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2. Underestimating the Importance of ManTech Limits Its Impact
Pages 9-16

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From page 9...
... In the few instances when leadership was present and coordinated groups of ManTech projects were aimed at significant future performance requirements, the program succeeded in greatly improving the production of weapon systems. Since this study began, major reductions in the Army and Navy ManTech programs have left the Air Force as the only service with a meaningful ManTech program.
From page 10...
... The Air Force program offers other examples of well-directed technological thrusts that yielded new products and product features, while reducing manufacturing cost and increasing quality: · new processes for unusual materials substantially increased the performance of Jet engines, · flexible machining of short runs of parts, · noncontact gauging and testing technologies to improve the in-process quality control of a variety of products, and · production of new types of aircraft made possible by advances in the production of composite structures.
From page 11...
... The ICAM program mobilized teams of defense contractors and universities to attack several dozen aspects -- including management as well as technology -- of a highly significant problem. Not all projects were ultimately incorporated into the solution of the problem; those that were technically ready at a cutoff date were combined in a demonstration of an integrated sheet metal manufacturing center.
From page 12...
... Only the Air Force program had discernible groups of projects focused on achieving particular goals. The wide variety of technical projects undertaken by the ManTech program testifies to the number and variety of technologies incorporated in current weapon systems.
From page 13...
... The first myth perpetuates the belief that direct DOD funding for manufacturing technology development is inappropriate and that indirect actions, particularly to stimulate increased competition, will be sufficient to assure adequate manufacturing processes. The myth ignores the unique nature of weapon systems and the unusual market in which only one primary buyer exists for products that require years to develop and produce.
From page 14...
... The third myth, which stresses measurable cost reduction as the primary goal, manifests itself in two ways. Some in DOD top management support the ManTech program because of its potential to reduce costs, while others question the need for the program when it cannot show demonstrable cost reductions.
From page 15...
... ~ goal to control the increase in overhead rates will surely feat to less efficient and less effective manufacturing processes. Elevating the Status of the Program The lack of understanding of manufacturing technology is evident not only in the absence of policy direction from DOD or in the prevalence of manufacturing technology myths, but also in the organizational location of the ManTech program.
From page 16...
... DOD must provide direct support for manufacturing technology development if the defense industrial base is to produce high quality, reliable weapon systems in a timely, efficient manner.


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