Seeking Security Pathogens, Open Access, and Genome Databases (2004) / Chapter Skim
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4 Conclusions and Recommendations
4 Conclusions and Recommendations
Pages 52-64
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From page 52... ...
Recommendation 1: Policies with regard to release of genome data on microbial pathogens should not change. Rapid, unrestricted public access to primary genome sequence data, annotations of genome data, genome databases, and Internet-based tools for genome analysis should be encouraged.
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From page 53... ...
Open access allows life scientists everywhere to evaluate, interpret, adapt, and extend results from many fields of inquiry for use in their own work and thereby accelerates research and speeds the delivery of life-saving benefits that biological and medical research are so rapidly creating. Science builds on itself, and the sharing of methods and data allows scientists to learn from the work of others and to make unexpected connections.
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From page 54... ...
Some sequence data have been classified, such as the sequences of certain PCR primers designed to be used in environmental sensors; this was done to reduce the likelihood that pathogens would be altered to make the primers useless. Mechanisms now in place to cope with sequence data obtained during criminal investigations or for specific intelligence or national-security reasons should not be used to limit scientific research but may be necessary to cope with unusual situations in the future.
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From page 55... ...
It seems unlikely that a uniform agreement could be generated between all public and private database managers and others who generate genome data, which would be necessary to track those with access to genome sequences. In addition, scientists are wary of efforts to track their use of genome data, especially in the competitive field of biological research.
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From page 56... ...
Pathogen genome sequences are not uniquely dangerous, because sequence data from non-pathogenic organisms could also be used to enhance a pathogen's virulence or create a new pathogen. For example, sequence data from a close relative of a pathogen, such as Bacillus cereus, could be useful to a potential terrorist.
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From page 57... ...
Recommendation 2: Genomics and genome sequence data should be exploited fully to improve our ability to defend against infectious agents of all types, including those which contribute to epidemic diseases and infant mortality and the naturally occurring or geneti cally enhanced organisms that could be used in a bioterrorist attack. Maximizing the benefit from research on infectious diseases is important for both public-health and national-security reasons.
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From page 58... ...
The newly formed National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity or another appropriate entity with the ability to connect with diverse federal agencies would be a suit able home for that function. The pace of scientific progress creates a need for continuous and thorough evaluation of science and technology as they affect national security 1For more information about biodefense and agriculture, see the 2003 National Research Council report Countering Agricultural Bioterrorism.
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From page 59... ...
The perspective of those involved in basic research related to humans, plants, animals, and microorganisms is essential for staying on top of new developments that may affect biosecurity. Continuing review of new technology could include the use of functional genomics as it pertains to understanding microbial virulence; host susceptibility and resistance to infectious diseases of plants, domestic animals, and humans; and relevant aspects of the development of new drugs, vaccines, and anti-infective therapies.
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From page 60... ...
Coordination of efforts in all arenas, including the international community and those involved in threat response, would provide a means of assessing the significance of advances in genome research in terms of both increased threats to security and improvements in understanding of the environment and human health and disease. As an additional benefit, providing a network for information exchange would help to further research in disease diagnosis and epidemiologic surveillance on a national and global basis and facilitate communication of information required for the unambiguous identification and attribution of pathogens in forensics.
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From page 61... ...
The NSABB will have up to 25 voting members, to be appointed by the DHHS Secretary in consultation with the heads of relevant federal departments and agencies. Members will be experts in a broad range of fields, including molecular biology, microbiology, infectious diseases, laboratory biosafety and biosecurity, public health/epidemiology, health physics, pharmaceutical production, veterinary medicine, plant health, food production, bioethics, national security, biodefense, intelligence, law and law enforcement, and scientific publishing.
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From page 62... ...
Recommendation 4: The committee endorses Recommendation 7 of Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism, which calls for an international forum to unify the discussion on the effect of genomics on biosecurity. Life-science research is global, and no single nation can successfully implement policy concerning access to and release of life-science data and results without reference to the rest of the international community.
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From page 63... ...
create an international forum on biosecurity to develop and promote harmonized national, regional, and international measures that will provide a counterpart to the system [recommended] for the United States." If conducted openly and in the proper spirit, the process of discussing these issues might actually build understanding, and some trust, among the nations involved and eventually help to establish an international norm against misuse of genetic information.
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From page 64... ...
Recommendation 5: The committee endorses Recommendation 1 of Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism,which calls for national and international professional societies and related organizations to work to educate scientists about the risk that life-science research results will be misused and about scientists' responsibility to miti gate the risk. Recommendation 1 of Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism calls for national and international professional societies and related organizations and institutions to create programs to educate scientists about the dual-use dilemma in biotechnology and their responsibilities to mitigate its risks.
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