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Executive Summary
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From page 1... ... Sea mines have been important in naval warfare throughout history and continue to be so today. They have caused major damage to naval forces, slowed or stopped naval actions and commercial shipping, and forced the alteration of strategic and tactical plans.3 The threat posed by sea mines continues, and is increasing, in today's world of inexpensive advanced electronics, nanotechnology, and multiple potential enemies, some of which are difficult to identify. Read the entire page →
From page 2... ... . Because of the low cost and wide availability of modern sea mines, their importance as a threat to shipping and naval force operations is growing rapidly. Read the entire page →
From page 3... ... However, the cost-effective military capability that is potentially available to the United States through the use of modern sea mines is being neglected. In addition, progress toward mainstreaming mine warfare is being retarded in part because the readiness to conduct mine warfare operations is not now 5The term ``mainstreaming as used in this report refers in general to the Navy~s efforts at the present time to bring existing mine countermeasures operational knowledge and understanding into the mainstream of naval force planning and, in particular, to help prepare for the introduction of new countermine warfare systems into the carrier battle groups. Read the entire page →
From page 4... ... Furthermore, in Navy and Marine Corps school curricula, mine warfare receives little emphasis, and assignments are not ordinarily considered beneficial for naval officers' career advancement. The Navy budget for mine warfare in total is small compared with that for the other major naval warfare areas, and the Navy budget for mines is negligible compared with the budget for other strike munitions. Read the entire page →
From page 5... ... � Naval component and other operational commanders should enhance realism in predeployment training, fleet maneuvers, and amphibious warfare exercises by routinely including mine threats, in addition to air and submarine threats, in such exercises and by assigning realistic consequences to poorly planned and executed countermine warfare operations. � The CNO and the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) Read the entire page →
From page 6... ... Notwithstanding its importance, ISR for maritime mining and countermine warfare is not in good order, either in the fleet or elsewhere in the joint warfighting and intelligence tasking establishments. The most critical problems are insufficient attention to mine warfare ISR in operational planning; failure to task the ISR agencies for needed information, including analysis and dissemination; a paucity of the environmental data needed to find mines expeditiously; and failure to use the best available modern sensors and signal processing technology to help find mines, including buried mines, and separate them from nonmine, minelike bottom objects to facilitate mine hunting and neutralization. Read the entire page →
From page 7... ... sea mining capability is being allowed to rapidly atrophy. With some additional effort focused toward the development of modern sensor and communication technology, sea mines and minefields could be remotely monitored and controlled, thereby enabling their use for coercive purposes in situations short of war, in full compliance with international conventions. Read the entire page →
From page 8... ... � In view of the potential importance of maritime mining as a coercive option quite independent of expeditionary warfare operations, the CNO should consider transferring resource sponsorship of naval mining programs to a resource manager with broad policy and cross-platform responsibilities. Modernize the Dedicated Mine Countermeasures Force Mine warfare threats may vary from a few mines having mainly nuisance value to major concentrations of sophisticated mines blocking naval force maneuver areas. Read the entire page →
From page 9... ... Currently, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) diver systems and marine mammal systems play key undersea MCM roles in countermine warfare operations. Read the entire page →
From page 10... ... Such a dedicated force should include: Upgraded surface MCM ships and their potential future replacements as discussed in Chapter 4; Dedicated MCM helicopters, including retention of the MH-53E helicopter in the dedicated airborne MCM force until it can be replaced by equipment that provides comparable capability, perhaps as a variant of the Navy's nextgeneration heavy-lift logistic aircraft;8 Augmented EOD/VSW teams and systems designed to help or replace them; Continued provision of support for deployed dedicated surface, airborne, and undersea MCM craft that is similar in concept to that provided by the Inchon (MCS-12) , enhanced by the future evolution of the command and support capabilitiy embodied in the Inchon. Read the entire page →
From page 11... ... extending the application of the new systems to the amphibious force. Specifically, � The CNO should develop and promulgate a countermine warfare concept of operations and a total system technical architecture that includes all the legacy dedicated MCM systems and the new organic MCM systems and other upgrades that will be fielded. Read the entire page →
From page 12... ... 1997. "Ship to Objective Maneuver," Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, Va., July 25. Read the entire page →
From page 13... ... And the Navy and Marine Corps have not harmonized the lane clearance width requirements or the navigational accuracy requirements of their respective landing craft in a way that establishes the number and minimum width of landing lanes that would have to be cleared of mines. The committee recognizes the complex considerations that have recently stopped the Shallow Water Assault Breaching/Distributed Explosive Technology (SABRE/DET) Read the entire page →
From page 14... ... Specifically, � The Marine Corps Combat Development Command for the Marine Corps and the Navy Warfare Development Command for the Navy, under CNO and CMC direction, should jointly define and approve preferred concepts of operation (CONOPS) for opposed amphibious operations, the size and operational character of which should form the basis for future landing force size and equipage requirements (including MCM requirements) Read the entire page →
From page 15... ... Reduce the Vulnerability to Sea Mine Threats The vulnerability of all classes of Navy ships to mine warfare is a neglected area of naval force planning. There are many areas where Navy ships, MCM forces, and even U.S. Read the entire page →
From page 16... ... � The CNO should ensure that MCM ships and helicopters that may have to operate in areas where they are threatened by attack from sea- or shore-based forces are provided with appropriate self-protection. � The CNO should ensure that the fleet commanders-in-chief and theater naval component commanders extend countermine warfare contingency planning to include transit and operating areas, homeland defense, and critical base defense. Read the entire page →

From page 1...

... Sea mines have been important in naval warfare throughout history and continue to be so today. They have caused major damage to naval forces, slowed or stopped naval actions and commercial shipping, and forced the alteration of strategic and tactical plans.3 The threat posed by sea mines continues, and is increasing, in today's world of inexpensive advanced electronics, nanotechnology, and multiple potential enemies, some of which are difficult to identify.

Executive Summary Pages 1-16

Executive Summary
Pages 1-16