Overcoming Impediments to U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation Report of a Joint Workshop (2004) / Chapter Skim
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3 Impediments and Their Causes
3 Impediments and Their Causes
Pages 23-36
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From page 23... ...
Programs can be impeded, often unwittingly, when their schedules make them a political issue in one or both countries. The Russian background paper suggests that bilateral cooperative programs and their impediments be considered in terms of how they affect and reduce international proliferation risk, minimizing the effects of domestic political trends of the day in the United States and Russia.
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From page 24... ...
Funding for Cooperative Programs to Actions Outside of the Programs The Russian background paper suggested that an ultimate objective of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime is to prevent nuclear weapons from spreading in the world. Therefore, according to the paper, the bilateral U.S.-Russian cooperative programs on nuclear nonproliferation, and impediments to them, should be considered in terms of this international context, i.e., how they affect and reduce the proliferation risk.
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From page 25... ...
Where these interests conflict, one may override the other. From the Russian perspective, promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy is a component of a healthy international nuclear nonproliferation regime: if the nations that have advanced nuclear energy programs supply nations that have little nuclear energy capability with nuclear power plants and supporting facilities, the nations with indigenous nuclear energy programs can control the kinds of technologies deployed and build nonproliferation requirements into the contracts, effectively raising the relative cost of proliferation.
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From page 26... ...
But difficulties remain. The authors of the Russian background paper noted that Russia recognizes the need for a solution to the issue of access control for foreign partners if Russia is going to attract U.S.
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From page 27... ...
In fact, rejections and delays beyond requested entry dates have prevented Russian partners from participating in meetings that promote, or even directly support, cooperative efforts on mutual and international security. The American background paper noted that the problem is now being compounded as other governments, including that of the Russian Federation, respond to the imbalances in visa requirements by increasing the rigor of their own visa approval processes and imposing restrictions upon Americans traveling in their countries.
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From page 28... ...
A comprehensive analysis of legal issues was beyond the scope of the discussion, but specific legal impediments to U.S.Russian cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation were highlighted in the Russian background paper, namely taxation of the assistance, access control of foreign specialists to WMD destruction facilities, holding tenders for the right of performing WMD destruction-related work, and nuclear liability related issues, including the issue of ratifying the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage. Taxation Several ofthe cooperative programs have an economic-aid component, wherein the U.S.
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From page 29... ...
However, if the contractors do not receive tax exemptions, they may not even be able to cover their own costs. The Russian background paper suggested that grants from ISTC, the Civilian Research and Development Foundation (CRDF)
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From page 30... ...
The Russian background paper stated that Russia is willing to implement a liability exemption, but only within the standards of international law and the framework of the ~ 963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (signed by Russia in ~ 996 and yet to be ratii fed by the Russian State Duma) , or the Protocol to the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in the Russian Federation (MNEPR)
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From page 31... ...
The Russian background paper observed that while much U.S.-Russian cooperation on nuclear nonproliferation can be accomplished with existing technologies or with modest levels of research and development, technical factors can be impediments to more scientifically ambitious projects. They noted that experience has justified the practice of conducting thorough, joint examinations of the relevance and achievability of scientific and technical objectives at early stages of cooperative programs.
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From page 32... ...
Travel Authorizations and Other Bureaucratic Obstacles Bureaucratic issues are interwoven throughout the problems with entry visas, but completely apart from the need for visas, participants in cooperative programs often must obtain permission from several agencies within their own government to travel internationally. As a recent report says, "In the case of an expert from a Department of Energy laboratory, a typical trip requires laboratory approval, DOE headquarters approval, State Department approval, a Russian vise, and Russian permission to visit a closed area (which typically requires at least 45 days advance notice)
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From page 33... ...
This may well include a frank belief that the blocking action serves the national security interests of the United States, or even that the action will ultimately strengthen the program by making it possible to introduce improvements. In other cases, however, members of Congress may oppose nuclear nonproliferation cooperation with the Russian Federation on the grounds that the Russian government, by virtue of being the government of the former Soviet Union, is inherently untrustworthy.
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From page 34... ...
With regard to U.S. funding of cooperative nuclear nonproliferation programs in Russia, the Russian background paper suggested that additional transparency in financial records would be helpful.
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From page 35... ...
Operating under ISTC status prohibits transfer of controlled goods and technologies because they can contribute to nuclear proliferation. At the same time, projects related to development of advanced nuclear energy facilities, which employ dual-purpose technologies, are a natural alternative focus for scientists who previously worked on nuclear weapons.
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From page 36... ...
in the background! papers, a number of approaches to overcoming impediments to cooperation-both general and specific-were suggested: Establishing and institutionalizing mechanisms for interaction at all levels of cooperation l(lentifying and seizing new opportunities for international cooperation, such as on developing proliferation-resistant nuclear energy technologies Facilitating changes in national law, policy, or procedures Creating mechanisms for communicating and disseminating the benefits of experience among program participants Prioritizing mechanisms In the following section, we describe these approaches, provide examples of each, and consider how they might be applied in future.
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