Assessment of Processing Gelled GB M55 Rockets at Anniston (2003) / Chapter Skim
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4. Processing of M55 Rockets at ANCDF
4. Processing of M55 Rockets at ANCDF
Pages 26-37
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From page 26... ...
stockpile of unitary chemi cal weapons. As noted in Chapter 1, as of July 2002, approximately one-fourth of this original tonnage had been destroyed during demilitarization operations at the Johnston Atoll Chemical Agent Disposal System (JACADS)
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From page 27... ...
report on the status of stockpile degradation under storage conditions that is being prepared by the Stockpile Committee. MODIFIED DISPOSAL PLAN FOR THE ANNISTON STOCKPILE Description of the Modified Plan An initial challenge faced by the Army as it readies the ANCDF for commencement of disposal operations is to determine a safe rate for processing gelled GB M55
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From page 28... ...
CR&E addressed a number of uncertainties and recommended that a staged ramp-up in the rate of disposal processing during the agent trial burn be followed for gelled rockets to show safe operation at a given rate before proceeding to a higher rate. This method allows demonstration of the maximum safe rate, which might be below the CR&E estimate owing to uncertainties in the analysis.
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From page 29... ...
In 2000, CR&E examined the ability of the DFS furnace planned for ANCDF to destroy M55 rocket segments containing gelled GB. Simplified computational fluid dy4During agent changeover operations, all areas exposed to agent are decontaminated by workers in DPE suits.
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From page 30... ...
, monitoring conditions closely over a period of several hours." ASSESSMENT OF PROCESSING GELLED GB M55 ROCKETS AT ANNISTON CRITIQUE OF MODELING AND AREAS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION While the committee respects the technical skill and accomplishment represented by the May 2000 CR&E modeling work, it believes that processing 34 rockets per hour may be unreasonably optimistic and that the actual maximum safe operating rate may be substantially lower. For one thing, if more than 20 percent of the GB is volatilized in the inlet section of the kiln by the heat released from the burster charge, the maximum heat release in the inlet section of the kiln may be higher than the 195,985 Btu/min projected by CR&E.
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From page 31... ...
With regard to ramp-up during the agent trial burn to establish an optimum safe performance rate in the throughput tests, all relevant existing process measurements acquired from the Process Data and Recording System of the baseline incineration system during previous operations will need to be evaluated. In addition to the use of five infrared pyrometers along the length of the kiln to measure the kiln shell temperature profile, the following continuous, real-time measurements should be made at least every 2 s and recorded on highspeed continuous recorders for the time periods of interest to determine the maximum feed rate: Differential pressure between the lower end of the feed chute and the surrounding room using at least two differential pressure transmitters with low draft range.
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From page 32... ...
The additional changeover would probably contribute additional worker risk. Complementary processing would reduce the time and cost of the overall ANCDF operations and contribute to eliminating the risk from the stored stockpile at Anniston sooner.
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From page 33... ...
The Army's experience at TOCDF in processing gelled GB rockets, coupled with sufficient modeling and agent trial burn testing for safely increasing the throughput rates during DFS operations at ANCDF, could lead to an improved processing sequence that saves time and reduces storage risk. RISK IMPLICATIONS OF ACCELERATED PROCESSING The Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program (CSDP)
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From page 34... ...
Worker Risk Industrial accidents include all manner of non-agentrelated injuries, such as cuts and falls. The work demands at a chemical agent disposal facility may be more complex than at a typical industrial facility.
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From page 35... ...
With regard to the options for processing rockets containing gelled agent at Anniston, it appears that maintaining the original schedule probably entails increased worker risk because of the additional agent changeover needed to expedite processing of VX M55 rockets before completing the processing of other GB munitions. On the other hand, the original schedule reduces public risk by a small amount by eliminating the VX M55 rockets about 4 months earlier.
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From page 36... ...
This was not compensated for in the LTT but was to some extent in the HTT and HTT-PFS tests. The HTT and HTT-PFS test conditions were designed to test the maximum hourly rolling average feed rates for metals and the maximum hourly average kiln temperatures (U.S.
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From page 37... ...
Because the stockpile at Pine Bluff is not believed to contain any of the agent lots known to exhibit gelling,~2 there would be no perceivable benefit to employing the modified disposal plan for ANCDF at Pine Bluff. The stockpile at Blue Grass is to be destroyed by neutralization-based technology.
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