Post-Challenger Evaluation of Space Shuttle Risk Assessment and Management (1988) / Chapter Skim
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1 Executive Summary
1 Executive Summary
Pages 1-9
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be appointed to audit the NASA review effort and verify its adequacy. The Committee monitored the overall NASA review and evaluation effort while performing detailed on-site reviews of its implementation for selected elements and subsystems (e.g., the Space Shuttle Main Engine, Solid Rocket Booster, Auxiliary Power Unit)
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The retention rationale is used to justify accepting the design "as is," in the Committee's view; its audits of the NASA review process cliscovered little emphasis on creative ways to eliminate potential failure mocles. The hazarc!
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. Only this program management, not the safety organizations, can make judicious use of the means available to achieve operational goals while controlling the safety risks at acceptable levels throughout the evolution of the program.
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The Committee believes that giving equal management attention to all Criticality ~ and ~ R potential failures conic be cletrimental to safety if, as is the case, some are extremely unlikely to occur, or if the probability is very Tow that the postulated worst-case consequences of the failures will result. Treating all such items equally will necessarily detract from the attention senior management can give to the most likely and most threatening failure mocles.
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1.3.8 Independence of the Space Transportation System Certification and Software Validation and Verification Program In general, hardware certification and verification, and software validation and verifications in STS are managed and conducted primarily by the same organizational elements responsible for the design and fabrication of the units. Thus, the 3 See Appendix A for definition of these terms.
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NASA management should also see to it that each individual involved in the NSTS Program is completely aware of his/ her Responsibilities and authority for decision mak~ng. 1.3.10.2 Adlequacy of Orbiter Structural Safety Margins The primary structure of the STS has been excluclecl, by definition, from the FMEA/CIL process, based on the belief that there is an adequate positive margin of safety.
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1.3.11 Focus on Risk Management The current safety assessment processes used by NASA do not establish objectively the levels of the various risks associated with the failure mocles and hazards. It is not reasonable to expect that NASA management or its panels and boards can provide their own detailed assessments of the risks associated with failure mocles ant!
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management system for other programs which have similar attributes, such as the Space Station. The safety of other large systems involving highly complex technology, and requiring major participation by several NASA centers and prime contractors, couIc]
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