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Summary of Discussions at a Planning Meeting on Cyber-Security and the Insider Threat to Classified Information (2001) / Chapter Skim
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3. Psychological, Social, Legal and Managerial Aspects of the Insider Threat
Pages 5-7

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From page 5...
... Differing Categories of and Motivations for presiders Participants acknowledged that defining the term 'insider' is difficult. Persons who constitute insider threats range from incompetent users making critical mistakes to moles who have been recruited, trained, and planted by nefarious outsiders; their motivations also vary widely and include the desire for recognition for hacking skills, ideological convictions, and monetary incentives.
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From page 6...
... Others suggested that learning to infer behavior and intent from usage signatures could be very powerful, although it is not clear how to achieve that at this point. Furthennore, any such techniques inevitably run the risk of Incorrectly labeling problematic behavior acceptable, or, arguably worse, determining benign usage signatures to be indicative of inappropriate behavior or intent.
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From page 7...
... One participant characterized the dilemma in both domains by paraphrasing directives from senior management and government as, "Collaborate with everybody but build systems that are resistant to attack." Legal Issues There are many legal aspects to the problem of the insider threat. First, the usual privacy and workplace surveillance issues need to be addressed when determining how, within an organization, to implement tools to decrease the possibility of insider malfeasance.
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Key Terms

  • audit trails
  • access control
  • insider threats
  • insider security
  • sensitive information

  • prove useful
  • ideological convictions
  • similar kinds
  • usual privacy
  • simply relying

  • approaches ranged
  • participants discussed
  • meeting discussed
  • obvious reasons
  • meeting participants

  • potential risks
  • analysis centers
  • requisite repository
  • problematic behavior
  • psychophysiology detection

  • exchanging information
  • managing employees
  • behavior acceptable
  • legal issues
  • functional work

  • third addresses
  • factors imply
  • highly unlikely
  • infrastructure assurance
  • unclear goals


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