IDs -- Not That Easy Questions About Nationwide Identity Systems (2002) / Chapter Skim
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3 Technological Challenges
3 Technological Challenges
Pages 34-45
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From page 34... ...
· Procedures for checking the authenticity of IDs and for verifying the presenter (with or without specialized equipment) would need to be established, promulgated, practiced, and audited.1 Association of an identity card with its holder has to be verified before the identity information it contains can be relied upon (otherwise, stealing the card would permit the theft of the cardholder's identity)
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From page 35... ...
Architectural issues include the degree of centralization of the underlying databases as well as the location and cost of data storage, computation, and communication, which can all be done at different places.5 For example, how would authorized entities obtain the records they wanted, under what circumstances, and with what degree of authorization? Would there be daily or weekly downloads of selected records to more permanent storage media?
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From page 36... ...
Even if software and hardware costs are minimized, experience with lesser systems from SSNs to state drivers' licenses to military identification systems shows that there will be significant ongoing administrative costs for training, issuing cards, verification, maintenance (keeping whatever information is associated with an individual and his or her ID up to date) , and detection and investigation of counterfeiting.7 In particular, the costs and technological and administrative complexity of assuring the integrity and security of an identity infrastructure are likely to be large.
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From page 37... ...
A picture on the front of the card would not be sufficient if very high assurance is sought.l° If the card makes use of a magnetic stripe, it would have been easy to copy the stored information to a new card with a different picture. If the card is a memory card or smart card, duplication, while a little more difficult, would still have been possible.
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From page 40... ...
But getting biometrics technology right (including control of the risks of compromise) and widely distributed is not easy.l2 l3 There are additional issues associated with the use of biometrics, such as some popular resistance.l4 Note that biometrics allows for cardless system options: A databaseonly system based solely on biometrics eliminates the risk of card loss or theft, but real-time database accessibility then becomes a major consideration.
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From page 41... ...
BACKEND SYSTEMS Once methods are in place to satisfactorily link persons to IDs, the requirements and goals of the system should drive decision making about associated databases. The databases' principal features are likely to include an ability to search based on an ID number or other unique identifier, various ID attributes, and possibly biometric data.
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From page 42... ...
As noted previously, it has proven extremely difficult to secure systems that utilize the Internet; a nationwide identity system would likewise need to be widely accessible and would inevitably be the target of malicious attacks as well as subject to unintentional or incidental damage. Failure modes of the system would have to be very carefully studied, and backup plans and procedures would have to be designed and tested for all critical systems that depend on use of the nationwide identity system.
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From page 43... ...
An incorrectly entered birth date, for example, may not be noticed or corrected for decades and may only come to light when the person applies for, say, Medicare. An 16Indeed, major federal agencies such as the Internal Revenue Service have run into problems with tracking and controlling access to information.
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From page 44... ...
Such a system is useful for predicting 20A forthcoming CSTB report will explore issues on critical information infrastructure protection and the law, including a preliminary analysis of the issue of information sharing between the public and private sectors. For more information, see |
From page 45... ...
This would necessitate examining the behavior of many people who do not pose a risk most human behavior involves law-abiding citizens pursuing constitutionally protected activities in order to identify the few who do.24 23Credit card companies make these correlations using both standard statistical methods and neural networks. 24For a discussion of some of the effects and implications of ubiquitous surveillance cameras, see the October 7, 2001, article by Jeffrey Rosen, "A Watchful State," New York Times Magazine.
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