Wolves, Bears, and Their Prey in Alaska Biological and Social Challenges in Wildlife Management (1997) / Chapter Skim
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Pages 1-13
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In particular, the committee was not asked to assess whether wolf control should be conducted in Alaska nor was the committee asked to design a program that would have broad public support. Both issues are political matters that will be decided by the Alaskan public and their elected officials.
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From page 2... ...
As public attitudes shifted during the 1960s and 1970s, predator control programs were increasingly questioned and more broadly-based data were gathered on predator ecology. In the 1980s and 1990s, the public increasingly demanded active management of nongame species.
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From page 3... ...
Under favorable conditions, wolf populations can increase as rapidly as 50% per year, and rates of increase are often higher after heavy exploitation because per capita food availability is typically high under those conditions. Because of their high reproductive rates, wolves can usually maintain their populations even if annual mortality rates are as high as 30% of the early winter population.
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· Two alternative stable states may exist in predator-prey systems, with a lower equilibrium corresponding to very low prey and predator populations, and a higher equilibrium corresponding to high predator and prey populations (with the prey close to their carrying capacity)
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From page 5... ...
Several control experiments failed to increase ungulate populations, possibly because predation rates by bears were high, habitat quality was poor, or the area and duration were insufficient. The degree to which, and the duration over which, wolf numbers were reduced varied considerably among experiments.
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From page 6... ...
In addition, budgetary constraints have led to the use of indirect measures of success that are less expensive in the short-term but which are not good indicators of population trends. ADFG did not measure hunter behavior before and after wolf control and cannot empirically show changes in where people hunted, their success per unit effort, and their satisfaction about changes in game densities that may have resulted from predator control efforts.
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From page 7... ...
At the same time, the economic impacts resulting from public objections to wolf control efforts might be partially offset in areas where there is widespread support for wolf control among local peoples who derive economic and practical benefits from the activity. A majority of nonconsumptive wildlife users and urban wildlife enthusiasts believe that intensive wolf and bear control reflects a well-entrenched bias among Alaska game management officials and hunter interests.
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From page 8... ...
Although not entirely unrelated to financial revenues and costs, economic benefits and costs represent a different standpoint for assessment. If a predator control program actually increases moose or caribou populations, the balance sheet of the potential impacts would consist of three main items: the marginal benefit of whatever increment occurs in the populations of prey species such as moose and caribou; the marginal cost of planning and implementing the predator control program itself; and any marginal reduction in benefit associated with the decrement in the predator population.
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From page 9... ...
The widespread public support for wolf protection and restoration in the lower 48 states and a general perception of wolves and brown bears as imperiled species, as well as the public controversy about wolf control within Alaska, point to this conclusion. However, the magnitude of the existence values, for both prey and predator species, which includes concern by non-Natives for the well-being of Native peoples in the absence of predator control, is unknown.
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From page 10... ...
Recommendation: Management objectives aimed at achieving stable populations of wolves, bears, and their prey should recognize that fluctuations in populations can be expected and provisions made for them in management plans. Before any predator management efforts are undertaken, the status of the predator and prey populations should be evaluated (including whether they are increas
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From page 11... ...
Recommendation: Wildlife policy makers in Alaska should be more sensitive to signs of overharvest and more conservative in setting hunting regulations and designing control efforts, particularly with moose, caribou and bears. Conclusion 7: The design of most past experiments and the data collected do not allow firm conclusions about whether wolf and bear reductions caused an increase in prey populations that lasted long after predator control ceased.
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From page 12... ...
Recommendation: A formal conflict resolution process should be developed and adopted to help avoid the kind of intractable and wasteful dispute that has characterized the recent history of wolf and bear management in Alaska. Conclusion 16: Decentralization of decision-making is not a panacea for solving wildlife management problems, but is likely to be helpful in many circumstances, particularly in rural communities.
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From page 13... ...
Conclusion 17: Interagency cooperation could improve management, reduce public confusion, and eliminate unnecessary duplication. Recommendation: ADFG should assume a leadership role in strengthening cooperative agreements between the various jurisdictions and agencies involved in wolf and bear management in Alaska.
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