Biographical Memoirs Volume 80 (2001) / Chapter Skim
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John C. Harsanyi
John C. Harsanyi
Pages 108-121
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After two years of studying leather chemistry at Grenoble, France, he returned to Hungary with the imminence of WorIcl War II to study pharmacy so that he couIcl continue his father's business. He then starter!
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. In Austria they waited seven months for a permit to go to Australia (the Hungarian quota for immigration to the Uniter!
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. Bergson sought to ground welfare economics in incliviclual welfare judgments by assuming that ethical evaluations of alternative resource allocations shouIcl be represented by a function of incliviclual utilities for them.
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a major program for bringing senior foreign scholars on visits to the United States even before World War II, and that program had many major consequences)
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a universally accepted solution concept, the Harsanyi analysis is still one of the major tools. Harsanyi's fellowship was for only one year.
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His breadth of interests was shown in several papers interpreting bargaining theory in such areas of application as ethics, the measurement of social power, en cl social status, but these have not hacl much impact. At this point Harsanyi began his studies on games with incomplete information, where one player has some information that the other has not (of course, each player may have some private information)
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From page 115... ...
Thus, if sellers have more knowlecige about the quality of their output than the buyers, we have a game of incomplete information analyzable along Harsanyi lines. Similar examples occur if borrowers know more about the prospects of their firms than the lenclers clo, en c!
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From page 116... ...
However, because the other players do not observe the perturbation, the strategy of any one player will be a random variable from the viewpoints of other players. Harsanyi showocl that as the magnitude of the perturbations tenclecl to zero, the resulting distributions converged to the mixed strategies of ordinary game theory.
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From page 117... ...
On the subjects he found important, he thought deeply and spoke and wrote only after long reflection. THE BlOG~PHICAL STATEMENTS in this memoir are derived from an oral history taken by the Regional Oral History Office, University of California, Berkeley, and from his vita supplied by the Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley.
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From page 118... ...
325-35. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
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From page 119... ...
1975 Nonlinear social welfare functions: Do welfare economists have a special exemption from Bayesian rationality? Theory Decis.
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8:g 1-122. A new throw of equibbrium sclechon far games with incomplete information.
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