Overcoming Impediments to U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation Report of a Joint Workshop (2004) / Chapter Skim
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Appendix E: American Background Paper
Appendix E: American Background Paper
Pages 107-119
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From page 107... ...
Burns and Rose Goffemeelleri6 Table of Contents Introduction Operational Effectiveness in a Political Environment Categories of Barriers and Impediments "Fixes" for Barriers and Impediments Summary of Observations Introduction 107 108 108 ~3 Barriers and impediments to cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation on controlling nuclear proliferation take many forms. Some are the results of differing political systems or the residue of historic clashes between systems and cultures.
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From page 108... ...
Cooperation between nations on nuclear security involves acts of governance and diplomacy, which are by nature political. The political context is simply a fact that must be recognized in assessing impediments to progress on controlling nuclear proliferation.
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From page 109... ...
Nationals of the Russian Federation and the United States must obtain visas to visit one another's countries. Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 200 ~ in the United States, visa issues were at times difficult, creating a hurdle that Russian and American participants in cooperative programs had to overcome to fulfill their jobs.
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From page 110... ...
including that of the ~ ~ ~ , ~ Russian Federation, respond to U.S. visa procedures by increasing the rigor of their own visa approval processes and imposing restrictions upon Americans traveling in their countries.
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From page 111... ...
The United States and the Russian Federation need to End a mutually agreed framework that gives due attention to, on one hand, the Russian government's reluctance to literally pay for the mistakes or premeditated acts of an American contractor, and on the other, the contractors' desire to avoid enormous, expensive legal battles, fought in the courts of another country.
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From page 112... ...
Travel restrictions are another example: Participants in cooperative programs often must obtain permission from several agencies within their own government to allow international travel, completely apart from the need for visas. As a recent report says, "In the case of an expert from a Department of Energy laboratory, a typical trip requires laboratory approval, DOE headquarters approval, State Department approval, a Russian visa, and Russian permission to visit a closed area (which typically requires at least 45 days advance notice)
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From page 113... ...
1. Changes in National Law or Policy Procedures When the United States and Russia embarked on the "cooperative threat reduction" or NunnLugar program in ~ 992, they had few precedents to guide them.
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From page 114... ...
Umbrella Agreement, that provided the first legal underpinnings for the CTR program in the Department of Defense, and, later, for additional nonproliferation cooperative programs in the Department of Energy. Other government-togovernment agreements were negotiated to underpin additional cooperative programs, such as the Plutonium Disposition Science and Technology Agreement in July 199S, and the Nuclear Cities Initiative Agreement in September 1998.
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From page 115... ...
In other cases, agencies have negotiated specific agreements to facilitate project implementation. For example, the Department of Energy has negotiated special additional access arrangements for the MPC&A Program and the Nuclear Cities Initiative; and it has negotiated special project management arrangements for the Plutonium Production Reactor Shutdown Agreement.
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From page 116... ...
In these cases, the hosting minister has often taken personal responsibility for negotiating special access to sensitive sites or other arrangements with counterpart ministries thus placing a heavy burden on his store of political capital. It is no surprise, therefore, that willingness to pursue ad hoc arrangements has become more and more rare at high levels in Moscow.
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From page 117... ...
Thus, for example, military-to-military contacts between the United States and the Russian Federation have played an important role over the past decade in developing the policy environment that has enabled threat reduction cooperation to advance in the Ministry of Defense in Moscow and the Department of Defense in Washington. It seems likely that some of the difficulties encountered in implementing the MOD-DOD programs have come about because of the slow-down in military-to-military cooperation that occurred after disagreements over the conflict in the former Yugoslavia.
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From page 118... ...
This development is consistent with the idea, which the Russian Federation has been emphasizing in its official discussions, that Russia can be more of a full partner in the cooperation, rather than simply an aid recipient. Russia's economy has been growing, and it is contributing a significant amount to the GS Global Initiative $2 billion over ten years, which is a contribution second in size only to that of the United States.
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From page 119... ...
As long as solutions, even quite various, remain within the realm of national law in both countries, they should be considered to be potentially beneficial to effective implementation of the programs. A solution set is a useful goal, rather than a single right answer.
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