Biological Threats and Terrorism Assessing the Science and Response Capabilities: Workshop Summary (2002) / Chapter Skim
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1 Introduction
1 Introduction
Pages 20-42
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From page 20... ...
The recent anthrax attack was as close to a traditional HAZMAT type of event as a biological event could be in terms of a defined source, teams could arrive at the site, define a perimeter, and identify who needed care. However, there are many potential biological scenarios that could unfold in very different ways that would require different strategies and investments.
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From page 21... ...
We must lay out a clear research agenda and invest appropriately to pursue that agenda in order to build the knowledge base that is necessary for developing better drugs and vaccines. The scientific community must mobilize to help reduce real risks in a way that will not be overly cumbersome to legitimate science.
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This statement reflects the professional view of the author and should not be construed as an official position of the National Institute for Allergy and Infectious Diseases.
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From page 23... ...
First, the civilian population is significantly more diverse than the military population in terms of age and health and, as such, poses unique challenges such as knowing which vaccinations and antibiotics should be administered to children, pregnant women, the aged, and individuals with medical conditions. Second, military preparedness emphasizes vaccine protection, however, there are many more bioterrorist agents than there are bioweapons, and it is neither feasible nor desirable to vaccinate the entire civilian population against all microbes on every list.
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From page 24... ...
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From page 26... ...
True, we need immediate gratification because of the threat of an immediate bioterrorist attack, but we also need to prepare for the long term. The extraordinary and elegant work that John Collier and his colleagues have done on the mechanisms of the pathogenesis of anthrax has revealed multiple targets for intervention and serves as an excellent example of the long-term benefits that stem from basic research.
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We were aware of the potential holes and gaps before September 11, now, we have even more proof. We may not know the perpetrators of recent events, but there is increasing hard evidence that formal efforts are being made by many countries to acquire biological weapons.
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It provides a framework that will keep the nation focused as we fill these gaps. It includes recommendations from the President of the United States regarding improving the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile including an authorization for a certain amount of money.
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From page 30... ...
Assistant Surgeon General and Director National Center for Infectious Diseases Centers for Disease Control and Prevention The recent anthrax events represent an unprecedented biological attack on our nation. On October 3, the CDC received an initial report of the index case in Florida, a 63-year old male photo editor employed by American Media, Incorporated.
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From page 31... ...
As part of the exposure assessment, nasal swabbing was conducted in the Hart Building soon after Senator Daschle's office received the letter. Twenty-eight nasal swabs were positive, those individuals are receiving antimicrobial prophylaxis and are being closely monitored.
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Our core diagnostics research missions have been essentially put on hold during this crisis. This statement reflects the professional view of the author and should not be construed as an official position of the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases or the U.S.
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From page 33... ...
Protecting air supplies of key facilities, and other assets such as subways and metro systems would seem to me to be very important when we have a perpetrator or perpetrators who have shown the capability to create a concentrated, pure preparation of aerosolizable anthrax spores. Knowledge Assets The expertise on issues surrounding terrorist use of biological agents is limited in this country, and recent events have shown that there are some gaps in our knowledge.
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From page 34... ...
The post-September 11 anthrax situation was the first real test of our country's response system to a potential bioterrorism attack. Many citizens consider the post-September 11 anthrax situation just a "scare", not an anthrax crisis.
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From page 35... ...
There were less than 4,000 people in the World Trade Center area that presented to hospitals for any type of medical treatment. If this had been a smallpox or anthrax situation resulting in tens of thousands of victims, many needing hospital beds, this same system would not have been able to respond.
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From page 36... ...
SOURCE: Lexis-Nexis Academic: Major world English language newspapers and TV transcripts.
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From page 37... ...
We need to continue to clearly define the threat. The recent anthrax attack was as close to a traditional HAZMAT type of event as a biological event could be in terms of a defined source and in the sense that teams could arrive at the site, define a perimeter, and identify who needed care.
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From page 38... ...
At the same time, there are some unique preparedness programs that pertain specifically to the bioterrorism threat, for example the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile. As the nation moves forward with its plan to expand the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile, our efforts should be linked with the best possible intelligence about what the real and credible threats are.
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From page 39... ...
But the anthrax situation has demonstrated that we still don't have an adequate handle on whether dangerous pathogens are secured, who is using them, and why. The scientific community needs to mobilize now to help reduce real risks in a way that will not be overly cumbersome to legitimate science.
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From page 40... ...
With respect to the recent anthrax emergency, it was clear when public health experts took a prominent role in the national news media and began to promote their message, it had a tremendous positive effect in helping the public understand what was being done on their behalf. For example, when state and local public health professionals began talking about the meaning of specific laboratory tests, information about exposure, or the need for medical prophylaxis the media was far more supportive of the response than when conflicting information from different and sometimes dubious sources were communicated.
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From page 41... ...
A third major lesson learned from recent events is the extreme importance of training front line healthcare providers, including nurses, doctors, clinicians, and infectious disease consultants in disease recognition. It was an alert clinician who initially identified many of these cases and then notified public health and law enforcement officials to trigger an investigation.
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From page 42... ...
In conclusion, Winston Churchill, who was involved in the dawn of chemical warfare in WWI and who also served as prime minister of England during WWII when the radiation age appeared, would probably tell us today that our investment in selected public health infrastructure and readiness for epidemics remains one of the best ways to prepare our population for the current threat of bioterrorism.
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