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4. Recovery and Consequence Management Technologies
Pages 92-111

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From page 92...
... However, in the case of terrorist acts using weapons of mass destruction (WMD) , or significant cyberattacks on the nation' s critical infrastructure, the damage may exceed the capacity of local agencies and the private sector that owns and operates the critical infrastructure.
From page 93...
... Such an attack could deny power and communications to wide areas, cause massive disruption in the nation's transportation and financial systems, and deny essential government services. Multiple events where WMD are employed against the nation, combined with cyberattacks against the critical infrastructure, could be even more challenging.
From page 94...
... Restore public order and essential services. Protect consequence management personnel.
From page 95...
... The areas of concentration include the following: · Establishment of, or integration into, an interoperable C4ISR system; · Real-time assessment of physical damage, casualties, and the enduring level of contamination; · Force protection; · Treatment of mass casualties; and · Containment of and, later, decontamination of the effects of WMD. The Army already has the capacity in other mission areas, provided that the appropriate doctrine is developed and that plans are established across the government and in NORTHCOM.
From page 96...
... It is possible that lives were lost because the first responders were unable to communicate and share their situational awareness. There is a strong need for an integrated system that allows the new HLS structure to conduct operations effectively; share a common operational picture built on a common database; provide multilevel security information to accommodate local, state, and federal needs; and facilitate real-time communications between these local, state, and federal entities.
From page 97...
... Another promising development that the Army S&T community should address for the emerging HLS C2 system is Joint Blue Force Tracking (CJCS, 1999~. The Blue Force Tracking architecture is designed to provide tracking, tagging, and locating of friendly troops and assets; logistics and asset management; and situational awareness.
From page 98...
... 98 V V o V o so ~ :-o.
From page 99...
... However, the concept could be extended to the HLS mission area, and the Army's experience with the Objective Force can help in doing so. Key elements for the development and fielding of an HLS common operational picture are the development and fielding of a family of both wide-area and focused sensors; the networking of these sensors for situational assessment; the fusion of sensor data; and adapting models that predict physical damage, contamination, and casualties based on real-time reports and sensor information.
From page 100...
... Finally, a family of models that can predict physical damage, contamination, and casualties can play an important role in the HLS mission. CBR contamination models today show the effects of known weapons.
From page 101...
... The fielding of the Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit and the Joint Service Protective Mask over the next few years will provide some needed improvements in individual protection at a lower maintenance cost while relieving the physiological burdens of heat stress and breathing resistance. Current SBCCOM research on materials for facepieces and lenses, advanced filters, and service-life indicators to improve masks will aid the Army and the civilian community and should be aggressively continued.]
From page 102...
... 102 ~ V A o ~ t ~ so ~ :-o.
From page 103...
... The Army's research and development across the spectrum of technologies needed for individual and collective protection from the effects of weapons of mass destruction for the Army and civilian emergency responders should be continued. Treatment of Mass Casualties It is likely that mass casualties will result from the use of WMD and high explosive incidents.
From page 104...
... 104 ~ V A o sit ~ :-o.
From page 105...
... Communication of the identity and assessment of chemical and biological 4Triage is the sorting of patients by the severity of injury or illness so that resources can be more efficiently utilized to do the most good for the most people. Triage is conducted repeatedly: during the initial encounter with the civilian emergency medical teams, when the patient is stabilized, decontaminated, and moved to the casualty collection point.
From page 106...
... The new challenges for recovery and consequence management include triage, tracking, and treatment of mass casualties following an event involving weapons of mass destruction. The scale of such an event 6Anna Johnson-Winegar, Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Chemical and Biological Defense)
From page 107...
... It is also likely that the cleanup tasks will be accompanied by substantial physical damage and the need to provide care for mass casualties. Complicating the difficulty of the decontamination process is the fact that standards for cleanup and decontamination have not been developed, although models do exist from civilian cleanup following toxic waste accidents.
From page 108...
... 108 V ~ ^ i o ~ ^ so :-o.
From page 109...
... 109 v o o o o .0 ·0 ·= ·= z z z z ca o ca ~ ca ca o o o .
From page 110...
... The cleanup following the B-52 accident at Palomares, Spain, stands out as the primary practical example of radiation cleanup by the United States. The nuclear decontamination process at Chernobyl may also provide some useful lessons learned.
From page 111...
... 2002c. M28 Simplified Collective Protection Equipment (CPE)


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