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1 The International Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime
Pages 13-16

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From page 13...
... These measures are intended to prevent the diversion or undeclared production of nuclear fissionable materials, or undeclared use of technologies, by a non-nuclear state or non-state actors such as an international terrorist organization, for the purpose of acquiring nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The key elements of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime are as follows:5 5 The United States and Russia cooperate increasingly through the IAEA on nuclear terrorism, orphaned sources, conversion of research reactor cores, and other matters, but these were not discussed at the workshop.
From page 14...
... Under this regime, nations with nuclear capabilities are divided into three groups: nuclearweapon states under the NPT (the United Kingdom, the United States, the Russian Federation, China, and France) , non-nuclear weapon states who are parties to the NPT, and states that are known or believed to have nuclear weapons but are not party to the NPT (India, Pakistan, North Korea,6 and Israel)
From page 15...
... The status of efforts by the nuclear-weapon states to fulfill their commitments under the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, including reductions of their nuclear arsenals, was indicated as a second reason why non-nuclear weapon states seek nuclear weapons. In the wake of the NET, the fundamental obligations of the United States and Russia to reduce their nuclear arsenals were restated in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I, 1991)
From page 16...
... Such developments would require new approaches to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, such as development and introduction of intrinsically proliferation-resistant nuclear energy technologies balanced with extrinsic measures (such as nuclear safeguards, etc.) to reduce the risk of indirect nuclear proliferation to an acceptable level.


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