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Overcoming Impediments to U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation Report of a Joint Workshop (2004) / Chapter Skim
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2 Scope, Results, and Good Practices of the U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Related Areas
Pages 17-22

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From page 17...
... senators who sponsored the legislation) , the initiative focused on Russia and some other former Soviet republics.8 Over the course of more than 10 years, CTR has facilitated the efforts of the United States and Russia to address several challenging problems in nuclear nonproliferation, such as: Ensuring that nuclear weapons and components were shipped safely to Russia from the Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan Enhancing significantly the level of safety in storage of both nuclear weapons at Russian Federation Ministry of Defense facilities and spent nuclear fuel at the Russian Navy facilities ~ The official name of the CTR umbrella agreement is the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States of America Concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage, and Destruction of Weapons and the Prevention of Weapons Proliferation.
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From page 18...
... demand for nuclear fuel and generated up to 10% of the annual electricity production in the United States. As compensation, Russia was to receive about $4 billion in revenues by the end of 2003, which are to be spent to upgrade the safety level of the nuclear power industry, "convert nuclear cities," and conduct research and development on advanced nuclear reactors and fuel cycles.9 Nuclear Submarine Dismantlement One aspect of cooperation under the CTR umbrella is the dismantlement of Strategic Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs)
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From page 19...
... Financial considerations weigh particularly heavily in the submarine dismantlement program, because Russia cannot afford to either maintain the submarines safely at dock or dismantle them on its own at an acceptable rate.~° A number of participants expressed concern that as the submarines rust and otherwise decay, they pose a growing environmental and safety risk, and that the significant amounts of HEU fuel involved pose a proliferation hazard. The United States has purchased and installed specialized facilities and equipment for submarine dismantlement, such as an automated guillotine to cut submarine hulls into sections, cable reprocessing facilities, and a radioactive-waste-treatment complex.
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From page 20...
... , multi-purpose studies were carried out at weapons laboratories in the United States and Russia. These studies focused on potential approaches, technological and organizational measures, and other techniques that could be used to ensure transparent dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the context of future arms reductions.
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From page 21...
... Because of the positive nature of these interactions, and the useful data they produced, some participants in the workshop stated that the joint verification experiments were a major step toward strengthening confidence between Russia and the United States. INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CENTER The idea of establishing the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC)
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From page 22...
... Several Russian participants attributed ISTC's success in part to the fact that the following key issues were agreed at the preliminary stage and formalized as an international agreement: Requirements for project proposals and format of their presentation Mechanism of coordination with Russian governmental bodies Project review procedure: project proposals receive expert appraisals by a Scientific Advisory Board, then decisions are made by the funding parties at the ISTC Board of Governors meetings Issues of audit and access to Russian institutions for evaluation Reimbursement of (exemption from) taxes and customs duties Payment of project grants for their participants Operational support of ISTC projects by its Executive Directorate In addition to ISTC, it is important to note two other programs that work to reduce the likelihood that Russian weapons expertise will leave Russia.
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Key Terms

  • nuclear nonproliferation
  • nuclear material
  • metric tons
  • russian federation
  • nuclear materials

  • material protection
  • submarine dismantlement
  • nuclear fuel
  • international nuclear
  • underground nuclear

  • background paper
  • secure transportation
  • nuclear facilities
  • cooperative threat
  • russian nuclear

  • nuclear cities
  • federation ministry
  • weapons complex
  • weapons proliferation
  • material control

  • threat reduction
  • export controls
  • proliferation prevention
  • minatom enterprises
  • umbrella agreement

  • safety program
  • russian background
  • reduction program
  • nuclear sector
  • cities initiative


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