Overcoming Impediments to U.S.-Russian Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation Report of a Joint Workshop (2004) / Chapter Skim
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Appendix D: Russian Background Paper
Appendix D: Russian Background Paper
Pages 59-106
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Export Control 68 2.4. International Nuclear Safety Program 70 2.5.
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Having been signed to clate by ~ 87 countries, the NET became virtually a universal clocument, · The nuclear safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (lAEA) , · The nuclear export control system: the Zangger Committee (created in 1971)
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and Russia on nuclear nonproliferation coincide. The U.S., as well as Russia, possess by far the largest arsenals of nuclear weapons and fully realize the huge potential hazards of nuclear proliferation, fraught with making it more difficult to control the process by international agencies, and with higher chances for countries with totalitarian and unpredictable political systems to acquire "nuclear" status.
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However, nuclear weapons by their very nature have huge destructive power and the many other deadly effects inherent in weapons of mass destruction. In case of uncontrolled nuclear proliferation there is a potential threat to the established system of maintaining international stability.
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To ensure long-term sustainable development of the world community, nuclear power in the future will have to resolve the problem related to the risk of indirect nuclear proliferation (i.e., due to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes) by the development and large-scale deployment of advanced and innovative nuclear energy technologies capable of ensuring proliferation resistance by an optimum combination of predominantly intrinsic features (technologies and materials)
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Senators Nunn and Lugar; for this reason the Agreement is often called the Nunn-Lugar program. As an extension of the intergovernmental umbrella Agreement, about twenty executive agreements have been signed covering a wide range of bilateral interactions, such as elimination of strategic offensive arms, safety improvements of nuclear weapons transportation and storage, disposal of chemical weapons stocks, improvement of the nuclear material protection, control and accounting system, construction of a storage facility for surplus weapons-grade fissionable materials, and shutdown of weapons-grade plutonium production reactors.
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The weapons elimination process caused the need to solve tasks related to safe and secure storage of nuclear materials, disposition of surplus fissionable materials, and restructuring and conversion of the Russian nuclear weapons industries. Under conditions of a terrorism threat, both sides have agreed to initiate work aimed at ensuring physical protection of all types of radiation sources.
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. In its turn, Russia received about $3.7 billion of revenues to be spent to upgrade the safety level of the nuclear power industry, "convert nuclear cities", and conduct research and development work on advanced nuclear reactors and fuel cycles.
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Under the U.S. Government financial support within the program framework a radioactive waste treatment complex was designed and commissioned in October 2000, and a land-based facility for interim storage of SNF unloaded from the decommissioned nuclear submarines was put into operation at the end of 2002.
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2.3. Export Control ~1 Agreement on Cooperation in the Elimination of Strategic Offensive Arms (SOAK Agreement)
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Minatom enterprises as well as from other ministries involved in inter-company export control programs at their enterprises attended the industry-wide training courses. In addition, about 450 scientists, engineers and chief executives responsible for export contracts and International Scientific & Technical Center (ISTC)
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Such an approach makes it possible to avoid potential bureaucratic impediments to the practical implementation of the cooperation challenges. It is believed that the issues of both export control and nuclear nonproliferation will remain one of most important lines in the U.S.-Russian collaboration in the near future.
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The INSP program in Russia, as well as many other cooperative programs, was coordinated by the Joint Coordinating Committee (ICC INSP) comprising managers of the U.S.
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2.7. Transparent Dismantlement of Nuclear Warheads During preparation for a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START ITI)
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Minatom enterprises and upgrade the available ones, Develop MPC&A related standards and regulations, Develop a federal information system for nuclear material control and accounting, Upgrade instrumentation and methodological support of nuclear material control and accounting, Improve radio communication for ensuring physical protection of facilities with dangerous nuclear material, Improve safety when shipping nuclear materials, Institute departmental security training centers, Equip R.F. Minatom enterprise security units, Establish departmental supervision at R.F.
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MOD facilities with up-to-date physical protection systems the following equipment has been supplied: over ~ 20 units of perimeter protection systems, 400 sets of computer equipment, devices to detect alcohol and drugs in human bodies, and a training complex for the maintenance personnel. Storage facilities for non-irradiated cores of nuclear submarine reactors equipped with up-to-date MPC&A systems were built for the Arctic and Pacific Navy; storage facilities for both nonirradiated and spent nuclear fuel were equipped with similar systems.
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Later on this decision was suspended but only for a limited time. Quite a similar politically motivated situation is arising regarding the new U.S.-Russian Agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
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Despite some restrictions (e.g., a special request notification deadline of 45 days preceding any visit to a Russian cIassiiled site) , within the U.S.-Russian cooperative programs such access is granted on the basis of yearly-approved lists of the U.S.
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The lack of internationally accepted, explicit, and comprehensive requirements for the nonnuclear counties developing peaceful uses of nuclear energy or having plans for their development provides a possibility for the nuclear countries to put forward claims, not always justified, and double (or even triple) standards.
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~ .5. International nuclear nonproliferation requirements for commercial use of nuclear technologies developed by the nuclear countries in the non-nuclear countries, as well as when nuclear states conduct joint studies at facilities sensitive to their national security, could constitute a conceptual foundation for institutionalization of nuclear nonproliferation at a national level.
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territory during the execution of cooperative programs. The issue is most fully addressed in the 1992 CTR Agreement, according to which ".
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, a number of problems still persist and need further solution: · Lack of a clear mechanism of the law's execution in the form of special clauses in the Russian Tax Code. More specifically, Part 2 of the Russian Tax Code, which came into effect in 2000, has no cIarii ication on the tax exemption mechanism regarding the participants in programs of scientific and technical assistance (including the U.S.-Russian cooperative programs)
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. More active involvement of regional authorities in the implementation of the U.S.-Russian cooperative programs on nuclear nonproliferation could be a possible solution of this problem.
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At present the results of considerations of the above documents by the Russian State Duma are difficult to predict because the main provisions of the CTR Agreement Article concerning the civil liability contradict not only the Russian legislation, but also the international legal practices in this area.
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In recent years these issues have been examined very closely by the Russian State Duma as well as by many governmental and non-governmental entities. More than once representatives of the donor-countries have placed the issues of "liability for potential nuclear damage" in the forefront and have referred to the ~ 963 Vienna Convention as one of the fundamental documents in this area, whose ratification by Russia is essential to the implementation of cooperative programs, including those in the nuclear nonproliferation area.
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3.3.2. The lack of a U.S.-Russian agreement on peaceful use of nuclear energy and the presence ofthe so-called "unresolved intergovernmental political issues" hinder the expansion of joint bilateral research and development on advanced nuclear reactors and fuel cycles resistant to nuclear proliferation.
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In June 2003 Phase lA of the Project was completed. During its implementation the requirements, criteria, and methods for assessing innovative nuclear energy systems were developed, which are to be verified and agreed at the international level.
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In its turn, INPRO's strengths include understanding of specific features of national and regional economic development and a possibility for development, on this basis, of effective requirements for innovative nuclear technologies in the member countries. It can also exert influence on the development of nuclear industries in these countries via the {AEA, as an acknowledged international organization a specialized UN Agency possessing well-regulated interaction channels with governments of the member countries and other international institutions.
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The time needed to develop and implement competitive advanced nuclear technologies devoid of the shortcomings inherent in the present-day generation of nuclear energy technologies and capable of ensuring the sustainable long-term development of the society is comparable to the period of depletion of organic fuels. Russia has an important scientific and technical potential and has managed to preserve experienced teams of scientists ~ .
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· Case studies should be arranged to apply different proliferation resistance assessment methodologies to specie ic nuclear energy systems. · Specialists of different countries need to work together in order to elaborate nuclear proliferation resistance assessment criteria (matrices)
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and Russian programs on surplus weapons-grade plutonium disposition, and also to initiate a new area of scientific and technical cooperation on managing plutonium taken out of defense-oriented nuclear programs. The plutonium disposition standards and regulations and the engineering approaches to inspections and monitoring of weapons-grade plutonium management and disposition have been developed under the Agreement.
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Russian interactions at the Governmental level, as well as at the level of executive bodies established to implement specific agreements, were rather consistent and effective. Because of that, the CTR Program was in many respects productive in terms of the scientific, technical, and economic assistance to Russia in implementing its international obligations to eliminate its strategic offensive arms, especially in ensuring their nuclear safety and physical protection.
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meetings the Commission's decisions were further developed and supported during bilateral meetings at the highest political level. Initially a special nuclear energy subcommittee had been established within the Commission framework and later on, in compliance with the decisions ofthe Commission's 10th Session, major preparatory work was performed on setting up a standing Committee on nuclear energy.
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3.5.3. During joint work on nuclear materials protection, control and accounting with the participation of the Russian Nuclear Center in Snezhinsk (VNITF)
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and Russia, and making the process irreversible. However, in our opinion efforts to close the gap in understanding the root causes and overcoming remaining differences in the mentalities of the sides should be initiated by the managers and participants in the bilateral cooperation programs and be supported by the governments primarily interested in their success.
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~ . Funding of the absolute majority of the U.S.-Russian nuclear nonproliferation programs is not sufficiently transparent.
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At present the U.S. side is preparing an independent technical assistance program on export control.
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However, the ISTC's status prohibits the transfer of such controlled goods and technologies because the latter, due to their specific properties, can potentially be used to fabricate weapons of mass destruction in other words, to contribute to nuclear proliferation. At the same time it is obvious, that the implementation of projects related to the development of advanced nuclear energy facilities having nothing to do with nuclear weapons programs and contributing to nuclear nonproliferation would allow the redirection of many nuclear scientists from military subjects.
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To this end, extended economic, scientific, and engineering cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy by the U.S. and Russia with third countries, provided the requirements of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime are unconditionally met, is believed to be especially beneficial and effective.
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on development of advanced and innovative nuclear energy technologies to meet the international requirements of the future, including the resistance to nuclear proliferation, prove the importance that both countries attach to this long-term issue. On the other hand, having two international projects with similar goals and less than sufficient coordination between them on the strategic and tactical level may be fraught with unjustifiable duplication of work and inadequate use of available resources, and lead eventually to degraded competitiveness of nuclear energy in the world energy markets of the future.
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The grants from the ISTC, CRDF, and other similar organizations and funds to a large extent solve the problem of tax exemption. However, the requirements for export control for the procurement of dual-purpose goods and technologies within such projects, the complexity and duration of the formal project review-and-approval processes, as well as established caps on project costs, substantially lessen the efficiency of attaining project goals.
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Bi- and multilateral scientific conferences and workshops on nuclear nonproliferation should be conducted on a systematic and regular basis. The goal of educating, training and promoting a new generation of specialists and managers goes far beyond the scope of the current project and requires long-term, large-scale and concerted efforts of the governments, political, scientific, and cultural institutions of both countries.
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Alternate RAS member, Director, Nuclear Safety Institute (IBRAE RAS) Scientific Director, VNIITF First Deputy Director, VNIITF Deputy head, Department for Science and Technology, Minatom Deputy head, Department of Export Control, Ministry for Economic Development and Trade Counselor, Department of Safety and Disarmament, Foreign Office Head, Division of Cooperation with the U.S., Canada and Latin America, Department of International and External Economic Relations (DMVS)
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C High-visibility U.S.-Russian technical cooperation on nuclear energy and other topics: Could become a mechanism for building confidence in the relationship.
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(example: export controls on dual-use technology)
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But such programs are only successful in situations where the paths toward accomplishing program goals and making a profit are indistinguishable. It is unrealistic to expect this to be true in most of the cooperative threat reduction work that remains to be done.
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It is important that advocates of cooperation lend young, knowledgeable leaders, researchers, and managers in the FSU to assume the mantle of cooperative threat reduction from the aging current leadership; pay, benefits, training all are lacking, providing an incentive to take expertise out of the military and nuclear sectors and into private business.
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ISTC International Scientific & Technical Center LANE Los-Alamos National Laboratory LEU Low-Enriched Uranium LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory MNEPR Multilateral Nuclear Environment Program in the Russian Federation MPC&A Nuclear Materials Protection Control and Accounting NPP Nuclear Power Plant NPT Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons NW Nuclear Weapons PPRA U.S.-Russian Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement R&D Research & Development R.F. Minatom Ministry for Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation R.F.
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