLIGIBLE • No first aid required injury/illness • No casualty • None to minimal operational impact • Less than 2 hours • No environmental impact • Perception unchanged • No public reporting Extremely Improbable • Almost impossible • Possibly only once in 10 to 100 years MINOR • First aid required Injury/illness • No casualty • Very limited partial operational impact • 2 to 4 hours • Contained with none to limited impact • Limited exposure to public • Blog/tweet/local news less than 24 hours Extremely Remote • Conceivable but highly unlikely • Possibly once in every 5 to less than 10 years MAJOR • Injury/illness few persons • Casualty • Loss of total operations less than 1 hour • Loss of partial operations less than 20 days • Non-contained but manageable • Mitigated in less than 30 days • Public exposure by local and national media between 24 to 72 hrs. Remote • Unlikely but possible to occur • Possibly once a year or multiple times within 5 years HAZARDOUS • Injury/illness many persons • Casualties • Loss of total operation1 to 3 hours • Partial loss of operation 20 to 59 days • Non-contained, resulting in environmental impact 30 to 89 days • Public exposure by regional media, national and global exposure greater than 1 week Probable • Regularly expected to occur in the system • Likely to occur multiple times per year or once per month CATASTROPHIC • Injury/illness extensive persons • Many casualties • Loss of total operation 3+ hours • Loss of partial operations greater than 60+ days • Non-contained, long term impact 90 + days • Sustained local media (anniversary coverage) and broad global media exposure Frequent • Continuously expected to occur in the system • Likely to occur once a day or multiple times per week CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS Probability/Likelihood Definitions Severity Definitions

Sample of Risk Management Reference Materials 55

56 Airport Risk Identification and Prioritization Practices Airport Chief Operating Officer Responsible Executive CAO Finance & Administration CAO Planning & Development Safety Specialist SCDOA Safety Organization Operations Officer Fire Design And Development Planning and Environment Facilities Airfield Maintenance SMS Manager SMS Manager Safety Executive Team (SET) Safety Action Team (SAT) SAT/SET March 9, 2018 Sr. Airport Manager Operations Airport Executive Director Accountable Executive Finance Specialist GSE SME FAA SME Airline SME Sr. Airport Manager Maintenance Sheriff SME Security Manager

Sample of Risk Management Reference Materials 57 SMS Manager SMF SMS Stakeholder Organization GAT FAA ADO TSA FAA Tech Ops January 29, 2018 SMF SMS Stakeholder Committee Aviation Port Services Sac Jet Safety Action Team (SAT) WorldwidePrime Air Jet Blue County DGS CBP Aeromexico FAA ATC VolarisHawaiian FedEx United American Alaska Horizon DeltaSouthwest Cessna FAA FIFO LSG Sky Chefs County Sheriff Flying Foods Group Jet Pro Line Maintenance Allied Aviation

58 Airport Risk Identification and Prioritization Practices City of Austin Department of Aviation Austin-Bergstrom International Airport Safety Office: 512-530-6363 abia.safety@austintexas.gov IF THIS IS AN EMERGENCY CALL - 911 AIRPORT HAZARD OBSERVATION or SAFETY CONCERN Type Hazard or Concern You Are Reporting ___________________________ Procedure / Aircraft / Vehicle / GSE / Mechanical / Equipment / Electrical / Lighting / Pavement / Sign / Marking / Security / Communications / HazMat / Occupational Health & Safety / Other Date of Report Click here to enter a date. ______ /_____ / _______ Month Day Year Location on Airport (Drawing on Back) ______________________ Airside - AOA (Runway, Taxiway, Taxilane, Tug Tunnel, Aircraft, Apron or Aircraft Parking Position; Gate, Cargo Ramp, or Other). Landside (Roadway, Parking Lot, Parking Garage, Walkway, Crosswalk, Signal, or Other). Terminal (Floor, Door, Lighting, Boarding Area, Ticket Counter, Walkway, Escalator, Elevator, Screening Checkpoint, Customs, Concession, Baggage Handling System, or Other). Date Observed Day of Week Time of Day Click here to enter a date. ______ /_____ / _______ Month Day Year Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun (Circle Day of Week) ______:______ AM / PM Time Description of Your Concern _____________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________ (Optional) Your Recommended Corrective Action _____________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________ (Optional) Your Name and Organization ___________________________________ Name ____________________________ Organization / Work Location ____________________________ Occupation Do you want to be Contacted? Contact Information (Optional) Yes ____ No ____ ______-______-_________ Telephone ____________________ Email HOW TO FILE YOUR CONCERN USE THIS FORM: DEPOSIT IN ANY AIRPORT HAZARD REPORTING DROPBOX TELEPHONE: SAFETY OFFICE 512-530-6363 OR COMMUNICATIONS CENTER 512-530-2242 (ABIA) Mail/In Person: Austin-Bergstrom International Airport Airport Safety Office - Confidential 3601 Emma Browning Drive Austin, Texas 78719 By Email: abia.safety@austintexas.gov AUS / KAUS / ABIA Safety Management Systems (SMS) 08/2016

Sample of Risk Management Reference Materials 59 AIRPORT DIAGRAM (MARK LOCATION OF HAZARD OBSERVED) (For Airport internal use only) Hazard Report # _______________________ Received by Safety Office Click here to enter a date. Date ______ /_____/________ (Mo/Day/Year) ______________________________________ Reviewed By (name) Click here to enter a date. Date ______ /_____/________ (Mo/Day/Year) Processing Comments (Policy, Repair, CIP, Etc…) __________________________________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________________________________. Disposition/Status: Open ____ / Closed ____ Date ______ /______ / ______ (Mo/Day/Year) Feedback Given: Yes ____ / No ____ Date ______ /______ / ______ (Mo/Day/Year) _______________________________ Approved By (Name) Click here to enter a date. Date ______ /______ / ______ (Mo/Day/Year) AUS / KAUS / ABIA Safety Management Systems (SMS) 08/2016

60 Airport Risk Identification and Prioritization Practices SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM MANUAL South Bend International Airport 1 Safety Management System Manual Selections from SBN SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM MANUAL South Bend International Airport (SBN) St. Joseph County Airport Authority (SJCAA)

Sample of Risk Management Reference Materials 61 SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM MANUAL South Bend International Airport 2 Safety Management System Manual

62 Airport Risk Identification and Prioritization Practices SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM MANUAL South Bend International Airport 3 Safety Management System Manual SECTION 2 – SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN 2.1 Definition and Description Safety Risk Management (SRM) is a formal process within the SMS composed of describing the system, identifying the hazards, assessing the risk, analyzing the risk, and controlling the risk. SRM includes the Safety Risk Assessment (SRA), which is the process of using data and subject matter expertise to assess the hazardous conditions and risk associated within a system, component of a system, or a proposed change to the system. The SRA process documents the system, hazards, risks, risk assessment, mitigations of those risks and how the mitigations will be monitored to ensure effectiveness. Mitigations of risk may include such things as avoiding the risk all together, changing the operation, tracking results and/or key performance indicators, and analyzing the trends. The SRA process is intended to be part of the normal work process for SBN. It should provide direction and a process to ensure continued safety improvement. All participants in the SRA process are encouraged to use their best judgment and all available, useful data. 2.2 When SRA Will Be Applied SRA will be applied under the following conditions or situations: 1. When a major change is anticipated for facilities included in the SBN SMS. This includes both Part-139 regulated and non-regulated facilities, and is not limited to: Construction and/or heavy maintenance activities that produce an operational impact; Introduction of a new tenant or airline; Introduction of a new hazard to a system; An investigation determines an accident or incident could have been avoided. 2. When there is a change in the operation and/or major equipment of the airport, either in how the airport staff is structured or a policy or regulation change is anticipated. 3. When trends in safety measurements or Key Performance Indicators (KPI) are outside the acceptable limits set by the Safety Manager and Accountability Committee. An example might be an unusual spike in the number of bird strikes that occur over a designated period.

Sample of Risk Management Reference Materials 63 SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM MANUAL South Bend International Airport 4 Safety Management System Manual 4. When management determines the need to analyze part of an operation. SRA can be used for any part of an operation and is not limited to the defined SMS areas of this document. SRA is the process used to analyze risk and determine the best mitigation of that risk to lessen its severity and/or likelihood. 2.3 Initiation of SRA When one of the conditions above are met, the Safety Manager will initiate a Safety Risk Assessment meeting. The meeting should include parties affected by, or those who have direct control over all or a part of, the system that is to be assessed. Individuals who will be affected but do not have direct control might also be invited to participate. The SRA participants should have sufficient operations expertise, safety experience, and training to adequately conduct the assessment. 2.4 Overview of the SRA Process All SRA participants should participate fully in the process. A detailed SRA process is contained in Appendix A. The detailed process provides direction, processes, and procedures for SRA. 1. Describe the System: SRA participants should first identify and describe the system currently in place, evaluating whether it is adequate to address the proposed action without any further mitigation. It is important that the complete process be followed to ensure that hazards and their associated risks are mitigated properly. 2. Identify the Hazards: The hazard identification stage should consider all possible sources of system failure. All hazards identified by the panel should be documented. Hazards could include but are not limited to equipment, operating environment, human element, operational procedures, maintenance procedures, weather, and external services (third party activities). Each hazard should be well documented. 3. Analyze the Risks: Each hazard has associated risk that should be identified and documented. Examples of risks relating to activities on the airfield might be a vehicle hits a parked aircraft; an aircraft leaves the pavement and damages the landing gear; a vehicle impacts a landing aircraft that is on the runway. Each risk should be well documented. 4. Assess the Risks, Severity: The severity of the risk should be measured using the SBN Risk Assessment Matrix attached in Appendix A. The severity should be determined by the worst credible outcome. The severity should NOT take into consideration the likelihood, and vice versa. The likelihood and severity of risks are to be determined independent of one another.

64 Airport Risk Identification and Prioritization Practices SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM MANUAL South Bend International Airport 5 Safety Management System Manual 5. Assess the Risks, Likelihood: The likelihood of the risk occurring should be measured using the Risk Assessment Matrix contained in Appendix A. The likelihood of a risk should be determined by the experience and judgment of those participating in the process. Over time, quantitative data gathered through measuring and monitoring should be used to determine likelihood. 6. Mitigate the Risk: After the panel has determined the severity and likelihood of a risk using the risk assessment matrix, a determination can be made as to whether the risk should be mitigated, monitored or require no action. Guidelines for mitigation: All risk should be reduced to the lowest possible risk level through whatever means the group determines as reasonable. Any risk that falls in the high-risk category as indicated on the risk assessment matrix must be mitigated to at least a medium risk. Any risk, without mitigation, that falls in the medium category as indicated on the risk assessment matrix should be analyzed to see if the risk can be reduced to a low risk. Forms of mitigation might include operational changes, improved communications, physical barriers, training, education, or avoidance (not allowing the change or action to take place). Avoidance might be determined for those risks that are a high-risk category and for which mitigation is determined to be too costly or impractical. The panel participants should completely describe the mitigation to be used, the amount of time the mitigation measure will be in place, the costs (if any) associated with the mitigation, the tracking mechanism that is or will be put in place to monitor the risk and its mitigation, and the person(s) responsible to see that the mitigation is carried out. It is important to monitor and track the mitigation and treatment of risk to determine the success of the mitigation. 7. Mitigation Monitoring and Tracking: The monitoring and tracking of mitigation should also be included in the reporting process described in Section 3, Safety Assurance. The Accountability Committee and Safety Manager must track any mitigation progress and results.

Sample of Risk Management Reference Materials 65 SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM MANUAL South Bend International Airport 6 Safety Management System Manual SECTION 3 – SAFETY ASSURANCE 3.3 Safety Key Performance Indicators (KPI) The Airport Authority strives to ensure that safety is monitored and tracked appropriately. All Part 139 inspection activities and documentation will remain consistent with the ACM. The results of those inspections and reconciliation of items or issues that are noted during the inspections are to be reported in the management staff meetings to the Accountability Committee. Part 139 KPI will be documented and analyzed for any negative trends. This process will need to consider a minimum of at least one full year of data. Non-Part 139 safety performance indicators include, but are not limited to: OSHA-reportable incidents or accidents for Airport Authority staff Medical emergencies: passengers, tenants, employees, etc. Vehicle accidents Equipment damage reports An annual total of the individual KPIs will be presented to the Accountability Committee. As more historical data becomes available, comparisons and adjustments to the reports and KPI should be made as needed. Changes may only be made by Accountability Committee following a review and documented request from the Safety Manager.

66 Airport Risk Identification and Prioritization Practices SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM MANUAL South Bend International Airport 7 Safety Management System Manual APPENDIX A: DETAILED SRA PROCESS Safety Risk Assessment (SRA) Assessment Process The following process assumes the project “owner” has already assembled the SRA panel. The panel includes Subject Matter Experts (SME) and stakeholders in the project or system. SRM is broken out into six (6) steps. They are: 1. Describe the System 2. Identify the Hazards 3. Analyze the Risk(s) Associated with Each Hazard 4. Assess Each Risk 5. Treat/Mitigate Each Risk, Implement 6. Monitor the mitigation In order to conduct a successful SRA, there must be an understanding of the situation and system that is to be analyzed for hazards and risks. Each individual SRA will have different inputs and results. However, each SRA has basic fundamental steps that should be used. Following is an outline of what each step of an SRA should include: Step 1: Describe the system involved using the 5M Model: Mission: what is the function of the system? Media/Environment where does the system reside? (airport environment most likely) Person. Operational Personnel Maintenance Personnel Engineering Personnel Other (Airline, FAA, TSA) Machine: Outline mechanical and human interface points. Management: Standard Operating Procedures, checklists, rules, and regulations. Bounded out: Determine what is NOT included in the system for review (OSHA regs perhaps). Step 2: Identify Hazards: FAA defines a hazard as: Conditions that exist in the system that can lead to injury, illness, or death to people; damage to or loss of a system, equipment, or property; or damage to the environment. A hazard must exist to be classified as a hazard. The lack of something cannot be classified as a hazard. Hazards can come from multiple sources. They include: Equipment Operating Environment Human Operator Human-Machine Interface SOPs External Services

Sample of Risk Management Reference Materials 67 SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM MANUAL South Bend International Airport 8 Safety Management System Manual Several tools may be used for Hazard identification; they include many of the business model tools used in other industries. Such as: Scenario Process Tool Logic Diagram Change Analysis Cause and Effect Tool Bowtie Model However, the process of a “what-if” brainstorming session in order to create a Preliminary Hazard List (PHL) and then conducting a Preliminary Hazard Analysis in order to focus the rest of the process is usually desirable. This is similar to the “5” Why model that is commonly used for root cause analysis. This process works well with a diverse SRA Panel that can represent different points of view in the system. Step 3: Analyze the risk(s) associated with each hazard: a. Identify the existing mitigations/controls in the system. (example: radio procedures for communication with the FAA ATCT) b. Determine the severity of risk for each hazard. What can happen that is reasonably anticipated? DO NOT factor in likelihood at this point. c. Determine the likelihood of risk for each hazard. How often can it happen? Has it happened before (review previous incidents and accidents reports)? Use operational expertise and professional judgment if not enough information is available from previous data. Quantitative analysis is preferred over Qualitative. Step 4: Assess the risk(s) associated with each hazard: Using the risk matrix rank the hazards according to their severity and likelihood. The Airport Authority risk matrix and definitions for severity and likelihood are included in Appendix B. They should always be used for an Airport Authority sponsored SRA. The FAA may require a different matrix based on their needs and in accordance with their processes for capital project approvals and grant assurance requirements. a. Hazards that are identified as a low risk do not need further mitigation or analysis. b. Hazards that are identified as a medium risk do not require further mitigation; however, if mitigations can be put in place to lessen the risk, then the SRA Panel should consider implementing such mitigation. c. Hazards that are identified as a high risk must be mitigated or avoided all together. A medium risk is the lowest level of acceptable risk. d. Determine those hazards for detailed risk mitigation (based on their risk level) Note: All high risks must be mitigated down to a medium risk or avoided altogether. All medium risks must be analyzed to determine if they can be lowered to a low level of risk. A medium level of risk is the minimal acceptable level of risk. All low levels of risk should be analyzed to determine if they can be eliminated altogether. Step 5: Mitigate the risk: Determining what mitigation measures may be put in place to lower the risks as described above:

68 Airport Risk Identification and Prioritization Practices SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM MANUAL South Bend International Airport 9 Safety Management System Manual a. Identify feasible mitigation options. Mitigation options may include: i. Training (example: additional radio operator training for FAA ATCT communications). ii. Improved equipment (example: new table saw with updated safety devices). iii. Specific safety equipment (example: hard hats or reflective vests). iv. Reconfigure the system to improve a hazardous situation (example: realign aircraft parking positions in order to provide more wingtip clearance between aircraft). b. Develop risk mitigation plans: Determine what mitigation options are feasible (realistic). Review what mitigation options have been successful in the past. What new options are available now? Determine if the mitigation that is put in place creates more hazards. Example: A Passenger Boarding Bridges (PBB) used to board larger commercial aircraft eliminates the hazard of passengers walking on the aircraft ramp. However, by using PBB you have introduced a new hazard into the system that is the act of pulling a large piece of equipment up and coming in contact with a multimillion dollar aircraft. This new hazard and its associated risks must be mitigated also. Determine the costs of mitigation. Each mitigation tool put in place has costs, in the form of time and/or money. Define this impact and document it. Costs should NOT be considered however when determining what mitigation options should be considered or used. It is important to know the costs so that the person accepting the risk and the mitigation has a complete picture of the impact. c. Document what will be done for mitigation. Step 6: Document what will be done for monitoring the mitigation to ensure its effectiveness. a. Monitoring should last throughout the life cycle of the change. Documentation of the monitoring should be reviewed periodically to ensure the mitigation is effective. The review of mitigations will take place during the monthly managers’ meetings with the Accountability Committee.

Sample of Risk Management Reference Materials 69 SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM MANUAL South Bend International Airport 10 Safety Management System Manual SBN Definitions of Severity and Likelihood Likelihood Frequently Occurs once every month or 3,000 aircraft operations or 25,000 enplanements Probable Occurs once every year or 34,000 aircraft operations or 300,000 enplanements Remote Occurs once every 5 years or 170,000 aircraft operations or 1,500,000 enplanements Extremely Remote Occurs once every 10 years or 340,000 aircraft operations or 3,000,000 enplanements Extremely Improbable Occurs once every 20 years or over 700,000 aircraft operations or 6,000,000 enplanements Severity: People Assets Environmental Reputation Catastrophic Fatality+ Loss of an aircraft/or over $1,000,000 dollars in damage/or loss of critical system(s) for an extended period of time A spill or release that is not contained and results in long-term damage to the environment and fines to the airport. An event or a series of events resulting in the community NOT using SBN for an extended period. Hazardous Severe Injury, requiring hospitalization Damage to an aircraft taking it out of service for an extended period of time/or damage in excess of $500,000/or disruption of critical services for extended period of time A reportable spill or release that causes short- term damage to the environment and requires mitigation. An event or a series of events resulting in the community lessening the use of SBN causing negative (annual) financial or operational impacts. Major Minor Injury requiring medical treatment Damage to an aircraft that is repairable/or damage to equipment or facility that is reparable within a short period of time. A reportable spill or release that is contained. An event or a series of events resulting in the community lessening the use of SBN for a short period of time. Minor Minor injury not requiring medical treatment Minor damage to an aircraft, equipment, or facility not requiring it to be taken out of service A spill or release that does not require a report. An event or a series of events resulting in the community questioning the reliability of SBN. No Effect No injury No Damage No Impact No Impact

70 Airport Risk Identification and Prioritization Practices SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM MANUAL South Bend International Airport 11 Safety Management System Manual SBN Risk Matrix Severity No Safety Effect Minor Major Hazardous Catastrophic Likelihood Frequently Probable Remote Extremely Remote Extremely Improbable Low Medium High No Action Required Monitor, Determine if Risk can be Mitigated to a Low Risk Must be Mitigated to a Medium Risk

Sample of Risk Management Reference Materials 71

Abbreviations and acronyms used without definitions in TRB publications: A4A Airlines for America AAAE American Association of Airport Executives AASHO American Association of State Highway Officials AASHTO American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials ACI–NA Airports Council International–North America ACRP Airport Cooperative Research Program ADA Americans with Disabilities Act APTA American Public Transportation Association ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials ATA American Trucking Associations CTAA Community Transportation Association of America CTBSSP Commercial Truck and Bus Safety Synthesis Program DHS Department of Homeland Security DOE Department of Energy EPA Environmental Protection Agency FAA Federal Aviation Administration FAST Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act (2015) FHWA Federal Highway Administration FMCSA Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration FRA Federal Railroad Administration FTA Federal Transit Administration HMCRP Hazardous Materials Cooperative Research Program IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers ISTEA Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 ITE Institute of Transportation Engineers MAP-21 Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (2012) NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASAO National Association of State Aviation Officials NCFRP National Cooperative Freight Research Program NCHRP National Cooperative Highway Research Program NHTSA National Highway Traffic Safety Administration NTSB National Transportation Safety Board PHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration RITA Research and Innovative Technology Administration SAE Society of Automotive Engineers SAFETEA-LU Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (2005) TCRP Transit Cooperative Research Program TDC Transit Development Corporation TEA-21 Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (1998) TRB Transportation Research Board TSA Transportation Security Administration U.S. DOT United States Department of Transportation

TRA N SPO RTATIO N RESEA RCH BO A RD 500 Fifth Street, N W W ashington, D C 20001 A D D RESS SERV ICE REQ U ESTED N O N -PR O FIT O R G . U .S. PO STA G E PA ID C O LU M B IA , M D PER M IT N O . 88 ISBN 978-0-309-48108-3 9 7 8 0 3 0 9 4 8 1 0 8 3 9 0 0 0 0