Skip to main content

Currently Skimming:

2. Experience at JACADS with Mustard Munitions
Pages 8-13

The Chapter Skim interface presents what we've algorithmically identified as the most significant single chunk of text within every page in the chapter.
Select key terms on the right to highlight them within pages of the chapter.


From page 8...
... resulted in stack concentrations, DRE, operating temperatures, carbon monoxide concentrations, stack particulate concentrations, and hydrogen chloride emissions that were all within required limits for all four test runs. At the time the trial burn report was prepared, no limits had been established for metals.
From page 9...
... Because the RCRA permit was based on agent loading rather than on the number of projectiles processed, the processing rate was severely curtailed (EPA, 1998~. In the absence of experience with chemical agent disposal operations, the original permit issued by EPA for operating the MPF had set a feed rate based on the schedule established for accomplishing the JACADS disposal mission, rather than on the capacity of the MPF to destroy agent feeds to the required DRE.
From page 10...
... In 1992, EPA required an operating temperature of 1,450°F+250°F. In four test runs, the actual measured temperatures ranged from 1,408°F to 1,461°F (U.S.
From page 11...
... ~JACADS RCRA permit Table 5-12, "Maximum Allowable Stack Emissions Limits." eThe analytical data in Table 2-4 are the averaged results from four different trial burns conducted in 1999. For both mercury and cadmium, in three of the four analyses, the levels were below the detection limit.
From page 12...
... Except for charging SDS to the LIC afterburner during operations, secondary wastes were not treated as they were produced. Substantial inefficiencies that were created from having to handle massive quantities of secondary wastes at the end of JACADS disposal operations included protracted storage and monitoring; multiagent mixing in storage areas, thus complicating monitoring; the possibility of further contamination of igloos and surrounding areas; and increases in the risk of worker exposure and transportation-related accidents.
From page 13...
... If not, the Army should determine the additional tests required to confirm a disposal process. A plan based on these results should also be developed for handling and disposing of all secondary wastes from processing the Pueblo stockpile, including demilitarization protective ensemble suits and hoses, spent carbon filter materials, scrubber brine solutions, plant cleaning wastes, and dunnage.


This material may be derived from roughly machine-read images, and so is provided only to facilitate research.
More information on Chapter Skim is available.